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I. INTRODUCTION'
"Taxes," as Justice Holmes informed us long ago, "are what we pay for civilized.society."l
It may surprise many that this price is extracted even from individuals in bankruptcy. Although the
right to discharge in bankruptcy ensures an "honest but unfortunate debtor" a fresh start to begin
anew his·or her economic life, that right is tempered by the federal government's legitimate interest
in protecting the public fisc by collecting taxes. The balance struck by the Bankruptcy Code2 and
Internal Revenue Code3 between the competing interests of an individual debtor and the federal
government insulates specific tax claims from the bankruptcy discharge. Under this compromise,
only enumerated tax claims will· survive a bankruptcy discharge in a chapter 11 case. 4
Recognizing that nondischargeable.tax liabilities are inconsistent with the fresh start policy,
Congress further attempted to alleviate ·some harshness through enactment of the Bankruptcy Tax
Act of 1980 (BTA).5 Among other things, the BTA creates a separate taxable entity where an
individual files for relief under either chapter 7 or 11 of the· Bankruptcy Code6 and enables an
individual chapter 7 or 11 debtor to elect to shorten and end the taxable year, thus shifting at least
part of the current year taxes to the estate as aBC §507(a)(8) priority claim. 7 Nevertheless, certain
tax claims designated as nondischargeable under BC § 523(a)(I) (such as claims for taxes incurred

ICompania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 100
(1927)(dissenting opinion).
2 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. In these materials, the Bankruptcy Code is referred to as "BC."
3Title 26, United States Code. In these materials, the Internal Revenue Code is referred to' as "IRC."
4 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(I)(identifying those tax claims that are nondischargeable by an individual debtor in a
chapter 7 or 11 case).
5pub . L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389 (1980)(codified at several sections of the IRC).
6See IRC § 1398. No separate entity for tax purposes is created where a partnership or corporation files for
bankruptcl relief. IRC § 1399.
See IRC § 1398(d)(2).
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within three years of the bankruptcy petition date) survive the discharge and, thus, significantly
affect a debtor's fresh start.
The outline begins with a discussion of the separate entity rules under the Internal Revenue
Code. Section 1398 creates much of the confusion; therefore, a thorough understanding of that
section is necessary to understand better what is at stake in the abandonment context.. The .outline
then moves on to the issue of abandonment in an individual chapter 7 or 11, discussing both
arguments for and against abandonment as a taxable event. Finally, the outline explores the issues
of the priority and dischargeability of tax claims, carefully distinguishing between the tax relief a
debtor could expect in a chapter 7 or 11 case as opposed to a chapter 13 case. .At the end of the
outline is a brief discussion of tax changes that are contained in the new Bankruptcy Act of 2005.
Of particular note is that the chapter 13 super discharge will no longer work to discharge certain tax
claims beyond the discharge one would expect in a chapter 7 case as in the past. Rather, once the
2005 Act goes into effect, the chapter 13 discharge will mirror the chapter 7 discharge for tax
purposes.

II. SECTION 1398: THE SEPARATE ENTITY RULES
One of the most important provisions of the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 (BTA) is Internal
Revenue Code (IRC) § 1398. Essentially, § 1398 creates a separate entity for purposes of federal
income taxes in cases where an individual debtor files for relief under chapter 7 or chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. Following is a list of common questions and answers regarding the scope,
purpose, and effect of § 1398.
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A.

WHEN DOES § 1398 ApPLY?

Section 1398 applies only when an individual debtor files for relief under chapter 7 or
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.

T~us,

only the bankruptcy estate of an individual debtor in

cases under chapter 7 or 11 is treated as a separate taxable entity. A separate taxable entity is not
created in chapters 12 or 13 or in any case where the debtor is not an individual. 8

B.

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF § 1398?

Section 1398 furthers the fresh start policy embodied in the Bankruptcy Code.

The

Committee Reports recognize that the purpose of bankruptcy is to provide for a debtor's ability to
begin his or her economic life anew. 9 Congress recognized that any expenses incurred by the estate
should not burden a debtor's fresh start. Consistent with this purpose is the fact that the income and
losses of a separate taxable entity are computed separately from the individual debtor. Moreover,
,any estate tax liability is generally confined to the estate and its assets. Furthermore, by making the
short-year election, a debtor may be able to shift at least part of his or her tax liability to the estate as
a Bankruptcy Code (BC) § 507(a)(8) priority claim. 1o

8

IRC §§ 1398(a), (b), and 1399.

A Comment on the
Tax Provisions of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission Report: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly, 5
Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 445-462 (1997)(symposium); Jack F. Williams, National Bankruptcy Review Commission
Recommendations on Tax Policy: Individual Debtors, Discharge, and Priority ofelaims, 14 Bankr. Dev. J. 101171 (1997); Jack F. Williams,The Federal Tax Consequences ofIndividual Debtor Chapter 11 Cases, 46 S.C. L.
Rev. 1203-1244 (1995)(symposium), reprinted in 47 Digest of Tax Articles 23-43 (1996); Jack F. Williams,
Rethinking Bankruptcy and Tax Policy, 3 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 153-206 (1995)(symposium); see also Robert
W. Van Amburgh, Tax Considerations For An Individual Debtor Contemplating Bankruptcy, Annals Bankr. L.
93, 121-28.
IOSee IRC § 1398(d); see also 1A Collier on Bankruptcy & 9.05 (15th ed. L. King ed.).
9S. Rep. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sessa 24-25 (1980); see generally Jack F. Williams,
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c.

How IS THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE TAXED PURSUANT TO

§ 1398?

Consistent with its separate entity status, an estate computes its own taxable income in the
same manner as an individual. 11 The estate is taxed at the same rate as a married individual filing
separately.12 The chapter 7 or 11 trustee is required to file any returns required by law and to pay
any taxes due. The trustee must file a return for each taxable year that the estate's gross income
exceeds the standard deduction and the exemption amount. 13

D.
MUST A TRUSTEE FILE A FEDERAL TAX RETURN WHERE THE ESTATE HAS
GENERATED NO INCOME?

Possibly. The estate may be liable for taxes generated by cancellation of indebtedness
income or by sale and exchange (i.e., a foreclosure on property that is property of the estate).

E.

How IS THE GROSS INCOME OF A BANKRUPTCY ESTATE DETERMINED?

The bankruptcy estate's gross income includes the gross income of the debtor to which the
estate is entitled under §§ 54I(a)(I) through (a)(7). Property of the estate includes all ofthe debtor's
legal or equitable interest in property wherever located.

Section 1398 does not permit double

counting of income or losses by both the estate and the debtor. Thus, § I398(e)(2) provides that a
debtor's gross income for any taxable year does not include any item to the extent it is included in
the estate's gross income. 14

ll IRC § 1398(c)(I).

12IRC §§ 1398(c)(2) and (c)(3).
13 See Van Amburgh, supra note 9, at 122.
14See generally lA Collier on Bankruptcy at ~ 9.04[3].
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F.

How IS INCOME TREATED WHERE THE INCOME WAS EARNED PREPETITION, BUT THE

INCOME WAS RECEIVED POSTPETITION?

Section 1398(e)(1) provides that gross income of the estate does not include ,any amount
received or accrued by the debtor before the commencement of the case.

Thus, § 1398 was

intended to override the assignment-of-income principles under tax law. An example may clarify
the effect. Assume that a cash-basis individual who draws a weekly salary nonexempt under
applicable state law earns one payment prior to the commencement of his or her chapter 7 case, but
it is received by the estate after commencement. In that case, the estate and not the debtor would
report the income. I5

G.

How

IS CANCELLATION OF INDEBTEDNESS INCOME TREATED UNDER THE SEPARATE
ENTITY RULES?

Whether the debtor or the estate reports cancellation of indebtedness income will depend on
when the taxable event occurs. If the taxable event, ~, complete or partial discharge, modification
of principal amount, etc, occurs before the commencement of the case, generally the debtor should
recognize the income under § 61(a) unless it can be excluded under § 108(a). (There is a means by
which to shift at least some of the tax consequences from the debtor to the estate through a § 1398
short-year election by the debtor). If the taxable event occurs after commencement of the case, then
the estate should recognize the income under § 61(a) unless it can be excluded under § 108(a).

H.

How ARE DEDUCTIONS TREATED UNDER THE SEPARATE ENTITY RULES?
Section 1398(e)(3) provides that the determination whether any amount paid or incurred by

the estate is allowable as a deduction shall be made as if paid by the debtor and the debtor was still
engaged in the trade or business that the debtor was engaged in before the commencement of the

I5 See Van Amburgh, supra note 9, at 123 (provides examples of cash-basis and accrual-basis debtors).

A-5

case.

It would appear that the same accounting method used for income should be used for

deductions. Additionally, § 1398(e)(3) permits the estate to characterize some of its expenditures as
trade or business expenses which can be used to offset current income of the estate. Furthermore,
administrative expenses and any fees under chapter 123, Title 28,United States Code, are
deductible by the estate to the extent not disallowed under another IRC section. 16

If the

administrative expenses cannot be used in the current year then they may be carried back three years
and carried forward seven years. 17

I.
ARE TRANSFERS OF ASSETS BETWEEN THE DEBTOR AND THE ESTATE TAXABLE
EVENTS?
No. Transfers of assets from the debtor to the estate upon commencement of the case and from the
estate to the debtor upon termination of the estate are not taxable events. 18

J.

DOES THE ESTATE SUCCEED TO THE DEBTOR'S TAX ATTRIBUTES?

Yes.

The estate succeeds to certain enumerated tax attributes of the debtor upon

commencement of the case. 19

Presently, these tax attributes include net-operating loss

carryovers as determined under IRC § 172; excess charitable contribution carryovers as
determined under IRC § 170(d)(l); the recovery of tax benefit items under IRC § 111; certain
credit carryovers; capital loss carryovers determined under IRe § 1212; the basis, holding
period, and character of property; the debtor's method of accounting; and other tax attributes of
the debtor, to the extent provided in regulations carrying out the purposes of § 1398.20

The

§ 1398(h)(2).
§ 398(h)(2)(C).
18 IRC § 1398(f).
19 See IRC § 1398(g).
nd
20 See C. Richard McQueen and Jack F. Williams, Tax Aspects of Bankruptcy Law and Practice (2 ed.
16IRC

17IRC
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Service has issued regulations adding passive activity losses and credits to the list.21 Upon
termination ofthe estate, any unused attributes are transferred back to the debtor. 22

K.

WHAT IS A "SHORT-YEAR" ELECTION?

How IS THE ELECTION MADE?

Section 1398(d)(2) creates an election that a debtor may make to split his or hertaxable year
into two taxable years. Thjs election is an important pre-bankruptcy planning tool that cannot
be overlooked. The first taxable year-ends on the day before the day the bankruptcy case was
commenced. 23

The second taxable year begins on the commencement date.

Assume an

individual debtor files for relief under chapter 7 on March 8 and shortly thereafter makes the
IRC § 1398(d) election. As a consequence of the election, the debtor has two tax years. The
first year spans from January 1 through March 7; the second year spans from March 8 through
December 31. If the election is not made the debtor would have one taxable year spanning from
January 1 through December 31. In other words, absent the election, the commencement of the
case will not interrupt the debtor's taxable year. 24 The short-year election is considered made if
the complete tax return for the short period is timely filed. 25 In our working example, the return
for the short period ending March 7 should be filed by July 15.

The debtor should

conspicuously write "SECTION 1398 ELECTION" at the top ofthe return. 26

2002)(hel~rul explanation

of the listed attributes).
See Treas. Regs. §§ 1.1398-1 and 1.1398-2.
221RC § 1398(1).

23 A

bankruptcy case is commenced upon the filing of the petition under BC §§ 301, 302, 303, and 304.
IRC § 1398(d)(I). The debtor cannot make the short-yea~ election if he or she has no assets other
than exemEt property. IRC § 1398(d)(2)(C).
See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 7a.2(d) (1981); Treas. Reg. § 1.6081-1(b)(2).
26 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 7a.2(d) (1981). For an excellent discussion on requesting extensions to file the
short-year return, see lA Collier on Bankruptcy at & 9.05[b]. See generally James I. Shepard, The Trustee's
Bankruptcy Tax Manual 157-58 (1999).
24 See
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L.

WHEN MUST THE SHORT-YEAR ELECTION BE MADE BY A DEBTOR?

The short-year election must be made by the debtor on or before the date for filing his or her
return for the short-taxable year. 27 IRC § 6072 requires that returns be made on or before the
fifteenth day of the fourth month following the close of a fiscal year. A Treasury Regulation
places a gloss on § 6072 in this context by requiring that the short-term return be filed on or
before the fifteenth day of the fourth full month following the close of the taxable year?8
Again, the election must be made on the return. Once made, the election is irrevocable.29

M.

WHAT Is THE EFFECT OF MAKING THE·SUORT-YEAR ELECTION?

The short-year election may be the most potent pre-bankruptcy planning tool because of its
wide availability to individual debtors. The most significant effect of the election is that any tax
liability for the first short-year becomes an allowed BC § 507(a)(8) priority claim against the
estate. Thus, the debtor may essentially force his or her unsecured creditors to pay all or a
portion of the first short-year tax claim. Of course, if there are insufficient assets to pay the
short-year tax claims in full, they do survive the bankruptcy as a non-dischargeable claim under
BC § 523(a)(1). If the debtor fails to make the election, then any tax liability for the complete
year is not

an allowable claim against the estate.30

Moreover, if a debtor makes the election,

then a debtor's tax attributes as of the end of the first taxable year are transferred to the estate to
be used by the estate to shelter income. If the election is not made, a debtor's tax attributes as of
the end of the full taxable year carryover.

§ 1398(d)(2)(D).
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 7a. 2(d).
29IRC § 1398(d)(2)(D).
30
See S. Rep. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1980).
27 IRC
28
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N.
WHEN IS IT ADVISABLE FOR A DEBTOR TO MAKE THE SHORT-YEAR ELECTION?
WHEN IS IT NOT?

There is no easy answer to the questions posed. Whether a debtor should make the IRC §
1398 election depends on the particular facts and circumstances at hand. As a general rule it
appears that in most cases the election should be made. 31 By making the election, a debtor is able to
shift at least some of the tax liability to the estate as an allowable BC § 507(a)(8) priority claim.
However, if the claim is not satisfied it will be nondischargeable and survive the bankruptcy. There
may be circumstances present to dissuade a debtor from making the election when substantial net
operati~g

losses are involved. Although that discussion is beyond the scope of this article, a rule of

thumb provided by VanAmburgh may be useful:
If the debtor will benefit more from (I) the use of a net operating loss carried forward from
the first short year (if he makes the election) to directly or indirectly reduce nondischargeable tax
liabilities than from (ii) the use of the net operating loss against projected income of the debtor after
the filing of the petition, then the election should be made. Otherwise the election should not be
made. 32
Nondischargeable taxes are the antithesis of an individual's fresh start. Yet, the drafters of
the Bankruptcy Code struck the synthesis in favor of the taxing authorities at least as to those tax
claims identified in § 523(a)(I). Nevertheless, all is not lost for an individual debtor and his or her
. bankruptcy counsel in reducing possible tax consequences in contemplation of a bankruptcy filing.
Although experience has shown that an individual debtor should most often make the short-year
election, there are many instances where the election should not be made. Counsel must be aware
of when a debtor should make the election and when a debtor should not. Often times, there are no

31

Van Amburgh, supra note 9, at 144; see also Shepard, supra note 26, at 150-57.
32Van Amburgh, supra note 9, at 145; see also lA Collier on Bankruptcy at & 9.05[3]; Shepard, supra note
26, at 150-157.
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easy rules, no easy answers. Nevertheless, § 1398 with all its nuances and ramifications cannot be
ignored before and during bankruptcy.

Example 1:

THE MALPRACTICE TRAP

Example 1-1:
A partnership applies for relief under chapter 7. May the partnership make a § 1398 election?
No. Only individual debtors may benefitfrom IRC § 1398. See IRC § 1399.

Example 1-2:
Elrod, a partner in the partnership identified above, seeks relief under chapter 13. May Elrod
benefit from the § 1398 election.
No. An individual debtor mustfile for reliefunder chapter 7 or 11 only to benefitfrom § 1398.

Example 1-3:
Assume Debtor is a cash basis taxpayer with a calendar year tax year (January 1 - December 31).
Debtor filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy relief on August 1,20XX. In the seven months before the
commencement ofa bankruptcy case, Debtor had income giving rise to a tax of $25,000.
IfDebtorfails to make the election, there is no interruption in her tax year. The tax would be due at
the end of her tax year (31 December) and payable by the fifteenth day of the fourth month
following the close ofher tax year (15 April). The tax claim would not participate in the chapter 7
distribution in that it is a postpetition claim. However, it would not be discharged in the chapter 7
case. Ifthe Debtor makes the election, she will have two tax years. The first short year runs from 1
January to 31 July. The second runs from August 1 to December 31. Now, the postpetition claim
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magically becomes a prepetition one due as ofthe end ofthe new short tax year. This is also a §
507(a)(8) priority claim that is nonetheless not subject to discharge as delineated in§ 523 (a).
Practice pointer: Make the election.

Example 1-4:
Same facts as above. However, in the previous tax years, Debtor had generated net operating losses
(NOLs) that can be carried forward or back to other tax years. An NOL is a surplus deduction that
tax law allows you to apply to other tax years.

IfDebtor does not make the election,

then these tax attributes will pass to the bankruptcy estate and

can be used by the trustee to reduce the estate's tax liability. Any unused losses would then pass
back to Debtor upon termination ofthe case.

If Debtor makes the election,

then she is entitled to

use them herself. Practice pointer: Make the election.

Example 1-5:
Same facts as abo.ve except that the NOLs arose in the seven months preceding the commencement
of the case. Further assume that she had· no income in the first seven months of the tax year and
expects substantial income in the last five months of the year.

Without the election, Debtor will be able to use the deductions against postpetition i'!come. With
the election, the bankruptcy trustee gets to use the losses and Debtor's income cannot be offset by
the deductions. Practice pointer: Do not make the election.

A-II

III. ABANDONMENT
The issue of the tax consequences of abandonment is limited· to individual bankruptcies
under chapter 7 or chapter 11 because IRC § 1398 creates a separate entity for tax purposes only in
those types of cases -- the bankruptcy estate. 33 The engine that drives the controversy surrounding
the tax consequences of abandonment is a debtor's desire to avoid the deferred taxes on
overencumbered property with a low basis. Ideally, a debtor

se~ks

to capture the consequences of

foreclosure in the estate so that pursuant to IRe § 1398, the tax is a liability of the estate and not the
debtor. In other words, a debtor hopes to force its priority claimants and unsecured creditors·to pay
the tax while walking away from any personal liability for any deficiency.
Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Internal Revenue Code considers the federal tax
implications of property abandoned by the estate before the close of the case. 34 The conflicting
interests at stake, however, may be understood easily· with an example. Assume that an individual
debtor owns an office building subject to nonrecourse indebtedness of $1 million. The fair market
value of the property is $500,000. The adjusted basis in the property has been reduced over time.to
$250,000. The debtor has incurred net-operating losses and carryovers of $250,000 related to the

business property. If the lender forecloses on the property in full satisfaction of the debt, the
foreclosure is a taxable event giving rise to a gain or loss.35 Here, the amount realized is a gain of

33See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8928012 (Apr. 7, 1989)(separate entity rules do not apply to chapter 12 estates).
34Authorities often refer to this as "midstream" abandonment. Nonetheless, 11 U.S.C. § 346(g)(I)(B) does
provide that for state and local tax purposes, a midstream abandonment is not a taxable event.
35 Crane v. Comm 'n, 331 U.S. 1 (1946). Because the debt is nonrecourse, no cancellation of indebtedness
income will arise when property is used to satisfy the debt in full. See Comm'n v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983). Tufts
treats the nonrecourse debtor as having sold the underlying collateral for the amount of the debt.
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$750,000, the difference between the amount of nonrecourse debt and the adjusted basis.3
this gain represents nothing more than phantom income.

6

Often,

37

If the foreclosure occurs while the property is· property of the estate, then the estate must
recognize the gain and pay the tax. In fact, the tax claim is a BC §§503(b)(I)(B) and 507(a)(I)
priority claim, which is paid in full ahead of all other claims (such as employee wages, pension plan
claims, and tort claimants) except secured claims and other administration expense claims (the latter
sharing pro rata with the tax claim.)38 If there are insufficient assets in the estate to pay the tax, then
the tax goes unpaid; the debtor is not liable for any deficiency. If the property is abandoned by the
trustee before foreclosure, then the debtor must recognize the gain and pay the tax even. though the
tax attributes associated with the property remain with the estate to shelter estate tax liability. The
opportunity to jettison burdensome or inconsequential property in these circumstances helps the
trustee in his or her efforts to maximize the recovery of the unsecured creditors but at the expense of
the debtor. Courts that have addressed the issue have fallen into two camps. ·The majority camp
largely follows the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in In re Olson,39 which concludes that no federal
tax consequences attach to .abandonment of property by the trustee in bankruptcy. The other camp
follows the reasoning ·of Bankruptcy Judge Queenan in In re Lane,40 that suggests that bankruptcy
abandonment underBC §. 554 is a taxable event which must be shouldered by the bankruptcy estate.

36See Comm 'n v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983)(the one-step analysis is used for nonrecourse debt satisfied by
property; the fair market value of the property is irrelevant to the calculation of the amount realized).
37 See Marc E. Grossberg, Tax Consequences of Abandonment of An Asset of a Bankrupt Estate, 50TH
N.Y.U. Institute 12-1, 12-2 (1992).
38 See generally Mark Wallace, Is a Midstream Abandonment of Property by a Bankruptcy Trustee Taxable
to the Estate? J. Tax. 26, 26 (July 1992).
39930 F.2d 6 (8th Cir. 1991).
40 133 BR 264 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
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A.

OLSON MODEL

The model of bankruptcy abandonment embraced by most courts and the Service is
explicated by the Eighth Circuit in In re Olson. 41 In Olson, the court held that abandonment was not
a taxable event, rejecting the fresh start argument embraced later by the court in In re A.I. Lane &
CO. 42 After the debtors filed a chapter 7 petition, the chapter 7 trustee abandoned certain property
that was subsequently sold by a secured creditor under state foreclosure proceedings. 43

The

individual debtors hired an accountant to prepare federal and state income tax returns for the
bankruptcy estate. These returns reported a gain realized from the sale of the property as a liability
ofthe bankruptcy estate. The debtors claimed that the estate was nevertheless liable for the tax.
The trustee did not authorize the debtors to prepare and file the tax returns for the estate.
The bankruptcy court in Olson observed that under IRC § 1398(f)(2) a "transfer,,44 includes
the release of an estate's interest in property by abandonment. 45 Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court
stopped short of accepting the debtors§ argument based on an extension of the holding in Yarbro v.
Commissioner, which would equate bankruptcy abandonment with tax or property abandonment. 46
In Yarbro, the taxpayer abandoned property under principles of property and tax law. Pursuant to
those principles, applicable nonbankruptcy law abandonment operates as a sale or exchange and is
effective in relinquishing title in the property.47 The Yarbro court suggested that the finding of an
exchange requires a giving, a receipt, and a nexus between the twO. 48 The bankruptcy court in

41 930 F.2d 6 (8thCir. 1991). The Olson model is based, in part, on the opinions in In re Bentley, 916 F.2d
431 (8th Cir. 1990), and In re McGowan, 95 BR 104 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988).
42 133 BR 264 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
43 The debtors did not object to the proposed abandonment. Olson, 100 BR 458, 460 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1989).
44For the broad defmition of transfer, see 11 U.S.C. § 161 (54).
45 100 BR at 462.
46737 F.2nd 479 (5 th Cir. 1984).
47 737 F.2d at 483-84.
48 Id. at 483-84.
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Olson found that the bankruptcy abandonment did not transfer title, did not relinquish title in the
debtors, and did not result in a "receipt" required for an exchange. 49
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. In holding that no taxable event occurred when the trustee
abandoned the property, the Eighth Circuit said that it could see no reason why abandonment during
the administration of the case should have any different tax consequences than abandonment of
property at the close of the bankruptcy case, which is not a taxable event pursuant to IRC §
1398(f)(2).50

The Service's position is consistent with Olson and its progeny. In a private letter ruling,
the Service stated that abandonment during a bankruptcy case has no tax consequences to the estate
because "termination of the estate" as it appears in IRC § 1398(f)(2) includes termination of the
estate's interest in property because of abandonment or exemption. 51
The Service has issued fmal regulations under IRC § 1398, which provide that a transfer in
an interest in a passive activity loss or credit or an at risk activity loss or credit under IRC § 465 to
the debtor as exempt under BC § 522 or if abandoned under BC § 554 is a nontaxable transfer. 52 In
support ofthe regulations, the Service cited Olson.
There are several persuasiv~. reasons against taxable abandonment. First, abandonment is a
disclaimer of interest by the estate, a release of the trustee's judicial lien; title and/or possession
have remained all along in the debtor. Thus, there "Yas no sale, exchange, or other disposition from
the estate to the debtor.

Second, the termination of the estate's interest in property through

abandonment is congruous to "termination of the estate" in IRC § 1398(f)(2).

To equate

"termination" under IRC § 1398(f)(2) with "closing the case" under BC § 350 is improper.
49Id .

at 462-63.
50This was a point the bankruptcy court also asserted in justifying its holding. 100 BR at 463.
51 See Priv. Let. Rul. 90-17075 (Jan. 31, 1990). The Service reaffrrmed its position in a subsequent letter
ruling. See Priv. Let. Rul. 92-45023.
52
See Regs. 1.1398-1 and 1.1398-2.
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Although closing a case is a form of termination, it does not exhaust all forms of termination. After
all, if Congress sought to equate termination under IRC § 1398(f)(2) with case closings under BC §
350, it could have easily used the term "closing" in IRC § 1398(f)(2) instead of the term
"termination." Congress chose not to even though BC § 350 predates IRC § 1398. Third, requiring
foreclosure of the property while part of the estate results in any tax liability being treated as an
administrative expense claim that will be paid not only before the unsecured creditors, but also
before all priority claims under BC § 507(a)(2) through (a)(7).53 Therefore, the other administrative
expense claims like attorney's fees of the debtor and trustee, the trustee's fees, bankruptcy fees,
other estate taxes, and certain postpetition tort claims, may not be paid in full; they must share W
rata with the current-year tax claim. Moreover, certain employee wage claims, pension fund claims,
and consumer claims may never receive any distribution.· Thus, delaying an inevitable property
foreclosure through a dilatory bankruptcy filing may reward a debtor at the expense of all his or her
creditors. ·This result makes no sense. Fourth, if there are insufficient assets in the estate to pay the
tax liability, it will never be paid. The debtor does not owe the tax. 54 Fifth, it would appear that
because abandonment is treated as a taxable event, the basis of the property might be "stepped up"
to its fair market value on abandonment.55 This may result in a windfall to the debtor especially
where the foreclosure never occurS. 56 Sixth, as constructed, IRC § 1398 provides a mechanism by
which a debtor may shift at least part of any tax liability by allowing the taxable event to occur
53 Accord Shepard, supra note 26, at 88.
54Accord id. See generally In re Barker, 301 B.R. 892 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2003)(bankruptcy court held that
the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code pertaining to the abandonment of estate property was satisfied, and thus
the court ordered the abandonment of the· property even though as a result of such abandonment, and upon the
expected foreclosure, the debtors would be individually liable, as distinguished from the bankruptcy estate, for a
capital gains tax of about $186,000). See also Michelle Arnopol Cecil, Abandonments in Bankruptcy: Unifying
Competing Tax and Bankruptcy Policies, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 723 (2004)(an excellent treatment of the issues of
abandonment combined with a thorough critique of existing competing models; the author offers her own model
built on an extension of the model proposed by the author of this outline).
55 IRC §1398(d)(2).
56Accord id.
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before filing the bankruptcy petition and electing to terminate the taxable year. 57

Thus, the

symmetry ofIRC § 1398 between liability and attributes may be preserved and settlements between
a debtor and creditor before a bankruptcy filing encouraged.

Seventh, abandonment is not

tantamount to foreclosure. Most often, the automatic stay will· prevent the foreclosure at least until
the creditor obtains relief from the stay. Meanwhile, the debtor could attempt to settle the matter in
a manner minimizing the tax consequences. Finally, although important, a debtor's fresh start is not
absolute.

In fact, under the Bankruptcy Code it is a rebuttable presumption. 58

Congress has

subordinated a debtor's fresh startto several tax claims, including taxes arising within three years of
the filing and those arising postpetition. 59

B.

LANE MODEL

The case that supports the proposition that the estate should shoulder the tax consequences
associated with the abandonment and subsequent foreclosure of property is In re A.J. Lane & Co. 60
Lane stands in stark contrast to Olson. In Lane, the court denied the chapter 11 trustee's motion to
abandon property of the estate· essentially because the debtor's tax liability would impair the
debtor's fresh start. There, the trustee sought to abandon two properties and a partnership interest in
a partnership that owned a third property under BC § 554. 61 The debtor objected, arguing that the
substantive grounds in BC § 554 for abandonment were not met and that the abandonment "would
shift foreclosure tax consequences from the bankruptcy estates to the debtor and would destroy
debtor's opportunity for a fresh start.,,62 Clearly, the trustee's sole reason for abandoning the

IRC § 1398(d)(2).
See 11 U.S.C.. 727(a).
59
Accord 11 U.S.C.. 507(a),523(a)(I).
60 133 BR 264 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
61 The motion was amended to exclude two of the properties that were subsequently refinanced.
62Id. at 266.
57 See
58
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property was to avoid the substantial income tax liability upon foreclosure on property that was of
inconsequential value to the estate and burdensome to administer. 63 The facts show that. the estate
would have incurred a tax liability of about $3.27 million on all the properties after using available
loss carryovers. 64 The debtor's tax liability would have been about $13 million. The debtor
probably would not have been able to reduce taxable income by loss carryovers because those tax
attributes were transferred to the estate pursuant to IRe § 1398(g) and would not be transferred back
to the debtor, if at all, until the estate terminated. 65
The Lane court gave three reasons for denying the trustee's motion to· abandon the
property. 66 First, because the facts suggested that foreclosure on the property was imminent, the
Court Holding67 doctrine persuaded the court to view the abandonment as a transfer from the estate
directly to the secured lender with the debtor as a mere conduit. Second, the court held that
abandonment itself is a taxable event, and that to shift the tax consequences to the debtor would
destroy the symmetry ofIRC § 1398 that intends to link a tax liability with its tax attributes. Third,
the court held that to allow a trustee to abandon overencumbered, low-basis property would

63 Id .

generally Craig W. Friedrich, Workouts, 1992 J. Real Estate Tax. 94, 95.
IRC § 1398(i). Thus, the substantial differen~e between the debtor's and the estate's tax liability -- a
$10 million dollar swing.
66Aside from the reasons discussed in the text, the Lane· court also questioned the merits of the
abandonment. Although there existed no equity in the properties, the court observed there, nevertheless, might be
value in the properties for the estate. The court based this observation on two points: First, the court suggested that
BC § 506(a), which defines a secured claim, applies and made it more likely than not that value existed for the
estate; second, a trustee could use the cramdown provisions in chapter 11, see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b), to retain the
property for the benefit of the unsecured creditors. Aside from the time-honored rule that vests in a trustee broad
discretion in deciding to abandon property under BC § 554, the Lane court's observations make no sense. The
secured creditors were seeking foreclosure. Section 506(a) would not help, especially where the property is not
appreciating. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992). The secured claims completely enveloped the value of
the properties. Finally, cramdown is not a panacea; it is also a lot easier to threaten than it is to successfully' invoke
under BC § 1129(b). Thus, the value the Lane court was alluding to was whimsical at best.
67 See Comm'n v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945)(the substance of a transaction viewed as a
whole is controlling for tax purposes). In Court Holding, the Supreme Court articulated the "step-transaction"
doctrine which requires that we collapse each separate step in the transaction into one transaction, thereby ensuring
that the substance of the transaction controls over its form.
64 See

65 See
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severely throttle the fresh start policy of the Bankruptcy Code. 68 Each rationale for the Lane court's
holding is addressed in turn.
The court's application of the Court Holding doctrine is unpersuasive even on the particular
facts in Lane. 69 In essence, the court concluded that the estate would abandon directly to· the
creditor with the debtor being a conduit.

Foreclosure,however, does not necessarily follow

abandonment.· In fact, most' often a creditor could not have foreclosed until it obtained relief from
the stay under BC § 362(d). Furthermore, operation of the stay as well as any applicable statutory
periods under state law would have permitted a now more motivated debtor to workout the situation
with·the creditor. 7o Finally, Professor Jim Shepard cleverly and convincingly dispatches with the
Lane court's reliance on the Court Holding doctrine. Shepard shows that the Lane court in fact
extracted the abandonment from the "complete" transaction.

71

According to Shepard, the beginning

point in viewing the Court Holding doctrine should include the point at which the debtor decided to
seek relief under the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, bankruptcy relief is but one step through which the
property passed from the debtor to his or her creditors. 72 In other words, where we begin the steptransaction analysis under the Court Holding doctrine is not as self-evident as the Lane court
appears to suggest.

a case adopting the Lane analysis, see In reRubin, 154BR 897 (Bankr. B. Md. 1992).
69The Court Holding doctrine is always a facts and circumstances test. See Grossberg, supra note 37, at
68 Por

12-8.
70

Grossberg, supra note 37, at 12-8.
Shepard, supra note 26, at 72.
72Id. at 73. The Lane court's reliance on the Court Holding doctrine denies the essential factual foundation
of Court Holding. In Court Holding, the Supreme Court characterized the transaction there as an attempt to evade
taxes through the negotiations between the parties. 324 U.S. at 708. There a corporation was attempting "to transfer
property already the subject of a sales transaction to another party for the sole purpose of having the other taxed on
the sale." Id. In the abandonment context there is no attempt to evade taxes,. merely an attempt to shift liability
from the debtor to the estate.
71
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The second reason the court offered is that abandonment is a taxable event, a position
inconsistent with all prior authorities. 73 Clearly, a foreclosure or a deed in lieu of foreclosure is a
taxable event. 74 But is abandonment a taxable event? I think not. As suggested here, if a debtor's
interest has always remained in the property,- albeit subordinated to the estate's interest until
abandonment, there can be no sale, exchange, or disposition from the estate to the debtor upon
abandonment -- the debtor always owned the property. Moreover, a basic tenet of tax law is that
form does control sometimes. 75 If bankruptcy law treats abandoned property as if it had never been
property of the estate, tax law should acquiesce. If abandoned property is not property of the estate,
abandonment cannot be a taxable event. 76
To justify the conclusion that abandonment is a taxable event, the court reviewed IRC §
1398(f)(2). Section 1398(f)(2) provides that the transfer back to a debtor from the estate is not a
disposition when the transfer occurs with the termination of the estate, unless by sale or exchange.
In Lane, the court held that the abandonment was not tantamount to the termination of the estate as
required by IRC § 1398(f)(2) and must, therefore, be a taxable event.

This justification was

expressly rejected by the court in In re McGowan,77 which held that ''termination of the estate" for
purposes ofIRC § 1398(f)(2) included the termination of the estate's interest in property under BC
§ 554(a).
The confusion is created by using the word "terminate" in IRC § 1398(f)(2).

Does

''terminate'' mean the case is closed under BC § 350? The Service has taken such a position, I

73See,~, In re Olson, 930 F.2d 6 (8th Cir. 1991) (abandonment is not a taxable event); In re McGowan,
95 BR 104 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988)(same).
74See Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504,510 (1941)(recourse debt); Helvering v. Nebraska Bridge
Supply & Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 666 (1941)(nonrecourse debt).
75See Friedrich, supra note 64, at 96 n.21.
76Accord Shepard, supra note 26, at 76.
77
95 BR 104, 108 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988).
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believe unjustifiably.78
unclear.

Exactly when the estate terminates for IRC § 1398 purposes remains

For example, in a chapter 11 case, confirmation of the plan and post-confirmation

operation even for a number of years is not congruous to closing the case under BC § 350. 79 Thus,
something ·less than a BC § 350 "closing" should satisfy the termination requirement under IRC §
1398(f)(2).

Therefore, the better argument is that once the estate's interest in the property

terminates through abandonment, it terminates for IRC § 1398(f)(2) purposes as to the property
abandoned.80
The Lane court embraced a "strict" interpretation of IRC § 1398(f)(2) in concluding that
abandonment is a "sale or exchange" for tax purposes. This argument, however, proves too much.
IRC § 1398(f)(1), which governs the transfer of assets and liabilities from the debtor to the estate
upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition, makes the transfer a nonrecognition event unless it is by
"sale or exchange." According to the Lane court, if the transfer -- if one even exists -- from the
estate to the debtor pursuant to abandonment under BC § 554 is a "sale or exchange," then the
transfer from the debtor to the estate also would be a "sale or exchange," taking that transfer out of
nonrecognition status under IRC § 1398(f)(1). Thus, the transfer by a debtor to the estate becomes a
realization event. Reliance on Lane and the Court Holding doctrine suggests such an analysis. 81 Of
course, this analysis eviscerates the essential purpose behind IRC § 1398.
In suggesting that bankruptcy abandonment is a taxable event, the Lane court also relied on
Yarbro v. Commissioner82 and similar tax court decisions.

In Yarbro, the Fifth Circuit

78 See Shepard, supra note 26 at 66 (citing. IRS letter for that proposition and noting that position is
inconsistent with In re Sonner, 53 BR 859 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985)(for tax purposes a chapter 11 case terminates
when plan is confIrmed).) Shepard defmes termination by reference to probate estate and partnership terminations.
Shepard, supra note 26, at 66-67.
79 .
See 11 U.S.C. §§1141-1144.
80Accord Olson, supra.
81 See Wallace, supra note 38, at 29 and 30.
82737 F.2d 479 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1984).
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characterized abandonment under tax law as a sale or exchange, and, thus, a taxable event. In a
situation where an abandonment under applicable nonbankruptcy law of over-encumbered property
has occurred, a taxpayer receives a taxable benefit in the amount the secured debt is discharged.83
Therefore, applicable nonbankruptcy abandonment becomes an event no different in tax
significance than a foreclosure sale or deed in lieu. Asserting that a trustee conveyed property and
received a benefit in the form of relief from the secured debt, the court regarded the reasoning in
Yarbro as "inescapable."
Where the Lane court erred was to equate tax abandonment with bankruptcy abandonment.
The concept of abandonment for general tax purposes borrows heavily from the common law of
property. In contrast, bankruptcy abandonment is a creature of statute; it has a specific meaning in
bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy abandonment is a disclaimer by the estate of any interest in a specific
asset of the debtor~ Thus, the debtor's· interest in the property remains undisturbed. ~ To attempt to
artificially weld the two distinct concepts of abandonment together would deny a rich and vibrant
history associated with bankruptcy abandonment and the peculiar nature and purpose of this
statutory beast.
A corollary to the second justification relied on by the court in Lane is that to allow the
trustee to abandon the property would destroy the symmetry between IRe. 1398(f)(2) and 1398(i).84
This point, I believe, is the most persuasive offered by the court. Section 1398(f)(2) provides that
the transfer of property (other than by sale or exchange) from the estate to the debtor upon
termination of the estate is not a taxable event. Section 1398(i) provides that the debtor succeeds to
the estate's tax attributes· on termination of the estate. By allowing the trustee to abandon property,
the estate may shift the associated tax liability to the debtor ·while retain the enumerated tax

83Accord 133 BR at 270.
84-Lane, 133 BR at 273.
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attributes that could have been used by the debtor to offset the amount realized from the subsequent
foreclosure. Of course, this is also the result where the property is deemed abandoned because it
was not administered by the trustee. 85 Moreover, any tax attributes· not used by the estate will
ultimately revert back to the debtor upon termination of the estate and will be available to offset
taxable income in the year of foreclosure, possibly ameliorating some of the harshness. 86
Nevertheless, fairness remains an essential element of bankruptcy and tax law. It is not fair to allow
a trustee to abandon property from the estate on the verge of foreclosure while, at the same time,
retain for the estate the tax attributes associated with the very property.
One distinguished commentator seizes upon the lack of symmetry as a justification for
characterizing abandonment as a taxable event. 87 Although the Olson model suggests this lack of
symmetry, that conclusion is not inescapable. One could persuasively argue that if abandonment is
congruous to tennination under IRC §·1398(f)(2), it should also be congruous to termination under
IRC § 1398(i). Termination for one should be termination for the other. Thus, when property is
abandoned, the tax attributes listed in IRC § 1398(g) should also remain with the property to the
extent they can be reasonably traced. This is the position taken by the Service in final regulations
concerning passive activity and at-risk losses and credits. 88
The third reason offered by the Lane court is that abandonment of the property would shift
the tax liability from the estate to the debtor, thus depriving the debtor of a robust fresh start. This is
true. If the estate abandoned the property in our example, and the lender subsequently foreclosed
the lien, then the postpetition tax would not be dischargeable.

The debtor owes the taX.

Nevertheless, as discussed previously, many tax ·claims weaken the fresh start policy. Section
85

See II U.S.C.. 554(c).
Accord Shepard, supra note 26, at 74-75.
87 See Lipton, Proposed 1398 Regs Raise Conflict Between Debtors and Bankruptcy Trustees,. J. Tax 12,
14 and 15 (July 1993).
88
See Regs.. 1.1398-I(d)(2), 1.1398-2(d)(2).
86
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523(a)(I) recognizes that the debtor's fresh start is subordinate to the government's interest

i~

collecting certain taxes for its operations, in particular taxes entitled to priority under Be § 507(a).89

89 See Shepard, supra note 26, at 75; see also In re Hanna, 872 F.2d 829,831 (8th Cir. 1989). In an effort
to alleviate a perceived lack of symmetry, the Service has recently taken the position that as to those attributes it
adds to IRC § 1398(g) by regulation, it would be unfair to saddle a debtor with the tax liability upon abandonment
and subsequent foreclosure while to allow the estate to retain the tax attributes associated with the property.
Accordingly, if before the termination of the estate (as defined by the Service), the estate transfers an interest in a
passive activity, former passive activity, or an unused IRC § 465 loss from an abandoned activity by midstream
abandonment, then (1) the estate must allocate to the transferred interest part or all of the estate's unused passive
activity loss and unused passive activity credit, determined as of the fIrst day of the estate's tax year in which the
transfer occurs, and (2) the debtor succeeds to and takes into account, beginning with the debtor's tax year in which
the transfer occurs, the unused passive activity loss and unused passive activity credit allocated to the transferred
interest. Lipton, supra note 87, at 15.
In 1993, the Section 108 Real Estate and Partnership Task Force of the Section of Taxation of the
American Bar Association published a report on, among other things, the tax consequences posed by bankruptcy
abandonment before the close of the case. Report of the Section 108 Real Estate and Partnership Task Force (Part
D, 46 Tax Lawyer 209 (Fred Witt ed. 1993); Part II, 46 Tax Lawyer 397 (Fred Witt ed. 1993)(collectively hereafter
"ABA Task Force"). After noting judicial disagreement on the subject, the ABA Task Force proceeded to disagree
among itself. The majority camp embraced Lane as its working model; the minority camp, Olson as its working
model. The consensus of the Task Force is "that an abandonment constitutes a taxable disposition to the bankruptcy
estate." Id. at 449. The Task Force based its recommendation on IRC § 1398 and the fresh start policy in
bankruptcy. Id. at 449. Although these two justifications may fuel the conclusions reached, they are far too thin a
wedge to supportthe model explicated by the Task Force. Much of the justification for the Task Force's conclusion
rests on two related points. First, the Task Force believed that because the estate and the debtor are separate taxable
entities, abandonment as a transfer of the property would constitute a taxable disposition. Second, under the
principles of Yarbro v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1984). a ta~ abandonment is a sale or exchange for tax
purposes, and, thus, bankruptcy abandonment should also be a sale or exchange for tax purposes. Unfortunately, the
Task Force mischaracterized the nature of bankruptcy abandonment and fell victim to the siren song that seeks to
equate all types of abandonment. Because a bankruptcy abandonment is a disclaimer by the trustee of the estate's
interest jn the property, the fact that the estate and the debtor are separate tax entities is really beside the point.
There is no transfer that constitutes a "sale or exchange" for IRC § 1001(c) purposes. The debtor's interest always
remained in the abandoned asset; resort to the relation-back doctrine or other fictions is unwarranted. Furthermore,
as discussed earlier, Yarbro dealt with property and tax law abandonment, not bankruptcy abandonment. Although
it is natural to equate the concepts, it is naturally wrong. The various concepts of abandonment are creatures of their
contexts, drawing life from the specific policies at play in their own comers of the legal galaxy. I believe the Task
Force shows the weakness of its hand when .the only statement directly supporting the application of Yarbro in
equating tax law and bankruptcy abandonment is that "the Yarbro analysis is equally applicable to abandonments in
bankruptcy." Id. at 449 (citing Lane). Contrary to the manner in which the proposition is stated, it is far from selfevident.
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IV. PRIORITIES AND DISCHARGE

A.

SCOPE OF DISCHARGE

An individual's most important bankruptcy objective is a discharge from his or her debts.

90

The discharge is at the heart of the fresh start policy promoted by the Bankruptcy Code and the
BTA. The chapter 7 discharge is granted virtually automatically unless an objecting party can
establish that the debtor has engaged in prohibited conduct, usually constituting some type of fraud
or bankruptcy crime. 91 The statute providing for discharge is liberally construed in favor of an
individual debtor. 92 Thus, the objecting party has the burden of establishing a ground for the denial
of a discharge.93

90See generally Douglas G. Baird, The Elements of Bankruptcy 27-44 (1992) (discuss fresh start policy);
David G. Epstein, Steve H. Nickles, & James J. White, 2 Bankruptcy. 7-16 (1993)(same).
91 See 11 U.S.C.. 727(a)(l) through (a)(10).
92Accord In re Adeeb, 787 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Johnson, 98 BR 359 (Bankr. N.D. 1988); In re
Cutignola, 87 BR 702 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); In re Burke, 83 BR 716 (Bankr. N.D. 1988); In re Drenckhalm, 77
BR 697 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987); In re Howard, 55 BR 580 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985).
93 If a debtor has been denied a discharge in a bankruptcy case, so that all his or her debts remain
outstanding, the debtor may not include the same obligations in a subsequent case to obtain a discharge. The denial
of the discharge is res judicata as to the obligations existing at that time, which are forever -nondischargeable.
Although understood as part of the warp and wolf of bankruptcy law, the right to discharge was not a part of the
early enactments of bankruptcy acts in the United States. The Supreme Court noted the comparative newness of the
discharge and fresh-start policy in bankruptcy in United Stqtes v. Kras, 409 U.S. 414, 446-47 (1973). In fact, it was
not until the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 that the law provided an individual debtor with a right to
discharge certain debts pursuant to the bankruptcy process. Moreover, contrary to conventional wisdom, there is no
constitutional right to a discharge; discharge is a statutory privilege provided to the honest but unfortunate debtor
who has not abused the bankruptcy process. See In re Wheeler, 101 BR 39 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988). A discharge
in a bankruptcy case voids any judgment to the extent that it is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor
with respect to a prepetition debt. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a). The discharge also operates as an injunction against the
commencement or continuation of. an action, the employment of process, or any act, including telephone calls,
letters, and personal contacts, to collect, recover, or offset any discharged debt. Id. In effect, the discharge is a total
prohibition on debt collection efforts against a debtor. However, a discharge of the debtor does not discharge those
liable on the debt along with the debtor, including guarantors, co-makers, or partners. 11 U.S.C.§. 524(e).
Furthermore, under BC § 524, any attempt to reaffIrm a discharged debt is void unless the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code delineating the requirements of reaffIrmation are specifically followed. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c).
To ensure the effectiveness ofthe discharge, § 525(a) prohibits a governmental unit from denying, suspending, or
refusing to renew a license or permit or deny employment solely because the person involved was discharged under
the Bankruptcy Code, was insolvent before the bankruptcy case, or has not paid a dischargeable debt. Additionally,
under. § 525(b), no private employer may terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment
against, an individual who is or has been a debtor under the Code, or an individual associated with a debtor under
the Code, solely because the debtor is or has been a debtor under the Code, was insolvent before the commencement
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Under chapter 11, § 1141(d) governs the scope and limits of discharge. Pursuant to

Be §

1141 (d), the confinnation of a plan of reorganization discharges a debtor from any debt that arose
before the confinnation of the plan. Unlike § 727(a),a partnership, corporation, or an individual
may receive a § 1141(d) discharge. 94

The § 1141(d) discharge is broader than the § 727(a)

discharge in that the latter discharges any debts that arose95 before the order for relief,96 while the
fonner discharges any debts that arose before the confirmation ofthe plan. 97

B.

EXCEPTIONS OF DEBT FROM DISCHARGE

Notwithstanding the debtor's discharge under the Code, certain debts are excepted from
discharge as a matter of public policy pursuant to § 523(a). These exceptions to discharge are
strictly construed. An exception to discharge should be contrasted with an objection to discharge.
If successful in an objection to discharge proceeding, the creditor's claim along with every other
claim survives the bankruptcy case; that is, the debtor will not receive a discharge at all. It is
significantly different with an exception to discharge proceeding under § 523(a).

If successful in

asserting § 523(a), the creditor's claim will not be discharged and will survive the bankruptcy case;
that is, a § 523(a) claim may be enforced and ultimately satisfied even after the bankruptcy case.
Thus, although the debtor receives a general discharge, the § 523(a) claims live on.
The burden of proof to assert that the debt is non-dischargeable under § 523(a) falls squarely
on the shoulders of the creditor asserting the exception.

Among the types of claims that are

of case under the Code, or has not paid a debt that is dischargeable under the Code. See generally D. Epstein, S.
Nickles, & J. White, supra note 90, at 7-40.
941n Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197 (1991), the Supreme Court held that an individual may properly seek
relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
951t should come as no surprise that just when a debt arises has become a bone of contention. D. Epstein,
S. Nickles, & J. White, supra note 90" 7-16, at 312.
96The order for relief is entered automatically where a debtor files a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. See
11 U.S.C. § 301. In an involuntary case, the order for relief comes after the court is persuaded that the grounds for
involuntary relief are met. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(h).
97For the requirements ·for chapter 11 plan confrrmation, see 11 U.S.C. § 1129.
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nondischargeable are' current year taxes and taxes for which the due date falls within three years of
the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 98 The following tax debts are excepted from discharge under §
523(a) as a matter of law:
•

Taxes entitled to priority under §§ 507(a)(2) and (a)(8).

•

Taxes connected with fraudulent returns, late returns, or a failure to file.

•

Withholding taxes and taxes collected from others, that is, trust fund taxes.

•

Debts that are not scheduled in time for the timely filing of the proof of claim.

•

Governmental fmes and penalties to the extent that they are not compensation for actual
pecuniary loss. Nonetheless, this category of non-dischargeable debt does not include
tax penalties relating to dischargeable taxes or to any transaction or event that occurred
more,than 3 years before the filing of the bankruptcy petition.

Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code specifies which debts of an individual debtor are not
discharged in a bankruptcy case under § 727 of chapter 7, § 1141 of chapter 11, or § 1328(b) of
chapter 13 (the "hardship discharge).99 Included among theses debts are certain taxes which are
identified as nondischargeable. loo
Section 523(a)(I) of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the taxes or customs duties that are not
dischargeable by an individual debtor in a chapter 7, 11 or 13 bankruptcy case under §§ 727, 1141
or 1328(b)(chapter 13 "hardship discharge"), respectively. However, the regular chapter 13 superdischarge does discharge debts identified under '§ 523(a).lOl

98 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(I), 507(a).
99However, these taxes may be discharged in a chapter 13 under § 1328(a),Le., the chapter 13 superdischarge.
100In In re Olsen, 123 B.R. 312 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991), the bankruptcy court held that a nondischargeable
tax claim survives bankruptcy regardless of whether such claim was filed or allowed in the bankruptcy case.
101
See 11 U.S.C. §1328(a).
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The first category of nondischargeable tax claims is set forth in § 523(a)(1 ).102 Under this
section, a tax or customs duty specified in § 507(a)(2) as an involuntary gap ciaim l03 or §
507(a)(8)104 is nondischargeable whether or not a claim for such tax was allowed by the court or
filed in the case.105 These priority and nondischargeable tax claims include the following:
1.

Involuntary gap claims under § 507(a)(2)106

2.

Income or gross receipts taxes incurred prepetition and within three years from the
filing of the bankruptcy petitionl07

3.

Income or gross receipts taxes assessed within 240 days from the filing of the
bankruptcy petition l08

102 11 USC § 523(a)(I), which reads as follows:
A discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from
any debt(1 )for a tax or a customs duty(A)ofthe kind and for the periods specified in section 507(a)(2) or 507(a)(8) of this title,
whether or not a claim for such tax was filed or allowed;
(B)with respect to which a return, ifrequired-(i)was not filed; or
(ii)was filed after the. date on which such return was last due, under applicable
law or under any extension, and after two years before the date of the filing of the
petition; or
(C)with respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return or willfully attempted in any
manner to evade or defeat such tax.
103 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(I)(A); 11 USC § 507(a)(2)(this section relates to the priority of involuntary gap
claims).
104 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(I)(A); 11 USC § 507(a)(8)(this section relates to the priority of allowed unsecured
tax claims of governmental units)
105 11 USC § 523(a)(I)(A).
106The second priority as set forth in § 507(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code is "unsecured claims allowed
under § 502(f) of this title." Under § 502(f), an involuntary gap claimis one which arises in the ordinary course ofa
debtor's business after the filing of an involuntary petition against the debtor but before· either the appointment of a
trustee or the entry of an order for relief. An involuntary gap claim is allowed "the same as if such claim had arisen
before the date of the filing of the petition." The involuntary gap claim is the creature of the involuntary bankruptcy
case.. Recall from chapter 1 that the filing of an involuntary petition against the debtor does not operate as an order
for relief under the Bankruptcy Code. This priority speaks .directly to the time delay made possible by segregating
the order for relief from the filing of the petition.
107An eighth priority is allowed by § 507(a)(8)(A)(i) of the Bankruptcy Code for unsecured federal tax
liens ("unsecured claims of governmental units") to the extent that such claims are for income or gross receipts taxes
incurred before the filing of the bankruptcy petition for which the due date of the tax return (including any
extension) occurred within three years before the date the bankruptcy petition was filed or for which the due date of
the return (including any extensions) occurred after the filing of the petition. As indicated, the due date of the return,
and not the date when the taxes are assessed, determines the priority.
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4.

Income or gross receipts taxes still assessable under applicable law at the time the
bankruptcy petition is filed 109

5.

Recent property taxes assessed prepetition and last due without penalty within one
year of the filing 110

6.

Trust fund taxes incurred at any time 111

7.

The employer's share of employment taxes on wages earned from the debtor and
paid before the filing of a bankruptcy petition to the extent the return for such taxes
was last due (including any extensions of time) within three years before the filing of
the bankruptcy petition or was due after the bankruptcy petition was filed l12

8.

Excise taxes related to transactions for which a return (if required) is last due (plus
any extension) within three years before the filing of the bankruptcy petition or due
after the· filing of the bankruptcy petition. 113

108Also included are income and gross receipts taxes assessed at any time within 240 days before the date
the bankruptcy petition was filed. The 240-day period is extended for the period of time an offer of compromise is
considered by the IRS after submission by the taxpayer, plus 30 days after such offer is rejected. Under this rule, the
date on which the IRS assesses the tax, rather than the date of the return, determines the priority.
109Section 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) grants priority to income and gross receipts taxes not assessed before the filing
of a bankruptcy petition, but which are still permitted to be assessed under applicable tax laws. Accordingly, a
prepetition and unsecured federal tax lien will still receive a seventh· priority under this section if the statute of
limitations still allows an assessment of the tax liability after the bankruptcy petition is filed, even though such
assessment was not made within the 240-day period (plus any extension) prior to the bankruptcy filing.
110An unsecured claim of a governmental unit for property taxes assessed before the bankruptcy petition
was filed and last payable without· penalty within one year before the filing of the petition is given a seventh
priority.
I11Taxes required to be collected or withheld and for which the debtor is liable in whatever capacity are
given a seventh priority under § 507(a)(8)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code.
112The employer's share of employment taxes on wages earned from the debtor and paid before the filing
of a bankruptcy petition receives an eighth priority under § 507(a)(8)(D) of the Bankruptcy Code, to the extent the
retUrn for such taxes was last due (including any extensions of time) within three years before the filing of the
bankruptcy petition or was due after the bankruptcy petition was filed. Older tax claims of this nature are payable as
nonpriority general claims. Likewise, the employee's share of employment taxes on wages eamed from a debtor
and paid before the filing of a bankruptcy petition also receives an eighth priority in the same manner as the
employer's share of employment taxes.
113Unsecured.claims for excise taxes are given an eighth priority under § 507(a)(8)(E) of the Bankruptcy
Code. The excise taxes claimed must relate to transactions for which a return (if required) is last due (plus any
extension) within three years before the filing of the bankruptcy petition or due after the filing of the bankruptcy.
petition. If a return is due, the three year period is extended if the due date for filing the return was extended. 11

A- 29

9.

Certain customs duty under § 507(a)(8)(F) of the BankruptcyCode

114

The second category of nondischargeable tax claims is set forth in BC § 523(a)(I) and
includes the following taxes:

1.

Tax liabilities relating to a tax return which was not filed;115

2.

Tax liabilities reported by a tax return filed late and filed within two years prior to
the filing of the bankruptcy petition or filed after the bankruptcy petition;

3.

Tax liabilities reported by a fraudulent return
willfully evade or avoid any tax.

116

or from an attempt by the debtor·to

117

U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(E). If a return is not required, the tax claim must relate to a transaction which itself occurred
within three years prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. For purposes of this priority, excise taxes covered
include sales taxes, estate and gift taxes, gasoline and special fuel taxes, wagering taxes, and truck taxes.
114Unsecured claims for customs duty are given an eighth priority under § 507(a)(8)(F) of the Bankruptcy
Code. According to the legislative history, this priority covers duties on imports entered for consumption within one
year before the filing of the petition, but which are still unliquidated onthe petition date; duties covered by an entry
liquidated or unliquidated within one year before the petition date; and any duty on merchandise entered for
consumption within four years before the petition but not liquidated as of the petition date, if the Secretary of the
Treasury or his or her delegate certifies that duties were not liquidated because of· possible assessment of
antidumpin~ or countervailing duties or fraud penalties.
11 See, e.g., In re Bergstrom, 949 F.2 nd 341 (10 th Cir. 1991), where the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit held that the term "filed return" was not broad enough to include a substitute return prepared by
the IRS, absent the debtor's signature thereon; In re Pruitt, 107 B.R. 764 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1989), where the
bankruptcy court held that substitute tax returns filed by the Internal Revenue Service when the debtor failed to file
such returns for several years did not preclude application of the Bankruptcy Code rendering tax debts
nondischargeable for any tax debt with respect to which a return was required and not filed; In re Brookman, 114
B.R. 769 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990), where the bankruptcy court held that the debt for unpaid income taxes was
nondischargeable because the debtor failed to rebut prima facie evidence that the tax return for the applicable tax
year was not filed; In re Crawford, 115 B.R. 381 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990), where the bankruptcy court held that a tax
obligation for which the debtor did not file a tax return is non-dischargeable even though the Internal Revenue
Service filed the return on the debtor's behalf.
11611 USC § 523(a)(I)(B); see 124 Congo Rec. Hll,113-14 (daily ed Sept 28,1978); S 17,430-31 (dailyed
Oct 6, 1978); see also In re Graham, 108 B.R. 498 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989), where the bankruptcy court held that a
prepetition tax court decision holding the debtor liable to the IRS·for the debtor's underpayment of taxes, but which
did not decide that the underpayment was fraudulent, did not preclude the debtor from disputing the government's
claim that such tax liabilities were non-dischargeable for fraud; In re Fernandez, 112 B.R. 888 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1990), where the bankruptcy court held that the debtor's conduct concerning tax obligations was shown to be willful
and evasive and thus, the tax obligations were deemed nondischargeable; In re Kirk, 114 B.R. 771 (Bankr. N.D. Fla.
1990), where the bankruptcy court held that the debtors' conduct demonstrated a purposeful attempt to evade
income taxes and thus, the claim of the IRS for civil fraud penalties was allowed; In re Carapella, 115 B.R. 365
(N.D. Fla. 1990), where the district court held that the tax liability of a chapter 7 debtor for a fraudulent return filed
by the debtor was nondischargeable; In re Gilder, 122 B.R. 593 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990), where the bankruptcy
court held that where the debtor submitted false withholding statements for the express purpose for eliminating the
withholding of federal income taxes from wages, such conduct was a "willful attempt to evade or defeat tax" within
the meaning of the exception to discharge; In re Hopkins, 133 B.R. 102 (Bankr. M.D. Ohio 1991), where the
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The third category of nondischargeable taxes is set forth in

§ 523(a)(7).118 This section

provides that tax penalties which are basically punitive in nature are nondischargeable only if the
penalty is computed by reference to a related tax liability which is also nondischargeable. It appears
that if the amount of the penalty is not computed by reference to a tax .liability, the transaction or
event giving rise to the penalty must occur during a three-year period ending on the date of the filing
of the bankruptcy petition.
In Inre Burns

120

119

and In re Roberts,121 the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh

and Tenth Circuits held that a tax penalty is discharged if the tax to which it relates is discharged or
if the transaction or event giving rise to the penalty occurred more than three years prior to the filing
of the bankruptcy petition. Moreover, in In re Henderson,122 the bankruptcy court held that tax
penalties relating to nondischargeable tax liabilities incurred more than three years before the filing

bankruptcy court held that the wife's signing ofjoint returns which she knew were in error constituted the making of
a fraudulent return or willfully attempting to evade such tax and, thus, such tax debts were nondischargeable in the
wife's bankruptcy case; In re Peterson, 132 B.R. 68 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1991), where the bankruptcy court held that
the debtor did not "willfully" attempt to evade tax by signing returns which the government admits were not
fraudulent and then filing for relief under chapter 7 shortly after such taxes became eligible to be dischargeable; In
re Graham, 973 F.2d 1089·(3d Cir. 1992), where the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a
United States Tax Court judgment holding the debtors liable for mcome tax deficiencies resulting from fraudulent
tax returns did not have claim preclusion or issue preclusion effect in determining whether the debtors' liability was
nondischargeable; In re Levinson, 969 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1992), where the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient to support a determination that the debtor had filed fraudulent
tax returns so as to render the tax debts nondischargeable.
117
11 U.S.C. § 523(aXl).
118 11 USC § 523(a)(7), which reads as follows:
(a)A discharge under Section 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual
debtor from any debt-(7)to the extent such debt is for a fme, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit
of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss, other than a tax penalty(A)relating to a tax of a kind not specified in paragraph (1) of this subsection; or
(B)imposed with respect to a transaction or event that occurred before three years before
the date of the filing of the petition.
119124 Cong Rec Hll,113-14 (daily ed Sept 28, 1978); S 17,430-31 (daily ed Oct 6, 1978); see also Rev
RuI68-574, 1968-2 CB 595.
12°887 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1989).
121 906 F.2d 1440 (10th Cir. 1990).
122
137 B.R. 239 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1991).
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of a bankruptcy petition were dischargeable in a chapter 7· case. Furthermore, in In re Fullmer,123
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that tax penalties imposed pursuant to
nondischargeable tax debts are nondischargeable as well. But in In re Byrum,124 where the district
court held that a tax penalty assessed by the.Internal Revenue Service more than three years before
the debtor filed a chapter 7 petition was dischargeable. 125 Likewise, in In re McKay,126 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that civil fraud penalties imposed on unpaid taxes
accruing more than three years before the filing of the debtor's bankruptcy petition were
dischargeable, even though the debt for unpaid taxes was not dischargeable on the ground of fraud.
With respect to individual debtors in reorganization under chapter 11, § 1141(d)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code incorporates by reference the exceptions to discharge set forth in § 523 and
discussed above. 127

Section 1141(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the confirmation of

a chapter 11 plan does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt excepted from discharge
under § 523. 128
With respect to all debtors (i.e., including corporations and partnerships), the confirmation
of a chapter 11 plan does not discharge the debtor from any debts (including taxes) if:

123 962 F.2d 1463 (10th Cir. 1992).
124 139 B.R. 498 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
125 See also In re Henderberg, 108 B.R. 407 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989), where the bankruptcy court held that
a taxing authority's claim for penalties did not enjoy priority status because such penalties were not for actual
pecuniary loss; In re Virtual Network Servs Corp, 902 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir. 1990), where the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the bankruptcy court exercise its equitable jurisdiction to subordinate the
claim of the IRS for a nonpecuniary tax loss penalty to the claims of other creditors in a chapter 11 liquidation
proceeding; In re Mako, Inc, 135 B.R. 902 (E.D. Okla. 1991), where the district court held that the IRS was not
entitled to security or priority status for the penalty portion of its claim against the debtor for unpaid taxes; In re
Garcia, 955 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1992), where the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
prepetition interest on a tax liability, as a pecuniary loss penalty, was entitled to the same priority in the chapter 13
case as the underlying taxes.
126957 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1992).
127124 Congo Rec. Hll,113-14 (daily ed Sept 28, 1978); S. 17,430-31 (daily ed Oct 6, 1978).
128 11 USC §§ 1141(d)(2) and 523.

A - 32

1.

The plan provides for the liquidation of all or substantially all of the property of the
estate

2.

The debtor does not engage.in business after consummation of the plan

3.

The debtor would be denied a discharge under § 727(a) of the Bankruptcy Code if
the case were a chapter 7 liquidation proceeding 129

Thus, a debtor is not discharged from any debt (including federal taxes) by the confirmation
of a plan if the plan is a liquidation plan and if the debtor would be denied a discharge in a chapter 7
liquidation·proceeding pursuant to § 727(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. 130 Under § 727(a)(I), only an
individual, and not a corporation or a partnership, may obtain a discharge. 131
After a debtor has made all payments required by the chapter 13 plan, the bankruptcy court
gran~s

to the debtor a discharge of all debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under § 502,

except the following debts:
1.

Debts with the final payment falling due after the fmal payment under the plan is due
as set forth in § 1322(b)(5), that is, certain long-term debt;132

2.

Debts owed to a spouse, former spouse, or child for alimonY,maintenance, or
support in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree, or property
settlement agreement as set forth in § 523(a)(5);133

3.

Certain student loans that do not pose an undue hardship to the debtor as set forth in
§ 523(a)(8);

129Id. § 1141(d)(3).
130S Rep No 989, 95th Cong, 2d Sess 129 (1978).
131
' .
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(I).
132 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(I).
133 Id. § 1328(a)(2).
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4.

Debts for death' or personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of a motor
vehicle while intoxicated as set forth in § 523(a)(9);
Debts for restitution included in a sentence on the debtor's conviction of a crime. 134

5.

Thus, § 1328 discharges most of the debts listed in § 523(a) that may not otherwise be
discharged in a chapter 7 or chapter 11 case. Included in those debts discharged in a chapter 13 case
are the tax claims identified in § 523(a)(I).

However, all priority claims under § 507 of the

Bankruptcy Code must be paid in full pursuant to the chapter 13 plan. In addition, § 1328(e).ofthe
Bankruptcy Code provides that the bankruptcy court may revoke a discharge if it had been obtained
through fraud, provided the request for revocation is made within one year after the discharge is
granted. 135
The chapter 13 discharge is much broader in scope than either the chapter 7 or chapter 11
discharge.. Recall that under chapter 7 or chapter 11·(when the debtor is an individual), a creditor
who persuades the court to except its debt under § 523(a) of the Code may disregard any discharge
order and enforce its claim even after discharge or plan confirmation..Not so in the chapter 13 case.
Under § 1328(a), almost all debts are discharged, even those that are non-dischargeable under §
523(a). The only debts which are not discharged are those for alimony and support payments,
certain educational loans, damages related to death or personal injury caused by the debtor's
operation of a motor vehicle while the debtor was intoxicated from the use of alcohol or drugs and
criminal restitution. Consequently, chapter 13 may be a more useful tool for the debtor who has a
substantial amount of debt that a court may find non-dischargeable under § 523(a), for example, tax
debts.

134

11 U.S.C. § 1328(a).
§ 1328(e).

135 Id .
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When does the discharge occur? Unlike the limited chapter 11 discharge that arises at the
time the plan is confirmed, the chapter 13 discharge arises only after the. debtor has completed full
performance under the chapter 13 plan.
What happens to the chapter 13 right to discharge if the debtor is unable to complete
performance under the plan? Section 1328(b) of the Code answers this question. If the reason the
chapter 13 debtor cannot perform under the plan can be traced to reasons beyond the debtor's
control, the debtor may receive a "hardship" discharge so long as the debtor has performed
sufficiently to have ensured that the creditors have received more under the chapter 13 plan as
partially performed than they would have received under a chapter 7 liquidation. Nonetheless, the
Code extracts a price from the chapter 13 debtor who by powers beyond the debtor's control must
resort to the hardship discharge. A discharge granted under this subsection discharges the debtor
from all unsecured debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under § 502, except: claims with
final payments falling due after the final payment under the plan is due as set forth in §
1322(b)(5);136 and debts as specified in § 523(a).137 Thus, those § 523(a) debts that are generally
non-dischargeable but would have been discharged under chapter 13 remain non-dischargeable if
the debtor is granted the hardship discharge. 138 In other words, the chapter 13 hardship discharge is
but the chapter 7 discharge in a different guise.
Since the chapter 13 discharge discharges "all debts provided for by the plan," the critical
issue is frequently the interpretation of the phrase "provided for by the plan," and, in the tax area,

136 Id. § 1328(c)(1).
137 Id. § 1328(c)(2).
138Section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code specifies certain taxes which are deemed nondischargeable in
connection with a § 1328(b) hardship discharge. These nondischargeable taxes include federal taxes given a second
priority as involuntary gap claims under § 507(a)(2), unsecured tax claims of governmental units under § 507(a)(8),
tax liabilities relating to a tax return which was not filed, tax liabilities reported by tax returns filed late or filed after
the bankruptcy petition, tax liabilities reported by fraudulent returns, and certain tax penalties.
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the ability of the chapter 13 debtor to discharge §§ 507(a)(2) and (a)(8) priority tax claims even
though such claims may have been "provided for" in the debtor's plan, but not actually paid.
Suppose, for example, that the debtor's chapter 13 plan provides that the debtor will "pay
one hundred percent of allowed claims to the IRS?" Suppose further that the IRS receives a timely
notice of the debtor's chapter 13 plan, but that the IRS does not file its proof of claim in a timely
manner, and the IRS is legitimately owed a designated amount of prepetition taxes which qualify as
a priority unsecured claim under § 507(a)(8). Upon consummation of the debtor's chapter 13 plan,
are the prepetition priority taxes owed to the IRS discharged?
It is clear that § 1322(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a plan must provide for the
full payment in deferred cash payments of all § 507(a)(8) priority claims, including tax claims. In
the example as stated above, however, there is authority to support the debtor's position that the
debtor will be discharged from the prepetition priority taxes owed to the IRS because the taxes were
"provided for" under the debtor's plan combined (fortunately, for the debtor) with the lack of
diligence by the IRS in failing to file its proof of claim in a timely manner. For example, in In re
Gregory,139 the court stated that "provided for by the plan" means that plan must deal with the claim
at issue or refer to it. The plan need not pay the claim or provide a benefit for the 'claim.140
Disallowed claims, including those claims for priority taxes under BC § 507(a)(8) are
discharged in a chapter 13 case. This most often happens where the IRS has failed to timely file a
proof of claim and the claim is disallowed. Bankruptcy Rule 3002 provides that a creditor must file

139705 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1983).
140
.

See also In reRyan, 78 B.R. 175 (Bankr. Tenn. 1987); In re Daniel, 107 B.R. 798 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1989), where the bankruptcy court held that the tax claim of the IRS was "provided for" under the debtor's chapter
13 plan and such claim was therefore discharged upon completion of the plan; In re Leber, 134 B.R. 911 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1991), where the bankruptcy court held that a tax claim by the Illinois Department of Revenue which had
actual notice of the debtor's chapter 13 case, but which did not file a proof claim for its prepetition tax claim, was
discharged by the chapter 13 plan, despite the contention that the Department was not effectively "provided for" in
the plan.
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a proof of claim within 90 days from the first date scheduled for the BC § 341 meeting. Any
creditors, including the IRS, may seek an extension in which to file the proofof claim. 141
Section 1325(a)(3) requires that a debtor's chapter 13 plan be proposed in good faith, which
courts consistently observe is one of the central, perhaps the most important, confirmation finding to
be made by the court in any chapter 13 case. Despite such sentiments- by the courts, "good faith"

i~

not defined in the Code or in its legislative history. Because of the ability of debtors to discharge
tax debts in a chapter 13, including tax debts arising from the failure to file a return or from tax
fraud, the issue ofthe plan's good faith is often in contention.
A majority of the federal courts have concluded that a debtor's good faith should be
determined on a case by case basis considering the "totality of the circumstances." These courts
have suggested a list of factors that courts should consider in analyzing a debtor's good faith. These
factors include:
1.

the amount of the proposed payments and the amount ofthe debtors§ surplus;

2.

the debtors' employment history, ability to earn and the likelihood of future

.

. .

Increases m mcome;
3.

the probable or expected duration ofthe plan;

4.

the accuracy of the plan's statements of the debts, expenses and percentage
repayment of unsecured debt and whether any inaccuracies are an attempt to mislead
the court;

5.

the extent of preferential treatment between classes of creditors;

6.

the extent to which secured claims are modified;

141

Bankr. R. 3002(c)(I).
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7.

the type of debt sought to be discharged and whether any such debt

IS

nondischargeable in chapter 7;
8.

the existence of special circumstances such as inordinate medical expenses;

9.

the frequency with which the debtor has sought relief under the Bankruptcy Code;

10.

the motivation and sincerity ofthe debtor in seeking chapter 13 relief;

11.

the burden which the plan's administration would place upon the trustee; and

12.

the percentage ofthe repayment to unsecured creditors. 142

Although many courts have either added or subtracted from this "laundry list" of factors,
they agree that a factor to be considered in the analysis is whether the debt sought to be discharged
is dischargeable under chapter 7. 143
Alternatively, some courts believe that the "laundry list" approach is an improper method
for courts to utilize in their good faith analysis.

These courts would apply the "honesty-of-

intention" test in analyzing the good faith standard. In utilizing this test, courts examine whether a
debtor intentionally misrepresented his fmancial status in the proposed plan, unfairly manipulated
the Code, or otherwise inequitably proposed the chapter 13 plan. This approach precludes the court
from scrutinizing a debtor's plan, and, therefore, a debtor's attempt to discharge a debt
nondischargeable under chapter 7 does not enter into a court's good faith determination.

re Estus, 695 F.2d 311,317 (8th Cir. 1982)(citations omitted).
court in In re Easley, 72 B.R. 948, 950-55 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1987), conducted a survey of over
300 good faith decisions and generated a list of 17 good faith attributes which the court found appropriate: (1)
frequency of bankruptcy filing; (2) accuracy of petition statements and schedules; (3) motivation in filing chapter
13; (4) initial filing of chapter 7 rather than chapter 13; (5) existence of debt nondischargeable in a chapter 7 case;
(6) circumstances.of incurring debt; (7) nature and amount of unsecured debt; (8) probable duration of the plan; (9)
degree of effort; (10) likelihood of future increases in income; (11) percentage of repayment of debt; (12) amount of
proposed payments; (13) amount of surplus in budget;· (14) special circumstances; (15) burden of administration;
(16) amount of attorney's fees; and (17) generic'tests such as "fundamental fairness," "honesty of intention," and
"totality of the circumstances." Id.
142In

143 The
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v.

BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENTS OF 2005 144

As I complete these materials, President Bush has signed sweeping legislation that with
change significantly the practice of bankruptcy law. On April 20, 2005, the President signed into
law the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("2005 Act"). Most of
the changes in the Bankruptcy Act will take effect on October 17, 2005, (180 days after the
enactment date), but do not apply to cases commenced before Oct. 17, 2005. The 2005 Act's tax
provisions, among other things, would: (1) align, for tax purposes, the chapter 13 discharge with
that of the chapter 7 discharge, thus, for example, prohibiting the discharge under a chapter 13
bankruptcy filing of any debt for fraudulent tax payments; (2) provide greater protection for holders
of ad valorem tax liens on real or personal property; (3) simplify the process for filing of claims by
states for certain fuel taxes; (4) set a priority for tax claims and simplify the calculation of interest
applicable to tax claims and (5) resolve the issue as to the appropriate interest rate on tax claims in
bankruptcy cases. Following is an overview of the tax provisions of the 2005 Act:
Title VII: Bankruptcy Tax Provisions
~

(Sec. 701) Amends the Bankruptcy Code to modify the treatment of certain tax liens.

~

(Sec. 702) Provides that a claim for debtor's liability for fuel tax which is filed by the
base jurisdiction designated under the International Fuel Tax Agreement shall be
allowed as a single claim.

~

(Sec. 703) Requires the clerk of each district to maintain a listing under which a
governmental entity responsible for the collection of taxes within such district may
designate an address for service of requests and describe where further information for
filing such requests may be found.

144

This list was originally compiled by the New York City Bar Association.
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~

(Sec. 704) Prescribes the rate of interest to be paid on mandatory interest payments on
tax claims.

~

(Sec. 705) Revises the specifications for income tax claims receiving eighth priority
(allowed unsecured claims of governmental units). Provides for tolling of the time
periods covering such tax claims for stays of proceedings in a prior bankruptcy case,. and
the pendency or effect of offers in compromise or installment agreements.

~

(Sec. 707) Prohibits a Chapter 13 discharge of any debt for fraudulent tax payments.

~

(Sec. 708) States that confirmation of a bankruptcy plan under Chapter 11 does not
discharge a corporate debtor from any debt for: (1) money or credit obtained by false
representation owed to a domestic governmental unit or to a person as the result of an
action filed with respect to certain claims against the Federal or a State government; or
(2) a tax or customs duty with respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return or
willfully attempted to evade or defeat such tax.

~

(Sec. 709) Limits the automatic stay ofD.S. Tax Court proceedings to prepetition taxes.

~

(Sec. 710) Sets as a prerequisite for court confirmation of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan
that includes tax claims, that the debtor make· regular cash installment payments over a
period ending not later than five years after the date of entry of the order for relief, and
in a manner not less

favora~le

than the most favored nonpriority unsecured claim

provided.for in the plan.
~

(Sec. 711) Prohibits the avoidance of statutory tax liens by certain purchasers.

~

(Sec. 712) Amends

th~

Federal judicial code to require officers and agents conducting

any business under court authority to pay all Federal, State, and local taxes when due in
the course of the business, unless· it is a property tax secured by a lien against estate
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property which is abandoned by the bankruptcy trustee, or payment of the tax is excused
under a specific bankruptcy law. Cites circumstances in which payment of such taxes
may be deferred in a case pending under chapter 7 until final distribution is made.
Moreover,entitles ·to administrative expense priority payment certain secured and
postpetition unsecured taxes incurred by the bankruptcy estate, including ad valorem
property taxes. FUrthermore, declares that a governmental unit shall not be required to
file a request for the payment of administrative expenses relating to a tax liability or tax
penalty. Additionally, allows a trustee to recover from property securing a claim for the
payment of all ad valorem property taxes relating to such property.
~

(Sec. 713) Requires as a condition for payment of tardily filed priority tax claims that
they be filed either before the trustee commences distribution, or ten days following the
mailing to creditors of the summary of the trustee's final report, whichever is earlier'
(currently, before the trustee commences distribution of the estate).

~

(Sec. 716) Conditions court confirmation ofa chapter 13 bankruptcy plan upon filing by
the debtor: (1) of all prepetition tax returns; and (2) before the day on which the first
meeting of the creditors is convened, of all tax returns for taxable periods ending in. the
four-year period that ends on the date of the filing of the petition. Directs the court to
dismiss a plan or convert it to chapter 7, whichever is in the best interests of the creditors
and the estate, if a chapter 13 debtor fails to comply with such time frame. Furthermore,
expresses the sense of Congress that the Judicial Conference should propose for
adoption amended Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure pertaining to objections to
tax returns and to plan confirmation.
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~

(Sec. 717) Redefines "adequate disclosure," for Chapter 11 postpetition disclosure and
solicitation purposes, to include full discussion of the potential material Federal and
State tax consequences of the plan to the debtor and to a hypothetical investor that is
representative ofthe holders of claims or interests in the case.

~

(Sec. 718) Denies an automatic stay (unless specified conditions are met) to the setoff of
an income tax refund for a taxable period which ended before the order for relief against
an income tax liability for a taxable period which also ended before the order for relief.

~

(Sec. 719) Revises special provisions related to the treatment of State and local taxes,
including the creation of a separate taxable estate when such is done for Federal tax
purposes.

~

(Sec. 720) Permits a taxing authority to petition the court to convert or dismiss a case if
the debtor fails to timely file a tax return or obtain an extension, whichever is in the best
interests of creditors and the estate.

Other provisions that may have an affect on tax issues but are not identified in Title VII of
the 2005 Act include the following:
•

(Sec. 214) Excepts from an automatic stay specified choses-in-action pertaining to
domestic support obligations proceedings, including: (1) child custody or visitation;
(2) dissolution of marriage; (3) domestic violence; (4) withholding of income that is
property of· the bankrupt estate for payment of domestic support obligations; (5)
suspension of drivers' licenses and professional licenses; (6) reporting of overdue
support owed by a parent to certain consumer reporting agencies; (7) interception of
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specified tax refunds; and (8) enforcement of medical obligations under title IV, part
D (Child Support and Establishment of Paternity) of the Social Security Act.
•

(Sec. 224) Permits an individual debtor to exempt from the property of the bankrupt
estate certain tax-exempt retirement funds that have not been obligated in connection
with any extension of credit.

•

(Sec. 314) Includes as nondischargeable chapter 13 debts those incurred: (1) to pay a
tax to a non-Federal governmental unit; (2) for restitution or a criminal fine included
in a sentence on the debtor's conviction of a crime; (3) for fraud or defalcation while
acting in a fiduciary capacity; or (4) for restitution, or damages, awarded in a civil
action against the debtor as a result of willful or malicious injury by the debtor that
caused personal injury or death to an individual.

•

(Sec. 315) Prescribes notice procedures for Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 creditors.
Expands debtor's duties to require filing with the bankruptcy court of: (1) Federal tax
returns; (2) evidence of employer payments received; (3) monthly net income
projections; and (4) anticipated income or expenditure increases. Permits a Chapter 7
or chapter 13 creditor to request the debtor's petition, tax schedules, and statement of
affairs, including the debt adjustment plan filed by the debtor. Requires dismissal of
a Chapter 7 or 13 case upon debtor's failure to provide to the bankruptcy trustee
within seven days before the initial date for the first meeting of creditors a tax return
for the latest taxable period prior to filing. Requires that, at the time of filing with
the taxing authority, a Chapter 7 or 13 debtor file with the bankruptcy court specified
tax documentation pertaining to the period from case commencement until case
termination. Requires a Chapter 13 debtor to file with the court a statement of
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income and expenditures in the preceding tax year, and monthly net income,
showing how calculated. Makes debtor's mandatory documentation available for
inspection and copying to certain bankruptcy officers and any party in interest.
Requires debtors to furnish driver's license, passport, or other photograph-containing
documentation establishing debtor identification.
•

(Sec. 1005) Repeals the requirement that the family farmer and spouse receive over
50 percent of income from farming operations in the year before a bankruptcy
petition is filed. Allows such income requirement to be met during either the taxable
year preceding the year in which the bankruptcy petition is filed, or the taxable year
in the second and third taxable years preceding the bankruptcy petition.

•

(Sec. 1225) Denies an automatic stay with respect to creation or perfection of a
statutory lien for a special tax or special assessment on real property whether or not
ad valorem, if the tax or assessment comes due after the filing of a petition for debtor
relief.

•

(Sec. 1228) Prohibits a court from granting a discharge in a chapter 7 case, or from
confirming a reorganization plan in a chapter 11 or 13 case, unless requested tax
documents have been provided to the court.

•

(Sec. 1302) Requires additional disclosures for credit extensions secured by a
dwelling that exceed such dwelling's fair market value, as well as related credit
advertisements, including a statement that the interest on the excess portion of such
extension is not tax deductible for Federal income tax purposes.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Both business and consumer bankruptcies regularly pose challenging tax issues. Many of
these issues are often overlooked, much to the detriment of our bankruptcy clients. Fortunately,
more attention is paid to tax issues in the bankruptcy context than even ten y.ears ago. These
materials are designed to aid you in the robust representation of your client. Best of luck.
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Introduction
Article 9 of the Unifonn Commercial Code is the state law governing secured
transactions. In 1990, a Study Committee was formed to consider whether to recommend
revision Article 9 of the U.C.C. The revision process culminated in 1998, with the
promulgation of Revised Article 9. Today, Revised Article 9 is the law in alISO states
and the District of Columbia. Revised Article 9 represents the first major changes to the
statute since 1972.
Significant changes were made with respect to the statute's scope, substantive
rules and procedures. The objective of the revisions was to add greater certainty to
financing transactions, which would in turn reduce both transaction costs, and cost of
credit. The revisions made to Article 9 can be identified as falling within one of two
central frameworks: (i) changes that result in the expansion in scope of personal property
and transactions covered by Article 9; and (ii) changes that result in the simplification of
the creation, perfection, priority, and enforcement of security interests.
This Article addresses five issues that arise within these frameworks: (i) changes
in rules with respect to the requirements surrounding the debtor's name (ii) the rules
concerning consignments under Article 9; (iii) new interpretations of the rules concerning
the true sale vs. secured loan issue; (iv) the new Article 9 collateral type, deposit
accounts; and (v) the expansion of the concept of proceeds under Revised Article 9.
I.' Debtor's Name - Revised §§ 9- 503, 9-506, 9-508

Introduction
The filing system is designed to give prospective creditors notice of the debtor's
encumbered property. A prospective creditor will want to see if there are is public notice
of another creditor's claim to debtor's assets. Ifa search of the public records reveals a
financing statement, the searching creditor will want to review the description of the
collateral to determine what property of the debtor is encumbered. From the filing, the
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creditor should be able to obtain the basic contact information for the party having a
security interest listed in the financing statement.
The debtor's name is the center of the Article 9 filing system; filing offices index
financing statements according to the debtor's name and I searchers search for financing
statements under the debtor's name. A financing statement is required to include many
items of information, but because the statements are indexed according to the name of the
debtor, that is arguably the most crucial item of information to get right. 2
Under old Article 9, the test for determining whether a financing statement filed
under a particular name was effective was whether it was, relative to the "correct name,"
"seriously misleading." Human judgment was relevant in making such a determination
because courts considered whether a "reasonably diligent searcher" could discover the
erroneous filing. 3 The abandonment of the "reasonably diligent searcher" rule under
Revised Article 9 represents a change. Whereas the old manual search systems, could
identify certain variations in names, the computerized search logic now used by many
state filing offices, has considerably less tolerance for variations.
The Revised Article 9 rule, which recognizes the development of computerized
search systems, is not absolutely inflexible, however. Revised Section 9-506(a) provides,
"a financing substantially satisfying the requirements of this [provision] is effective, even
if it has minor errors or omissions, unless the errors or omissions make the financing
statement misleading.,,4 Generally, a financing statement is "seriously misleading" if it
1 "The filing office shall index an initial financing statement according to the name of the debtor
and index all filed records relating to the initial financing statement in a manner that associates
with one another an initial financing statement and all filed record relating to the initial
statement." U.C.C. § 9-519(c) (2004).

2

Section 9-502(a) provides, ... a financing statement is sufficient only if it:
(I) provides the name of the debtor;
(2) providesthe name of the secured party or a representative of the secured party; and
(3) indicates the collateral covered by the financing statement.

See. e.g., Knudson v. Dakota Bank and Trust Co., 929 F.2d 1280, 1283 (8 th eire 1991) (under
former Article 9, a financing statement is not seriously misleading if it "reasonably likely" that
searcher searching under the debtor's correct would find the financing statement).
3

4

Section 9-506 reads in full:

(a) Minor errors and omissions. A financing statement substantially satisfying the
requirements of this part is effective, even if it has minor errors or omissions, unless the errors or
omissions make the financing statement seriously misleading.
(b) Financing statement seriously misleading. Except as otherwise provides in
subsection (c), a financing statement that fails sufficiently to provide the name of the debtor in
accordance with Section 9-503(a) is seriously misleading.
(c) Financing statement not seriously misleading. If a search of the records of the
filing office under the debtor's correct name, using the filing office's standard search logic, if
any, would disclose a financing statement that fails sufficiently to provide the name of the debtor
in accordance with Section 9-503(a), the name provided does not make the financing statement
seriously misleading.
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fails to sufficiently provide the name of the debtor. 5 A financing statement indicating
something less than the debtor's correct name is not deemed seriously misleading, if"a
search of the records of the filing office under the debtor's correct name, using the filing
office's standard search logic" would reveal the financing statement. 6 Essentially,
Revised Article 9 "allows a searcher to rely on a single search conducted under the
correct name of the debtor and penalizes filers only for errors that result in nondisclosure
of the financing statement in a search under the correct name."? This standard is stricter
than that of former Article 9.
Although Revised Article 9 allows a searcher to rely on a single search conducted
under the correct name of the debtor, there are instances where it is in the best interest of
the searcher conduct a more extensive search to detect seriously misleading filings. In
some instances, a financing statement, which is found to be "seriously misleading" under
the computer search logic standard is nonetheless deemed to be effective.
To illustrate, under Revised Section 9-705, a financing statement filed prior to
July 1, 2001 remains effective until it lapses or June 30, 2006. What this means is that a
seriously misleading financing statement filed prior to July 1, 2001 remains effective
until the earlier of June 30, 2006 or its lapse date, even though the computer search logic,
using the stricter standard did not disclose the financing statement. 8 For this reason, it
remains necessary to continue search for "seriously misleading," but effective filings
until June 30, 2006.
Most states have adopted some form of the Model Administrative Rules (MARS),
providing strict search logic standard rules.9 The MARS search logic ignores
punctuation, accents, capitalization, spaces, and business form abbreviations. It does not,
however, recognize minor misspellings, common variations, or typographical errors as
being equivalent to the correct name of the debtor. Under the Revised 9-506(c) standard,
there is a greater risk of failure to perfect as a result of a misspelling of the debtor's

(d) "Debtor's correct name." For purposes of Section 9-508(b), the "debtor's correct
name" in section (c) means the correct name of the new debtor.
5

See § 9-506(b) (2001).

6

See § 9-506(c) (2001)

7

In re Kinderknec~t, 308 B.. R. 71 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004).

8 Some courts are not complying with § 9-705 and thereby not applying the former Article 9
standard to filings, which are not yet subject to Revised Article 9. Rather, they are improperly
applying the stricter computer search logic standard to filings filed prior to July 1, 2001. See e.g.,
In re Grabowski, 277 B.R. 388, 391 (Banke. S.D. Ill. 2002).

The Model Administrative Rules (MARS) appear at 'vvww.iaca.org/sts. Sixteen states, including
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, New Mexico, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin, have adopted some form of MARS.

9
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name: an error in the debtor's name is fatal if a search under the correctly spelled name,
using the office's standard search logic, does not locate the financing statement. to
Revised Article 9 calls for the secured party to file an amendment to its financing
statement when certain changed circumstances are present: when there is a change in the
name of the debtor or transfer of collateral to a new debtor. II Under Revised Section 9507(c), if a change in the name of the debtor makes a financing statement seriously
misleading, a financing statement amendment must be filed in the new name of the
debtor within four months of the name change then in order to perfect a security interest
in property acquired more than for months after the name change. 12 Where there is a
transfer of collateral to what is defined by Revised Article 9 as a "New Debtor" (one who
becomes bound by law or by contract by original debtor's security agreement),13 if the
New Debtor's name is sufficiently different from the old debtor's to make the filed
financing statement seriously misleading, the financing statement filed under the old
debtor's name will perfect the creditor's security interest in the collateral the transferee
has or acquires within 4 months the transfer. 14 In other words, if the financing statement
is seriously misleading because of the New Debtor's name, the filed financing statement
is NOT effective to perfect the creditor's interest in collateral the New Debtor acquires
more than fOUf months after being bound. 15 For continuous perfection, the creditor must
file an initial financing statement providing the-new name of the debtor before the
expiration of the fOUf month period. 16
A creditor's failure to correctly name the debtor in the financing statement can be
fatal if a bankruptcy petition is later filed by or against the debtor. Because it is the duty
ofa bankruptcy trustee to preserve cash and assets of the debtor's estate for the benefit of
the debtor's unsecured creditors, the trustee seeks to avoid unperfected security interests.

10

See § 9-506(c) (2001).

II

See 9-507(c) 9-508

12

Section 9-507(c) provides:

If a debtor so changes its name that a filed financing statement becomes seriously
misleading under Section 9-506:
(I) the financing statement is effective to perfect a security interest in collateral
acquired by the debtor before, or within four months after, the change; and
(2) the financing statement is not effective to perfect a security interest in
collateral acquired by the debtor more than four months after the change, unless an amendment to
the financing statement which renders the financing statement not seriously misleading is filed
within four months after the change.
13

See § 9-203(e) (2001).

14

See § 9-508 (2001).

15

See § 9-508(bX2) (2001).

16

Id
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The trustee scrutinizes the sufficiency and validity of any seCllrity interest asserted
against the debtor-in-bankruptcy's collateral, and will challenge the perfection and lien
position of such interest whenever possible. Where a financing statement fails to
correctly provide the name of the debtor and is not disclosed by the computer search
logic, the trustee can successfully challenge the filing as being ineffective. As a result, the
creditor's interest is treated as being unperfected and thereby an unsecured claim.

Sufficiency of the "debtor's name"

When is the name of the debtor, "sufficient"? Revised Section 9-503(a) sets forth
the standards for sufficiency some types of debtors. For example, the name of a debtor
who is a registered organization is the name "indicated on the public record of the
debtor's jurisdiction of organization which shows the debtor to have been organized." 17
The name of a decedent's estate is sufficient "if the financing statement provides the
name of the decedent and indicates that the debtor is an estat~.,,18 "A financing statement
sufficiently provides the name of a debtor, who is a trust or trustee, only if the financing
statement: (a) provides the name specified for the trust in its organic documents or, if no
name is specified, provides the name of the settlor and additional information sufficient
to distinguish the debtor from other trusts having one or more of the same settlers; and (b)
indicates, in the debtor's name or otherwise, that the debtor is a trust or is a trustee acting
with respect to property held in trust.,,19
The drafters also included a catchall provision, which provides that a financing
statement sufficiently provides the name of the debtor if the debtor has a name, only if
the provides the individual or organizational name of the debtor; and if the debtor does
not have a name, only if it provides the names of the partners, members, associates, or
20
other persons comprising the debtor.
So how do you determine what is an individual debtor's name? Do you look at
the name on the debtor's driver's license? Or her passport? Or her birth certificate? Or
the name a person is commonly known as? Imagine a situation where Mary Ellen
Smith's birth certificate reads, "Mary Ellen Jones," her driver's license reads, "Mary E.
Jones," her passport is Mary Ellen Smith (following nuptials to Jim (aka) James J.
Smith), and she is known in her community as Emmy Smith (M.E. Smith). What is this
debtor's correct name?

17

See § 9-503(a)(I) (2001).

18

§ 9-503(a)(2) (2001).

19

§ 9-503(a)(3)(A)-(B) (2001).

20

See § 9-503 (2001).
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Recent Case Law
In In Fe Spearing Tool and Manufacturing Co, 292 H.R. 579 (May 14, 2003),
on October 15, 2001 the IRS filed two notices of federal tax liens with the Michigan
Secretary of State under the name of "Spearing Tool & MFG Company." The debtor's
exact registered name was "Spearing Tool and Manufacturing Co." In making its
decision to make funding advances to the debtor between October 15, 2001 and April 6,
2002, plaintiff relied upon the fact that its search under the exact registered name of the
debtor did not disclose any liens, including the IRS's lien.
In an adversary proceeding, plaintiff petitioned for a determination of lien
priority, contending that IRSs liens were not properly filed with the Secretary of State's
office because they did not provide the exact registered name of debtor. Therefore the
filings were ineffective. The question considered by the court was whether IRS tax liens,
which satisfied the requirements of federal law, but did not satisfy state law requirements
regarding the sufficiency of the debtor's name on a financing statement, were ineffective.
The court observed that federal law, which only requires that the notice of tax lien
"identify the taxpayer," controls the form and content of tax lien notices. In holding that
the federal tax liens were effective, the court found that "there was no error in identifying
the taxpayer [and] ... the IRS used the accepted abbreviation for the word
Manufacturing." As further support for its conclusion, the court also pointed out that "the
debtor frequently used the Mfg. and MFG abbreviations in identifying itself ... and
plaintiff itself referred to the debtor as Spearing Tool and Mfg. in creditor narratives
prepared by one of its employees."

***
The varying degrees of tolerance built into the computerized search logic utilized
by the applicable filing offices, in some instances, can yield different results. For
example, in the Florida case of In re Summit Staffing Polk County, 305 B.R. 347
(October 15, 2003), the trustee sought determination of priority of her interest in the
debtor's account receivable. Associated Receivable Funding of Florida, Inc. had filed a
financing statement under the debtor's old name; it failed, however, to refile or amend the
financing statement to reflect the Mew Debtor resulting from the old debtor's
incorporation.
The facts of the case are as follows. On September 4, 2001, Associated
Receivable filed a financing statement with the Florida Secretary of State, naming
"Randy A. Vincent as the debtor, and Summit Staffing as an additional d~btor.,,21 The
addresses of both the debtor and the additional debtor were the same. On March 14,
2002, Summit Staffing Polk County, Inc. was incorporated and conducted the business
formerly conducted by Randy A. Vincent d/b/a Suinmit Staffing. Associated Receivable
loaned Summit Staffing Polk County, Inc. operating funds as it did with Randy A.
Vincent. The parties did not enter a new security agreement nor was a new financing
statement filed.

21

305 B.R. at 349.
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On October 16, 2002, Summit Staffing Polk County, Inc. petitioned for Chapter 7
bankruptcy. The trustee claimed priority to the debtor's only account receivable, which
was acquired more than four months after the debtor's name change, upon the ground
that when "she conducted a uee search ... using the actual corporate name of the
Debtor, Summit Staffing of Polk County, Inc," the search did not result in the disclosure
of Randy Vincent's financing statement and no secured interest in any of the Debtor's
assets was found." 22 The court, applying the computer search logic standard, held that
the Associated Receivables previously fued financing statement was not misleading
because a search under the correct name of the new debtor, "Summit Staffing of Polk,
Inc., which had an address of 5903 Charloma Drive, Lakeland, Florida, 33813 ...
disclosed the financing statement showing the debtor Summit Staffing" with exactly the
same address as the debtor in this case. 23 As further support for its conclusion, the court
stated, "whether the erroneous filing was actually found by the searcher or not ... [is of
no consequence, so long as] that filing would be disclosed in the results of a proper
search." The court also observed that a searcher using the Florida Secured Transaction
Registry is directed to "Use the Previous and Next buttons to display additional search
results . .. and should certainly do SO.,,24
In the neighboring jurisdiction of Georgia, the court in Receivables Purchasing
Co. Inc., v. R & R Directional Drilling, LLC, 263 Ga.App. 649 (October 16, 2003),
found that a financing statement filed against "Net work Solutions, Inc." rather than
"Network Solutions, Inc.," the exact corporate name of the debtor, was seriously
misleading under Revised Section 9-506(c): a search of the filing office's records using
its standard search method did not reveal the financing statement filed against the
incorrect name of the debtor.

The rulings of In re Summit Staffing Polk County and Receivables
Purchasing Co. Inc. illustrate that whether a financing statement is considered to be
seriously misleading under Revised Section 9-506(c) greatly depends on the level of
tolerance built into the computer search logic of the applicable filing office. The
computer search logic used by the Florida filing office in Summit Staffing Polk County
is an example of liberal search logic: it disclosed a financing statement filed under the
name of "Randy A. Vincent" and "Summit Staffing" where the name searched was
"Summit Staffing of Polk County." In contrast, the computer search logic used by the
Georgia filing office in Receivables Purchasing Co. Inc., failed to disclose a financing
statement in the name of "Network Solutions Inc." where the name searched was "Net
work Solutions Inc."

***
In a line of cases involving financing statements filed under the nickname of the
debtor, the courts addressed the question of whether such financing statements were
seriously misleading. For example, in In Fe Envin, 50 V.C.C. Rep.Serv.2d 933 (Bankr.
22Id
23

305 B.R. at 353.

24

305 B.R. at 354.
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D. Kan. 2003), the bankruptcy court ruled that a financing statement filed under the
name of "Mike Erwin," rather than "Michael A. Erwin," was not seriously misleading,
even though the search logic using the exact name of the debtor, "Michael A. Erwin," did
not disclose the financing statement filed under "Mike Erwin." The court's rationale for
deviating from the clear meaning of Revised Section 9-506(c) was that the drafters "d[id]
not give any specific criteria for the sufficiency of an individual's name" in Revised
Section 9-503. 25 The court observed that the "drafters clearly understood how to give
specific rules for debtor names, even requiring a debtor corporation's legal name.,,26
Accordingly, the court held that a financing statement filed against "Mike Erwin," the
name by which the debtor was generally known, fulfilled the notice function of the filing
system and would have been disclosed by a searcher, who "exercised some reasonable
due diligence" in conducting a search. 27
In In re Kinderknecht v. Deere and Co. 300 B.R. 47 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2003),
the Kansas Bankruptcy Court, using the same reasoning as it did in In re Erwin, found
that a financing statement filed against "Terry Kinderknecht," debtor's nickname, rather
than Terrance Kinderknecht, the debtor's formal legal name, was not seriously
misleading. The court not only noted that a reasonably diligent searcher would have
found the financing statement by searching "Terry," but also pointed out that the debtor
filed his Chapter petition 7 under the name of "Terry" rather than "Terrance, and the
debtor listed the secured debt at issue in his bankruptcy schedules.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court's ruling in Kinderknecht and
disavowed Erwin. 28 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit in Envin, 308 B.R. 71 (B.A.P. 10th
eire 2004), held that Kansas law (Revised 9-506(c)), required that a financing statement
against an individual debtor be filed against his or her legal name.

II. Consignments - Revised § 9-102(a)(20)

Introduction
Many manufacturers and suppliers sell their goods through consignment
transactions. In a consignment transaction, the manufacturer or supplier (consignor)
delivers his goods to a dealer (consignee) to sell to his customer. If the consignee sells
the goods, he must remit the proceeds to the consignor. If, however, the consignee does
not sell the goods, he must return them to the consignor or be liable for the price of the
goods. During the consignment, title to the goods remains in the consignor and passes
directly to the purchaser when the goods are sold.

25

50 vec Rep.Serv.2d 933.

26

Id

27

Id

28

See In re Kinderknecht, 308 B.R. 71 (B.A.P. loth Cir. 2004).
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The drafters of Revised Article 9 brought all consignments entirely under the
scope of Article 9 and removed non-security consignments from the purview ofUCe
Article 2. 29 Article 9 does, however, exclude certain consignment transactions from its
coverage. Non-Article 9 consignments include transaction in which the consignee is: (1)
engaged in the business under the same name of the seller, (2) an auctioneer, (3)
generally known by its creditor to be substantially engaged in selling goods of others.
Also, if the aggregate value of each of the consignor's deliveries is less than $1,000 or if
the goods were consumer goods in the hands of the consignor, the Article 9 filing rules
do not apply. Non-Article 9 consignments are usually bailments and consignors in such
transactions must look to the applicable state common law or statutory law to determine
its rights. On the other hand, if the transaction is an Article 9 consignment, Article 9
establishes "the rules pertaining to lien creditors, buyers, and attachment, perfection, and
priority of competing security interests [concerning Article 9] consigned goods.,,30 But it
does not govern "the relationship between the consignor and consignee.,,31 Simply
stated, Article 9 provides rules for "determining the rights and interests of third-party
creditors of, and purchasers of goods from, the consignee, but not. .. remedies of the
consignor [against the consignee. ],,32
Under Revised Section 9-319, "the consignee is deemed to have rights and title to
goods identical to those of the consignor," and thereby have the power to grant security
interests in the goods to its creditors. 33 Consequently, where the consignee has granted a
security interest in the goods to his creditors, the goods are subject to liens in bankruptcy,
unless the consignor has complied with the laws of Article 9. 34 Prior to the Article 9
revisions, consignors could protect itself against creditors of the consignee or the
consignee's trustee in bankruptcy by displaying a sign on the goods stating the
consignor~s interest (e.g., "property ofand consigned by LRL Manufacturing Co.") or
segregating the goods in an area designated as containing the consignor's property.
Although it does not harm the consignor to still require the consignee to clearly mark the
29 Revised Section 9-109(a)(4) provides, ''this article applies to a consignment." Section 2326(3), which dealt with non-security consignments, has been deleted from Article 2.

30

§ 9-109, Comment 6.

31Id
32Id
33

See § 9-319(a).

34

Section 9-319, Comment 2 provides:
For purposes of detennining the rights of certain third parties, the consignee is deemed to
acquire all rights and title that the consignor had, if the consignor's security interest is
unperfected. The consignee acquires these rights even though, as between the parties, it
purchases a limited interest in the goods (as would be the case in a true consignment,
under which the consignee acquires only the interest of a bailee). As a consequence of
this section, creditors of the consignee can acquire a judicial liens and security interests in
goods.
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goods because it is a good business practice, such markings will not protect the goods
from the reach of creditors and bankruptcy trustees if the consignor has not complied
with Article 9 filing requirements.
For purposes of perfection and priority, Article 9 consignments are treated as
purchase money security interests (PMSIs).35 Revised Section 9-1 03 (d) provides, "the
security interest of a consignor in goods that are subject of a consignment is a purchasemoney security interest in inventory.,,36 This does not mean that consignments are not
recognized under Revised Article 9. Instead, this means that the special perfection and
priority rules that have always governed PMSIs in inventory also govern consignments
under Revised Article 9. 37 The official comment 6 in § 9-103 explains that the drafters
intended to "obviate any need to set forth special priority rules applicable to the interest
of a consignor.,,38
"Purchase money collateral means goods or software that secures a purchase
money obligation incurred with respect to that collateral; and a purchase money
obligation is an obligation of an obligor incurred as all or part of the price of the
collateral or for value given to enable the debtor to acquire rights in our the use of the
collateral if the value is in fact so used.,,39 Simply stated, a purchase money security
interest in inventory is value given to the debtor solely to acquire rights in specifically
purchased new inventory. "The concept of purchase money security interest requires a
close nexus between the acquisition of collateral and the secured obligation. Thus, a
security interest does not qualify as a purchase-money security interest if a debtor
acquires property on unsecured credit and subsequently creates the security interest to
secure the price. ,,40
In order for a purchase money security interest in inventory to prevail over a
previously perfected security interest in inventory, the purchase money lender must: (1)
have filed a UCC-I financing statement prior to the time that the debtor possesses the
property; (2) send notice of the intended delivery to existing inventory financers (3)
within five years before the debtor receives possession of the property, which (4) tells the
recipient that the sender intends to acquire a PMSI inventory of the debtor and describes
such inventory.41 To prevail over the claims of consignee creditors or the trustee in
35

See § 9-1 03(d).

36Id.
"[Revised Section 9-324(b) and (c)] afford a means by which a purchase money security
interest in inventory can achieve priority over an earlier-filed security interest in the same
collateral." § 9-324, Comment 4.
37

38

§ 9-103, Comment 6.

39

§ 9-103(a).

40

§ 9-103, Comment 3.

41

See § 9-324(b).
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bankruptcy, a consignor must also comply with these rules. 42 In other words, a consignor
must take two steps before delivering the goods to the consignee. First, the consignor
must file a UCC-I financing statement that describes the consigned goods to be
delivered. The financing statement must be filed in the jurisdiction where the consignee
is organized. 43 Second, the seller must send notice to the creditors of the consignee
possessing a conflicting security interest. The notice must describe the consigned goods
and indicate that the consignor has a consignment interest in the goods. If the consignor
takes these two steps, he will defeat claims of the consignee's creditors. On the other
hand, if the consignor fails to comply with the Article 9 filing requirements, his goods
will be subject to the claims of the consignee's creditors.

Recent Case Law
Recent case law involving consignments governed by Article 9 illustrate the
adverse effects of a consignor's failure to comply with the filing requirements of Revised
Article 9.
In In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002), consignors
objected to the debtor's motion to sell consignment inventory. Prior to 1996, the debtor,
the largest full-line supplier of entertainment, obtained all inventory on a tenns basis. In
November 2001, when the debtor voluntarily petitioned for bankruptcy, it possessed
inventory w4ich it obtained under either terms relationships based on purchase invoices
or a consignment relationship based on distribution agreements. Under a terms
agreement, the debtor purchased inventory outright and thereby obtained title. Under a
consignment agreement, however, the title to the inventory remained with the vendorconsignor and the goods were not paid for until the debtor-consignee sold the products.
Although the debtor possessed two types of inventory, Le., terms and consignment, it did
not segregate the inventory. Inventory obtained by tenns or consignment was
"commingled and essentially indistinguishable as to whether it was held on a terms or a
consignment basis.,,44 The debtor did not post signs, "nor were there any markings on the
inventory that would indicate to an outside observer that some of the inventory held by
[the debtor] had been obtained on a consignment basis.,,45 As of the petition date, the
debtor had in its possession approximately $108 million worth ofinv~ntory of which
consigned goods accounted for less than 15 percent.
In determining whether to grant the consignee's motion to auction all its
inventory, including consigned inventory, the court opined that "the ability of the
[consignors] to assert their ownership rights against a creditor of the consignee in the
context of the consignment relationship formed by the Distribution Agreements was

42

See § 9-1 03(d), Comment 6.

43

See §§ 9-301(1) & 9-307.

44

279 B.R. at 116.

45

Id
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governed either by fonner [TJnifonn Commercial Code] (V.C.C.) § 2-326 46 (prior to July
1, 2001) or by revised §9-102(a)(20) (from July 1, 2001) [,which] ... also implicates
revised V.C.C. §§ 9-319(a) & 9-103(d).,,47 The court further opined that it did not need
to "decide which code provision applied in this case since the parties agreed that the
analysis of the contesting [consignors'] rights to the contested inventory remained the
same under either the former or the revised D.C.C. provisions as enacted in Califomia.,,48
Therefore, the question considered by the court was whether the consignee could be
considered a "merchant" under revised D.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20) or a "person conducting
business" ~der former V.C.C. § 2-326(3)(b).
The court indicated that the purpose of former V.C.C. § 2-326(3) and now revised

u.c.c. §§ 9-102(a)(20) & 9-319(a) was "to protect general creditors of the consignee
from claims of consignors that have undisclosed consignment that create secret liens on
the inventory.,,49 The court then found that to prevent application of former D.C.C. § 2326(3) and revised V.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20), the consignor must either have (I) filed a
UCC-I financing statement as required under U.C.C. Article 9 or 2 or (2) prove that the
debtor is generally known by his creditors to be s.ubstantially engaged in selling the goods
of others. Because the contesting consignors had not filed a UCC-I financing statement,
the court found that they had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence:

46

Former D.C.C. § 2-326 provides:

(1) Unless otherwise agreed, if delivered goods may be returned by the buyer even
though they conform to the contract, the transaction is ... (b) A "sale or return" if the goods are
delivered primarily for resale.

(2) Except as provided in subdivision (3), ... goods held on sale or return are subject to
[the claims of the buyer's creditors] while in the buyer's possession.
(3) Where goods are delivered to a person for sale and the person maintains a place of
business at which he or she deals in goods of the kind involved, under a name other than the name
of the person making the delivery, then with respect to claims of creditors of the person
conducting the business the goods are deemed to be on sale or return. The provisions of this
subdivision are applicable even though an agreement purports to reserve title to the person
making delivery until payment or resale or uses such words as "on consigriment" or "on
memorandum". However this subdivision is not applicable if the person making the delivery
does any of the following:
(a) Establishes that the person conducting the business is generally known by his or her
creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others.
(b) Complies with the filing provisions' of the division on secured transactions.

47

279 H.R. at 122.

48Id.
49

279 B.R. at 125.
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(1) that the debtor was substanti.ally engaged in selling the goods of others, and (2) that it
was generally known creditors of the debtor that this is the case.
In granting the debtor's motion to sell the consigned inventory, the court found
that the consignors had not met their burden because they did not demonstrate that a
majority of the creditors had actual knowledge that the debtor was substantially engaged
in selling the goods of others. The court also found that even if the contesting consignors
demonstrated that a majority of the creditors of the debtor "knew of the consignment
sales, they could not and did not show that [the debtor] was actually substantially
engaged in such sales ... [because] the percentage of consigned inventory for [the
debtor] was never more than 17.03 percent, which [was] below the 20 percent
threshold.,,50
In a case factually similar to Valley Media, the Chapter 7 Trustee in In Fe
Corvette Collection of Boston, 294 H.R. 409 (S.D. Fla. 2003), brought an adversary
proceeding to determine the priority and extent of alleged liens against motor vehicles
that owners had left with the bankrupt used car dealership. The debtor, a used Corvette
dealership, owned some of its inventory outright and held the rest on consignment. On
the bankruptcy petition date, the debtor had six Corvettes in its possession on
consignment of which three were pursuant to written consignment contracts and three
were pursuant to alleged oral consignment contracts. Rather than filing a UCC-I
financing statement or a recorded security agreement with the Florida Department of
Motor Vehicles, the consignors "withheld their respective Corvettes' title prior to placing
the Corvettes on consignment with the Debtor.,,51
The cotm observed that "three main issues must be determined" to assess the
validity of the Trustee's assertion that because the consignors failed to perfect their
interests, "[their] interests in the Corvettes [we]re unsecured and [could] be avoided
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(I), which vests the Trustee with the authority, as of the
date, to avoid any transfer or obligation of the Debtor which is avoidable by a
hypothetical creditor on a simple contract with a judicial lien on the property of the
Debtor unsatisfied as of the commencement of the case.,,52
The first issue [was] whether the [consignors] delivered to the Debtor the six
Corvettes. The second issue [was] whether the Debtor's creditors were aware that
the Debtor was substantially engaged in selling the goods of others because, if so,
the Debtor held the Corvettes on approval, thereby rendering the Corvettes
beyond the reach of the Debtor's creditors. Finally, regarding the orally
consigned vehicles, the last issue [was] whether the Statute of Frauds render[ed]
the oral consignment agreements unenforceable. 53
50

379 B.R. at 132.

51

294 B.R. at 411.

52

Id.

53

294 B.R. at 412.
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With respect to these issues the court held the following. First, the court ruled
that the physical delivery of the Corvettes to the debtor satisfied the delivery requirement
under the Florida U.C.C. and that delivery of the certificate of title was not necessary to
effectuate delivery of the goods for the purpose of consignment. Second, the court stated
as to consigned goods, the goods are subject to the claims of the debtor's creditors
because there is a presumption that the goods are held by the debtor "sale or return. ,,54
The court then, endorsing Valley Media, indicated that "consignor[s could] overcome this
presumption by proving (i) he or she has complied with an applicable law providing for a
consignor's interest or the like to be evidenced by a sign or (ii) he or she established that
the person conducting the business is generally known by his or creditors to substantially
engaged in selling.the goods of others, or (iii) he or she complied with the filing
provisions of the chapter on secured transactions.,,55 Because neither consignor filed a
UCC-I financing statement nor marked the Corvettes as consigned goods, they could
only overcome the presumption by establishing that the debtor was generally known by
his creditors as being engaged in consignment transaction. The court held that the
consignors did not meet this burden because their own testimony that "most of the
debtor's inventory was held on consignment and that everybody who wanted to sell a
Corvette knew that the debtor primarily sold consigned vehicles fell short of [their]
burden ...,,56 The defendant also failed to demonstrate that the majority of the debtor's
creditors actually knew that the debtor was engaged in the business of selling the goods
of others because "general knowledge in the industry was insufficient to prove
knowledge by a majority of creditors."s7 Lastly, the court ruled that the oral consignment
contracts were not barred by the Statute of Frauds. For these reasons, the court ruled that
that consigned goods were governed by Article 9 and the consignors had failed to perfect
their interest. Consequently, the Trustee could avoid their interest under § 544(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code.

54 294 B.R. at 413. The court noted that the Florida Statute § 672.326 recognizes two types of
consignments: "sale on approval" transaction and "sale or return consignment. In distinguishing
the two types of consignments, the court explained:
In a sale on approval transaction, the consignor delivers goods to the consignee primarily
for use. Fla. Stat. 672.326(1)(a). Goods held on approval are not subject to the claims of
the consignee's creditors until acceptance, and the consignor need not take any action to
protect its interest in the goods. On the other hand, in a sale or return consignment, the
consignor delivers goods to the consignee primarily for resale. Fla. Stat. 672.326(1)(b).
Goods held "sale or return" are subject to the claims of the consignee's creditors. Id
55294 B.R. at414.
56

I d.

57 294 B.R. at 415. The majority of creditors are determined by the number of creditors, not by
the amount of their claims. Id
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III. True Sale or Transfer of Collateral?

Introduction
A perennially Article 9 "hot topic" is whether an asset transfer is a "true sale" or a
transfer of collateral in connection with a secured loan. This issue arises most frequently
in the securitization context. In a typical securitization, °a firm, known as the "originator"
transfers rights to payment from receivables to a special purpose entity ("SPE.") The SPE
in turn, sells securities backed by the receivables (known as asset-backed securities, or
ABS) to investors. The investors are paid from collections on the receivables.
A central issue for participants in securitization transactions is whether, upon a
securitization originator's bankruptcy, the transferred assets will be included in the
originator's bankruptcy estate. What property is included in a debtor's bankruptcy estate is
at the center of the bankruptcy process. Estate property is used to satisfy creditor claims,
and it may be used, sold, leased, or borrowed against (subject, in certain cases, to secured
parties being provided with adequate protection), and it may be required to be returned to
the estate if in the hands of third parties. Estate assets are subject to the automatic stay and
court permission is required before any party with a claim can act upon them.
If however, the assets are deemed sold, the debtor no longer has use of or access to
them. Both the reorganizing debtor (needing assets to accomplish its reorganization (and
especially liquid assets)) as well as debtor's other creditors (who are entitled to recover
what is owed to them from the debtor's estate assets) are motivated to challenge the
purported "true sale" of tranSferred assets. Accordingly, once bankruptcy is filed, the
trustee (under the supervision of the court) will carefully examine all of the originator's
prior transactions.
The Bankruptcy Code has conventionally relied upon non-bankruptcy law to define
the property rights of parties to a bankruptcy. 58 When what is at issue is whether a transfer
of Article 9 assets are properly included in the transferee's bankruptcy estate, the question
of the nature of the transfer, as well as the steps needed to be taken to establish .the
transferee's property rights, have always been non-bankruptcy-Iaw determinations.

Revised Article 9
Revised Article 9 includes a new section that purportedly speaks to the true sale
issue. Section 9-318 reads:
No Interest Retained in Right to Payment That is Sold; Rights and Title of
Seller of Accounts or Chattel Paper with Respect to Creditors and Purchasers,

The debtor's estate, as defined under section 541(a) is comprised of "interests of the debtor in
property." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1997).

58
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(a) Seller retains no interest. .f\. debtor that has sold an account, chattel paper,
payment intangible, or promissory note does not retain a legal or equitable interest
in the collateral sold.

(b) Deemed rights of debtor if buyer's security interest unperfected. For
purposes of determining the rights of creditors of, and purchasers for value or an
account or chattel paper from, a debtor that has sold an account or chattel paper,
while the buyer's security interest is unperfected, the debtor is deemed to have
rights and title to the account or chattel paper identical to those the debtor sold. 59
This provision was included in the Revision, largely in response to the holding in
Octagon Gas Systems v. Rimmer (In Fe Meridian Reserve, Inc.), 995 F.2d 948 (10th
eire 1993),60 in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that
property sold by the debtor prior to its bankruptcy was included in debtor's bankruptcy
estate. The Tenth Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of
11 estate" in United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203-205 (1994), in
concluding that, because property of the estate includes property subject to a security
interest, and because the sales of accounts are governed by the law governing transfers of
security interests, accounts sold remain property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate. 61
Indeed, the Octagon decision, 62 coupled with the uncertainty surrounding both the issue
of asset classification and the scope of Article 9, led the PEB Drafting Committee to
make a series of substantive changes· to Article 9 to address the risk to originators and
investors engaging in securitization transactions. 63 One such change was the inclusion of
Section 9-318.
Revised Section 9-318 makes clear that "true sales" of assets remove such assets
from the estate, provided the transfer is perfected. Section 9-318, however, does not
determine whether an asset transfer is a true sale. Official Comment 2 notes that,
"[n]either this Article nor the definition of "security interest" in section 1-201 provides
rules for distinguishing sales transactions from those that create a security interest
securing an obligation. ,,64 Thus, this remains a determination to be made by courts on a
case-by-case basis.

59

u.c.c. § 9-318 (2001).

In Octagon, the transferee did not file a financing statement to perfect its interest, leaving it
vulnerable to avoidance by the bankruptcy trustee, pursuant to its § 544(a) lien avoidance powers.
It is possible, however, that the transferee was automatically perfected under § 9-302(I)(e)
(providing for the automatic perfection of certain isolated and small transfers of accounts).
60

61

Octagon, 995 F.2d 948, 955.

62 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Octagon Gas Ruling Creates Turmoil for Commercial and AssetBased Finance, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 4, 1993, at 1, 2 (sharply criticizing the Octagon decision).

63

64

See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE D.C.C., ARTICLE 9 REpORT 181-84 (1992).
U.C.C § 9-318 cmt. 2. (2001).
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Courts and the True Sale v. Collateral Transfer Dilemma
In addressing the collateral transfer v. true sale issue, courts have tried to balance
the rights of asset transferees against the interests of the debtor's general creditors who
may not be aware that the debtor no longer owns what appears to be its income stream. 65
Because a "true sale" of a debtor's accounts can be structured in a way that takes on
certain aspects of a secured loan, courts have looked behind the formal structure of a
documented "sale" and, if certain factors are present, treat the buyer's interest as a lien
rather than an ownership right. Even in light of parties' characterization of an asset
transfer as a true sale, courts will independently examine the substance of the
transaction. 66 See Reaves Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Sunbett Fruit & Vegetable Co., Inc.,
336 F.3d 410 (5 th Cir. 2003) (stating that "[c]haracterization of the agreement at issue
turns on "the substance of the relationship" . . . "not simply the label attached to the
transaction").
Courts have historically decided whether a particular transfer is an assignment of
collateral or a true sale based upon the presence (or absence) of the following factors: (i)
residual interests retained by the transferor, (ii) transfer price set at fair market value by
independent appraisers, (iii) recourse to the asset transferor, (iv) the acquisition of
dominion and control over the assets by the transferee, (v) the transfer of the benefits and
burdens of o~ership by the transferee, and (vi) the intent of the parties as expressed in
their writings. See, e.g., Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.
2d 538, 542-44 (3d Cir. 1979) (describing the factors relevant to the determination of the
existence of a true sale, and finding that because the agreement between the parties
allocated the risk of account non-payment to the seller, the transaction was a loan); In re
Cornet Capital Corp., 142 H.R. 78 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1992) (transaction was a secured
loan because of transferee's payment of interest to purchasers of interests,
notwithstanding transferor's default); In re Evergreen Valley Resort, Inc. 23 H.R. 659
(Bankr. D. Maine 1982) (transaction was a secured loan due to debtor's retained
interest); In re Hurricane Elkhorn Coal Corporation, 19 B.R. 609 (W.D. Ky 1982)
(transaction was a secured loan because of debtors retained interest); Federated Dept.
Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 500, 511 (1968), affd, 426 F.2d 417 (6th eire
1970) (because transferor retained some risk, transfer was deemed to be a collateral
assignment); Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies v. Grover (In Fe Woodson Co.), 813
F.2d 266, 272 (9th Cir. 1987) (transferor retention of risk, coupled with lending interest
rate, suggested a loan, rather than a sale); Bear v. Coben (In re Golden Plan of
California, Inc.), 829 F.2d 705, 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1986).

Whether or not the transfer is a true sale, if the asset is governed by Article 9, the transferee
must give notice of the transfer by filing a financing statement.

65

66 "So long as people do not mean what they say or do not say what they mean, there will be
enough uncertainty to keep everyone busy hiding intent and obfuscating meaning." In re Winston
Mills, Inc., 6 B.R. 587, 596 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980), cited in In re Best Products Co., Inc., 157
B.R. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (in which the court analyzed whether a transaction was a lease, or a
secured financing).
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Many securitization transactions, however, include a mix of factors, some
suggesting a true sale and others suggesting a collateral transfer. While parties may
intend one characterization, the facts and circumstances of the transfer may suggest
another. See Castle Rock Indus. Bank v. S.O.A.W. Enters., Inc. (In Fe S.Q.A.W.
Enters., Inc.), 32 B.R. 279, 283 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1983) (notwithstanding the parties'
characterization as a sale, a participation agreement was determined to be a loan
transaction); Boerner v. Colwell Co., 577 P.2d 200, 204-205 (Cal. 1978) (transfer of
construction contracts deemed to be a sale and not a loan).
The court in the recent case Reaves Brokerage Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Sunbelt
Fruit & Vegetable Co., Inc., 336 F.3d 410 (5 th Cir. 2003), relying upon the analysis in
Endico Potatoes v. CIT GrouplFactoring, Inc., 67 F.3d 1063 (2d. Cir. 1995), identified
the "transfer of risk" as the salient determining factor:
The root of all of these factors is the transfer of risk. Where the lender has
purchased the accounts receivable, the borrower's debt is extinguished and
the lender's risk with regard to the performance of the accounts is direct,
that is, the lender and not the borrower bears the risk of non-performance by
the account debtor. If the lender holds only a security interest, however, the
lender's risk is derivative or secondary, that is, the borrower remains liable
for the debt and bears the risk of non-payment by the account debtor, while
the lender only bears the risk that the account debtor's non-payment will
leave the borrower unable to satisfy the loan. 67
The parties to the asset transfer transactions in Reaves Brokerage characterized
their transfers as sales of accounts. The transferee was referred to in the so-called
factoring agreement as "absolute owners of all accounts." The agreement further
described the transfers using many terms consistent with a "true sale."
The court did not stop its analysis with the parties' and the contract's
characterization of the transaction, however. It found that the transferee had full recourse
against the transferor in the event of underperformance or non-payment of the transferred
accounts. Moreover, the parties' arrangement included a system of "advances" against
the value of the accounts - similar to a revolving line a credit. In addition, the financing
statement filed by the account transferee included assets beyond the accounts purported
to be "sold.,,68 Recognizing that the "distinction between purchase and lending
transactions can be blurred," and limiting its holding "to the facts and arguments of this
admittedly close case," the court found the account transfer to be a a secured transaction,
rather than a "true sale. ,,69

67

67 F.3d 1063, 1069.

68 The financing statement listed collateral including, "accounts, contract rights, instruments,
documents, chattel paper" and other "general intangibles." Id. at 416.

Id. at [417]. The court also made clear that it was "guided by the policies behind {Perishable
Commodities] PACA, which mandate protection of suppliers of fresh fruit and other perishable
commodities. We express no opinion on the proper construction of factoring agreements in 000PACA contexts."

69
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Interestingly, in Carter. v Four Seasons Funding Corporation, 351 Ark. 637
(2003), the court identified the intent of the parties, as evidenced by the "surrounding
facts and circumstances," as the determining factor as to whether the transfer at issue was
a true sale or a transfer of collateral, even after finding clear evidence of retained risk on
the part of the seller. Because the parties expressed a clear intent to engage in a sales
transaction and not a secured loan, the court concluded the transaction was a sale. The
court explained its conclusion:
The Purchase Agreement at issue was the result of negotiations between
two sophisticated business entities. The terms of the agreement expressly
contemplated the sale of account receivables at a discount - a common
means of raising capital. Looking at the agreement itself and the actions of
the parties, we discern no basis for a reversal of the circuit court on grounds
that it clearly erred in finding that the parties agreed to- a sale of accounts
receivable. To us, it is clear that the parties intended a factoring agreement
and an analysis of all relevant factors confirms our conclusion. Moreover,
we agree with the circuit court that the appellants failed to meet their burden
of proof by clear and convincing evidence that the financial arrangement
was a subterfuge for usurious loans. To conclude as appellants would have
us do under these facts would be to cast legal doubt on the business of
factoring accounts receivable as a means of raising capital. This we are not
inclined to do. 7o
-

State Statues: It's a True Sale Because I Say It Is
Some states have attempted to remove discretion from state courts as to whether a
particular asset transfers is a true sale or collateral transfer. For example, Delaware's
Asset-Backed Securities Facilitation Act reads in part: 1. Any property, assets or rights purported to be transferred, in whole or in
part, in the securitization transaction shall be deemed to no longer be the
property, assets or rights of the transferor;
2. A transferor in the securitization transaction, its creditors or, in any
insolvency proceeding with respect to the transferor or the transferor's
property, a bankruptcy trustee, receiver, debtor, or debtor in possession
or similar person, to the extent the issue is governed by Delaware law,
shall have no rights, legal or equitable, whatsoever to reacquire, reclaim,
recover, repudiate, disaffirm, redeem or recharacterize as property of the
transferor any property, assets or rights purported to be transferred, in
whole or in part, by the transferor; and

70

351 Ark, at 661.

B - 19

3. In the event of a bankruptcy, receivership or other insolvency proceeding
with respect to the transferor or the transferor's property, to the extent the
issue is governed by Delaware law, such property, assets and rights shall
not be deemed to be part of the transferor's property, assets, rights or
estate. 71

Similar provisions have been included as non-uniform amendments to Article 9 in
Alabama,72 Ohio,73 South Dakota,74 Texas,75 and Vriginia. 76 These provisions were
designed to statutorily define when a transfer is true sale, based solely on the intention of
the parties to engage in a securitization.77 Would a federal court be bound by these
statutes?

Bankruptcy Courts' Equitable Powers
Recently, a bankruptcy court demonstrated a willingness to rely upon its equitable
powers to decide that the assets the debtor transferred and initially characterized as
securitized, were property of th~ debtor's bankruptcy estate. See In re LTV Steel Co.,
274 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001). The court, after weighing the interests of the
affected parties, observed that if debtor was unable to access its liquid receivables, it
would have immediately ceased business operations. With respect to the issue of whether
the securitized assets were property of the estate, the court said:
... there seems to be an element of sophistry to suggest that the Debtor does
. not retain at least an equitable interest in the property that is subject to the
interim order. Debtor's business requires it to purchase, melt, mold and cast
various metal products. To suggest that Debtor lacks some ownership
interest in products that it creates with its own labor, as well as the proceeds
to be derived from that labor, is difficult to accept. Accordingly, the court
concludes that Debtor has at least some equitable interest in the inventory and
receivables, and that this interest is property of the Debtor's estate. This
equitable interest is sufficient to support the entry of the interim cash
collateral order. Finally, it is readily apparent that granting Abbey National
71

6 Del. C. § 2703A (2004).

72

Code of Ala. § 35-IOA(2) (2004).

73

ORC Ann. 1109.75 (2004).

74

S.D. Codified Laws § 54-1-10 (2003).

75

Texas Utilities Code § 39.308 (2004).

76

2004 Va. ALS 600.

See also N.C. Gen. Stat § 53-426 (2004) (declaring all securitization transfers to be true sales
when the originator is a bank); MCLS § 460.10 (2004) (declaring public utility securitization
tr~sfers to be true sales); R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-1-59 (2004) (declaring public utility securitization
transfers to be true sales).
77
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relief from the interim cash collateral order would be highly inequitable. The
Court is satisfied that the entry of the interim order was necessary to enable
Debtor to keep its doors open and continue to meet its obligations to its
employees, retirees, customers and creditors. Allowing Abbey National to
modify the order would allow Abbey National to enforce its state law rights
as a secured lender to look to the collateral in satisfaction of this debt. This
circumstance would put an end to Debtor's business, would put thousands of
people out of work, would deprive 100,000 retirees of needed medical
benefits, and would have more far reaching economic effects on the
geographic areas where Debtor does business . . . .
Prior to the court's ultimate resolution of this issue, the parties reached a
settlement. The court's apparent willingness, in the name of equity, to return transferred
assets to the debtor's bankruptcy estate in order to facilitate debtor's reorganization sent
shock waves through the securitization markets. The final chapter on the extent to which
bankruptcy courts will exercise their equitable powers in this context is not yet written.

Bankruptcy Reform Legislation - Withdrawn
The uncertainty surrounding the true sale issue led to the introduction, as part of
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of2001, of an amendment to Section 541 defining "property
of the estate. 78 Section 912 was an attempt to federalize the issue of whether the transfer
of receivables is a true sale or collateral transfer. 79 The proposed language makes clear
The debtor's estate, as defined under section 54 1(a) is comprised of "interests of the debtor in
property." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1997).

78

79 Section 912 of The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 200 1
(Introduced in the House on Jan. 30, 2001 and subsequently withdrawn) reads:
SEC. 912. ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATIONS.
Section 541 oftitle 11, United States Code, is amended in subsection (b) by inserting after
paragraph (7), as added by this Act, the following:
(8) any eligible asset (or proceeds thereof), to the extent that such eligible asset was
transferred by the debtor, before the date of commencement of the case, to an eligible entity in
connection with an asset-backed securitization, except to the extent such assets (or proceeds or
value thereof) may be recovered by the trustee under section 550 by virtue of avoidance under
section 548(a); and by adding at the end the following new subsection
(f) For purposes of this section, The term "asset-backed securitization" means a
transaction in which eligible assets transferred to an eligible entity are used as the source of
payment on securities, including, without li~itation, all securities issued by governmental units,
at least one class or tranche of which was rated investment grade by one or more nationally
recognized securities rating organizations, when the securities were initially issued by an issuer;
The term "eligible assef' means-financial assets (including interests therein and proceeds thereot), either fixed or revolving,
whether or not the same are in existence as of the date of the transfer, including residential and
commercial mortgage loans, consumer receivables, trade receivables, assets of governmental
units, including payment obligations relating to taxes, receipts, fines, tickets, and other sources of
revenue, and lease receivables, that, by their terms, convert into cash within a finite period, plus
any residual interest in property subject to receivables included in such financing assets plus any
rights or other assets designed to assure the servicing or timely distribution of proceeds to
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that notwithstandit:tg how the transfer would be characterized by a court under state law,
if the parties represent in writing that a sale was intended, the parties formal
characterization would control (provided certain defmed criteria were met).
For
example, whether or not the debtor retains some of the risk of ownership or the transferee
retains recourse rights against the debtor, the parties' declaration of the asset transfer as a
sale would make it so.80 After much controversy and public discussion, Section 912 was
security holders;
(B) cash; and
(C) securities, including, without limitation, all securities issued by governmental units;
(1)
The term "eligible entity" means-(A) an issuer; or
(B) a trust, corporation, partnership, governmental unit. Limited liability
company (including a single member limited.liahilitycompany), or other entity
engaged exclusively in the business of acquiring and transferring eligible assets
directly or indirectly to an issuer and taking actions ancillary thereto;
(2)
The term "issuer" means a trust, corporation, partnership, or other entity engaged
exclusively in the business of acquiring and holding eligible assets, issuing securities
backed by eligible assets, and taking actions ancillary thereto; and
(3)
The term "transferred" means, the debtor, under a written agreement, represented
and warranted that eligible assets were sold, contributed, or otherwise conveyed with
the intention of removing them from the estate of the debtor pursuant to subsection
(b)(8) (whether or not reference is made to this title or any section hereof),
irrespective and without limitation of -(A) whether the debtor directly or indirectly obtained or held an interest in the issuer
or in any securities issued by the issuer;
(B) whether the debtor had an obligation to repurchase or to service or supervise the
servicing of all or any portion of such eligible assets; or
(C) the characterization of such sale, contribution, or other conveyance for tax,
accounting, regulatory reporting or other purposes.
H.R. 333, available at <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/querylD?cl07:1:./temp/--cI07d6pxiR:e438814:.htm>
Subsection (1) of proposed section 912 purported to allow the trustee to recover transferred
assets for the estate under section 550 "by virtue of avoidance under section 548(a)." The
negative inference in this language seems to be that these excluded "eligible assets" are beyond
the reach of the trust~e's other powers to recover assets transferred by the debtor --specifically,
those provided for in sections of the law other than section 548. Section 548(a) avoidance is
limited to giving the bankruptcy trustee the right to recover for the estate transfers by the debtor
that are deemed to be fraudulent made within one-year of bankruptcy filing. The other important
avoidance powers include section 544(a)(I) (which provides for the avoidance of unperfected
security interests) and section 547 (which provides for the avoidance of transfers that result in a
preference for one creditor over all other creditors as a group). In particular, section 544(aXl)
allows the bankruptcy trustee to avoid unperfected transfers of accounts when the creditor has not
"perfected" its transfer by a simple notice filing. Even in the case of a true sale of accounts, a
judgment lien creditor would have state law priority in transferred account assets when the
"buyer" fails to file a financing statement. Under this provision, that same unperfected buyer
(assuming a true sale of accounts) would be safe from challenge in bankruptcy. The proposed
language that makes these federalized "true sales" immune from section 544(a)(I) avoidance is a
significant departure from bankruptcy law's historic deference to state law.
80
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ultimat~ly withdrawn from the Bankruptcy Reform bill. This provision would have
compelled courts to accept the parties' characterization of a transfer as a true sale, even in
the face of incontrovertible evidence of a secured lending.

Legal Opinions
Because the definitive determination of the collateral transfer v. true sale issue is
so uncertain, lawyers have historically been reluctant (and in some instances, unwilling)
to unqualifiedly conclude in legal opinions that a specific asset transfer is a true sale. 81
Indeed, in recent testimony before Congress addressing the "true sale" issue, it was
observed:
In order to obtain sales treatment under the relevant accounting standards,
participants in mortgage-backed and asset-backed securitization transactions
must obtain assurances from counsel that the sale of assets will be final under
applicable bankruptcy law. Such legal advice is referred to as a "true sale
opinion." Unfortunately, there is a lack of guiding judicial precedent
regarding what constitutes such a true sale of assets. .The considerations in
the analysis are highly subjective and depend upon a qualitative assessment
of a wide variety of facts and circumstances. For these and· other reasons,
any true sale opinion will generally be a reasoned one, with various
assuJ1.1ptions as to factual matters and conclusions that introduce an
unnecessary degree of legal uncertainty in the asset-backed market. As a
result, for some types of transactions, true sale opinions can be extremely
difficult, costly, and in a few cases, impossible to render. 82

IV. Deposit Accounts § 9-102(a)(29)
Introduction
Under Revised Article 9, a creditor can now take an original security interest in a
business debtor's deposit accounts. 83 Under former Article 9, deposit accounts were
81 See generally Robert J. Harter, Jr. & Kenneth N. Klee, The Impact ofthe New Bankruptcy Code
on the "Bankruptcy Out" in Legal Opinions, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 277 (1979); Special
Committee on Legal Opinions in Commercial Transactions, New York City County Lawyer's
Ass'n in Cooperation with The Corporation Law Committee of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of
New York and The Corporation Law Committee of the Banking, Corporation and Business
Section, New York State Bar Ass'n, Legal Opinions to Third Parties: An Easier Path, 34 Bus.
LAW 1891 (1979).

See United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative
Oversight and The Courts: Hearings Regarding the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 10dh Congress
(March 18, 1999) (statement of Seth Grosshandler, Partner, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton),
available at <http://wv.'\v.house.govljudiciary/l 06-gros-htm>
82

§ 9-109, Comment 16 ("except in consumer transactions, deposit accounts may be taken as
original collateral under this Article").

83
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expressly ~xcluded from collateral that a creditor could take an original security interest
in, but were often captured by the creditor as proceeds of other original collateral. 84
Moreover, a number of states enacted non-uniform amendments to old Article 9,
including deposit accounts as potential Article 9-govemed collateral. 85 Consequently,
secured lenders rarely attempted to take a security interest in deposit accounts, which
frequently represent a large portion of an individual's or organization's wealth.
Revised Section 9-102(a)(29) defines "deposit accounts" as a "demand, time
savings, passbook, or similar account maintained with a bank.,,86 Deposit accounts do
not include investment property, such as stocks, or accol:lIlts evidenced by an instrument,
such as certificated CDs. 87 Revised Article 9 allows creditors to take a security interest in
a deposit account held by debtors, except in connection with consumer transactions. 88 A
consumer transaction is one in which both the obligation incurred and the collateral
acquired are primarily for personal, family, or household use. 89 A lender can, however,
take a security interest in a consumer's deposit account in a business transaction. It is
also important to note that a secured party that has not expressly or directly taken a
security interest in a deposit account may nevertheless have an interest in such an account
as proceeds.
The law of the depositary bank's jurisdiction governs perfection and priority of
security-interests in deposit accounts, unless the parties· agree upon another jurisdiction.9o
To perfect a security interest in a deposit acco~t held by a non-consumer, commercial
debtor, the lender must "control" the account. 91 A security interest in a deposit account
cannot be perfected by filing a UCC-l financin~ statement: control is the only way to
perfect a security interest in a deposit account. 9
Revised Section 9-104 sets forth the different methods of gaining control of a
depositary account. 93 If the secured party is also the depositary bank in which the deposit

84

See Fonner Section 9-104(1).

85 See e.g., former California U.C.C. § 9-104, § 9-302; former Hawaii U.C.C. § 9-104, § 9302(1)(h); former Idaho § 9-104, § 9-302(1)0); former Illinois U.C.C. § 9-104, § 9-302(1)(h);
former Louisiana U.C.C. § 9-104, § 9-305(4).
86

§ 9-109(a)(29).

87

See Id.

88

See § 9-109(d)(13).

89

See § 9-102(a)(26).

90

§ 9-304(a) - (b).

91

§ 9-314.

92

See § 9-312(b)(I).

93

See § 9-104.
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account is maintained, control is automatic. 94 If, on the other hand, the secured party is
not the depositary bank, the secured party may obtain control either by: (1) obtaining an
authenticated agreement under which the depositary bank agrees to "comply with
instructions originated by the secured party directing disposition of the funds in the
deposit account without further consent by the debtor; or [(2)] becoming the [depositary]
bank's customer with respect to the deposit account, [in which case the secured party
would be entitled to withdraw funds from the account].,,95 By becoming the bank's
customer, the secured party acquires the rights of customer under Dee Article 4 rather
than solely the rights of a secured party under Article 9. Even if the debtor has the right
to withdraw funds from the deposit account, the secured party is still deemed to have
control over the account. 96 The method used by the secured party to control the deposit
account is critical because methods of control are treated differently for the purpose of
determining priority.
As a general rule, the party who has control of the deposit account has priority, .
and ifmore than one party has control, the party that first obtained control has priority.97
The exception to the general rule, however, is that a depositary bank's right of setoff or
recoupment will always prevail over a competing security interest, unless the secured
party gained control by becoming the bank's customer with respect to the account. 98
Simply stated, a secured party that gains control over a deposit account by placing its
name on the account jumps ahead of all other secured lenders and the recoupment and
setoff rights of the depositary bank. Where the secured party has perfected by a control
agreement, the bank's rights will prevail unless the lender obtained a subordination
agreement from the bank. 99 Finally, the interest of a secured party who has an interest in
a deposit account as rcroceeds will always be defeated by secured parties who have
perfected by control. 00

94

§ 9-104(a)(2).

95

§ 9-104(a)(2)-(3).

96

§ 9-104(b).

97 § 9-327. "Security interests perfected by control (Section 9-314, 9-104) take priority over those
perfected otherwise ...'~ § 9-327, Comment 3.

§ 9-327, Comment 4 states, "the security interest of the bank with which the deposit account is
maintained normally takes priority over all other conflicting security interests in the deposit
account ... A secured party who takes a security interest in the deposit account as original
collateral can protect itself against the results of this rule in one of two one ways. It can take
control of the deposit account by becoming the bank's customer ... Alternatively, the secured
party can obtain a subordination agreement from the bank."
99 See §9-327, Comment 4.
98

100Id
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Recent Case LaHJ

In In re E-Z Serve Convenience Stores, 299 B.R. 126 (M.D.N.C. 2003), a debtor
granted a security interest in its "present and hereafter acquired inventory; present and
future accounts; present and future documents of title; present and future general
intangibles; present and future subsidiary collateral; and present and future other
collateral." In preparation for its bankruptcy filing, the debtor hired legal counsel and
made advance payments totaling $790.000 ("retainer"). After rendering several months
of service, the debtor's legal counsel was informed by the Trustee that their services were
no longer needed. At this time, counsel held a retaining balance of$186,546.96. In
response to counsel's motion to withdraw and transfer funds, the debtor's secured
creditor filed a limited objection, contending that it had a secured and perfected security
interest in the debtor's right to the remaining portion of the retainer because the retainer
was a general intangible.
In rebuttal, the Trustee argued that the secured creditor did not have a perfected
security interest in the remaining portion of the retainer because "the asset is a deposit
account'" of the debtor that is controlled by [legal counsel] and the secured creditor did
not have a perfected interest in that deposit account on the petition date.
The court began its analysis by recognizing that the vee definition of deposit
account is "a demand, time, savings, passbook, or similar account maintained with a
bank." The court then determined that the debtor's interest in the retainer was not a
deposit account for several reasons. First, the funds were held in a trust account by legal
counsel, not a bank. Although the trust account may have been legal counsel's deposit
account, it was not the debtor's account. Finally, numerous courts have found that a right
to a refund is a general intangible. For these reasons, the court concluded that the
unearned portion of the retainer held by the debtor's legal counsel was a general
intangible and not a deposit account.
In Sonic Engineering, Inc v. Konover Constr Co, 51 uec Rep.Serv.2d 844
(Conn. Super. Ct 2003), debtor granted a security interest in a deposit account. The
question considered by the court was whether a judgment creditor or a secured creditor
had priority to the deposit account. In November 2002, Sonic obtained a judgment
against Konover Construction and sent a state marshal to carry out a bank execution. The
marshal obtained a check in the requested amount but was asked by a bank employee not
to do anything with the check for 24 hours, in order to give the bank to ensure that the
execution was proper. Several hours later, a bank employee left the marshal a message
indicating that the check should be returned because the debtor had signed a control
agreement pledging the account as collateral to another creditor. The marshal deposited
the check anyway, but was unable to obtain the funds because the bank had placed a stop
payment on the check.
On January 28, 2003, Michael Konver signed a loan agreement under which he
agreed to loan Konover Construction Company an amount not to exceed two million
dollars. Pursuant to the loan agreement, Konover Construction Company signed a
revolving loan promissory not, and a control agreement was signed by Michael Konover,
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the president of KODover Construction Company, 'and the depository bank. The court
observed that "the control agreement was clearly intended to comply with the provisions
of § 9-104 of the Uniform Commercial Code in order to establish a security interest in
[Konover Construction Company] bank account in favor of Michael Konver."IOl
Sonic argued that its interest had priority to the deposit account because it was a
holder in due course. The court, however, found that Sonic was not a holder in due
course because it never possessed the instrument, and even if "the marshal should be
deemed to have been at least in part acting as agent of Sonic, then Sonic had notice of a
potential claim. In ruling that the secured creditor had priority to the deposit account, the
court concluded that the secured creditor satisfied the § 9-203(b) requirements by
advancing $700.000 to the debtor and controlling the deposit account collateral pursuant
to §9-104, although the debtor was able to draw funds from the deposit account

v.

Proceeds - Revised § 9-102(a)(64)

Introduction
Revised Section 9-102(a)(64) defines "proceeds" as "whatever is acquired upon the
sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition of collateral," "whatever is collected on,
or distributed on account of, collateral, as well as all "rights arising out of collateral.,,102
This definition, in eliminating the requirement that an asset can only rise to the level of
proceeds as a result of a disposition of the original collateral, reflects an expanded
conception of proceeds. 103 "Proceeds" now has the Eotential to include a broad range of
property-with-a-connection-to-the-original collateral. I 4
The broad language used by the drafters must, however, be read in light of the
function and purpose of security interests' extension to proceeds of original collateraL To
101
102

51 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 844.
The Section 9-102(a)(64) definition of proceeds reads in full:

(A) whatever is acquired upon the sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition of
collateral;
(B) whatever is collected on, or distributed on account of collateral;
(C) rights arising out of collateral;
(D) to the extent of the value of collateral, claims arising out of the loss, nonconformity,
or interference withthe use of, defects or infringement of rights in, or damage to, the collateral;
or
(E) to the extent of the value of collateral and to the extent payable to the debtor or the
secured party, insurance payable by reason of the loss or nonconformity of, defects or
infringement of rights in, or damage to, the collateral.
103 "Proceeds includes whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection or other
disposition of collateral or proceeds." Former U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1995).
104 Unlike a security interest in original collateral, a security interest in proceeds attaches
automatically at the time the proceeds arise. See §§ 9-203(f), 9-315(aX2)(200 1).
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understand the reason for a security interest's extension to proceeds, one must ask the
threshold question of why creditors' security interests extends to proceeds at all? One
theory is that a security interest extends to proceeds to reflect the hypothetical ex ante
bargain of reasonable debtors and creditors. If an item of collateral is sold or otherwise
permanently disposed of, a secured party reasonably would expect that its lien would
continue in whatever assets the debtor receives in exchange. What is received represents a
return on the productive capacity of the sold collateral.
An asset's economic value can be expended in a variety of ways, however, beyond
being permanently and absolutely disposed of. The language of Article 9's revised
definition of proceeds reflects this. For instance, Revised Article 9 deems cash generated
from the lease or license of collateral as proceeds, in accordance with the theory that such
leasing or licensing exhausts an asset's finite productive capacity. An attachment of a
security interest in the cash received from the lease or license is simply an
acknowledgment that the economic value. of assets can take different forms.

The contours of the new proceeds definition, however, are as yet undefined. The
language with the greatest potential to be liberally construed is found in Section 9102(a)(64), subsections (b) & (c). These subsections identify proceeds as including
"whatever is collected on, or distributed on account of collateral," as well as "rights arising
out of collateral." Because of the lack of specific definition, the constraints placed upon its
interpretation must be found in the fundamental policy underlying Article 9's coverage of
proceeds. Not every asset that can conceivably trace its roots to original collateral ought to
be deemed proceeds. What is "collected upon" or what "arises out of' an encumbered
asset must be viewed through a coherent policy lens to determine whether or not it rises to
the level of an Article 9 "proceed.,,105 The drafting history and judicial interpretation of
the term "proceeds" under both former and Revised Article 9 are instructive.
The history of the proceeds definition, while leaving some fundamental questions
unanswered, .supports limitations on the interpretation of its broad language. For example,
while the 1992 Article 9 Permanent Editorial Board "(PEB") Study Group report saw
proceeds-collateral as including property received in exchange or replacement of the
original collateral, it also recommended that "those things that are so necessarily and
obviously associated with an interest in the original collateral that a security agreement and
financin·g statement ought not be required to mention them explicitly, " should similarly be
deemed proceeds. 106 The PEB Study Report made clear, however, that not every asset that
There is no indication that the "rights arising" language finally adopted in Revised 9102(a)(64)(c) was designed to go very far beyond the vision of the PEB Study Group. In fact, in
the Section 9-101, Official Comment 4f., "significant revisions," the Drafters seem to attach little
independent significance to the "rights arising" concept. The "significant revisions" section
makes reference to "distributions on account of collateral" and "claims arising out of loss ... or
damage" as examples of the kind of rights and property that "arise out of' collateral."U.C.C. 9101, comment 4(t).
105

106 Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code Article 9: Report 110-11
(1992). This "close association" model of proceeds embraces "all forms of distributions on
account of securities, partnership interests, and other intangibles ... that do not involve an
"exchange"
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owes its existence to the original collateral is a proceed. The report observed that, "at
some point, the acquisition of assets by the debtor ... will be too attenuated for those
assets to be considered proceeds."I07 When, and under what circumstances one reaches
that point remains the, as yet, unanswered question.
Since the competition for proceeds collateral commonly arises following a debtor's
bankruptcy filing, the scope of a creditor's security interest often turns on how proceeds
are defined in bankruptcy. Section 552(b) of the Bankruptcy Code states that security
interests created before bankruptcy, extend to debtor's assets received post-bankruptcy,
provided the assets are "proceeds, product, offspring or profits of the pre-bankruptcy
collateral. The statute offers the further qualification that the proceeds must be recognized
by the parties' security agreement and by "applicable non-bankruptcy law.,,108
Bankruptcy courts have adopted one of two approaches to defining the contours of
"proceeds" under Section 552(b). The first approach has historically· deferred to the
interpretation of the term as used pursuant to Article 9; the alternative approach is to use
the language of Section 552(b), in light of its legislative history. The legislative history of
Section 552(b) states that "the term proceeds ... covers any property into which property
subject to the security interest is converted"I09 and is "not limited to the technical
definition of that term in the U.C.C.,,110 Interestingly, in expanding the language of
proceeds under Article 9, the revision brings the two approaches to interpreting "proceeds"
in a bankruptcy context into alignment. The most common approach to interpreting
"proceeds" under the Bankruptcy Code, III brings us back to the question we began with:
what are the limitations on the broad language found in Revised § 9-102(a)(64)?

/07 To illustrate the contours of their suggested expansion, the Study Group noted that "accounts
generated by a construction contractor should not be considered proceeds of the contractor's
construction equipment,even though the equipment depreciates as a result of its use in generating
accounts. Nor should inventory fabricated by a debtor's factory equipment be considered
proceeds." According to the Study Group, there are some assets with a connection to original
collateral which are not as clearly defined as proceeds. For example, the report declined to
conclude that cash earned from music or video machines should be considered a "proceed" of the
machine as original collateral, noting that the answer turned on the question of whether the
machine is merely providing a selVice, or whether the cash generated ought to be deemed to arise
from the machine's short-term rentaL Id. It is not clear that such a distinction is supportedby
either the language or the policy underlying the statutory provision.

108

11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2001).

109

H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 377 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,6333.

110

S. Rep. No. 95-989 at 82, 91 (1978).

4 Collier on Bankruptcy ~ 552.02 at 552-11 (8 th ed. 1989). See also Unsecured Creditors
Comm. v. Marepcon Fin. Corp. (In re Bumper Sales, Inc.), 907 F.2d 1430 (4 th Cir. 1990).
III

B - 29

Recent Case Law
In In re Rebel Rents, Inc. 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 615 (Feb, 20, 2004), (a recent
case applying former Article 9) debtor granted a security interest in its "inventory
machinery, equipment, attachments, accessories and replacement parts thereof .... , plus
all proceeds derived there from,," The question considered by the court was whether the
creditor's lien extendedto debtor's lease income. The court recognized that under former
Section 9-306, while courts interpreted "proceeds" broadly to include "what was received
when collateral or proceeds were sold, exchanged, collection or otherwise disposed of,"
none of the cases extended the definition of proceeds to include income generated by a
lease of the collateral. The court quoted In Fe Cleary Bros. Constr. Co, 9 H.R. 40
(Bankr. D.D. Fla. 1980): "The words "otherwise disposed of' related to a permanent or
final conversion, not a temporary use....The way to create a security interest in rent under
the U.C.C. is to assign the lease or to give a security interest in the lease. The rent would
then be the proceeds of the collateral as: ''the account arising when a right to payment is
earned under a contract right."
In seeking further guidance, the court looked to the
This
Permanent Editorial Board Commentary No.9, issued in June 29, 1992.
Commentary, in adopting a functional approach to the determination of whether lease
payments on encumbered equipment ought to be deemed proceeds of such equipment,
stated:
Lease rentals would constitute proceeds of a secured party's collateral
consisting of goods even where the subsequent lease of goods is for a term
which is of a short duration in relation to the useful life of the goods" Where
the goods have a limited useful life, any transfer of the use and possession of
the goods in return for a consideration constitutes a disposition, however
small, of the debtor's interest in the goods. If that consideration consists of
chattel paper, that chattel paper and the payments thereon constitute proceeds
of the secured party's collateral."
The court, in observing that the parties were unable to cite to a single case that
relied on the position taken in the Commentary, ultimately concluded that creditor's lien
on debtor's equipment did not extend to rental income from the debtor's lease of the
equipment. As final support for their conclusion, the court cited Revised Article 9' s
expanded defInition of proceeds and its explicit language defining proceeds as including
"whatever is acquired upon the ... lease... of collateral."

***
In a line of cases involving payments made in connection with agricultural
commodities, the courts addressed the question of whether certain payments constituted
"proceeds." For example, in In re Stallings, 290 B.R. 777 (March 24, 2003), the court
declared that government payments designed to compensate debtor for damaged crops
were not proceeds of the crops. While the court recognized that Revised Article 9
expanded the proceeds definition, it ultimately concluded that "it is too much of an
interpretative stretch to view the . .. payment, which can be seen as a "gift" from the
government ... as falling within the V.C.C. definition of proceeds." 112 Did the court get
112

290 B.R. at 783.

B - 30

this right? An economic-based functional analysis would ask the question of whether the
government payments were a substitute for the destroyed crops. Would the secured party
reasonably expect that its lien would continue, in the payments, upon the destruction of the
crops? If the crops were not destroyed, but instead, grown, harvested and sold, would it be
reasonable for the parties to expect that the creditor's security interest attach to the
proceeds of the sale?
In another case involving government agricultural payments, In re Gary Stevens,
307 H.R. 124 (March 3, 2004) the court found that agricultural program payments were
not proceeds of the previous year's crops, but proceeds "arising from or relating to"
contract rights having their origin in "the statutory and regulatory fabric of the farm
support program," (citing, Kingsley, 865 F..2d 975, 980 (8 th eire 1989)). Because,
however, the creditor did not properly perfect its interest in the original collateral, the court
avoided the creditor's interest in the proceeds payments.
In In Fe Wiersma, 283 B,R. 294 (September 20, 2002), the court found that
Debtor's damage claims against an insurer of cows (and milk), arising out of the loss of,
and damage the cows, were "proceeds" of the creditor's secured interest in the cows.
Broadly interpreting the language, the court found that "proceeds" includes all components
of the damage claim, including punitive damages. Citing Idaho Code § 28-9-02(64), the
court concluded, "[t]he VCC definition of "proceeds" includes within its scope whatever is
acquired upon disposition of collateral, all rights arising out of collateral, and includes all
claims arising out of the loss of, or damage to, collateral" (emphasis added).

***
In perhaps the most interesting case examining the contours of proceeds under
Revised Article 9, In Fe Cafeteria Operators, L.P., 299 B.R. 400 (July 1, 2003), the
court was presented with the issue of whether the revenues generated by a restaurant were
proceeds of the creditor's original collateral. In this case, a creditor held an original
security interest in " all personal and fixture property of every kind and nature, including
without limitation all furniture, fixtures, equipment, raw materials, inventory, other goods,
accounts. . . deposit accounts, rights to proceeds of letters of credit and all general
intangibles." Following the debtor's bankruptcy, what was at issue was creditor's claim to
post-petition revenues generated by the debtor restaurant.
The court began its analysis by recognizing that Bankruptcy Code Section 552(b)
expressly provides for creditors' security interest to continue in proceeds of original
collateral. In reliance on the Section 552(b)'s express reference to "non-bankruptcy law,"
the court determined that Article 9's definition of proceeds controls the question of
whether the cash and cash equivalent revenue ought to be deemed proceeds, and therefore
the encumbered collateral of the secured creditor. II3 The court observed that under state
law, the revenues generated by the debtor restaurant could be "conceivably" deemed
proceeds from the "sale of food and beverage inventory and arise out of the use of fixtures
I13 299 B.R. at 406. The court in a footnote observed that the secured creditors "did not argue
that the cash allegedly generated as a result of the use of the ,fixtures falls within anothe~ §
552(b)(I) exception, i.e., product, offspring, profits." Id. at 408.
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and equipment" (emphasis added).114
The court stated that, "on its face, the
Massachusetts definition of proceeds does not include revenues generated by a serviceoriented business, since services are not tangible collateraf' (emphasis added), but then
conceded that the post-petition restaurant revenues at issue may be proceeds "since they
are acquired, inter alia, upon the sale of food and beverage inventory and arise out of the
use of fixtures and equipment, i.e., stoves, ovens, warmers, tables, chairs, plates, forks and
knives, all of which are subject to Bank Group's pre-petition lien.,,115
Relying on a witnesses who testified that approximately two-thirds of the revenues
received by the restaurant were "derived... from the time and energy expended by the
Debtor's employees who provide services for which the Debtor's customer's pay. . ..
[and] ... [t]he only asset converted to cash ... is the food and beverage inventory," 116 the
court ultimately concluded that, "the revenue generated from the use of fixtures and
equipment in the present case does not constitute proceeds under Massachusetts law." 117
(emphasis added).
A number of issues are raised by this court's interpretation of the definition of
"proceeds." First, there is no requirement under Article 9 that proceeds can only spring
forth from tangible collateraL For example, inventory can arise from contract rights and
when such contract rights are offered as collateral, the inventory is proceeds of such
intangible rights. I 18 Further, when intellectual property is taken as collateral, payments
made pursuant to a license to use such intellectual property are proceeds of the intellectual
property.

114 In comparing restaurant revenues with hotel receipts, the court observed that other bankruptcy
courts have found that a secured lender's lien on all a debtor's assets "created a lien on all of the
debtor hotel's revenues, including income from the restaurant and bar...." In ultimately
distinguishing restaurant revenues from hotel revenues, the court observed that "the hotel cases
involve use of real property without real diminishment to the facility, , " [y]et, the rents
generated thereby are typically cash collateral since they are generated primarily from the use of
real property." ... "In a restaurant, the food and beverages that make up the final product of the
restaurant undoubtedly are used up in the process. The reasoned approach is to grant a limited
interest in post-petition revenues." Id at 409.

115

299 B.R. 400 at 406.

116

299 B.R. 400 at 410.

117 299 B.R. 400 at 410. It is interesting to note that in this case, the secured party had an interest
in "all general intangibles" of the debtor. Among the general intangibles of a restaurant are the
employment contracts with the chefand other "service employees." Revenues from the service
component of a restaurant meal, while not involving a disposition, would surely be considered
"collected ... on account" of such service contracts.
118 For example, debtor/retailer contracts with supplier for the manufacturer of an item of
furniture. The contract is a "thing in action" and is intangible. If debtor offers the contract as
collateral to its financier, once the furniture is completed and identified to the contract, it becomes
an item of inventory in debtor'shands - at the same time being proceeds of the contract to
manufacture it.
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Moreover, as noted above, the requirement that there has to be a conversion (or
disposition) to give rise to proceeds has been lifted. Proceeds includes "whatever is
collected on, or distributed on account of, collater~l, as well as all "rights arising out of
collateral." 119 One could view revenues from the sale of food cooked and served in a
restaurant as "collected ... on account of' both the inventory and the restaurant fixtures.
Would the revenues be properly considered "arising out of' the original collateral
in this case? The risk of such a characterization is that there is potential for that phrase to
include every conceivable asset that owes its existence, no matter how tangentially, to
original collateral. In the most extreme case, the "arising out of' language allows for the
argument that any property that can trace its causal or creative roots to the original
collateral rises to the level of "proceeds," even if it does not represent a direct economic
return on the productive capacity of the asset. For example, it has been suggested that the
"rights arising" language could capture the "organs grown from stem cells "arising out" of
the debtor's patent on the stem cells or on the growth process.,,120 This expansive view of
the proceeds right would allow the secured party to extend the security interest into
property that goes beyond original collateral's direct future productive capacity. At a
certain point, rights that "arise out of' original collateral become too attenuated to be
reasonably expected by the creditor to be proceeds of its original collateral.
Interestingly, the court ultimately rested its compromise holding on the equitable
exception to the rule in Section 552(b), limiting a continuing security interest in proceeds
received post-petition. The court observed, "[t]he equities of the case" provision is
intended to prevent secured creditors from receiving windfalls to allow bankruptcy courts
broad discretion in balancing the interests of secure creditors against the general policy of
the Bankruptcy Code, which favors giving debtors a "fresh start.,,121

119

The Section 9-102(a)(64) definition of proceeds further includes,

(D) to the extent of the value of collateral, claims arising out of the loss, nonconformity,
or interference with the use of: defects or infringement of rights -in, or damage to, the collateral;
or
(E) to the extent of the value of collateral and to the extent payable to the debtor or the
secured party, insurance payable by reason of the loss or nonconfonnity of, defects or
infringement of rights in, or damage to, the collateral.
120 See Jonathan Lipson, Remote Control" Revised Article Nine and the Negotiability of
Information, 62 OHIO ST. L. J. 1327, 1322-33 (2002) ("The new proceeds definition could extend
the secured parties' proceeds right far beyond the range of the original collateral and create
surprise encumbrances on information and related property rights ... ").
121 299 B.R. at 409-410, citing In re Patio and Porch Systems, Inc., 194 B.R. 569, 575 (Bankr. D.
Md. 1996).
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BACKGROUND
Facts:
On October 2, 1998, the Debtors, Lee and Amy Till, purchased a used
truck from Instant Auto Finance for $6,395 plus $330.75 in fees in taxes. The
Tills financed all but $300 of the purchase price by entering into a retail
installment contract that Instant Auto assigned to the Respondent, SCS Credit
Corporation. Under the terms of the loan, which carried a 21 % finance charge
per year over the course of its 136 week term, the agreed to cover the debt by
making 68 biweekly payments. Instant Auto, and then SCS, retained a purchase
money security interest that allowed for repossession of the truck if the Tills
defaulted under the contract.
On October 25, 1999, the Tills filed a joint petition for relief under chapter
13 of the Bankruptcy Code. While the Tills owed SCS $4,894.89, the parties
agreed that the truck was worth only $4,000, and, therefore, SCS's secured claim
was limited to $4,000.
The Tills debt adjustment plan proposed to pay SCS from a portion of their
monthly wages, over a three year period. Interest on SCS's secured claim would
accrue at a rate of 9.5%, a rate which was based on the national prime rate of
approximately 8% plus a 1.50/0 risk premium. SCS objected to the proposed rate,
contending that it was entitled to interest at the rate of 21 % per year, which was
the rate SCS could obtain if it could foreclose on the truck and reinvest the
proceeds in a loan substantially similar to the original loan made to the Tills.

Procedural History:
The Bankruptcy Court confirmed the Tills' plan over SCS's objection. The
District Court reversed, holding that the "coerced loan" (alkla "forced loan")
approach, described below, was the proper method to determine cram down
interest rates, and that the lender should receive at least the amount it could
have obtained if it had foreclosed on the loan, sold the collateral,and reinvested
the proceeds in loans of equivalent duration and risk (there was evidence that the
lender routinely received 21 % interest on its loans).
The Seventh Circuit, by a divided panel, agreed with the District Court's
result, but held that the Bankruptcy Court should have started with the 210/0
contract rate as the "presumptive contract rate", and then permitted the debtors
and the lender to argue why the rate should be adjusted upward or downward
from the contract rate. In re Till, 301 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2002). The dissent
disagreed, arguing that the proper cram down rate should be based upon the
lender's cost of funds - "what it would cost the creditor to obtain the cash
equivalent of the collateral from an alternative source."
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After granting certiorari, a sharply divided Supreme Court reversed and
essentially agreed with the Bankruptcy Court, but without a majority opinion. Till
v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465,124 S.Ct. 1951 (2004).
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The Statutes:
In both the chapter 11 and chapter 13 contexts, the Bankruptcy Code
permits a court to confirm, or cram down, a plan over the objection of a secured
creditor.
As Till was a chapter 13 case, the Debtors invoked the cram down
provision of 11 U.S.C. § 1325 in obtaining approval of their plan. In relevant part,
§ 1325(a)(5)(B) states a plan may be crammed down if the holder of each
allowed secured claim retains the lien securing the such claim and:
the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be
distributed under the plan on account of [an allowed secured] claim
is not less than the allowed amount of such claim." 11 U.S.C. §
1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).
Therefore, the Till plurality held that when a plan provides a secured
creditor with deferred payments, as opposed to a lump sum payment, the
bankruptcy court must choose an interest rate sufficient to compensate the
creditor for the risk of inflation and the risk of nonpayment, and nothing more. It
is, therefore, necessary to ensure only that the creditor receive at least the value
of its claim. 541 U.S. at 474.
In the chapter 11 context, a similar provision governs how secured claims
must be treated in order for a plan of reorganization to be crammed down:
With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan [must]
provideD ... that each holder of a claim of such class receive on
account of such claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the
allowed amount of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of
the plan, of at least the value of such holder's interest in the
estate's interest in such property. 11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II).
Thus, as in the chapter 13 context, a dissenting secured creditor must be
compensated if a chapter 11 plan provides that the secured creditor's claim will
be paid with deferred payments. However, as discussed herein, the Till plurality
only briefly touches on chapter 11 cram downs, and, in so doing, creates
uncertainty as to whether its holding with regard to the appropriate methodology
for determining the interest rate to be paid to dissenting secured creditors applies
to such cram downs.
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Alternative Methods of Determining Cram Down Interest
Rate:
Formula (a/kla Prime Plus) Rate
Under the formula, or prime plus, approach a bankruptcy court begins with
the national prime rate and then adjusts it upward according to the risk of default.
Not only was this the approach adopted by the Tills and approved by the
Bankruptcy Court, but the formula rate was adopted by a plurality of four
Justices, led by Justice Stevens. The plurality opinion states that the appropriate
size of the upward risk adjustment depends on "such factors as the
circumstances of the estate, the nature of the security, and the duration and
feasibility of the reorganization plan." kL. at 479. Accordingly, the bankruptcy
court must hold an evidentiary hearing with regard to the appropriate risk
adjustment. The plurality declined to address the level of risk premium that
should be added to the prime rate, but it did note that courts have generally
approved risk premiums of 1%-30/0.
Because the formula approach starts from "a concededly low estimate,"
the evidentiary burden is on the creditors. kL. In the plurality's view, the formula
approach "entails a straightforward, familiar, and objective inquiry, and minimizes
the need for potentially costly additional evidentiary proceedings." kL.
Ultimately, the plurality's adoption of the formula approach is a
manifestation of its belief that the burden of rebutting the presumptive rate should
be placed on creditors, as relevant information is more readily available to
creditors than debtors in the chapter 13 context.

Contract Rate
The contract rate approach uses the contract rate as the presumptive
base rate. The contract rate then may be adjusted either upward or downward,
depending on changed circumstances or the interest rate environment.
The plurality rejected this approach because, like the coerced loan
approach, it "improperly focuses on the creditor's potential use of the proceeds
of a foreclosure sale." kL. at 477. Moreover, the plurality emphasized that while
the contract rate approach does allow a debtor to present evidence and argue for
a downward rate adjustment, too much of a burden is placed on the debtor, who
will have to obtain voluminous and complex information about the creditor in
order to rebut the presumptive contract rate. Additionally, reasoned the plurality,
the contract rate approach entitles inefficient lenders to obtain higher cram down
rates that well-managed lenders. Finally, the plurality noted that because the
contract rate approach focuses on a creditor's prior dealings with the debtor,
"similarly situated creditors may end up with vastly different cram down rates."
kL. at 478.
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The dissent endorsed the contract rate approach and essentially agreed
with the Seventh Circuit that the contract rate should be the starting point, and
that the parties had the burden of showing why an adjustment from that rate - up
or down - was appropriate.
In critiquing the dissent's endorsement of the contract rate approach, the
plurality stated that the dissent relied on two flawed assumptions: "(1) 'subprime
lending markets are competitive and therefore largely efficient'; and (2) the risk of
default in Chapter 13 is normally no less than the risk of default at the time of the
original loan." 19.:. at 481.
Regarding the efficiency of subprime lending markets, the plurality
rejected the notion that Congress relied on this assumption when enacting
chapter 13. Moreover, the plurality called into question whether subprime
lending markets are perfectly competitive, noting that used vehicles are often
sold by means of tie-in transactions and that the extensive state- and federal
regulation of subprime lending markets indicates that unregulated subprime
lenders would exploit borrowers' ignorance.
As to the assumption attributed to the dissent that the risk of default in
chapter 13 is no less than the risk of default at the time of the original loan, the
plurality stated that in enacting chapter 13, "Congress intended to create a
program under which plans that qualify for confirmation have a high probability of
success." 19.:. at 482. In the plurality's view, there might be merit to the statement
that too many risky plans are being confirmed, "but the solution is to confirm
fewer such plans, not to set the default cram down rates at absurdly high levels,
thereby increasing the risk of default." 19.:. at 483.

Coerced Loan la/Ida Forced Loan) Rate
The coerced loan, or forced loan, approach estimates the rate the creditor
would realize on a loan of like duration and risk. This was the approach adopted
by the district court and then, in modified form, by the Seventh Circuit.
The plurality rejected this approach because it would require a bankruptcy
court to consider evidence about the market for comparable loans. Additionally,
the plurality stated that the coerced loan approach overcompensates creditors
because it takes into account factors, such as transaction costs and profits, that
are not relevant in the context of cram down loans.

Cost of Funds Rate
The cost of funds approach estimates what it would cost the lender to
obtain the cash equivalent of the collateral from another source.
In discussing this approach, the plurality noted that the cost of funds
approach "rightly disregards the now-irrelevant terms of the parties' original
contract, [but] it mistakenly focuses on the creditworthiness of the creditor rather
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than the debtor." III at 478. Additionally, the plurality emphasized that like the
contract rate approach, the cost of funds approach places a significant
evidentiary burden on the debtor.

c-a

Factors Guiding the Court's Choice in the Chall1!1!
13 Context
Three considerations guided the plurality in the analysis by which it arrived
at the conclusion that the formula rate is the appropriate approach to setting
cram down interest rates. kL. at 474-77
First, the plurality cited administrative concerns. Specifically, the plurality
stated that the appropriate approach should be one that may be applied to the
Bankruptcy Code's other cram down provisions, is familiar to the financial
community, and minimizes the need for expensive evidentiary proceedings. kL.
at 474.
Second, the plurality noted that in chapter 13 cases involving secured
interests in personal property, a bankruptcy court has the authority "to modify the
number, timing, or amount of the installment payments from those set forth in the
debtor's original contract" with a secured creditor. kL. at 475. In connection with
this authority, the plurality further noted that the circumstances dictating how the
bankruptcy court modifies the original obligation include the fact that the risk of
default is lower because the postbankruptcy obligor is the court-supervised
estate.
The bankruptcy court's power to modify the debtor's obligations, including
of course the interest rates on contracts, ties directly into the court's obligation to
confirm only those plans that are feasible. 3 That is, the cram down and feasibility
provisions of chapter 13 together obligate "the court to select a rate high enough
to compensate the creditor for its risk but not so high as to doom the plan." kL. at

480.
The third consideration guiding the plurality's analysis is that the chapter
13 cram down provision requires an objective rather than a subjective inquiry.
According to the plurality, "the court should aim to treat similarly situated
creditors similarly, and to ensure that an objective economic analysis would
suggest the debtor's interest payments will adequately compensate all such
creditors for the time value of their money and the risk of default." kL. at 477
(emphasis added).
In the plurality's view, the formula rate best addressed these three
considerations. The formula approach satisfies the plurality's administrative
concerns in that it is a methodology easily grasped by the financial community
and the bankruptcy courts. Moreover, as set forth above, the formula approach,
at least according to the plurality, provides for "a straightforward, familiar, and
objective inquiry" thereby minimizing the need for expensive evidentiary
proceedings. Finally, the plurality implied that the formula approach was the
3

Section 1325(a)(6) states that a chapter 13 plan may only be confirmed if "the debtor will
be able to make all payments under the plan and to comply with the plan."
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approach that would most successfully provide bankruptcy courts the means to
implement chapter 13 plans that would compensate secured creditors for their
risk and the time value of money, while still meeting the Bankruptcy Code's
feasibility requirement.

c-s

Chapter 11 in Till:
Though it only briefly references chapter 11 , the plurality opinion creates
an air of confusion as to how it's holding that the formula approach is the
appropriate method for determining the cram down rate of interest should be
applied to chapter 11 cram downs.
In discussing the requirement generally found in the Bankruptcy Code's
cram down provisions that a stream of deferred payments must be discounted to
its present dollar value to ensure that a creditor receives the value of its claim,
the plurality cited to numerous provisions of §1129 and stated: "We think it likely
that Congress intended bankruptcy judges and trustees to follow essentially the
same approach when choosing an appropriate interest rate under any of these
provisions." k!:. at 474.
Here, the plurality seemed to signal that whichever approach was deemed
appropriate in the chapter 13 context would also be applicable in the chapter 11
context.
However, shortly thereafter, the plurality seemed to indicate that a there
may be justification for applying different types of cramdown rates in chapter 13
than in chapter 11. Specifically, in footnote 14, the plurality noted that while there
is no free market of willing cram down lenders in the chapter 13 context because
every cram down loan is imposed by a court over the objection of the secured
creditor, "the same is not true in the Chapter 11 context, as numerous lenders
advertise financing for Chapter 11 debtors in possession." k!:. at 477, fn. 14.
Accordingly, the plurality suggested that "when picking a cram down rate in a
Chapter 11 case, it might make sense to ask what rate an efficient market would
produce." k!:. On the other hand, "[i]n a Chapter 13 context... the absence of
any such market obligates courts to look to first principles and ask only what rate
will fairly compensate a creditor for its exposure." k!:.
It is hard to understand why rates of interest charged for debtor in
possession ("DIP") financing have any relevance whatsoever to the rate of
interest that should be offered to a secured creditor in a cram down context. A
DIP loan is normally granted upon a debtor's entrance into chapter 11, and
although it has the added benefits of the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court on
the issue of risk, it is often limited to the pre-petition lender who has the leverage
in the negotiations as a result of, among other things, the provisions of Section
364 (c) and (d). Since a cram down loan relates to a loan upon immergence
from chapter 11 , a more relevant interest rate might be the rates charged in
connection with exit financing where the bargaining position of the debtor and the
lender are more equal. In any event, cram down is just that, and there is no
market for such loans even in chapter 11. It may be that if the formula approach
applies in chapter 11 , and in order to make some sense out of footnote 14, the
rates that the market may be offering for exit financing should be used to set the
upward adjustment to the prime rate and may, in many cases, be a floor on what

e-g

may be appropriate in a cram down context depending on how the cram down
loan and the exit financing compare in terms of collateral, duration, payment
terms, and the like.
Given the plurality's analysis, Till should apply to chapter 11 cram downs
notwithstanding footnote 14. As noted above, the standard for cramming down a
secured creditor in chapter 13 under §1325(a)(5)(B) is virtually identical to the
standard for cramming down a secured creditor in chapter 11 under §
1129(b)(2)(A)(i). Moreover, with the exception of plurality's observation that the
bankruptcy court's continued supervision of the plan payments phase reduces
lender risk, all of the factors that led the plurality to choose the formula approach
apply equally in chapter 13 and chapter 11. There is no reason to believe that
the plurality's administrative and evidentiary concerns would not apply equally in
the chapter 11 context. Similarly, nothing in § 1129(b)(2)(A) differentiates it from
§ 1325(a)(5)(B) with respect to whether the inquiry, from the point of view of a
secured creditor, should be objective. Above all, in both the chapter 13 and
chapter 11 contexts, the bankruptcy court has both the power to modify rights of
any creditor and the obligation to confirm only those plans that are feasible. See
11 U.S.C. § 1123 (a)(5)(H), 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a)(11). As such, it appears that all
of the factors that led the plurality to adopt the formula approach in the chapter
13 context would also lead it to adopt the formula approach in the chapter 11
context.

C - 10

ChalJter 13 Cases Citing Till:
In re Smith, 310 B.R. 631,633-34 (D. Kan. 2004) (reversing the bankruptcy court
because while the bankruptcy court correctly adopted the formula approach, it
did not properly apply the formula method as mandated by Till in that (1) it did not
use the prime rate as its base rate; and (2) it did not conduct case-by-case
evidentiary hearings to determine the proper risk adjustment for each loan)
In re Bouzek, 311 B.R. 239, 242 (Bankr. E.O. Wis. 2004) (Justice Thomas'
concurring opinion in Till cited for its analysis of Rash - specifically explaining the
rationale of Rash that a replacement value standard is appropriate in chapter 13
cramdowns because the creditor is receiving neither the property nor the value of
the property and, therefore, is exposed to both the risk of default and
deterioration of the property's value)
In re Pokrzywinski, 311 B.R. 846 (Bankr. E.O. Wis. 2004) (holding that add-on
interest that nearly doubles the amount of interest paid as compared to simple
interest based on a declining balance would result in a windfall to the creditor is
"untenable" after Till)
In re Berksteiner, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1576, *2-*6 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2004) (holding
that the evidentiary burden placed on creditors by Till applies equally to a creditor
seeking an adjustment of the local rule's 12% default rate)
In re Scrogum, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1376, *3-*4 (Bankr. C.O. III. 2004) (denying
confirmation of the debtor's plan because, under Till, the debtor's proposal to pay
a creditor at an interest rate of zero, which was the contract rate of the retail
installment contract between the debtor and the creditor, violated § 1325; rather,
the formula approach should be employed)
In re Harken, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 2062, *3-*5 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2004)
(employing the formula approach in setting an interest rate (prime rate of 5% plus
a risk adjustment of 3%) to be paid on the creditor's claim during the debtor's
chapter 13 plan)
In re Bivens, 317 B.R. 755, 759, 762-70 (Bankr. N.D. III. 2004) (analyzing the
means by which to arrive at an appropriate risk adjustment and then holding that
a 70/0 rate, which included a risk adjustment of more than 20/0, comported with the
formula approach of Till and was adequate to protect the creditor's interest)
In re Moore, 319 BR. 504,515 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (passing mention of Till
with regard to scrutiny courts should apply to chapter 13 plans)
In re Cachu, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 236 (Bankr. E.O. Cal. 2005) (in determining the
cramdown interest rate applicable to the county's claim for real property taxes in
light of Till, court settled on a rate of 4.75% (prime rate of 4.25% plus a risk
adjustment of 0.5%.»
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In re Nowlin, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 273, *15-*16 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2005) (where a
debtor proposed to a creditor 80/0 (40/0 prime plus 40/0 risk adjustment) on its
crammed down claim, court found that such rate was adequate to compensate
the creditor for any risk it may assume under the plan)
In re Pike, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 381, *5-*8 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2005) (holding that
where a creditor is oversecured and a party in interest objects to payment of the
contract rate or higher rate, the court may determine the appropriate rate by
applying Till's formula approach)
In re Cook, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 254 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (stating that Till is not
binding authority because five justices did not agree on the rationale and
because there is no common denominator among the opinions in Till and,
therefore, relying on Sixth Circuit caselaw in holding that that the "coerced loan"
approach is appropriate method for determining rate of interest to be paid to
unsecured creditors where plan proposes to pay a 100% distribution over time to
unsecured creditors)
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Chaoter 11 Cases Citing Till:
In re LWD, Inc., 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 384, *35-37 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2005) (citing to
Till in determining the discount rate to be used to calculate the amount the
defendant must pay to the debtors' estates for not adequately disclosing an
insurance policy and, in turn, causing bidders to undervalue the debtors' assets)
In re AE Hotel Venture, 321 B.R. 209 n.8 (Bankr. E.D. III. 2005) (in differentiating
between default interest sought under § 506(b) and interest that is charged to
compensate for the risk of non-payment, Till cited for the proposition that interest
may be charged to compensate for the risk of non-payment)
In re Prussia Associates, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 557, *31-*52 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2005)
(holding that in the chapter 11 context that Till is instructive, but not controlling
insofar as it mandates use of the formula approach)

C - 13

References:
Carmen H. Lonstein & Steven A. Domanowski, Payment of Post-Petition Interest
to Unsecured Creditors: Federal Judgment Rate Versus Contract Rate, 12 Am.
Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 421 (2004)
Daniel J. Carragher, What the Supreme Court's Prime Plus Ruling Means for
Chapter 11, 23-6 ABIJ 26 (Aug. 1, 2004)
Hon. Erithe Smith, Ronald F. Greenspan, Brian L. Holman, & Thomas E.
Patterson, Till Death Do Us Part: The Impact of the Supreme Court's Cramdown
Interest Rate Decision on the Already Rocky Marriage Between Debtors and
Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, Presentation for The Financial Lawyers
Conference and The Los Angeles Bankruptcy Forum, September 14,2004.
Hon. James D. Walker, Jr. & Amber Nickell, Bankruptcy, 55 Mercer L. Rev. 1101,
1126-27 (2004)
John D. Ayer, Michael L. Bernstein & Jonathan Friedland, Confirming a Plan, 2310 ABIJ 16 (Dec. 1,2004)
Ronald F. Greenspan and Cynthia Nelson, UnTi11 We Meet Again: Why Till Might
Not Be the Last Word on Cram Down Interest Rates, FTI Consulting, Inc.
Thomas J. Yerbich, How Do You Count the Votes - or Did Till Tilt the Game?,
23-6 ABIJ (Aug. 1, 2004)

C - 14

MEDIATION
An Opportunity To Provide For A Just And Fair
Compromise Of Bankruptcy Controversies

Roger M. Whelan
Attorney at Law / Former Bankruptcy Judge
Ashton, Maryland

Copyright 2005. Roger M. Whelan and UK/CLE. All Rights Reserved.

SECTIOND

MEDIATION
An Opportunity To Provide For A Just And Fair
Compromise Of Bankruptcy Controversies

INTRODUCTION

D-l

MEDIATION - STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNSEL

D-4

PREPARATION FOR MEDIATION

D-6

THE MEDIATION SESSION

D-7

CONCLUDING MEDIATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-8

D-8

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX:
Order Assigning Adversary Proceedings To Mediation
And Setting Mediation Deadlines

D-l1

Mediation Time Chart

D-13

Order (A) Approving Mandatory Mediation Procedures For
Certain Claims And (B) Appointing Mediator To Mediate
The Claims Included Therein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . .. D-15
Mediation Procedures Term Sheet. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-19
Motion Of Debtors And Debtors In Possession ForAn Order
(A) Approving Mandatory Mediation Procedures For Certain
Claims And (B) Appointing Mediator To Mediate The Claims
Included Therein

SECTIOND

D-25

MEDIATION
An opportunity to provide for a just and fair compromise
of Bankruptcy Controversies

INTRODUCTION
The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act (T 28 U.S.C. Sec. 651, et. seq.) 1 marked a major
step forward for the federal judiciary in addressing the growing docket load confronting the
district courts and, clearly, the U. S. Bankruptcy Courts as well. Pursuant to Sec. 651(b): "Each
United States district court shall authorize, by local rule adopted under Sec. 2071 (a), the use of
alternative dispute resolution processes in all civil actions, including adversary proceedings in
bankruptcy, in accordance with this chapter... , exceptthat the use of arbitration may be
authorized only as provided in Sec. 654. Each United States district court shall devise and
implement its own alternative dispute resolution program, by local rule adopted under Sec.
2071 (a), to encourage and promote the use of alternative dispute resolution in its district."
Although the specific statutory language refers to "each United States district court..." a sensible
and now accepted reading applies to adversary proceedings before the United States Bankruptcy
Courts as a " ...unit of the district court... " (28 U.S.C. 151). As of the present date, almost all
1 The legislative history of this important legislation, as amended and passed by Congress on October 30, 1998, provides
that:

"(1) Alternative dispute resolution, when supported by the Bench and Bar, a~d utilizing properly trained neutrals in a
program adequately administered by the Court, has the potential to provide a variety of benefits, including greater
satisfaction of the parties, innovative methods of resolving disputes and greater efficiency in achieving setdements;
(2) Certain forms of alternative dispute resolution, including mediation, early neutral evaluation, mini-trials and voluntary
arbitration, may have potential to reduce the large backlog of cases now pending in some federal courts throughout the
United States, thereby allowing the Courts to process their remaining cases more efficiendy; and
(3) The continued growth of Federal Appellate Court - Annexed Mediation Programs, suggests that this form of
alternative dispute resolution can be equally effective. in resolving disputes in the federal trial courts;
Therefore, the District Courts should consider including mediation in their local alternative dispute resolution
programs."
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bankruptcy courts recognize the importance of alternative dispute resolution and by local rule
have provided for some form of implementation of this legislation. The most frequent form of
alternative dispute resolution is clearly mediation and its success is readily apparent by the
marked and dramatic decrease in civil trials in the federal court system. 2

Alternative dispute

resolution can involve more than one form of dispute resolution, and the most common forms are
arbitration, early neutral evaluation (including issue resolution), mini-trials and mediation as the
most frequently employed form of dispute resolution. Even when one form of alternative dispute
resolution has failed,

r~sort

to some other form might well be an advisable approach to resolving

a complex and heated controversy. For example, where mediation has failed (and in some cases,
this is because of a lack of complete discovery by one or both parties at the time of scheduled
mediation), the parties may choose to participate in amini-trial3 or have the matter rescheduled
for binding arbitration.
An excellent example of how mediation procedures have been successfully implemented

is the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. Because of the number of
mega Chapter 11 cases that have been, and continued to be, filed in this district, and the
thousands of adversary proceedings that are generated in such cases, Chief Judge Mary F.
Walrath, on April 7, 2004, entered a general order regarding the mandatory utilization of
mediation in all preference actions "filed on and after May 1, 2004." No later than 90 days after
the filing of an answer or other responsive pleading, the parties are required to file a stipulation
providing for the appointment of a mediator (although there are 31 approved names on the
2 "In the federal courts, the number of civil cases reaching trial has fallen from 11 % in 1962 to 1.8% in 2002." See "The
Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts" - Author: Marc GalenterProfessor of Law, University of Wisconsin. A similar decrease has been observed in connection with adversary
proceedings that have been successfully settled through the process of mediation.
3 A mini-trial is usually limited to a one day presentation and is usually presided over by a former judge selected by both
parties. The ruling, of course, is not binding but is frequently used as a basis for achieving a reasoned settlement based
upon the results of a condensed trial.
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mediation registry of this Court, the parties are usually free to select a qualified mediator of their
choice) and within 60 days after entry of the order assigning the adversary proceeding to
mediation, the mediator is required to file a Certificate of Completion. Within 90 days of the
order assigning the adversary proceeding to mediation, the proceeding will be set for trial by the
Court. See Court Forms that are Employed by the u.S. Bankruptcy Court in the District of
Delaware are attached. In many instances, this same procedure will be employed for other types
of adversary proceedings, other than preference actions.
Because of the continuing and mounting success of mediation, courts and counsel should
realize that this mediation procedures are suitable in a number of other ways. In complex
Chapter 11 cases, a mediator can be helpful in assisting the debtor and creditor constituencies in
working through the many problems confronting counsel in the formulation of a successful plan
of reorganization. One of the most important objectives of a seasoned mediator is to have the
parties focus on mutually obtainable results, by separating the parties from the problem and the
stated positions taken, and instead have the parties focus on their mutual interests and the
alternative avenues available for reaching and satisfying those interests. The skilled mediator (in
reality a problem-solver), will usually stress the benefits ofa continued relationship and will
search for a solution that may have been overlooked by both parties in their initial adversarial
confrontation. A respected and disinterested mediator can often promote the basis for a reasoned
and fair solution that was either overlooked or ignored in the early stages of the adversarial
confrontation. For example, in connection with an objection to an administrative priority claim
that would prove to be difficult to pay by the debtor because of its limited resources, the
mediator might well suggest some other alternative other than a dollar payment for the claim.
Where the plan of reorganization anticipates a continued business operation by the debtor, a new
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contract of employment or some other suitable arrangement that meets the satisfaction of both
parties, might well be one way of resolving the debtors objection to such a claim.
Almost any type of dispute arising in a bankruptcy case (for example, turnover
proceedings, avoidance actions, landlord/tenant issues, customer disputes, etc.) can be referred to
mediation. Employing mediation for resolution of asbestos claims is yet another example of how
a critical element in developing a plan of reorganization can be successfully addressed.
Although non-dischargeability proceedings are yet another example, objections to a debtor's
discharge (Sec. 727(a) proceedings) would not, because of the public interest factor in dealing
with the fresh start doctrine and the court's necessary involvement pursuant to Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 7041.

MEDIATION - STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNSEL
One of the primary considerations for employing mediation is the cost of trial preparation
and the expenses att.endant to the trial itself. In many cases, the cost of employing an expert
witness(es) must be factored into the financial equation of reaching a reasoned settlement. Aside
from counsel fees and related trial expenses, the time lost by the party representatives must also
be factored in. Together with the delay occasioned by the court's docket and the uncertainty of
prevailing at trial, mediation is a worthwhile step to be considered before progressing too far
down the path to trial. Even where the core legal issues appear well settled and established,
factual nuances and trial presentation can frequently result in a different outcome.
Another important consideration and benefit for mediation is the first opportunity of the
client to become actively involved in the legal process. Most mediators will wisely require the
presence of both parties to be involved in the mediation conference and the client will feel a
sense of achievement by being permitted to present his or her side of the 'story.' The mediator,
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as part of the introduction to the mediation process, will highlight that all of the statements and
negotiations are strictly confidential and enjoy the same privilege as all settlement talks pursuant
to FRE 408. Moreover, the mediator will explain that there are no communications between the
mediator and the judge concerning the mediation process except for the filing of a status report
as usually required by local rule.
For the attorney involved in mediation, there is the opportunity to observe the demeanor
and the abilities of opposing counsel and, more importantly, to discern the strength and
weaknesses of the opposition's cases. Most mediators will, prior to the actual mediation session,
require the submission of position papers in order for the mediator to become fully acquainted
with the factual background and the legal issues involved. This can afford each counsel with an
excellent opportunity to present, in a condensed form, the first "trial brief."
Finally, one of the truly great benefits of mediation is the opportunity for counsel to
achieve an objective that could never be achieved in litigation where the judge decides the matter
in one way or the other. In other words, there may be other objectives that can be reached
consensually where the parties are brought to focus on mutual and shared interests. In one
mediation involving a substantial administrative priority claim, the mediator after numerous
conferences with both parties suggested that a sale of real estate to the administrative priority
claimant, which was of economic benefit to the claimant, but was a burden to the reorganizing
debtor, might be a way to settle the claim without payment of cash that was of vital concern to
the reorganized debtor in connection with its limited resources. Withdrawal of the claim, and the
transfer of the subject property, proved to be a better than contemplated result for both parties
and was a result that could not have been achieved by litigation.
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PREPARATION FOR MEDIATION
The first consideration is the timing and scheduling of the mediation. Ideally, there
should be at least some initial discovery by both parties in order for counsel to be aware of the
. key items of evidence that will be introduced in order to support the respective legal positions of
the parties. In many cases, counsel are reluctant to mediate if there are major 'gaps' in the
evidentiary process.
Secondly, and even before the scheduling of a mediation date, the selection of a mediator
is a matter of critical importance. Most courts, such as Delaware, have an approved list of
mediators but in any case, counsel should carefully ascertain the background and experience of
the mediator to be selected. Former judges are often a good choice, particularly where there are
open and unsettled legal issues involved. More importantly, counsel will want to be sure tha~ the
mediator has done a complete conflicts check in order to be sure that the mediator is truly
disinterested.
Next, will be for the parties to arrange a pre-mediation conference call in order to 'iron
out' such issues as - the most convenient location for the mediation in order to reduce travel
expenses, a convenient date for all of the parties to attend and the fees to be charged by the
mediator (many mediators will employ a reduced rate because of the nature and goals of
mediation). Although most mediations will involve a sharing of the mediator's fees and
expenses, the ultimate burden may already be a matter of court order. In Delaware, where
preference adversary proceedings are commenced, the estate will be solely responsible for the
payment of the mediation fees.· In some instances, the court may permit the mediator to
apportion the fees and expenses as the mediator deems equitable. Also, an estimate of time
should be made in order to allow for luncheon and related expense items that may arise. Counsel
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will also want to know what the mediator will expect byway of position papers (the length,
document inclusion and submission dates).
Finally, because mediation is an integral part of the litigationjoumey, counsel must be
aware of the importance of client preparation. Although the process is confidential and nonbinding, you will want to prepare your client and determine in advance the extent to which the
client is comfortable in advancing his or her position. It may be advisable to have the client
focus on the factual background and his or her personal involvement in connection with the
development of the claim in order to make the case presentation more personal and meaningful.
It would be advisable to impress upon the client the need for suitable dress. Although mediation
is not as formal as the trial, the client should be aware that it is an important stage of the
litigation process.

THE MEDIATION SESSION
The mediator, after an introduction to the mediation, will outline the order of presentation
and the procedures to be employed, usually in connection with separate breakout sessions. The
actual mediation process is, in a very real sense, an advanced form of negotiation. You should
never be in a position to have to bargain against yourself. Advancing an offer to the next stage is
critical to the timing and manner of a parties' presentation. Some of the key points in advancing
your clients position may best be summarized as follows:
(1)

Understand the other sides problems - separate the personalities from the
parties problem.

(2)

Avoid emotional outbursts - recognize and understand the other parties
emotions - "put yourself in their shoes!"

(3)

Focus on the parties interests - not their stated positions.
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(4)

Ascertain what are the shared or mutual interests or concerns and focus on
possible solutions or options in advancing an ultimate objective for your
client.

(5)

Avoid arguments - these are almost always self-defeating and instead
counsel should rely upon and insist on resort to objective criteria in
connection with negotiating any stated position.

(6)

Use the mediator to advance your strong and best positions in order to
move the other party to a possible position of settlement.

Finally, always leave the 'door open' to possible meetings or conference calls if there
seems to be some positive movement toward a possible settlement.
CONCLUDING MEDIATION

At the mediation session, once an agreement has been reached, it is important to reduce
the essential terms and conditions of any settlement to writing and have one party assume
responsibility for preparing a final settlement agreement. Be sure and verify and establish any
specific requirements for submission and approval, particularly if there are any particular
conditions in an existing order of a confirmed plan. Usually, prior to plan confirmation,
settlements will require compliance with Bankruptcy Rule 9019. In most instances, unless
objections are filed, there will be no need for a court hearing. As a final matter, be sure there is
an understanding of who is responsible for the payment of the mediator's fees and expenses.
CONCLUSION

Mediation may well prove to be the most important tool available to the bench and bar in
addressing the mushrooming explosion of litigation in the nation's bankruptcy courts. Proper
implementation of mediation by the bankruptcy courts and resort to the mediation process by
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counsel will greatly assist clients in achieving a fair and reasoned settlement of most
controversies and will provide these same parties with an effective means of achieving objectives
that a court would be unable to achieve by mere entry of an order orjudgment.
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~TEDSTATESBANKRUPTCYCOURT

District of Delaware
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER ASSIGNING ADVERSARY PROCEEDING

To MEDIATION AND SETTING MEDIATION DEADLINES
Pursuanllo this (~OUrffs·StandingOrder dated April 7,2004, RE: Procedures in Adversary
Proceedings, _.
..
" not individually, but solely in his capacity as Trostee for t
" , Plaintiff(s) and
._
. Defendant(s) (collectively, the
"l>atties"), are directed to nlediation to attentpt to resolve disputes by and between the Parties relative to the
above-captioned adversary proceeding. Upon the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the above-captioned adversary proceeding is hereby assigned to Dlediation; and it
is tunher
ORDERED, that the costs of the nlediation shall be paid by the bankruptcy estate, or if there is no
bankruptcy estate, by the plaintiff in the adversary proceeding; and it is further
ORDERED, that:
(a) If the parties have stipulated to entry of this order, Honorable Roger M. Whelan who has
bam selected by the parties is appointed the mediator in this adversary proceeding; or,
(b) If the parties have not stipulated to entry of this order, the coon appoints, who is a
mediator tronl the Register of Mediators of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Iklawar~, as t1~
mediator in this adversary proceeding; and it is lurther
ORDERED, that the Parties shall furnish the nlediator with copies of such docunlents and such
a)ofidential statement of position as the mediator may request; and i.t is further
ORDERED ~ that within twenty (20) days of appointment, the mediator shall schedule an initial
nl~iati()n session; and it is funher
ORDERED, that this mediation shall be conducted in accordance with the [.,()Cal Rules of the United
States Bankruptcy C()urt of the District of Delaware. (Effective February 1, 2002, amended Septt:mber 1, 2002
("Local Rule 9019-3 Mediation U); and it is further
.
ORDERED ~ that pursuant to Local Rule 9019-3(c)(iii)(A), the Parties and counsel shall alt~nd such
mediation sessions as the Mediator shall deem appropriate and necessary at such tinles and places as the mediator
shall det~rmine; and it is further
.
ORDERED, that no later than 10 days following the conclusion of the nlediation or 6() days aft~ t~
entry of this order, whichever is earlier, the mediator shall file and serve on the parties the mediator's certificate of
conlpletion or nlediatioD status report. The inl()lUlation provided by the mediator shall not contain any infonnation
concerning the merits of the case or confidential conlmunications made during the mediation process: and it is
furth~
.
ORDERED, that within one day after the entry of this Order, the attorneys l<)r each of tll~ l>atrl·i~
shall send a a)py of this Order to· ( I) each of the individual Panies that such attorney represents; and/or (2) the
principal, officer, director or other person with full settlement authority for each entity that such attorney repr~nls.
9
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I)at~:

Isl Paul B l,jpdsG)'

·'()!I2J()4.

United States Bankruptcy Judge
Disbict of Delaware
(VAN-416)
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60 DAYS

90DAYS

I
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DRAFT
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60 DAYS

90 DAYS

MEDIATION TIME CHART
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....-.. 30DAYS
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10 DAYS

..

~

I

:omp'aint flied;
Responsive pleading filed;
)iscovery ptanning conference .. To be scheduled no later than thirty (30) days after first answer fited or sixty (60) days after adversary proceeding Is commenced, whichever occurs earliest.
3tipu1ated order appointing mediator· Must be filed 90 days after responsive pleading filed unless the parties have submitted a motion for order of dismissal or a stipulated judgment.
If parties fail to filed stipulated order appointing mediator, no later than ten (10) days after the deadline (see No.4), the Court will issue an order appointing the mediator.
~edjator's certificate of completion or Mediator's written report re: mediation not concluded due within sixty (60) days after entry of order appointing mediator.
rrial .. Scheduled ntnety (90) days after entry of order appointing mediator. or as soon thereafter as Court's calendar permits.
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L\J THE lJNITED

Sr.~TES B.o\..~XRl),PTCY COu~r

FOR THE DISTRICT Or DELA WARE

ORDER. (."-) .~PROVING

M~1).~TORY

:'t'CEDIATION

PROCEDURES FOR CERTAIN CLA1l"IS A.i\t1) (B) APPOJNT~G
~!EDL.s. TOR TO l\1EDL-'TE THE CL~S mCLtTDED THEREL"l

This matter coming before the Court on the Motion for an Order

(.~)

..\pproving

Mandatory Mediation Procedures and (B) AppoiDting Mediator ro ~ediate the Claitr'.s Included
Ttlcrelri (the "Motion') filed by the abOYc-eaptioned

deqtor1 and debtors in possession

(collectively, the ItDebtors lt); the Court (a) having reviewed the Motion and all pleadings relating

thereto,' (b) ha.ving mriewed the obj~tioQS aod swem~ts filed in respoDSc to the Motion
(collectively•.the "Objections tl ), and (0) hivi.ng h~ard the statements of counsel regarding the
~otion a.t

a. hearing before the Court (the "Hearing"): the Cou.'1 zinding tb.a! (a.) the

COUl1

bas

jurisdiction over this matter Plmuant to 28. U.S.C. §§ t 57 aDd 1334. (b) t":bls is a core proc eeding
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § lS7(b)(2), (c) notic~ of the Motion and the Hearing was sufficient under
tht: circumstances and (d) implementation of the Mediation Proe~ures (as such term is denncd'

in the Motion) and as mod.itied below is in the om int~ of the Debtors' estates and cred.ito~;

and the Court having det:.."mined that the 1:&11 and fa.ctual b~ 5et forth in the Motion and at
the

Hearing

establish

just

cause

D· 15

for

me

relief

granted

bcrein;

IT IS ·riEUBY ORDERED TIi.~T:
1.
=.~tent

:Thc Motion is

not withdra\'ID

2.

GRA~1"ED,

and the Objections are OVERRl:LfD to the

or othe:tvtise addressed herein.
Capitalized terms not othet\Vise defined. herein have the meanings given tu

them in the Motion.
3.

The Mediation Procedures set forth in the revised Mediation Procedures

T:rm Sheet, a copy of\lt'hich is attached hereto as Exhibit 1, are approved in all respects.
~otice

4.

The

S.

Roger M. Wh~lan is fo\md to be a disinterested person under 11 L:.S.C.

of DesignAtioD tlttacbed to the Motion

i:.S

Exhibir 0 :s

approved.

§ 101(14) and be is hereby appointed as the Mediator. Mr. Whelan's COmpeCSatiOl1 shall include
an hourly me for mediation services of 5350 per hour, subject to future adjustments

followi~g

notice to the Court. and reimbursem.ent of all outwOf..po~ket costs and expenses. The Debto rs are

authorized, without further notic;e or Cowt approval, to compensate and reimburse Mr. \'l"helan
for the Deoto1'$' portion of his fees, costs and expe11SCS in cOnJJcction \Vith the Mediation

Procedures.

6.

Duri:.a the period that a Mediation

C~aim

is subject to

me

Mediation

Procedures, the DcOtors and the Claimant on which the Notice of Designation has been s crved

shall be enjoined from, among ether thiDgs, ,ommcncing or continuing any action or proceeding

m~y manne:: or my p1ac= to r=$olve, reconcile. c1cten:z1iDc the :lature, priority or amount

of or

collect upon a Mediation Claim other than through the Mediation Procedures. This injunction
(the "Mediation Injunction") shall eorcmence:(a.) 'with respect to Claims held by Cla.inants
identified on the Preliminary Mediation Claims List or the Potential Additiunal Mediation

D - 16

Claimants List. on the date

mat the applicable Notice of Desi gnation

is filed and seT\'eci: and

(b) \\i.th respect to· l'1on-Included Claims. if no objection to inclusion in the ~!ediat!cn

Procec1ures is timely filed, upon the expiration of the 20-day objection period described. ~bo\'c or.
if!Q objection to inclusion in the Medianon Procedures is filed. upon the

Court ovc:nuling the objection.

ezltry

The lvIediation Injunction shall expire

of an order 0 f the

~ith

respett to a

Mediation Claim only when the: ?v!ediation Procedures have been cotr.pleted with respect to ::"ut

Clz.im.

Mediation Claims sht.ll remain su,!,ject

7.

to ~e

automatic stay

Ul1d~r

section 362 of the Bankruptcy Co~c after expiration of the Mediation Injunction through the dare

of confirmation of a plm or plans ofreorganization in the applicable Debtors' cbapter 11 cases,
unless the stay i$

Ot

bas beeD earlier terrn.inated· by an order

or the Court or by consent of the

Debtors.

8.

Notwithstmdini anytb.ing herein to the contrary, me claims asserted by

American Commercial Bank, Bayview Servic~ Inc., U,S. AttomcYs Office

OD

behalf 0 f the

Small Business AdministTanoc. WUliam Eldrid2e, TecoD. Corporation. Trousdale Northwest,

Inc, Mary Wilcoxen. Anne P. N"'"lX. 2'rxx Realty, Inc~ James P. N~ and Jim Nix shall not be
subject to the Mediatic~ Procedures.

9"
~ropria.te to

Tho DebtO'rS and the Mediator are authorized to take all steps necessarY 0 r

implement the MediaIion Procedures.

. f:. J~

LVY JilA-.-- .

CHIEF UNITED STATES Bk"lKRlJPTCY JUDGE',
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IN THE UNITED ST."-TES BAL'lI<Rt?TCY COL'RT

FOR. !HE OISTRIcr OF DEL•.\.W.W

lvCEPIATIQS PROCEDUREs TER;\( SJ{EET
The followmg summarizes the mandatOry mediation ,rocedures (the

"M~di&tiQn

Procedures") adopted in the chapter 11 cases of the zbg,,·e-eaptioneti debtors and debtors in
possession (coUectively, the "Debtors'). Each claim that potentially could be include4 in the
~edia1iQI1

Proec4ures is refcmd to heroin IS a "Claim.·

E~h

holder of £ Claim is re(errtd to.

herein as a "Claimant" and. the clalrzw1ts are refe:rred to b.crein coUeetivciy as the ·Claimants," .A..

"Mediation Claim" is a C1a1m iD.clUded i:n me MediacioD Pm~
InclusiOn of Claims in the Mediation P;pce4urg. A Claim Illay be:
inc;ludo<l in tha Mcdildol1l'n;)..c:du.rCl wbtdher or act a pt'OOf cr:1&:im has
bo= 1Dcc1md. wbach=r or DQC the Debtors have filo:l &ft objecUoa. to tbe
Claim. CLaimaz1ts ru.y request tblttbe Debtors include their Claims in the
MediJdion Pmcedures. but the initial decision to include Claims ill:he
MediarioA Proeed.urcs sbal1 be in th: sole disc=tion of the Deb tot'S. A
Claim will be classified as I. Modiation Claim., IDd :hercforo be subject to .
tho Mediation 'rocc:duRs, upon tbe .6liaS IDd servioe or a "Nori~ nr
Detipation" (i.e doSned below) by the Debtors on counsel for the
C1Iimau or upon a C1.aim.am if appeariDe pro set Upon L\e eJ11rjf of an
orc1Ir approviD, the Mediation Pmcedures (the "Mcdia.ti011 Order"'), th:
Debtors will daipate ce:naiJl Claims £Or laQl~tiol1 tbrouab m: Mcalation
hocodures by servin, upon holden or such Claims a Notice or
OaipaaoD iDdiCIdAI rhat the applicable Claim has beeE1 submitted. ro the:
Mediation Procedures (the ''Notico ofDcaipatiaa.W). After receipt or th~
Nadel: ofDerignation. the C1aimaDt may roqucst that the DebtorS include
other Claims in the Mediation Procedures. In the event of a. dislune
conc--ming incl\!Siau of tbe other Claims, the :v1.ediator shall ha~..e t.1"l: sole
discretion as to whether such other CIafms shall be :ncluded. in th:
Mediation Procedures. The Debtors 'Hill send a copy ot" the ='ot!~c of'
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DesigI12.tion to the Mediator, norifying the ~{ediator of the pending
mediation and of me need for the scheduling of a mediation conference (:l
:'N!ediation Conference") between the par.ies. Once the ~oti~e of
Designation is set"~ a Claimant may request that certain Claims be
mediated prior to other Claims, and the ~ediator shall decide in his sole
discretion if circumstances exist that justify in pla.cing a requested Claim
prioe to the mcdiaticn of other Claims.
No Risht to Witbdraw Claim from the Medi!liog Proeed~res. Th~
Debtors mall not have the riiht to withdraw from the ~r"di~tion

ProccdlJres At)y Claim once a Notic: of Designation is served..

Objection to Inclusion in the Mediation ?rocedures. Each Claimant \\-ho
is identified on either the Preliminary MediatioIl Claims liSt anached as
Exhibit B to the Motion or the Potential Additional ~!edialion Claimants
List a.ttached IS Exhihit C to the !\ftodon will be ;ubject Lo the Mediation

?roc:d.utes upon service of the Notice of DesiiDation on such Claimant.
without mrthcr opportwlity to object to the Mediation Proc:dures in dus
Court, except as provided in tl1e Mediation Order.
Non-Included Clammu. A Claimant not identified on the P~liminary
Mediation Claims List or the POtential Additional Mediation ClaimanTS
List (a ''Non-Included Claimant'') that the Debtors serve with (a) a copy of
the Mediati011 Older, (b) a copy oftbis Mediation. Procedures rerm Sheet
and (c) & Notice ofDesiption will have:20 days to.file an objection ~-ith
tho Court to the inclusion in the Mediation Procedures of any of its
Claim(s) identified in the Notice of Designatiotl ("Non-Included Claims")If the Non-lDctuded Claimant fails to file with !he Court a.a objection to its
Lncluaiod in the Modiation Procedura "W'ithin thia 2o..day time peri od. the .
Noe-Included Claimaut shall be subj~t to the Mediation Procedures
without further order of lhe Court. If the Non- bcluded Claimant timely
filsI an objection to its inclusion in the MediaIion Procedures, the Dehtors
sball have 20 days from the date of the filing of the objection to file u
reply to the objection and a request for a hearina before the Court

rcprdina inClusion ofthe applicable Claim in the Mediation Procedures.
R.emoval £rom AJlR Procedures- If a Claim -with. respect to which a
Notice of Designation is served is subject to the altemative dispute:
r=solution procedures previously approYed by the Court in these chapter
11 cases (the "ADR Procedures"), the Claim will be removed from the
ADR Procedures ami inclwied in the Mediation Proeedurcs.
Statu. Cogfen;noe.

Within 20 days of the service of the Notice of

Desienation. the Mediator shall eonduet by telephone a status conference
with the Claimant. Claimant's counsel and counsel to the Debtors, to
discuss tb.t: preparatioQ for the mcdi arion.
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The Mediation Ccmferenc~. The Mediator, in consultation ~'ith the
J'arties. shall set the date or the mediation conference (the "~recUatioll
Conference"). The lv!ecliator may schedul: one or morc !Ylediation
Conferences subsequent to the Mediation Confe~I1cc if the ~Iedi:ltor
believes that doing so "'ould further the likelihood of resolution.
Mediation Comc:rences wilt be conducted for n.ot lonser than one.ha.1F ~y
{four hours). unless further extended by agreement of the parties.

,

Telephonic Mm1ia..tion Col1!erences.' Whil~FOtlJ:!'" disfavored,
the: ~!edia.tOr ma.y, where appropriate, allow the ~'l<di~t\on

Conferences to be held telephonically.
:>

tn-Person Mediation Conferences. The rvrediation Conferenc~s
shall bo held in Wasr.mgtcn, D.C., unl~ss the Mediaior directs

otherwise or the parties mutually 19ree to mother location.
Submission Materials. Not less than seven calendar dAys before the date
of the Mediation Conf=m1CCt each party shall submit directly to the
Mediator, and serve on all counsel and pro SI Claimants participating in
the Mediation Comemscc written statement 0 f no more thin five pages,
exclusive or ex.hibits, setting forth. tfu: parties' respective positions on th~
Mediation CIim(s) (the uSubmissions")~ The Mediator may in his sole
discretion potmit a party to filo a Submission of more thaa fi\le pages.
The Submission may consist of previously filed l)lcadinp, in which case
the five-page limit sball not apply. The Mediator may, at any time, request
that the parties submit additional materials or designate tha.t materials be
submitted only to the: Mediator. Th~ Submissions Uld all othc:r materials
provided to the Mediator shall DOt be filed. 1Nith th, Court and me Court
sball not have access to them.
y ..

•

Persons aCQuired

to Attend.

The following persons must attend the

Mediation Conf'ereace:

>

The applicable Claimant and the Claimant's attorney unless the
Clai.mantfs attorney e.-,anifies .in writing to the Mediamr that ne has
nul settlement authority without ~ need to contact the eli ent. in
wbich case the Claimant may be e?Ccused from attending the
Mediation. If the Claimant bas appeared pro se in the Debtors'
chapter 11 cases, only the applicable Claimant; and

).

A representative althe Debtors ~ an attorney for the Debtors)

who has .full authority 'to negotiate and settle the matter on behalf
of the Debtors. The Mediator mav order that a non-a't:tomey
representative of the Debtors must appear iXl addition lo one of the
Debtors' attom~ys.
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;; . .1A

I.

1

f / ' r'J

failure to Attend. If the Claimant fails to appear at th~ ~£ediaLiun \vithout
Jhe consent of the lv!cdiator. the Debtors may ole a. motion to disallo\v the
claim. .If the Debtors rail to appear at the ~!ediation without the consent
of the Mediator, tb.e Claimant may tile a motion to aJlow the Claim in full.
Mediation Fees, Costl and mali!!. The ~!ediator shall direct how his
fe:s and out-of-pocket costs mel expenses of the mediation shall be shared
between the Debtors and the Claimant I.n the event said amounts are not

paid within the 30 days, the ?vlediator may request thnl the (~ourt reduc:
the amount owed to a money judgement ;n favor of the Mediator.

QM Costs and

Expenses. The Mediator :nay requC5t that the Dcbtor3

provido bi:m. with publicly Clvailable informAtion

50

as to

d~velop

backiround infonnarion and establish appropria.te and efficient ~ted ialion
Procedures. The DebtOr! shall pay all fees, costs and expenses incurred by
the Mediator in reviewing this information and establishing the Mediation
Procedures.
Mediation Procedures and the Local Rules. The Mediation Procedures are
based in largo part on Rule 9019·3 of the Local Rules of Baokruptcy
Practice and Procedure of rho United- States Bankruptcy Court fot' the.
District of Delaware (the "Loeal Rules"). In the event of any conflict
betWeen the Local Rules and the Mediation Procedures, the Mediation
Proc=dures shall govern.

Confidentiality of Mediation 1v!atcri§1s and Communications.
All
work product and other maIerials collIained in the case files
of the Mediator are co11fidentiaL Any commrmic:ation marle in or in
cotmcetiOD with the mcdjanou that relates to a controversy being
mecliated, whether made.to the Mediator or to a party, or to any person if
made a% the Mediation CoDference. is confidential; provided. howev~,
Claim.mtI may. dilcuu :be merits of their respective p~sitions.
Coutld=ti&l materials and communications are not subject to disclosure in
memo~

~y judicial or

administrative proceedin~.

Civil Immynity. The MedWor shall be immune ~m civil liAbility for or
re4U1t.ing n-om any aet or omission do'Cc: or made while engaged in c fiort5
to 85iist or facilitate a mediation unless tao act or omi5sion \\'85 made or
done in bad flith, \\lith malicious intent or i11 a manner exhibiting a vvilliiJl,
wanton disregard of the rights, safety cr property motha-.

or

Protection of InfQTTIJ1tion Disclosed at Mediation. The Mediator and the
participants in mediation are probibited .&om divulging., outside of the
mediation. any oral or written information disclosed by the partics or by
witnesses in the coune of the mediation. ~o person may reJy on or
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int.'"'Oduce as evidence in any arbitral, judicial or other proceeding evidenc:
pcrtainini to any aspect of the mediation effort, including but not ti.miled
Jo: (I) \oiews expressed or sagsestions made by a party with respect to ~
possible settlement of the dispute; (b) the fact that another pany had or
had Dot indicated willininess to accept 3 proposal for settlement made by
the ~{ediator; (c) proposals made or vicws expressed by the ~!cdiator:
(d) ~wements or admisdonl matie by a party ia the course of' mr:di~tion;

and (e) documents p~ared for the purpose of. in the course ofor pursuant
to the mediaIioD. other thJm documentS tbat prior to the ~1ediation
Conference have been filed with tho Court In a.ddition. 'Without Jimiting
ti1e foregoing, Rule ~8 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. imd ~y
~plicable federal or state stamte, rule. common law or judicial precedent
relating to the privileged nature of s~ttlement dis\:ussions, mediation or
dispute resolution procedures shall a.p~ly. Information
di3coverable or ndmissiblc in evidence, however. <.i()~S not
become exwl't from discovery, or inadm;ssihJe in evide~ee~ m=eJy by
being used.by a party in the mediation.

other

altemativ~

otherw~c

Discovery from Mediator. The Mediator shall DOl be compelled to
disclose to the Co\1rt or to an): person outside the Mediation Conference
any of tho records, reports, summaries, notes. communications or other
documents received or made by the ·Mediator while serving in such
capacity. r.be Mediator shall not testify or be .compelled to testify in
regard to the media.tioll in CClmectiOD with any arbitraL judicial, or ~thcr
proceeding. The Mediator shall not be a n!Ce.(.~ pany in ;tny
proceedings relating to the mectiation.

PresCIYaB0n

of Privileges. Tho disclosur: by a PartY of privileged
infOanatiOll to the Mediator does not waiver or otherwise adversely affect
the privileged naturo of the information.

Recommenda!ions bv Mediam. The Mediator is not required to prepare
writtez1 COlZJ!1UZlts or recomm=dal:ions to the partiec. The Mediator may
present a written settlement recommendation memorandum to attorneys or
pro
Claimants, but not to the Court. The Media.tor may. in his sole
discretion anc1 without disclosing the iofotmation protected !tom
diseloeurc as dcscnDod abovCt submit reports to the Court thm yvou1d
categorize unresolved Claims and make recommendations to the Court
with respect to the manner in which the legat issues raised by the Claims
should be resolved.

3.

•

Pr!pa:ratiog or Orders. Tho Debtors shall have the authori~'Y to
compromise and settle Mediation Claims without funhcr Court order in
accordance with the parameters set forth in the Court's Order Granting
De};>tors and Debtors in Possession Ongoing Awnority to Settle and P3}"
Certain Categories of Claims and Controversies dated December 28.. 1999
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. (D.L 3(66). . Beginning on July 31. 2001, the Debtors will nIe on

D.

monthly basis a motion under Bankruptcy Rule 9019 listing all Claims
,ettled. the original amount of ~h C~aim settled, the amount of ~~ch
settlement and the name of each C1aimant's counsel ~'bose Clailr.s were
settled during that month.
Final Disposition or Claims. Claims not resolved through the :vrediation
Procedures shall be resolved by the Court or another a):)propriate coW't or
forum.
Injunction. During the period thac a Mediation Claim is SUbject :0 ·tht:
Frocedures. the Debtors and the Claimant on which the ~otice
of Designation has been served wiU. be enj Q.ined from amons other things.
commencing or continuing any action or proceeding in any mantler or any
~rediation

J

place

to

resolve, recuncilt:, determine the nntu.'""e, priority or amount of or

collect upon a Mediation Claim other than through the .'v!ediation

Procedures described herein. This injunction (the "Mediation Inhmctioc")
will commenoe: (a) with respect to Claims held by Claimants identified
on the Preliminary Mediation Claims List or the Potential Additional
Mediation Claimants List, aD the date that the applicable Notice of
Designation is filed and served; and (b) with respect to Non-Included
Claims, if no objection to inclusion in the Mediation Procedures is timely
tiled., upon the expiration of the 20-day objection period described above
or, if an objeetion to inclusion in the Mediation Procedures is fil~ upon
tho c::Dtty ofan order ofthe Court ovenuImg the objection.. The Mediatio~

mjuaetion will expire with respect to a Mediation Claim only ~·hen the
Mediation Procedures have b=n completed with respect to that Claim.
Nothing co'Qwned berein shalI

~et

the Claimcmt from seeking r:1icf

. from the Mediation Injunction £rom the Court in accordance wi th the
BaDlauptcy Code, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and the
Local Rules. In additicm, Mediation Claims will remain subject to the
automatic st:A'j under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code after expiration
of the Mediation ~unction through the date of eonfumation of a plan or
plans of'reorganization in the applicable Debtors' chapter 11 cases. unless
the stay is or has bem earlier t=:micated by an order or the Cow"t or by
consent 0 f the Debtors.
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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

MOTION OF DEBTORS AND DEBTORS IN POSSESSION FOR
AN ORDER (A) APPROVING MANDATORY MEDIATION
PROCEDURES FOR CERTAIN CLAIMS AND (B) APPOINTING
MEDIATOR TO MEDIATE THE CLAIMS INCLUDED THEREIN

The above-captiolled debtors and debtors ill possession (collectively, the
UDebtors") llereby move the Court for tIle elltry of an order (i) approving tIle nlediatioll
proced.ures proposed herein (the "Mediation Procedllres") to assist ill the resolution of certain
unresolved claims against the Debtors' estates and (li) appointil1g a single nlediator to mediate
the claims included in the Mediation Procedures.

In support of this Motion, the De'btors

resJlectfully represel1ts as follows:

Background
A.

General
1.

On June 1, 1999 (tlle "Petition Date"), 831 of the Debtors comnlellced

their respective reorganization cases by filing voluntary petitions for relief under chapter 11 of
the Bankrul'ltcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (tIle "Bankruptcy Code"). On Decenlber 30, 1999,
De'btor Neweol (Dela\vare), L.L.C. conmlel1ced its vo111ntary chapter 11 case" The Debtors~
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chapter 11 cases have been consolidated for procedural purposes only and are being achninistered
jointly.

2..

The Debtors are cOlltinuing in 11ossession of tlleir respective 11roperties and

are operating and nlaJ.l.aging their bllsinesses, as debtors ill possession, pllrsuant to sections 1107
and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code.

3.

011 June 11, 1999, the United States trustee for the District of Delaware

(the "Uluted States Trustee") appointed a statutory committee of 1111secured creditors ill these
cllapter II cases (the "Creditors' Committee"), purSllant to section 1102 of the Bank.n.lptcy C"*.
4.

The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157

and 1334. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C.. § 157(b)(2).
5.

Debtor Loewen Grollp International, I11C., a Delaware corporation

("LOll"), is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Debtor TIle Loewen Group Inc., a British Colwnbia
corporation ("TLOI"). The other De'btors are either direct or indirect subsidiaries or affiliates of
LGII.

On June 1, 1999, TLGI and certain of the Debtors' Canadian affiliates commenced

insolvency proceedings tmder the Canadian C01npanies' Creditors Arrangement Act ill the
Ontario Sllperior COllrt of Justice in Toronto, Ontario..

B.

Cla;n,s to Be Subn,itted to the Mediatiol' Procedures
6.

Prior to the Petition Date, the Debtors e1ltered into thousands of

agreements in connectioll witt} tlleir acquisitiol1 of hundreds of fulleral home and cemetery
businesses and their ongoing business operations.

TIle types of agreements into which the

Debtors nlost commonly entered in connection with these acquisitions include:
•

purchase agreements;

•

11oncom11etitioll agreements;

D - 26

•

consulting, managenlellt, employment and other similar agreements;

•

leases; and

•

right of first refusal agreelnents.

In addition, the Debtors frequently issued promissory notes ill COllilectioll with their acquisitions.
7.

Some of tile nondebtor parties to these transactions and agreements

already have filed proofs of claim in these c·ases. Others either have objected to the Debtors'
requesl') to reject agreemellts alld/or Inay file proofs of clailn for rejection damages in the future.
Each such nondebtor party is referred to llerein as a "Claimant," and tIle nondebtor parties are
referred to herein collectively as the

"Claimants.'~

Certain of the proofs of claim that have been

filed Ilave "been lllcluded on claims objectiollS tiled "by the De"btors, and others have not yet been
illcluded on any claims objectioll.
8.

On March 15, 2001, tIle Court held a hearulg (tile "March 15 Hearing") 011

motions filed by the Debtors to disallo,v ·proofs of claim asserted in respect of the rejection or
tennination of noncompetition agreements. 1 At the hearing, the Court recommended that the
Debtors file a motion seeking approval of a mandatory mediatioll program to assist iIl resolviIlg
claiIns arising fronl 110ncom11etitioll alld consulting agreelnents.. In this regard, tile Court stated
in part as follows:
[I]t does seem to me that this is an area where one . . . mediator
with expertise ill barucruptcy should be able to, I think, settle a lot
of these matters. And so I would ellcourage the debtor to file such
a motion and, in that regard, perhaps put on hold the existing ADR

See Verified Motion for an Order Disallowing Certain Claims Asserted on ACCOU1lt ()f
Terminated Noncompetition Agreelnents (D.I. 5971) (the "'Tenninated Noncom11etitioll
Agreements Motion"); Verified Motion for an Order Disallowing Certain Clainls
Asserted 011 ACCOUllt of Rejected Noncompetition Agreenlents (D.I. 5973) (tlle "Rejected
Nonconlpetition Agreements Motion'~).
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procedure with respect to clainlS arising out of non-compete and
COllsulting agreelnents.

(Transcript of Proceedings dated March 15,2001 at 81:10-81:16 (the "March 15 Transcript,,).)2
9..

111 ligllt of tIle Court's COffilnents during the MarcIl 15 Hearing, the

Debtors are proposing tIle Mediation Procedures.. These procedures are proposed in addition to
the alternative dispute resolution procedures (the "ADR Procedures") previously approved by the
Court in these chapter 11 cases. 3
10.

The Debtors believe t1lat the mediatioll approach recommended by the

Court will be beneficial in resolving not only claims arisillg froln nOllColnpetitioll and conslliting
agreements, btlt also other types of clailns arising from the prepetition acquisition transactions
described above. Accordingly, the Debtors request authority, in their sale discretion, to sublnit
to the Mediation ProCedtlres uluesolved clailns arising from 110nconlpetition and consulting
agreements or fronl prepetitioll acquisition trallsactions (collectively, the "Clailnsn ).

As

discussed above, the Debtors allticipate that the ClainlS, without linlitatioll, include clainls
asserted in proofs of claim, requests for payment of administrative expense and rejection
d81nages claims tllat may not llave yet beell asserted. 4 In some but 110t all itlstances, Claims
referred to the Mediation PrOCedtlres will be tIle subject of pending clainls objections filed by the
Debtors. In general, the Debtors intend to submit all related Claims held by a Claimant or group
of Claimwlts to mediation at the same time, so that the Claims may be mediated together.
2

A co.py of the relevant portion of tIle March 15 TrallScript is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

3

The COllrt approved the ADR Procedures pursllallt to its Order ApJ)roving Alternative
Dispute Resolution Procedures, dated Februaty 28, 2000 (D.I. 3345).

4

For example, tIle Debtors wish to refer to the mediation procedures the rejection damages
clailns associated Witll certaill pelldillg nl0tions to reject noncompetition and consultitlg
agreements.

D - 28

11.

Based on filings 11y the Claimants and communications with the Claimants

or their counsel to date, the Debtors believe that the followi11g issues will frequently arise in
connection with the Inediation of tIle ClaiIns:
•

Whether tlle agreenlellts at isslle are execlltory COlltracts subject to
assumption or rejection or instead constitute deferred purchase price
obligations of the Debtors.

•

Whether the agreements at issue are stand-alone agreements that may be
independently assumed or rejected or whether the agreeme11ts are
integrated with other agreements entered lllto in connection with the saIne
acquisition transactio11.
Whether the damages in respect of the tennination or rejection of
noncolnpetition agreenlents are the unpaid balances wlder the agreements
or SOine ot11er alnount.

•

Whetller the damages under all agreelnent dellolninated as a "consultiIlg
agreelnent" are subject to the damages cal' im!Josed by section 502(b)(7)
of the Bankruptcy Code.

•

Whether the parties have claims or counterclaims u11der any related
purchase agreenlellt (e.g., in respect of post-closing adjustments and
contulgent purchase price obligatiol1s).

Request for Approval of the Mediation Procedures and Authority Therefor
12.

By this Motion, the Debtors seek approval of the Mediation Procedures to

assist in the resolution of the Claims. Clainls submitted to tIle Mediation Procedures are referred
to herein as "Mediation Claims." A Claim would be classified as a Mediation Claim, and
tllerefore be subject to the Mediation Procedures, upon the filing alld service of a Notice of
DesigIlation (as defmed below) on a Clainlant by the Debtors. A prelilninary list of the initial
ClainlS that the Debtors anticipate will 'be subject to the Mediatioll Proced'ures (the "Preliminary
Mediation Claims List") is attaclled hereto as Exhibit B. The Prelimillary Mediation Claims List
includes:

(a) tIle Claims to which the Debtors objected by meaIlS of the Temllllated
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Noncompetition Agreements Motion and the R~jected NOllcompetition Agreenlellts Motion that
have not been the subject of a default order entered by the Court;5 (b) the Claims held by
nonde'btor parties to certain COllsulting alld lloncompetitioll

agreelnent~

that are the subject of

pending contract rejection motions; and (c) allY otller Clailns lleld by tIle holders of these Clainls
that have not been disallowed or otherwise resolved (whether or not specifically identified on the
Preliminary Mediation Claims List). 6

The Preliminary Mediation Claims List includes

approximately 37 Claimants and 68 ClaiIns.

To provide holders of Claims notice of the

pro.posed Mediation Procedures, the Debtors are serving copies of t11is Motion on holders of the
Claims included on the Preliminary Mediation Claims L-ist and, in addition, on the holders of the
other currently-filed Claims tllat the Debtors have identified for possible subnlission to the
Mediation Procedures, as set forth 011 the list (tIle '''Potential Additiol1al Mediation Claimants
List") attached hereto as Ex11ibit C. The Debtors, however, reserve their right~ to i11clude ClainlS
held by Clailnants not identified on either the Preliminary Mediation Claims List or the Potential
Additional Mediation Claimants List in the Mediation Procedures.
A.

The Proposed Mediation Procedures
13.

TIle Debtors propose to implement the Mediation Procedures on the

following tenns:

5

The Court has el1tered defaults order granting the relief requested in tIle Temlll1ated
Noncompetition Agreenlellts Motion and the Rejected NoncompetitionAgreements
Moti011 with respect to clailnants that did 110t oppose the 1notions. See Order Disallowing
Certain Claims Asserted On Account of Tenninated NOllcompetition Agreements
(D.I. 6379); Order Disallowing Certain Claims Asserted On ACCOUl1t of Rejected
NOnC()nlpetitio1l Agreements (D.I. 6380).

6

The approval of the Mediation Procedures will 'be without prejudice to tIle Debtors' rights
to oObject to a Claim on any and all grounds !,lrior to its inc IllS ion in the Mediation
ProCedtlres.
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•

Illclusion of Clainls ill the Mediation Procedures. A Claim nlay be
included ill the Mediation Procedures whetller or 110t a proof of claim has
been filed and whether or not the Debtors have filed an objection to the
Claim. Clailnants nlay request that tIle Debtors lllclude their Clainls in the
Mediatioll Procedures, btlt the decision to illclude Claims in tlle Mediation
Procedures shall be in the sole discretion of the Debtors. A Claim will be
classified as a Mediation Clann, alld tllerefore be subject to the Mediatioll
Procedures, upon the filing and service of a ''Notice of Designatioll" (as
defmed below) on a Claimant by the Debt()rs. Upon tile entry of an order
a!,proving the Mediation Procedures (tIle "Mediation Order"), the Debtors
will designate certain Claims for resolution through the Mediation
Procedures by servulg upon llolders of stlcll Clailns a Notice of
Designation indicating tllat tile applicable Clainl lIas been submitted to the
Mediation Procedures (the "Notice of Designation,,).7 The Debtors will
send a cOl'Y of the Notice of Designation to tIle Inediator appointed by the
Court (the "Mediator"), notifying the Mediator of tIle pending mediation
and of the need for the scheduling of a mediation conference (3
"'Mediatioll COllferel1ce") between the parties.

•

Reservatioll of Right to Withdraw Clainl froin the Mediation Procedures.
The Debtors shall have the rigllt, ill their sole discretioll, to withdraw from
the Mediation Procedures any Clainl that has been submitted thereto.

•

O"bjection to Inclusion in the Mediation Procedures.. Upon the entry of the
Mediation Order, each Claimant ,vho is identified on either the
Prelilninary Mediation Claims List or tIle Potential Additional Mediatioll
Claimants List vvho fails to file an objection to the Motion or whose
objectioll is overruled by the Court will be subject to the Mediation
Procedtlfes upon service of the Notice of Designatioll on such Claimant,
without further opportunity to object to the Mediation Procedures in this
Court..

•

Non-Included Claimants. A Claimant not identified on tile Prelinlinary
Mediation Claims List or the Potential Additional Mediatiol1 Claimwlts
List (a ''Non-Included Claimal1t") that the Debtors serve with (a) a copy of
tile Mediatioll Order, (b) a copy of the Mediatioll Procedures tenn sheet
attached to tIle Mediatiol1 Order aIld (c) a Notice of Designati0118 willllave
20 days to file an objection with the Court to the inclusion in the
Mediation Procedures of ally of its Claim(s) identified in the Notice of

7

The Notice of Designation will be substantially in the foml attached hereto as Exllibit D.

8

The Debtors anticipate that most of the Non-Included Claimants will be Clainlants who
file claim.c;; subsequent to the date of tllis Motion ill respect of damages on account of the
Debtors' rejectioll of executory contracts.
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Designation ("Non-Included Claims"). If the Non-Included Clain1al1t fails
to file \vitll tile Court all objection to its inclusion in tIle Mediatioll
Procedures within this 20-day time period, the NOll-Included Claimant
shall be subject to tIle Mediation Procedllres \vithout furtller order of the
Court If tIle Non-Illcluded Clannant timely fIles an objection to its
inclusion in the Mediation Procedures, the Debtors shall have 20 days
from tIle date of the filillg of the objection to file a respollse to the
objection alld a request for a hearing 'before the Court regarding inclu..'-";ion
of the applicable Clailn in the Mediation Procedures.
•

Removal from ADR Procedures. If a Claim \vith respect to which a
Notice of Designation is served is subject to tile ADR Procedures, tIle
Claim will be relnoved from the ADR Procedures and included in tlle
Mediation Procedures.

•

The Mediation Conference. The Mediator, in COllsultation with the
parties, shall set the date of the nlediation c()nference (the "Mediation
Conferel1ce"). The Mediator may sclledule one or more Mediation
Conferellces subsequent to the Mediation Conference if the Mediator
'believes tllat doillg so would further the likelihood of resolutioll.
Mediatioll COluerellces \villbe COllducted for not longer thatl olle-Ilalf day
(four hours), unless further extended by agreement ()fthe parties.
•

Telephonic Mediation Conferences. The Mediation Conferences
may be lleld telephonically when appropriate.

•

In-Person Mediation Conferences.
In-person Mediation
COllferences will be 11eld in Wilnlll1gtoll, Delaware, unless the
Mediator directs otherwise or the parties mutually agree to another
location..

•

Submission Materials. Not less than seven calendar days before the date
of the Mediatioll Conference, each party shall submit directly to the
Mediator, atld serve 011 all cowlsel and pro se parties, a written statelnent
of no more than fIve pages, exclusive of exhibits, setting forth the :parties'
respective positions on the Mediation Claitn(s) (the "SllbmissiollS"). The
Mediator may, at any time, reqllest tllat the parties su'bmit additional
materials or designate that materials be subnlitted only to the Mediator.
The Sublnissions and all other materials provided to the Mediator shall not
be tiled with the Court and the Court shall not have access to them.

•

Persolls Required to Attend.
Mediatioll Conference:
•

The following persons must attend the

The applicable Claimwlt aJld the ClainlaJ.lt's attorney; alld
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•

A representative of the Debtors (e.&, an attorney for the Debtors)
WllO has full authority to negotiate and settle the matter 011 behalf
of the Debtors.

•

Failure to Attend. Willful failure to attelld any Mediation COluerence in
accordance with the Mediation Procedures will result in the disallowance
of the Claimallt's Mediation Clainl(s). A persoll required to attend the
Mediation Conference is excused from appearing if all parties and the
Mediator agree in advance of the Mediation Conference that the person
need not attelld.

•

Mediation Fees. Costs and Expenses. The fees alld admillistrative costs of
the Inediation sllall be shared equally by the Debtors and the ClaiInant,
unless otherwise ord.ered by the Mediator.

•

Mediatioll Procedures and the Local Rules. The Mediation Procedures are
based in large part on Rule 9019-3 of the Local Rules of Bankruptcy
Practice and Procedure of the United States Ballkruptcy Court for the
District of Delaware (the "Local Rules"). Notwitllst311ding the Local
Rules, however, except as otherwise set forth in the Mediatioll Order and
tIle Mediatioll Procedures, tIle Mediator sllall determine tIle methods,
procedures and timing of the nlediation, in consllltation with the Court, if
llecessary. In tIle event of any conflict between the Local Rllles aIld the
Mediation Procedures, the Mediation Procedures shall govern.

•

Confidentiality of Mediation Materials and Communications.
All
memoranda, work product and otller materials contained in the case files
of the Mediator are cOllfidential. Any conmlunication made ill or in
cOnllectioll with tlle nlediatioll that relates to a COlltroversy being
nlediated, whether made to the Mediator or to a party, or to any person if
nlade at tIle Mediatioll Conference, is cOllfidential. Confidelltiallnaterials
and communications are not subject to disclosure in any judicial or
administrative proceeding4

•

C:ivil Immunity.. The Mediator shall be ilnmune from civil liability for or
resultillg from any act or onlission dOlle or made while engaged in efforts
to assist or facilitate a mediatiOll llnless the act or omissioll was Inade or
done in bad faith, wit.h malicious intent or in a manner exhibiting a willful,
VY'allton disregard of tIle rights, safety or property of another.

•

Protection of Infonnation Disclosed at Mediation. The Mediator and the
participants in mediatioll are prohibited from div1JIgiIlg, outside of the
mediation, any oral or \vritten information disclosed by the parties or by
witnesses in the COllrse of the nlediation. No persoll nlay rely on or
introduce as evidence ill any arbitral, judicial or otller proceeding evidence
pertaining to any aspect of the nlediatioll effort, including but not limited
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to: (a) views expressed or suggestions nlade by a .party with respect to a
possible settlelnent of the dis!')ute; (b) the fact hat another 1',arty had or
had ll0t indicated willingness to accept a proposal for settlement made by
tIle Mediator; (c) proposals made or views e,,:pressed by the Mediator;
(d) statemellts or admissions made by a party ill tIle course of mediation;
and (e) documents prepared for the purpose of, in the cou.rse of or pursuant
to the mediation. In additioll) without liInitUlg tIle foregoing, Rule 408 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, and any ~pplicable federal or state statute,
rule, conlmon law or judicial precedent relating to the privileged nature of
settlement discussiollS) mediation or other alternative dispute resolution
procedures shall apply. Information otherwise discoverable or admissible
in evidellce, however, does not beconle exempt from discovery, or
inadmissible ill evidence, lnerely by 'being used by a party in the
nlediation.

•

Discovety from Mediator. The Mediator shall not be compelled to
disclose to the Court or to any person outside the Mediation Conference
any of the records, reports, sUlD11laries, notes, COmmtlnications or other
documents received or made by the Mediator while serving in such
capacity. The Mediator shall not testify or be cOlnpelled to testify in
regard to tIle lnediation in connection witll allY arbitral, judicial, or odler
proceeding. The Mediator shall not be a necessary party in any
proceediIlgs relatlllg to tile mediation.

•

Preservation of Privileges. TIle disclosure by a party of privileged
illfonnation to the Mediator does not waive or otherwise adversely affect
the privileged nature of the information.

•

Recommendations by Mediator. Tile Mediator is not required to prepare
written comments or recolnmendations to the parties. The Mediator may
.present a writtell settlemellt recolmnendation Inemorandwn to attorneys or
pro se litigants) but not to the Court. The Mediator may, in his sole
discretion and without disclosing the information protected fronl
disclosure as described above, submit reports to tile COtlrt that \vould
categorize unresolved Claims and make recommendations to the Court
with respect to the nlalmer ill wmcll tile legal issues raised by the Claitns
Sllould be resolved.

•

Preparation of Orders.
TIle Debtors shall have the authority to
compromise and settle Mediation Claims without further Court order in
accordance witll the parameters set forth in the Court's Order GrantiIlg
Debtors and Debtors III Possession Ongoing Authority to Settle and Pay
Certain Categories of Claims and COlltroversies, dated December 28, 1999
(D.I. 3066) (tIle "Settlement Order"). Begiruling at tIle end of the third
calelldar quarter of tile year 2001, for all settlements falling outside the
parameters of the Settlenlent Order, the Debtors shall subnlit. on a
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quarterly basis fully executed stipulations and orders to the Court with
reSl',ect to all settleme11ts reached l..lnder the Mediation Procedures during
the calendar quarter, together with a motion for approval of the
settlenlents.

B.

•

Final Disposition of Claims. Clainls 110t resolved through tIle Mediation
ProCedtlres sllall be resolved by the Court or aJ.lotller appropriate COtlrt or
fOfUin.

•

Injtmcti0ll. Dtrrlllg the period that a Mediation Claim is subject to the
Mediatioll Procedures, the Debtors and the Claimant on which the notice
llas beell served will be enjollled from, alnong other tllings, commencing
or continuing allY actioll or proceeding in allY manner or any place to
resolve, reconcile, determine the nature, priority or amount of or collect
tIpOn a Mediation Claim other than through the Mediation Procedures
described herein. This injunction (the "Mediation Injunction") will
commence: (a) with respect to Clainls held by Claimants identified on the
Prelimulary Mediatioll Claims List or the Potelltial Additional Mediation
Claimall~ List, on the date that the applicable Notice of Designation is
flied and served.; and. (b) with respect to NOll-mcluded Claims, if no
objection to inclusion in the Mediatio11 Procedures is timely filed, upon the
expiration of the 20-day objection peri(ld described above or, if an
objection to incltlSion in tIle Mediation Procedures is filed, upon the entry
of an order of the Court overruling the objection. The Mediatioll
Injunction will expire with respe~~ to a Mediation Claim only when the
Mediation Procedures have been completed with respect to tllat Claim. In
addition, Mediation Claims will remain subject to the automatic stay under
section 362 of the BallknIptcy Cod.e after expiration of the Mediation
Injullction through the date of con:fimlation of a plan or plalls of
re<'lrganization in the applica'ble Debtors' chapter 11 cases, 'unless the stay
is or llas been earlier tenninated by all order of the Court

Relevant Authorities
14.

This Court is authorized to approve tlle Mediation Procedures pursuant to

section I05(a) of the Bal1kruptcy Code, \vhicll provides that "the Court may issue any order,
process, or judglnent that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title."
11 U.S.C. § 105(a). GiVe!l the nature (If the Claims and. the common issues relating to nlanyof
the Claims, the Debtors believe that the Mediation Procedures will assist in resolving the Claims
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in an expeditious, cost-effective and fair mamler. Accordingly, the Debtors believe that a.pproval
of the Mediation Procedures will benefit all parties.

15.

Furthermore, alternative dispute resoilltion programs similar to the

Mediation Procedures have been ap.proved in other cha,pter 11 cases in this District

See,~, In

re Venture Stores, Inc., No. 98-101 (RRM) (D4 DeL Oct. 16, 1998) (approving mediation
procedures and employment of a mediator); In re Kaiser Group Intenlational, Inc., No. 00-2263
(IvlFW) (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 29, 2()Ol) (approving alternative dispute resoilltion procedures,
lllcluding nlediation procedllre); Hamischfeger Industries, Inc., No. 99-2171 (PIW) (Bankr. D.
Del. June 30, 2000) (approving mediation and arbitration procedures and appointing claims
resolution facilitator and claims resolution supervi~or).9

Request to Appoint the Mediator and Authority Therefor
16.

The Debtors are hereby llominating Roger M. Whelan, outside counsel to

Shaw PittInan and fonner United States Batlkruptcy Judge for the District of Collunbia, to serve
as the Mediator. A brief biograplly of Mr. Wllelan is attached hereto as Exhibit E. The Debtors
are aware of no relationship between them and Mr. Whelan. 10
17.

As lloted above, unless otherwise ordered by the Mediator, costs of the

mediation will be shared equally by the De.btors and the nondebtor parties to the mediation. In
accordance witll precedent in this District, the Debtors request authority to cOlnpellsate and
9

Copies of the unreported orders cited herelll are available UpOll request from counsel to
the Debtors.

10

Mr. Whelan has indicated that he does not represent ally party in these cases and has not
been retained by or heard any matters lllvolvil1g tile Debtors, t1leir creditors, their eqllity
security holders or any other parties in interest, or their respective attorneys and
acCOWltants, tIle United States Trustee or any person elnployed in the Office of the
United States Trustee, in any matter related to the Debtors or their estates.
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reimburse the Mediator for the Debtors" portion of his services and expenses in cOlmection with
the Mediation Procedures without further notice or Court approval. See In re Venture Stores,
Inc., No. 98-101 (RRM) (D. Del. Oct. 16, 1998) (authorizillg the payment of the mediator's fees
without ftlrther 110tice or court approval).
Notice
18.

No trustee or examiner has 'been appointed in these chapter 11 cases.

Notice of this Motion has been given to:

(a) the United States Tnlstee; (b) cOUllSel to the

Creditors' Cotnlnittee; (c) cOllnsel to the De'btors' post.petition lenders; (d) eacll oftlle Claitnants
identified on the Prelinlinary Mediations Claims List or the Potential Additiollal Claimants List
and/or their counsel, if known; and (e) the other parties on the general service list being
Inaintained in these cases. In light of tile natlrre of the relief reqllested in this Motion, the
Debtors submit that no other or further 110tice is required.

No Prior Reqnest
19.

No ,prior reqllest for tIle relief SOllght in this Motion has been made to tllis

or any ()ther court.
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WHEREFORE, the Debtors respectfully request that the Court enter an Order,

substantially in tlle fonn attached hereto as Exhibit F: (i) approving the Mediation Procedures on
tIle terms described hereill; (ii) appoillting Mr. Wllelan to serve as the Mediator and authorizillg
the Debtors to COmlJellsate and reimburse the Mediator for the Debtors' portion of his services
and expellses in cOllilection with the Mediation Procedures without further notice or Court
approval; (iii) authorizing the Debtors to take all steps that the Debtors determine, in their sole
discretion, are necessary or alJpropriate to implelnent tIle Mediatioll Procedures; and (iv)
graIlting such other and further relief as the Court nlay deenl proper.

[remainder of page intentionally left blank]
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Since 1997, a bankruptcy bill seemed to raise its head out of the ground every
year like Punxatawny Phil, the erstwhile groundhog, only to return below ground each
year for any number of reasons. The bill grew over the years from an initial version of
just a couple of hundred pages to S.256, a 500 plus page bill that finally made its way
through the Senate and then the House of Representatives. President Bush signed the bill
on April 20, 2005. It is Public Law 109-06. Any bill that is over 500 pages is bound to
have something for everyone, and this bill is no different. It is impossible in these
materials to cover each and every aspect of the bill, and I will not attempt to do so. I will
try to highlight for you some of the high spots (or low spots depending on your view of
the bill) both as it applies to consumer debtors and business debtors as well as creditors in
those cases. I assume that some of these issues will be addressed in more detail in other
sessions of the seminar, so my effort will be to make you aware generally of the changes,
and I expect there will be additional seminars in which you will have more substantial
time to consider the issues in greater detail. Before addressing the amendments to the
Code, however, I will first address recent amendments to the Bankruptcy Rules and
Official Forms and amendments to the Rules and Forms that are on the horizon.

AMENDED RULES AND FORMS EFFECTIVE ON DECEMBER 1, 2004
The Rules Enabling Act process begins with a proposal from the Advisory
Committee on Bankruptcy Rules to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure that amendments to the rules and forms be published for comment. If the
Standing Committee agrees, the amendments usually are published in August with the
comment period concluding the following February. The Advisory Committee then
reconsiders the proposal along with the comments submitted to the Committee either in
writing or at a public hearing, and the Committee will then, if appropriate, recommend to
the Standing Committee that the amendments be approved and presented to the Judicial
Conference of the United States. If the Standing Committee accepts that
recommendation, the Judicial Conference of the United States reviews the proposals. If
the Judicial Conference finds the proposals acceptable, it will forward the amendments to
the Supreme Court for its consideration. 1 The Supreme Court will then issue an order by
May 1 of each year promulgating the rule changes and additions. These rules, however,
only become effective if Congress takes no action to the contrary prior to the following
December 1. Thus, the rules adoption process takes approximately three years from the
time the rule is first proposed until it becomes effective in bankruptcy cases.
Three rules amendments became effective on December 1, 2004. They amended
Bankruptcy Rules 1011(a), 20020), and 9014(c). A description of the amendments
follows.

1 The Judicial Conference will forward only the proposed rules and rules amendments to the Supreme
Court. As to the Official Forms, the Judicial Conference has the fmal say on these amendments.
Consequently, approval of Forms changes can be accomplished in one year less than approval ofa rule
amendment or addition.
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The amendments to Rules 1011(a) and 2002(j) were both technical and minor. In
Rule 1011(a), a cross reference to Rule 1004(b) was changed by deleting "(b)" which had
previously been deleted by an amendmentto that rule. The Rule 2002(j) amendment
changed the mailing address of notices to the Internal Revenue Service from the "District
Director" (a position no longer in existence in the IRS) to "the address set out in the
register maintained under Rule 5003(e).
The amendments to Rule 9014 were more significant. Those amendments
essentially provide that contested matters are not governed by the mandatory disclosure
provisions of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The rationale for
excepting contested matters from these requirements was that most contested matters
would be concluded before the mandatory discovery periods would have expired.
Subjecting the many motions for relief from the stay and other contested matters to this
process seems counterproductive, so the amendment provides that they do no apply,
unless the court directs otherwise. In a particular matter, the court could find that these
procedures would be helpful and could order the parties to follow those provisions.

AMENDED RULES AND FORMS TO BE EFFECTIVE ON DECEMBER 1, 20052
There are several amendments to the Bankruptcy Rules that will become
effective, absent Congressional action to the contrary, on December 1, 2005. These rules
amended are:
•

Rule 1007 is amended to require the debtor in a voluntary case to submit with the
petition a list of entities to which notices will be sent in the case. The listed
parties are identified as the entities listed or to be listed on Schedules D through H
of the Official Forms.

•

Rule 2002 is amended to add a subdivision (g)(4) to the rule. This subdivision
authorizes an entity and a notice provider to agree on the form and method of
notices to the given to the entity by the notice provider. It will especially enable
creditors with involvement in a substantial number of cases throughout the
country to tailor their noticing needs

•

Rule 3004 is amended to conform the rule to § 501(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.
The amendment clarifies that the debtor or trustee may not file a proof of claim
until after the time for filing a proofby a particular creditor has expired.

•

Rule 3005 is amended to delete any reference to a creditor filing a proof of claim
that supersedes a claim filed on behalf of the creditor by a codebtor. The
amendment thus conforms the rule to § 501(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.

2 These amendments will become effective only if Congress does not take any action to the contrary prior
to December 1, 2005.
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•

Rule 5005 is amended to add the clerk of the bankruptcy appellate panel and the
district judge among the persons who can transmit papers to the proper person or
entity when those papers were erroneously delivered to them initially.

•

Rule 7004 is amended to authorize the clerk specifically to sign, seal, and issue a
summons electronically. The amendment does not address the service
requirements for a summons which are set out in other provisions of Rule 7004.

•

Rule 9001(9) inserts the definition of notice provider into this rule, and other
definitions are renumbered to reflect this insertion.

•

Rule 9006 is amended to clarify that the three day period is added to the end of
the time period for taking action when service is accomplished through certain
specified means. This amendment in intended to conform as closely as possible
to the amendment being proposed by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules.

•

Rule 9036 is amended to delete the requirement that the sender of an electronic
notice have received confirmation of receipt of that notice to make the notice
complete.

BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
OF 2005
Every bill has a name, and this one is no different. Its name ostensibly tells you
what the bill covers, but also as with all bills, names can be deceiving. For example,
Subtitle B of Title N of the bill is called "Small Business Provisions." The bill actually
includes a new definition of a "Small Business", but if you thought that Subtitle B of
Title N contained only provisions that apply to small businesses, you would be wrong.
As for the "abuse prevention" and "consumer protection" in the bill, the jury is still out
on those. In this portion of the materials, I will address some of the more significant
parts of the bill.
The general effective date of the Act is October 17, 2005, which is 180 days after
the date of the enactment, April 20, 2005. Several provisions became effective upon the
date of enactment. Sections 522(0), (P), and (q) along with §§ 727(a)(12) and
1141(d)(5)(C) are already effective. They place limits on homestead exemptions and
delay the entry of an order of discharge if § 522(q) is applicable in a particular case.
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CONSUMER PROVISIONS
Means Testing
The provision of the bill that has probably received the most attention in the press
is the amendment to § 707(b) that inserts a means test into the Bankruptcy Code. Section
707(b) already contained a provision authorizing the court to dismiss a chapter 7 case ifit
was a substantial abuse of that chapter. The case law generally had devolved to a sort'of
totality of the circumstances test, and the courts often focused upon the debtor's ability to
make significant payments under a chapter 13 plan in considering whether to dismiss a
particular chapter 7 case. Congress clearly found this level ofjudicial oversight of
improper filings insufficient, and the new § 707(b) is now several pages longer and
provides that a debtor who cannot pass the means test is a presumptive abuser of chapter
7.
Note the structure of § 707(b). In subparagraph (1), the court is directed to
dismiss any case that presents an abuse of chapter 7, and conversion of the case is
possible if the debtor so requests. Subparagraph (2) then sets out the lengthy provisions
of the means test that generate a presumption of abuse when a specific amount of
"money" is left from the debtor's "current monthly income" when a variety of expenses
(some actual and some set out by Internal Revenue National and Local Living Standards)
are deducted from that income. The amount is a sliding scale between $100 and $166.67
per month of excess "money." The scale slides in the following manner. First, if your
remaining monthly income exceeds $166.67, you are presumed to be in abuse of chapter
7, regardless of the amount or nature of your debts. If the remaining monthly income is
less than $100, you have "passed" the means test, and you are free to pursue chapter 7
nirvana. If the remaining monthly income is between $100 and $166.67, then you must
take the debtor's nonpriority unsecured claims, and to the extent that they exceed
$24,000, then the monthly income must be equal to or greater than 25% of that debt for
the presumption of abuse to arise. For example, if the nonpriority unsecured debt is
$32,000, then the presumption of abuse arises if the debtor can pay 1/60th of $8,000 each
month.

Debtor Education: Credit Counseling and Financial Management Courses
The legislation includes plenty of provisions for debtor education. Debtors must
meet these obligations both at the beginning and at the end of the case. Section 109(h)
adds another prerequisite for eligibility for any form of bankruptcy relief for an
individual debtor. They must have had an individual or group briefing describing credit
counseling opportunities and the counselor must have assisted the individual in
performing a budget analysis. This briefing can be by telephone or over the internet, so I
can envision debtors' attorneys providing a dedicated computer terminal in their office
for this purpose. The credit counselor also must be an approved agency (the United
States trustee is tasked with certifying the agencies, see § 111). This counseling must be
done during the 180 days prior to the filing of a petition by the debtor. Since this must be
done prior to the filing "by a debtor," it does not appear that the failure of a debtor to
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obtain credit counseling will be a bar to involuntary cases against individuals. You
should note, however, that this obligation applies to all individual debtors, not just those
whose debts are primarily consumer debts. The obligation to obtain credit counseling
does not apply if
•
•

•
•

there are no approved agencies available in the district (but, remember that
telephone and internet methods are available) (§109(h)(2)(A)),
the debtor certifies in a manner satisfactory to the court that exigent
circumstances warrant a waiver of the obligation and states that he or she could
not obtain credit counseling during a 5 day period after which the debtor
requested the counseling, (§ 109(h)(3)
by reason of mental illness or incapacity the debtor could not reasonably
participate in the briefing, (§ 109(h)(4) or
the debtor is "active military serving in a military combat zone." (§ 109(h)(4))

At the end of the case under chapter 7 (§ 727(a)(II) and chapter 13 (§ 1328(g)), the
debtor must have "completed an instructional course concerning personal financial
management." The United States trustee also must approve these courses, and the
exceptions in § 109(h)(4) apply to this requirement. We certainly don't want our military
in combat zones being distracted by personal financial management courses, and
Congress took care of that.

Discharge and Dischargeability
The time between chapter 7 discharges under the revised Code will be 8 years
instead of 6. Congress also has introduced a time limit on discharge in chapter 13 cases.
Up to now, the effective limit on multiple discharges in chapter 13 was the plan
confirmation process. Congress now is much more explicit on the matter through the
enactment of § 1328(t). Under that section, the debtor is not eligible for a chapter 13
discharge if the debtor received a discharge in a case under chapter 7, 11, or 12 during the
4 year period prior to the commencement of the chapter 13 case, or if the debtor received
a prior chapter 13 discharge in a case that was commenced within 2 years of the current
chapter 13 case.
As for the dischargeability of debts, there are several amendments to § 523, and
Congress has essentially wiped out the super discharge in chapter 13. For example,
•

•
•

presumed nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(C) is expanded to purchases of
luxury goods and services within 90 days of the order for relief (used to be 60
days), with the threshold debt being reduced from $ 1,225 to $ 750. Similarly,
the cash advance period is extended from 60 to 70 days, and the $1,225 is again
reduced to $ 750,
nondischargeable student loans no longer are limited to those provided by
governmental units or nonprofit institutions,
debts incurred to pay taxes owed to any governmental units, not just taxes owed
to the federal government as was previously the case,
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•

•

all domestic support obligations and other debts owed to a spouse, former spouse
or child of the debtor without regard to any balancing of the parties' needs (note
also that debts governed by § 523(a)(15) no longer will need to be challenged in
the bankruptcy court under the new § 523(c)(1), and
debts owed to a pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, or other plan under
specified provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.

Debtor Filing Obligations and Consequences
In addition to completing the schedules and statements as currently required,
debtors under the Revised Code will have additional responsibilities. They must show
evidence of their identity, and they must file with the court copies of pay stubs and the
like for the 60 days prior to the filing of the petition, as well as both current and past tax
returns (or transcripts). The debtor also must file a statement of "monthly net income", a
term that is not defined in the Code, but which probably refers to the means test. (See
above).
If the debtor fails to file all of the materials required under § 521(a)(1) within 45
days of the filing of the petition, the case is automatically dismissed effective on the 46th
day. Any party in interest can ask the court for an order of dismissal which shall be
entered within 5 days. The debtor can, however, ask for an extension of the 45 day filing
period on the grounds that the debtor made a good faith attempt to compile and file the
materials, and that "the best interests of creditors would be served by the administration
of the case." § 521(i). The taxing authorities have their own authority to seek dismissal
or conversion of the case if the debtor fails to file a timely tax return. § 5210).

Debtor's Attorney's Certification
Under Revised Code § 707(b)(4)(D), the debtor's attorney's signature certifies
that the attorney "has no knowledge after an inquiry that the information in the schedules
filed with such petition is incorrect." A similar consequence flows from the attorney's
signature on the petition, pleadings and written motions. If the court finds that the
attorney's conduct failed to meet Rule 9011 standards, it can impose civil penalties
against the attorney payable either to the court or the trustee or United States trustee.
Attorneys also are "debt relief agencies" under the Revised Code, and new §§ 526
through 528 contain a long list of restrictions on these agencies. Specific notices must be
given to debtors, including a notice that reminds debtors that they can represent
themselves. Section 342(b) of the Revised Code also includes information that must be
given to debtors, including several reminders that the documents and information
supplied must be truthful and that criminal sanctions are available against those who may
be untruthful.

E-6

Serial Filing and the Automatic Stay
Congress amended § 362(c)(3) and (4) to add additional limitations on the
operation of the automatic stay. In response to cases in which the debtor filed a series of
separate cases, or a series of filers filed separate cases involving the same property, the
new law provides that the stay is either greatly restricted in its application, or does not
arise at all upon the filing of the petition. In a chapter 7, 11, or 13 case, the stay
automatically tenninates 30 days after a petition is filed if there was a case dismissed
within one year prior to the filing of the new case. The stay can be extended if a party in
interest requests the extension and the court finds that the new case was filed in good
faith. There is a presumption that the new case was not filed in good faith if there was
more than 1 prior case in the year immediately preceding the filing of the most recent
case, or if the prior case was dismissed for failure to amend the petition or schedules in
the absence of a substantial excuse (and inadvertence or negligence by an attorney is not
a sufficient excuse). The stay also expires in 30 days if there has been no substantial
change in the debtor's financial or personal affairs since the conclusion of the previous
case.
The stay also tenninates in 30 days with respect to any creditor who had a
pending motion for relief from the stay in the original case at the time the case was
dismissed, or whose motion for relief was granted in the previous case.
These 30 day stays provide the debtor with a short breathing spell while giving
creditors who have been through it all before with the debtor some confidence that the
stay will not go on forever in a series of cases. There is no stay, however, if the debtor
had two or more prior cases pending within one year of the commencement of the latest
case. Instead, the court may impose the stay on the request of a party in interest. Once
again, the party in interest must overcome the same presumption that the new filing is not
in good faith.
The automatic stay also expires as to property subject to security interests if the
debtor does not either reaffinn, redeem, or surrender the property as contemplated by §
521 (a)(2). The debtor must act within 45 days "after the first meeting of creditors" or the
stay expires. That section does allow the trustee to move the court during the 45 day
period to protect any property that is of consequential value to the estate.

Valuation of Collateral
For purposes both of redemption under § 722 and cramdown under § I325(a)(5),
valuation is based on the cost of replacement of the property without any reduction for
the costs of sales or marketing of the property. This amendment to § 506(a)(2) sets the
replacement cost as the retail price for similar property. Thus, the standard is more along
the lines of a consignment or used goods store rather than a "garage sale" standard for the
valuation of the property.
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Exemptions
The Revised Code makes a number of changes to the exemption provisions.
Kentucky has recently opted back in to the federal exemptions, so Kentucky debtors now
have a choice to make at the start of the case. That assumes, of course, that Kentucky
law applies. Revised Code § 522(b)(3)(A) provides that the law where the debtor has
been domiciled for the past 730 days governs the debtor's exemptions. If the debtor has
not resided in Kentucky for the 730 days prior to the commencement of the case, then the
law of the jurisdiction where the debtor resided for the greater part of the 180 days before
the 730 day period governs. That subsection concludes by stating that if the choice of
law rule results in the debtor "being ineligible for any exemption, the debtor may elect to
exempt property" under the federal exemptions.
A variety of retirement funds also are exempt without regard to whether the
debtor selects state or federal exemptions. The exemption for IRAs may not exceed
$1,000,000 unless "the interests ofjustice" require that the cap be ignored. Bankruptcy
Code § 522(n).
As for homestead exemptions, there are several new provisions. First, the
homestead exemption under state law is capped at $125,000 until a debtor has lived in the
state for 1215 days. (This is approximately 40 months.) If the debtor has resided in the
state for longer than that period, then there is no cap on the amount of that homestead
under § 522(P). Furthermore, if the value of the homestead includes the value of
otherwise nonexempt property disposed of by the debtor in the past 10 years with intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, then the $125,000 cap also applies to the
homestead. Bankruptcy Code § 522(0).
The $125,000 cap also applies if the debtor commits a felony which demonstrates
that the case is an abuse of title 11, or if the debtor owes a debt attributable to a violation
of the securities laws and several other listed categories of fraudulently or criminally
created debts. This limit, however, will not apply if the full exemption is necessary for
the support of the debtor or any dependent of the debtor. Bankruptcy Code § 522(q).
The amendments that added subsections (0), (p), and (q) became effective on the
date of passage of the legislation, April 20, 2005.
The Revised Code also now includes a more complete definition of household
goods for purposes of the avoidance of liens that impair an exemption. New § 522(f)(4)
tells us what is in the definition of household goods, as well as what is not. A VCR is in
(how old is this legislation?), but works of art (unless done by the debtor or a relative of
the debtor) are out.
Notices to Creditors
Revised § 342 contains several provisions governing notices to creditors. For
example, under § 342(c)(2), any notice that the debtor sends to creditors must be sent to
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the address supplied to the debtor by the creditor in at least 2 communications to the
debtor in the 90 days prior to the commencement of a voluntary case. Note that this
applies only to notices given by the debtor.
Under § 342(e), a creditor can file with the court and serve on the debtor a notice
of address to be used in the case. The creditor also may file with any bankruptcy court a
notice of address to be used in all chapter 7 or 13 cases where that creditor holds a claim.
If a notice is sent to another address notwithstanding the creditor's effort to have the
notice sent to a specific address, the notice is ineffective until the notice is "brought to the
attention of such creditor." Moreover, monetary penalties cannot be imposed on a
creditor for violation of the stay unless the wrongful conduct occurs after the creditor
receives notice in accordance with this provision.

Reaffirmation
The reaffirmation provisions are supplemented by a new subsection (k) in § 524
of the Revised Code. This subsection contains a lengthy disclosure obligation for
reaffirmation agreements to be enforceable. The information is several pages long and is
intended to ensure that the debtor fully understands the scope and effect of the
reaffirmation agreement. For example, the debtor must complete a statement that sets out
the debtor's actual monthly income and expenses to show that he or she can afford to
enter into the reaffirmation agreement. Subsection (m) provides that the agreement is
presumed to be an undue hardship if the debtor's statement shows that the debtor's
income is less than the total of the debtor's expenses and the reaffirmation payment. The
debtor then must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that other income is
available to cover the payment of the reaffirmation obligation.

Ride Through
Revised Code § 521 (a)(6) provides that an individual debtor may not retain
personal property that is subject to a purchase money security interest unless the debtor
reaffirms or redeems the property within "45 days after the first meeting of creditors
under section 341(a)." The s~atute does not say if this is 45 days "from the first date set
for the § 341(a) meeting of creditors" (a phrase used elsewhere in the Code), or 45 days
from the conclusion of the meeting of creditors. Section 521(a)(6) goes on to provide
that if the debtor does not act in that time frame, the stay is terminated and the property is
no longer property of the estate (subject to the trustee's right to mover the court prior to
the expiration of the period for an order directing delivery of the property to the trustee).
Section 362(h)(1), however, provides that the stay terminates and property is no longer
property of the estate if the debtor fails to act within 30 days of the first date set for the
meeting of creditors. This section is not limited to purchase money security interests,
though they are not excluded from the section. This is a conflict that the courts will have
to resolve unless it is addressed in a technical corrections bill.
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CHAPTER 13 CHANGES
Commencement of Payments
Under Revised Code § 1326(a)(1), absent a court order to the contrary, the debtor
must begin making payments to the trustee to the extent the proposed plan so provides,
and to lessors and secured creditors according to the terms of the lease or as adequate
protection to the secured creditor, respectively. This seems to assume that the court is not
involved in determining the amount of the payment necessary to provide adequate
protection of the creditor's claim. Some personal property may not be depreciating as
rapidly as others, and it is unclear how the payments would be made, and in what
amount, in the absence of a court determination.

Stripdown of Secured Claims
Historically, the court would value the collateral and the debtor would pay the
present value of that collateral through periodic payments. Section 1325(a), as revised,
now provides that the valuation process does not apply when valuing purchase money
security interests in motor vehicles created within 910 days of the commencement of the
case, and purchase money security interests in any other collateral if those interests were
created within one year of the commencement of the case. This raises the question of the
impact of the surrender of the collateral under § 1325(a)(5)(C). If the property is deemed
to be worth the amount of the outstanding indebtedness, then the entire debt would seem
to be satisfied by the surrender of the property, and the creditor could not share in any
distribution to unsecured creditors.
The Revised Code also provides in § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i) that the holder of the lien
being crammed down in the plan retain the lien on the property until the earlier of the
payment of the full debt (both secured and unsecured) or discharge at the end of the case.
The lien is also retained by the creditor if the case is dismissed or converted. As to
conversion, this operates to apply the payments made in the chapter 13 case first to the
unsecured portion of the claim and thereafter to the secured portion of the debt.

Payments of Support Obligations
The Revised Code provides that the court cannot confirm a plan unless the debtor
is current on all domestic support obligations. Moreover, if the debtor misses any such
payments as they come due during the life of the plan, the court can dismiss or convert
the case on motion of a party in interest under § 1307(c)(11).

The Chapter 13 MeanslDisposable Income Test
Disposable income under § 1325(b) is now defined as the debtor's "current
monthly income" less expenses for the maintenance and support of the debtor and the
debtor's dependents. "Current monthly income" is a defined. term as more completely
described in the general means test discussion above. This artificial income number is
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imported into the chapter 13 disposable income calculation.• Moreover, if the debtor's
current monthly income times twelve exceeds the state's median income for a household
of that size, the expenses deducted from that number are theiliving expenses allowed
under the means test by reference to the IRS guidelines. For debtor's below the.median
income level, actual expenses are deducted from the income. to determine the debtor's
disposable income.
If the debtor's income is above the state median income level, the payment plan
must be at least 5 years.
Discharge and Dischargeability
The super discharge is no longer. Most of the nondischargeable categories of §
523(a) are imported into the chapter 13 full payment discharge. One exception is for a
debt for damage to property as a result of a willful or malicious injury caused by the
debtor. (Note also that this is willful or malicious, as compared to willful and malicious
as set out in § 523(a)(6).)
Repayment of Pension Loans
Revised Code § 1322(f) in connection with new § 362(b)(19) creates an
obligation for chapter 13 debtors to repays loans made by a pension, profit-sharing, stock
bonus, or other plan established under specific provisions ofthe Internal Revenue Code.
This provision also protects the continuing withholding of funds from a debtor's ,wages to
make these payments. In short, it permits the debtor to repay himself or herself from
their current wages. The amounts so withheld are specifically excluded from the
definition of disposable income in chapter 13.

THE INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR IN CHAPTER 11
Individual debtors in chapter 11 are in for a whole new ballgame. First, new §
1115 provides that property of the estate includes the debtor's postpetition earnings from
personal service. This is a change from the prior law, and it brings chapter 11 into line
with the treatment of these earnings in chapter 13. New § 1129(a)(15) provides that the
debtor must either pay objecting claimants in full, or pay all projected disposable income
into the plan for at least 5 years. The creditors could accept less favorable treatment, but
there would not seem to be much incentive for a creditor to accept anything less than at
least five years of the debtor's disposable income. Also as in chapter 13 cases, an
individual debtor in chapter 11 does not receive a discharge until the completion of all of
the payments under the plan. See § 1141(d)(5). A partial payment discharge is available
for the debtor if modification of the plan is not practicable and the present value of the
payments already made is not less than the amount that creditors would have received in
a chapter 7 case.
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BUSINESS PROVISIONS
The primary focus on the reform legislation has been on its consumer bankruptcy
provisions in general, and the means test, in particular. But, with over 500 pages of
reform, there are plenty of changes in store for business bankruptcy cases. These changes
include an entirely new chapter of the Code, Chapter 15, addressing cross-border
insolvency cases, and complicated rules governing the netting of certain financial
contracts. Title IV of the Bill includes general and small business bankruptcy provisions,
and this paper highlights a number of those amendments.
Title IV of the Bill is titled General and Small Business Bankruptcy Provisions.
Subtitle A of the title of the bill is titled "General Business Bankruptcy Provisions," and
Subtitle B is "Small Business Bankruptcy Provisions." Notwithstanding this apparent
split in the two subtitles, several of the provisions in Subtitle B (Small Business) actually
apply to all cases. Therefore, this analysis includes first the generally applicable
provisions, then the provisions applicable to small business debtors, and finally the
provisions in the small business debtor subtitle that nonetheless apply to all cases.
Amendments that apply generally:

•

Section 402 of the bill would amend § 341 of the Code by adding a new
subsection (e) that permits the court, after notice and a hearing, to dispense with a
meeting of creditors if the debtor has filed a plan and solicited acceptances of the
plan prior to the commencement of the case.

•

Section 404 of the bill amends current § 365(d)(4) to provide that the unexpired
leases of nonresidential real estate in which the debtor is the lessee are deemed
rejected and must be immediately surrendered to the lessor by the earlier of 120
days after the commencement of the case, or the date of the confirmation of a
plan. The court, for cause, may extend the 120 day period for an additional 90
days, but any extension subsequent to the additional 90 days is available only with
the consent of the lessor.
Section 405 of the bill recognizes the authority of the court to order the U.S.
trustee to adjust the number of members and the makeup of committees under §
1102. The provision also suggests ("the court may order the United State
trustee...") that small business concerns, as defined in § 3(a)(I) of the Small
Business Act, be added to the appropriate creditors' committee if the claim it the
small business concern holds, in comparison with its annual gross revenue, is
disproportionately large. So, a small business that has a "large" claim against the
debtor can be added to the creditors' committee and thereby play an active role in
the case while holding down their costs.

•

•

Section 406 of the bill includes added protections for a warehouseman's lien.
They would be protected from actions under Code § 545 to avoid statutory liens.
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•

Section 408 of the bill amends § 1125 of the Code to authorize the solicitation of
acceptances or rejections of a plan if the entity "was solicited before the
commencement of the case in a manner complying with applicable nonbankruptcy
law." Thus, if a creditor received a solicitation to vote in favor of a plan in a
prepackaged chapter 11, other lawful solicitations can be made while the case is
pending.

•

Section 409 of the bill amends § 547(c)(2) of the Code by restructuring the
provision (former subparagraphs (B) and (C) become (A) and (B), while former
subparagraph (A) is subsumed into the opening language of the exception). More
importantly, however, the "and" between former subparagraphs (B) and (C)
becomes an "or" under the amended section. This effectively expands the
exception to preference recoveries, especially in those jurisdictions that required
proof of each of the conjunctively linked elements under § 547(c)(2).

•

Section 410 of the bill continues the focus on preferences although this is an
amendment to the venue provision governing actions to collect money or
property. Under the amendment, these actions must be brought in the defendant's
home district for any action to collect a consumer debt of less than $15,000, or
any other debt in excess of$10,000. The $10,000 business debt limit applies only
if the defendant is a noninsider. If the defendant is an insider, the $1,000 venue
limit continues.

•

Section 411 of the bill imposes a new deadline for the exclusivity period for filing
a plan under § 1121 of the Code. Under the amendment, the exclusivity period
cannot exceed 180 days from the date of the order for relief. The existing law
permits the court to extend this deadline on a showing of good cause. There is no
specific limit on the court's discretion under the current law (other than cause) in
setting the final deadline for the exclusivity period. To the extent that the
expiration of the exclusivity period results in a shifting of the balance of power in
a chapter 11 case, this amendment will make this shift more certain in the future
in cases where the debtor has a need for additional time in which to craft a plan.

•

Section 414 of the bill amends § 101(14) of the Code by deleting the provisions
of that section that automatically render investment bankers for a security of the
debtor (without regard to the timing of the issuance of the securities) and their
attorneys not disinterested. Under the amendment, the only provision that would
render investment banks not disinterested is the general provision that they may
not have an interest materially adverse to the estate or any class of creditors or
equity security holders.

•

Section 415 of the bill adds a new subparagraph (E) to § 330(a)(3) of the Code
directing the court to consider whether a professional person is board certified or
has otherwise demonstrated skill and experience in the bankruptcy field. The
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amendment makes board certification a specific factor in the award of
compensation to professionals.

•

Section 417 of the bill amends § 366 of the Code by adding a fairly detailed
definition of "assurance of payment" for purposes of that section. There are
several mechanisms offered as appropriate "assurances of payment", such as
prepayment or surety bonds. Interestingly, the amendment specifically provides
that the timely payment of utility charges in the past is not evidence of assurance
of payment in the future. Not surprisingly, the availability of an administrative
expense priority is not an assurance sufficient under the provision.

•

Section 419 of the bill directs the Judicial Conference ofthe United States to
prescribe forms for all chapter 11 debtors to disclose the "value, operations, and
profitability" of entities in which the debtor holds a controlling or substantial
interest. Not addressed by the provision is what happens if the entity, which is
not in bankruptcy and which may not be controlled by the debtor (but rather is an
entity in which the debtor's interest is "substantial") does not submit such a
report. The entity is not itself a debtor, and the debtor may not be in a position to
force the entity to complete the fonn.

•

Section 331 is an amendment that was added during the Senate markup of the
bill. It includes strict limitations on the payment or allowance of claims for
retention bonuses or severance pay to key personnel of the debtor. Specifically,
the amendment provides that payments to induce persons who are insiders to
remain in the debtor's employ are not allowed unless the payment is essential to
retain the person who has "a bona fide job offer from another business at the same
or a greater rate of compensation", and the amount of the payment does not
exceed ten times the amount of a similar transfer to a non-management employee
during the calendar year of the proposed transfer, or ifno such transfer has been
made to a non-management person during the calendar year of the case, then it
may not exceed 25 times the amount of any similar transfer to an insider in the
calendar year preceding the case. Severance pay is similarly limited to an amount
not to exceed 10 times the amount of the mean severance pay given to nonmanagement employees, unless the severance pay is a part of a program generally
applicable to all employees. The amendment also prohibits·the payment or
allowance of any other obligations outside of the ordinary course of business as
priority administrative expenses unless they are ')ustified by the facts and
circumstances of the case." Tying the maximum amounts to payments made to
other employees during the calendar year of the case presumably includes both
pre and post bankruptcy payments.
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Amendments that apply in "small business" bankruptcy cases:
•

Section 431 of the bill adopts a more flexible process for the confirmation of
plans in small business cases. Under this amendment, the court may determine
that the plan contains sufficient information such that no disclosure statement is
required. Additionally, disclosure statements can be submitted on standard forms
and can be conditionally approved, with final approval to be given at the
confirmation hearing. The hearing on approval of the disclosure statement may
also be combined with the confirmation hearing itself. This should allow the case
to proceed to confirmation with fewer hearings and less cost to the participants.

•

Section 432 of the bill sets out the definition of a small business. It is a person
engaged in commercial or business activities, other than owning or operating real
estate, and it must have no more than $2 million in debt (excluding debt to
insiders or affiliates). Furthermore, for the debtor to be a "small business debtor",
either the U.S. trustee has not appointed a creditors' committee in the case, or if a
creditors' committee was appointed, it "is not sufficiently active and
representative to provide effective oversight of the debtor." Since the U.S. trustee
cannot appoint a committee until the case is filed and the debtor has identified
some creditors, it would seem that a debtor that otherwise meets the definition at
the moment of the filing of a voluntary petition would be a small business debtor,
and would seem to lose that status when a committee is appointed. If the
committee thereafter becomes "insufficiently active and representative", the
debtor might revert back to being a small business debtor. The definition has
several loose ends.

•

Section 434 of the bill adds a new § 308 to the Code. That section establishes
new reporting requirements for small business debtors. They must file periodic
reports setting out their "profitability" (i.e. "the amount of money that the debtor
has earned or lost during current and recent fiscal periods"), reasonable
approximations of their projected cash receipts and disbursements, comparisons
of their actual receipts and disbursements to their earlier projections, and stating
their compliance with the Bankruptcy Rules and tax and other governmental filing
obligations including the payment of taxes. This reporting obligation does not
become effective until 60 days after rules are prescribed to establish the forms for
use in reporting the data. Section 435 of the bill directs the Judicial Conference to
prescribe the forms.

•

Section 436 of the bill inserts a new § 1116 into the Code. That section sets out a
list of 7 duties for the trustee or debtor in possession in small business cases.
(Remember, it may be difficult in some cases to determine whether the debtor is a
small business debtor. See the discussion of Section 432, supra.) Among the
duties are filing financial statements and tax returns within 7 days of the date of
the order for relief, meet with the U.S. trustee prior to the § 341 meeting, timely
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file other documents and tax returns during the case, and permit the U.S. trustee to
inspect the debtor's premises and books and records.

•

Sections 437 and 438 of the bill set new deadlines for plan exclusivity and the
filing and confirmation of a plan in a small business case. Section 437 sets the
exclusive period for the debtor to file a plan at 180 days after the order for relief,
and the plan and disclosure statement, in any event, must be filed within 300 days
after the order for relief. Section 438 then provides that the court shall confirm a
plan in a small business case not later than 45 days after the plan is filed, as long
as it complies with the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The
deadlines for the exclusivity period, the time for filing plans, and the time for
confirmation of a filed plan can only be extended for a reasonable time at the end
of which confirmation of a plan will result. The order extending the time also
must be signed before the existing deadline has expired. Thus, requests for
extensions must be made in sufficient time to allow the court to hear and
determine whether an extension is warranted. The passage of the deadline means
that the debtor would not have a confirmable plan, and that would be grounds for
conversion or dismissal of the case.

•

Section 439 of the bill creates a new obligation for the United States trustee to
conduct initial interviews with small business debtors prior to the § 341 meeting
of creditors. The interview is to evaluate the debtor's financial viability and
business plan and to set up an agreed scheduling order. It is also intended to
provide an opportunity for the United States trustee to advise the debtor of various
reporting and filing obligations. The amendment also requires the United States
trustee to promptly move for conversion or dismissal whenever there are grounds
for such a motion.

Amendments from the Small Business Subtitle that apply to all cases:
.' Section 440 of the bill amends § 105(d) of the Code to require (rather than simply
to allow) the court to hold "such status conferences as are necessary to further the
expeditious and economical resolution of the case."
• Section 441 of the bill places new limits on the availability of the automatic stay
if a small business debtor has filed a previous bankruptcy case. Under the
amendment, the automatic stay would not apply in a small business case if the
debtor has another case pending simultaneously (presumably the stay in that case
would be in effect), and the stay would not operate if the debtor was in a small
business case that was dismissed within 2 years of the order for relief in the
second case, or if the debtor had a plan confirmed in a small business case within
2 years of the new case. The provision also applies if an entity acquired all or
substantially all of the assets in a small business of the kinds described above.
The debtor can overcome this denial of the automatic stay by showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the second bankruptcy filing resulted from
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circumstances beyond the debtor's control, a~d that it is more likely than not that
the court will confirm a plan, other than a liquidating plan, in a reasonable time.
•

Section 442 of the bill is another provision that is included among the small
business case changes, but the amendment applies in fact to all chapter 11 cases.
It amends § 1112 of the Code by restating examples of cause for conversion or
dismissal of chapter 11 cases. This section also amends § 1104(a) of the Code by
adding a new subparagraph (3) which permits the court to appoint a trustee or
examiner in lieu of converting or dismissing the case. The court also may deny an
otherwise well-taken motion if the debtor or another party in interest establishes
that there is a reasonable likelihood that a plan will be timely confirmed and that
as to the grounds for granting the motion to dismiss or convert, there is a
reasonable justification for the act or omission, and the failure will be cured
within a reasonable time. If the "cause" for dismissal or conversion is substantial
or continuing loss or diminution. of the estate and an absence of a reasonable
likelihood of rehabilitation, however, the court cannot deny dismissal or
conversion even if the debtor shows a reasonable likelihood of timely
confirmation of a plan. An interesting aspect of the amendment is that is
substantially copies existing § 1112(b), and it adds a number of additional
examples of grounds for dismissal or conversion. In the opening language of the
proposed § 1112(b)(1), however, the bill would seem to change the category of
persons eligible to move for conversion or dismissal. Under the current provision,
the issue is raised "on request of a party in interest or the United States trustee or
bankruptcy administrator." The bill, however, says that the issue can be raised
"on request of a party in interest." There is no mention of the United States
trustee or bankruptcy administrator as parties that can raise this issue. Given the
Supreme Court's decision in Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004),
in which the Court held'that the removal of the debtor's attorney from the list of
persons entitled to payment out of the estate prevented the payment of fees to the
debtor's attorney, the deletion of the United States trustee and the bankruptcy
administrator from existing § 1112(b) could be construed as a Congressional
determination that those parties cannot raise the issue of conversion or dismissal
of chapter 11 cases. On the other hand, § 307 of the Code provides that the
United States trustee may appear and be heard on any issue, and this separate
statutory authority may be enough to grant standing to the U.S. trustee in these
matters. It would also be unusual for Congress to create an entirely new set of
duties for the United States trustee relative to the oversight of small business
debtors, and then preclude the trustee from moving to dismiss or convert those
cases in appropriate circumstances.

•

Section 444 of the bill amends § 362(d)(3) in a couple of aspects. The section
sets out a requirement that as to single asset real estate, the debtor either must
have filed a confirmable plan or have commenced making monthly payments to
the secured creditor to keep the automatic stay in effect. This requirement arises
under the existing law "90 days after the entry of the order for relief." However,
it may be difficult to know whether a particular case is a single asset real estate
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case, so the amendment provides that the important date is the later of the 90 day
period, or 30 days after the court determines that the debtor has "single asset real
estate." The amendment also clarifies that the debtor may make payments to the
creditor from the rents or other income generated by the property. Finally, the
amendment changes the amount of the payment necessary to continue the stay in
effect. Under the existing provision, the debtor must pay an amount "equal to
interest at a current fair market rate on the value of the creditor's interest in the
real estate." Under the amendment, the payment must be in the amount of the
"nondefault contract rate of interest on the value of the creditor's interest in the
real estate."
•

Section 445 of the bill adds a subparagraph (7) to § 503(b) of the Code. This
provision caps the amount of an administrative expense claim resulting from the
rejection of an unexpired lease of nonresidential real estate to the monetary
obligations for a period of2 years from the later of the rejection of the lease or the
turnover of the premises. This amount is further limited to the extent that the
claimant either recovers or has a right to receive payment from another source.
Of course, any amount of the claim in excess of the cap would constitute a general
unsecured claim allowable to whatever extent § 502(b)(6) permits.

HEALTH CARE BUSINESSES
The Revised Code introduces several new definitions including health care
business, patient, and patient records. A health care business is an entity that offers to the
general public facilities and services for a variety of medical care. A patient is an
individual who receives services from a health care business, and patient records are
written records of the patient's health care.
In a chapter 7, 9, or 11 case of a health care business, the court is directed in § 333
of the Revised Code to order the appointment of a patient care ombudsman in the first 30
days of the case, unless determines that the appointment is unnecessary. Absent such a
ruling, the United States trustee appoints the ombudsman who is then directed to monitor
the quality of the health care and represent the interests of the patients. The ombudsman
is required to submit periodic reports on the quality of patient care at least every 60 days.
If the quality of health care is diminishing substantially or otherwise compromising the
well being of the patients, the ombudsman is to make an immediate report to the court
with notice to all parties in interest.
Revised Code § 704(a)(12) directs the trustee (or debtor in possession in a chapter
11 case) to use all reasonable and best efforts to transfer patients to another acceptable
health care facility if the debtor health care business is closing. The trustee is to identify
another facility that is located reasonably near the debtor's business and offers
substantially similar services and maintains a reasonable quality of care.
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If the health care business is closed, the costs of closing are administrative
expenses. New § 351 then directs the disposal of patient records. It provides for both
publication and personal notice of the disposal of the records, and the section ultimately
even provides for the shredding of records that are unclaimed. Section 704 is also
amended to add these obligations

CROSS BORDER CASES
Section 304 of the Code governed cases ancillary to foreign proceedings, but the
refonn legislation repealed the provision. In its place is an entire chapter of the Code.
Chapter 15 of the Code incorporates the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency and
provides the mechanism for a foreign representative to commence a case under title 11.
The chapter includes a number of provisions to govern these cases, and it is beyond the
scope of this outline to address all of those issues. There is one provision in chapter 15,
however, that applies in all bankruptcy cases, not just those commenced under chapter
15. Section 1514 governs notices to be given to creditors with foreign addresses. It
provides that notices to these creditors be given individually absent specific court
authority to the contract. Additionally, § 1514(d) requires that the rules and any court
order directing notice must provide additional time to those creditors "as is reasonable
under the circumstances."
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I.

Constitutionality of Provisions Regulating the Practice of Law
A.

Does the power of Congress to enact uniform laws on the subject of
bankruptcies empower Congress to regulate the practice of law in bankruptcy
proceedings?
There are at least three provisions of the new law that raise this issue.
(1)

Section 110 imposes strict guidelines for bankruptcy petition preparers.
They must advise the debtor they are not attorneys, cannot practice law,
or give legal advice. The Judicial Conference of the U.S. must prescribe
the form of this notice, and can fix the maximum fees to be charged by
petition preparers. Subsection 11 O(k) provides:
(k) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit activities
that are otherwise prohibited by law, including rules and laws
that prohibit the unauthorized practice of law.

(2)

Section 341 contains this provision with respect to representation of
creditors at meetings of creditors.
(c) The court may not preside at, anq may not attend, any
meeting under this section including any final meeting of
creditors. Notwithstanding any local court rule. provision of a
State constitution, any otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy
law, or any other requirement that representation at the
meeting of creditors under subsection (a) be by an attorney,
a creditor holding a consumer debt or any representative of
the creditor (which may include an entity or an employee of an
entity and may be a representative for more than 1 creditor)
shall be permitted to appear at and participate in the meeting
of creditors in a case under chapter 7 or 13, either alone or in
conjunction with an attorney for the creditor. Nothing in this
subsection shall be construed to require any creditor to be
represented by an attorney at any meeting of creditors.

(3)

Sections 526,527, and 528 of the new law, by regulating the activities of
a "debt relief agency," in effect regulate the interview between an attorney
and a debtor client, by specifying the documents the attorney must provide
to the debtor, the advice the attorney must give is set out in the statute,
including that the debtor can represent himself or herself, or get help from

F- 1

a petition preparer, and the attorney is precluded from advising the debtor
to pay an attorney (apparently including the attorney giving the advice) a
fee for services performed as part of preparing for or representing a debtor
in a case under title 11. § 526(a)(4).
B.

Do the provisions of the new law regulating advertising by lawyers violate the
First Amendment?
Section 528 mandates that attorneys who represent debtors (assisted persons)
in filing for relief under title 11 include in their commercial advertising the
statement:
We are a debt relief agency. We help people file for relief under
the Bankruptcy Code or a substantially similar statement.
This is somewhat ·comparable to the labeling that must appear on a pack of
cigarettes or on prescription drugs. The attorney must label himself or herself
as harmful to the interests of debtor clients.
The Supreme Court has found many attempts to regulate commercial
advertising by attorneys, pharmacists, and other entities to be violative of the
First Amendment.
The Supreme Court has never held that commercial speech may be suppressed
in order to further a state's interest in discouraging purchases of the underlying
product that is advertised. Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Com'n ofNew
York, 447 U.S. 557,100 S. Ct. 2343 (1980); Virginia State Bd. OfPharmacyv.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 963 S. Ct. 1817,425 U.S. 748 (1976)
(State may not suppress dissemination of concededly truthful information about
entirely lawful activity on basis of fear of that information's effect upon its
disseminators and its recipients.
There is a presumption that the speaker and the audience, not the Government,
should be left to assess the value of accurate and non-misleading information
about lawful conduct. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770, 113 S. Ct. 1792
(1993); Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association, Inc. v. U.S., 527 u.s.
173, 119 S. Ct. 1923 (1999).
See also, Florida Bar v. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. 2371,515 U.S. 618 (1995) and
Shapero v Kentucky Bar Ass'n., 108 S. Ct. 1916,486 U.S. 466 (1988), and the
cases cited in those cases.
See also, U.S. Posta/Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Association, et al.,
101 S. Ct. 2676,453 U.S. 114 (1991).
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II.

Constitutional Issues Concerning IRS Standards Used in Means Testing
The IRS National Standards permit debtors with higher incomes to spend more for
food and other services than debtors with lower incomes.
For example, for a debtor with a four-person family whose income is less than $833,
the total allowance for food, apparel, personal care and miscellaneous expenses
is $881 ; for a debtor with a family of the same size whose income is $5,834 or greater
the allowance for these items is $1,564, an additional $683.
Does this violate equal protection? Does it violate the requirement that bankruptcy
laws be uniform?
According to Black's Law Dictionary uniform means:
Uniform. Conforming to one rule, mode, pattern, or unvarying
standard; not different at different times or places; applicable to all
places or divisions of a country. Equable; applying alike to all within
a class; sameness.
A statute is general and uniform in its operation when it operates
equally upon all persons who are brought within the relations and
circumstances provided for; when all persons under the same
conditions and in the same circumstances are treated alike, and
classification is reasonable and naturally inherent in the subjectmatter. The words "general" and "uniform" as applied to laws have a
meaning antit~etical to special or discriminatory laws.

III.

Valuation of Property
Is it constitutional to mandate a standard for valuing personal property of individual
debtors who file for relief under chapter 7 or 13 different from the standard for valuing
personal property of individual debtors who file for relief under chapters 11 and 12?
§ 506(a)(2).
Section 506(a) of the Code, as amended by subparagraph (2) provides:
(2)

If the debtor is an individual in a case under chapter 7 or 13.
such value with respect to personal property securing an allowed
claim shall be determined based on the replacement value of
such property as of the date of the filing of the petition without
deduction for costs of sale or marketing. With respect to
property acquired for personal, family. or household purposes.
replacement value shall mean the price a retail merchant would
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charge for property of that kind considering the age ·.and
condition of the property at the time value is determined.
Apparently, the old (present) valuation standards continue to apply in chapter 11 and
chapter 12 cases.
Does this mean a self-employed electrician who files for relief under chapter 11 or a
family farmer who files for relief under chapter 12 may continue to strip down a debt
secured by a truck to the value of the vehicle, while a debtor in chapter 7 or 13is
denied that privilege?
NOTE: Congress did not change § 522(a) which defines value to mean fair market
value.
Is personal property securing an allowed claim to be listed at a greater value
(replacement value) in one schedule and at a lesser value (market value) in the
exemption schedules?

IV.

Does Compulsory Chapter 13 Violate the Thirteenth Amendment Prohibition
Against Involuntary Servitude?
The Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was ratified on December 6,
1865. The Amendment abolished not only slavery but also "involuntary servitude,"
except as punishment for crime. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the
Thirteenth Amendment is self-executing and that the words "involuntary servitude"
have a larger meaning than slavery. The plain intention was to make labor free, by
prohibiting control by which "the personal service of one man is disposed of or
coerced for another's benefit, which is the essence of involuntary servitude. Bailey
v. State of Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911). Underscoring supplied.
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Bailey v. State ofAlabama, 219 U.S. 219, 31 S. Ct.
145 (1911) that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude
cannot be transgressed indirectly by the creation of a statutory presumption any more
than it can be violated by direct enactment. "The power to create presumptions is not
a means of escape from constitutional restrictions." 219 U.S. at pg. 239; 31 S. Ct. at
pg.151.
In a subsequent case, Taylorv. State of Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 62 S. Ct. 415 (1942),
the U.S. Supreme Court held the fact the debtor is afforded an opportunity to rebut
the presumption of guilt of the crime of fraud arising from non-payment of debt does
not make a statutory presumption on which a conviction of fraud rests any less
repugnant to the Thirteenth Amendment, 315 U.S. at pg. 30; 62 S. Ct. at pg. 418
(1942).
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Comment: The means-test provisions are grounded on the presumption that a debtor
who can pay at least 25 percent of his or her non-priority unsecured debt over a
period of 60 months is deemed to be abusing the provisions of chapter 7 by filing for
relief thereunder. The presumption is based on a rigid mathematical formula and the
further presumption that the employment, health, income and size of the debtor's
family and health of family members will remain static during a five-year payment
period. The bill requires the court to notify creditors that the debtor has been
determined to be an abuser of chapter 7 before any hearing by the court on that
issue.
Three Presidential commissions that have studied the issue have rejected compulsory
chapter 13, as has Congress on several occasions commencing as far back as 1932.
The Brookings Institution in its study of bankruptcy published in 1971 considered the
question of compulsory chapter 13. The authors of the study concluded it was
impossible to tell 'whether the positive effect on the economy of forcing debtors to
repay old debt would outweigh the effect of reduced spending and consumption by
such debtors during the period of repayment. They concluded the net result either
way would surely be small.
Brookings also considered the question of whether bankruptcies increase interest
rates for all borrowers as claimed by proponents of the present legislation. The
authors of the study concluded that bankruptcies probably increase interest rates only
for poor, low income workers who are poor credit risks and do not increase interest
rates for the public in general.

V.

Practice Issues
A.

Kentucky's Opt-Out
As most practitioners know by now, Kentucky, which in early 1980 opted out of
the exemptions provided by section 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, has now
amended KRS 427.170 to opt back in, to make available to debtors the option
of claiming exemptions under state law or under section 522(d).
Two other states, Arkansas and New Hampshire, apparently are recent opt-in
states.
This change in the law increases the homestead exemption from $5,000 per
person to $18,450 per person, or $36,900 in a joint husband and wife case.
Other exemptions are increased as well. The new law takes effect June 20,
2005.
The question naturally arises whether a debtor whose case is now pending may
on and after June 20, 2005 amend Schedule C to claim exemptions under Code
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§ 522(d).
The law seems pretty well established that exemptions are determined as of the
date of the filing of the petition. White v. Stump, 266 U.S. 310, 313, 45 S. Ct.
103 (1924). There are quite a number of cases to this effect in instances where
a state has modified its exemption laws. See Bankruptcy Service, Lawyers
Edition, Vol. 2E, § 26:190. This would seem to end the discussion.
However, in this instance the § 522(d) exemptions have been in effect since the
Code took effect October 1, 1989. They were in effect a few months until
Kentucky opted out, at which time a debtor was denied access to the § 522(d)
exemptions. Now the debtor's access to those exemptions .has been restored.
While Kentucky's out-out was in effect Congress increased the § 522(d)
exemptions. These exemptions were also adjusted upward pursuant to § 104
of the Code.
B.

Strip Down
Only one provision of S. 256 "appears to be retroactive, an amendment to §
523(a)(19) relating to the exception to discharge for violation of the Federal
securities laws. Otherwise, provisions of the law take effect October 18, 2005
or thereafter.
In U.S. v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 103S. Ct. 407, the Supreme
Court held that § 522(f) could not be utilized to avoid a nonpossessory,
nonpurchase-money lien that was created before enactment of the Code. The
court concluded Congress had inadequately expressed an intent to make this
lien avoidance provisions of the Code retroactive. The majority opinion of six
justices noted there was a substantial question respecting the constitutionality
of retroactive application. The remaining three justices concurred in the result
based on Holt v. Henley, 232 U.S. 637, 43 S. Ct. 459 (1914) cited by the
majority as standing for the proposition that "[no] bankruptcy law shall be
construed to eliminate property rights which existed before the law was enacted
in the absence of an explicit command from Congress."
The Supreme Court has held that the provisions of the bankruptcy law are part
of every contract as if fully set out in the contract.
Does this mean the right of a debtor to strip the allowed amount of a secured
claim to the value of the collateral may still exist with respect to collateral
securing any debt contracted prior to the effective date of the new· law?
The Supreme Court in the Security Industrial Bank case instructed that no
bankruptcy law shall be construed to eliminate property rights which existed
before the law was enacted, in the absence of an explicit command from
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Congress.
C.

Miscellaneous
Kentucky's new law regulating the activities of debt adjusters; KRS 380.010.
Doesn't regulation in effect legitimize such activities?
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AN ACf relating to debtor-creditor relations.

Be it eruu:tetl by Ole General A"embl, ofthe Co",.,.""MltIt 01Kelltueq:
Section 1. KRS 427.170 is amended to read as follows:
An individual debtor domiciled in this state is(-BeQ authorized to exempt from property
of said debtor's estate the property specified under 11 U.S.C. I.C. 522£4'Esuh. .li8R {d} ef

seelien S2a efThe BlIRIEruplef Cede ef 19=.18, 91 Stat. 2549 (1~8~, PUlis LatH 95 598].

UNOFFICIAL COpy AS OF 04/07/05
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AN ACT relating to the business of debt adjusting.
Be it elUleted by the General A",mbly ofthe Commonwetiltla ofKentucky:
Section 1. KRS 380.010 is amended to read as follows:

(2)

"DeBter,

tI

BR

iBdivid&&I er iRdiviElyais jeiBtly

IRQ S8'tl8f&lly, 8f

jeiBdy 0r severally

iaEIeIJteti. ]

"P,rson I' inelH4,s. but is not limited to, iIulil1idluUs. pqrt",erships, as,oeiations,
comortUiolU. limited litJbUity cOlllll4ni.,. tnutl.
(2)

au otll.r legal.ntitiesj

"Debt -justine" m,1UIS doing busi"." in debt -i",tilll, budget cOllm"in"
debt IlUJlUIg,m,pt, or debt pooli", "rvice. or holtling
,imilar import,

11&

OMS'" 9'"

by words of

providin, s,rrie" to d,btors in the IlUllUlg.m,nt oftheir debts,

to do gny ofth, following:

Effect th, -jrutm.nt, co_rom;'" or dischqrg, of "ny

ea)

tlCCOUIlt.

not, or

other ind,bt.dne"ofthe debtor;

(b)

Receive from the iUbtor slid disb""" to th, ubtor', cr,dito,., tin)' money or
oth,r thi", orval",; or

ee)
(3)

Solicit bpin", alld Mvertis, lIS 4 debt qdjuste,; alld

"Reside" meallS to live in a pqrtic"la, plllee on a temporqry or permqnent basis.
SECTION 2.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 380 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:

(1)

S"bj.ct to ,,,bs,ctio,,

(3) 0(1_

,eetio",

tl

p,nOIl, whether or not located in this
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stllte. e"fag.I in debt .ustin, shpll do botla oelke (oUowill':
fa)

UII".S specificqlly ill8trucled otherwise. by

G

d.btor, disburs,to the

approprillt. creditors all fu- r'Cfi."d from th, debtor. leIS any

contrlbutiolll or fee, 1Iot prohibited by subssclioll (2) of this ,ection. within
thirtY (30) dqy, afrec.ipt o(tbe fu- from the d,btor,' Gnd

(6)

Mqintqin G sepqmte byst account (or tIN receipt oftuly funds from debtors
and tit, disbursement oflb, fH- to cr«liton Oil behalf ofthe debtors.

(2)

If cOntrlbutiollS or f,es (OT ,,,gariP, ill d,bt q4huting liT' ace.,_' directly or
indirectly. II "rroll

(a)

Ace",

II

,,,g,g,d in debt qdiwtiu sbgll not dQ tuI, 0(111, foUowing:

contribution or

fe'

uc"tljn,

"v'ntr-fi~e dolltut ($75)

from a

tkbtor relidi", in this ,tDU for 1111 inititll set "pi

(b)

Ace"t a eOllfpltqtion contribptign or f" exc"din, fifty dollqn ($50) per
ealendar y,ar from

(c)

tJ

dsbtor r,riding ill this atate; or

Ace",' tJ periodic contribution or f" from a debtor who r"idea i1l this stllte

'Iud geeetls the grml,r of,ight tHUl oll,-bglfllfrcenl (B.5~) of., amount
pqid by the deblor eull month

for dUtribution to the debtor', creditors or

thirty dolltuB ($30).
(3)

Sub,ectioN (1) tuUl (2) of tIai.t ,.clio" ,Iudl "91 prohibit II p.,.,OIl ,,,,Gged ill debt
_jutin, (or

tJ

thbtor who r.,ide, ha t1aLf ,tilt.

from

eJuuriIl, the d,btor (l bad

ch,ck chqrg, of tw,nty dollGn .($20) orth,· tUIIO"rat . " d 011 from th, debt
-;WI,I"S bqnIc. which,v,r is ".,qt,r. in qdditIDlI to cOlltribution, or '"S not
prohibit,d by subs,ction (2) oflllis "ction.
(4)

Fees or contrlbutiolll permitted ill ,ub.,clio", (1),

(2),

lind (3) ofIlia s,ction may

be adjusud 011 all alllUUl' btlfis by th' amoullt ,q"i,aklll to
~co1l6um,r

lilly

incretUB in the

prie, ind". publish,d by th, Unit,d Stilt" D'pqrtment of lAbor.

Blr,au ofLq!Jor Stgtlstic,.
(5)

Any p.noll tlud ell,lIges ill debt lUljruting ,Iudl filc an inititd rgistcqtioll (~rm!
Page 20f2
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accollUHHlifd by lIR initiql regjltrqtion fe, olmo hruulr.4 fifty dol1tln ($250), and

the r,gistrtltion aludl be ren,wed «lela ye",. th.rlll"" for a ,•• of two hundred
fifty dollqa ($250) to

cov., the tlCtuIIl co,t of filing the registration. in

accordqnc. with q4111inistrqtiye reglqtions pronud,tlted by th. Attorney GeneraL
(6)

AllY ,.noll that ,lIgGg" in d,bt _ruting ,aU IIITGII,' for and undergo aft

a",,1UIl lIudit o( the persoll'I brum•••, including tillY tnut
distributed to creditors

011

"'lUIs d'DosUed and

heW' of debtors. "hie" ,hall b, conducted by an

independent. thinl-pqcty certified Wile

IICCOrmtqlll.

Both of th, following shall

qppl, to 1111 lIudit p,rform,d 8nder tllis ,ub,ection:
The persoll ,Iudl fil, the re,. of til, arulU and th. quditor'f opillion with

(a)

the ,olUMmer Protection DiviBioll of til.

Office

of the AUor,.,! General

within thirty (30) ds!, of til, ,,"nivRlqry dqle of flU,.g th, initial
r,gistrtltiolli Gild

Th, Attorney Ge".IYll,W make IIvtlilabk II ,ummqrr

(b)

or,h. results ollhe

qruUt Gild th, auditor" opinion _II written request of liliy person and

_,mellt of a (" .01 to gel,d th, co,t o(eo"i", th, ,ummqrr and
opinion.

(7)

A penon .",a,ed in tUbt gdjll8ting rludl obtllill lind lit tdl tUne, maintain

WlfIWI£e cove",. for ,uon lind 0_610118. emplo". 6110,..''', d,positor's
(orgery, lind

comput,r frqu4 ill tlte IUIIDum often percent elK) Dllhe monthl!

avemg. (or the immeditJtely prBe_din, fix (6) montlu o(lb. am.gate amount of
aU depositl mtUle with th, perroll by qU tkbton. Th, illSllCtJnce cov,rage shall
comply witll tdl oftil, following:
(a)

Th, minimum limit of th, iluruwic, cO'Pe"'f_ sludl not be les, than one
hundred thOlUlJnd dol1tln ($100.000), tuUI the lIUIXimum limit of the
ins"ranee cO'Perage s1uJll 1I0t b, mor, t1um two hundrtUI

arty thousand

dolllln ($250,000);
Page 3 of3
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(6)

The wlU'dnee

sludl

COl""'"

IIOt

include

II

deductible ill excess· of ten

perc.1It (In) olth. (tIC, .oulltorl". polk' cov,ra,,;

ecl

The iuurtme,

COy,,.,,,1uJU b, usrud by

lUI

i1JSur,r and rat,d tlt leat-A-,

or it', "uivtJklft, by tJ IIIItionaUy r,cogni;,d rating organiZlJtignj and
(d)

17Ie Im",.e co,emc, sluJU provide tlult the COIII"mer Protection
Division of th, .Offic, of the Attorn,y Gln,ral

sW

be 1UUII,d

tIS

an

tulditiona' ignIted PIety.
(8)

AllY p,ao" ''''11I,4 ill d,bt q4iufting f1Iqll comply

with th' ,roNions of this

section.
SECI10N 3.

A NEW SECI10N OF KRS CHAPTER 380 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOlLOWS:
The Altom,! Gen,ral s1aqJl promulrm tulIIIiIIutnlti", r,glg#Dns ill accordance with

KRS Chqpt,r 13A to 'lIS"" tit, proper tUlministrtdioll tuU1 ,,,forc,m,nt ofthis chapt".
Section 4. KRS 380.030 is amended to read as follows:
The following persons

~hall

not be considered debt adjusters for the purposes of this

chapter:

( 1)

Any attorney-at-law of this state;

(2)

Any person who is a regUlar, full-time employee of a debtor, and who acts as an

adjuster of his employer's debts;
(3)

Any person acting pursuant to .any order or judgment of court, or pursuant to
authority conferred by any law of this state or of the United States;

(4)

Any person who is a creditor of the debtor, or an agent of one (1) or more creditors

of the debtor, and whose services in adjusting the debtor's debts are rendered
without cost to the debtor;
(5)

Any person who, at the request of a debtor, arranges for or makes a loan to the

debtor, and who, at the authorization of the debtor, acts as an adjuster of the debtor's
debts in the disbursement of the proceeds of the loan, without compensation for the
Page4of4
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services rendered in.adjusting the debts; and
(6)

Any charitable, religious or educational organization, determined to be exempt from

taxation under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code tlud is not in the
bus;".,. oldebl gdjlUtillg. 118 defi.ed ill Seclio1J 1 of this Act.
Section 5. KRS 380.990 is amended to read as follows:
Any person who violates tIu proviswlII orSeclio. 2 ofthis Act[ eets 8f effers te set 85 a

deat

aejl:l~

in the state is guilty of a misdemeanor and:. upon convictiol\ shall be

punished by a fine. of fiJI. hundred dollqa ($500)[SS99) or imprisonment not to exceed
sixty (60) days', or both such fine and imprisonment.
Section 6. The following KRS section is repealed:
380.020 Injunction against debt adjuster -- Appointment of receiver.

Page 5 ofS
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AND DISCHARGE: SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN CHAPTER 13
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DISPOSABLE INCOME, CRAM-DOWN, AND DISCHARGE:
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN CHAPTER 13 PRACTICE
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by
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Chapter 13 Trustee, Eastern District of Kentucky
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WARNING:
DO NOT RELY ON THIS OUTLINE!!
YOU MUST READ THE AMENDED BANKRUPTCY CODE
AND FORMULATE YOUR OWN CONCLUSIONS.
I HAVE ATTEMPTED TO SET FORTH A SUMMARY OF ONLY A
FEW OF THE LEGISLATIVE CHANGES THAT AFFECT DISPOSABLE
INCOME, TREATMENT OF SECURED CLAIMS, AND DISCHARGE
ISSUES IN CHAPTER 13 CASES. THIS IS NOT A COMPREHENSIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE BAPCPA OR OF ANY SINGLE ISSUE.
BECAUSE THE BAPCPA CONTAINS ERRORS, INCONSISTENCIES,
AND AMBIGUITIES AND DOES NOT LEND ITSELF TO EASY
INTERPRETATION, I DO NOT WARRANT THE ACCURACY OF
EVEN THE MEAGER INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN.
FURTHERMORE, THE BAPCPA IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE THROUGH
TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS, WHICH COULD RESULT IN
SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES TO PROVISIONS OF THE BAPCPA EVEN
BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE NEW LAW.
Beverly M. Burden

DISPOSABLE INCOME, CRAM-DOWN, AND DISCHARGE:
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN CHAPTER 13 PRACTICE AS A RESULT
OF THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005
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A) Disposable Income
1) § 1325(b)(I)(B): If the trustee or a creditor holding an unsecured claim objects
to confirmation, the Plan must provide that: "all of the debtor's projected
disposable income to be received in the applicable commitment period will be
applied to make payments to the unsecured creditors under the plan."
2) § 1325(b)(2): "Disposable Income":
a) Start with "current monthly income" defined in § 101(10A) as:
(i)

"the average monthly income from all sources that the debtor receives
(or in a joint case the debtor and the debtor's spouse receive)" for the
preceding 6 months;

(ii)

include "any amount paid by any entity other than the debtor (or in a
joint case the debtor and the debtor's spouse) on a regular basis for the
household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's dependents";

(iii)

exclude per § 101(10A):
(01)

Social Security benefits,

(02)

payments to victims of war crimes,

(03)

payments to victims of terrorism;

b) then exclude per § 1325(b)(2):
(i)

child support payments

(ii)

foster care payments

(iii)

or disability payments

)
)
) for dependent child;
)
)

c) then per § 1325(b)(2)(A) deduct amounts "reasonably necessary to be
expended" (see below) for:
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(i)

(ii)

maintenance or support of debtor and dependents (including
postpetition child support payments), and
charitable contributions (up to 15% of debtor's gross income);

d) then per § 1325(b)(2)(B), if the debtor is engaged in business, deduct
necessary business expenses;
e) then per § 1322(f) deduct amounts required to repay 401K or other pension
loans ( § 1322(f) incorporates by reference new § 362(b)(19), which excepts
pension loans from the automatic stay).
3) § 1325(b)(3): "Amounts reasonably necessary to be expended under [ §
1325(b)(2)] shall be determined in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B) of
section 707(b)(2) if the debtor has current monthly income, when multiplied by
12, greater than" the median family income of the applicable State for the
appropriate family size.
a) § 101(39A): "Median Family Income" is the median family income
calculated and reported by the Bureau of the Census, adjusted to reflect
changes in the Consumer Price Index.
b) If the debtor's current monthly income multiplied by 12 is more than the
median family income, refer to the "means test" in § 707(b)(2) to determine
allowable expenses.
c) If debtor's income is less than median family income, presumably the amount
of reasonably necessary expenses is determined in the same manner as under
present law.'
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d) Kentucky Median Family Income in 1999 (last report of Census Bureau)
Kentucky Median Family Income in 1999 (American Bankruptcy Institute, at www.abiworld.com):

Overall

2 persons

3 persons

4 persons

5 persons

6 persons

7 or more

40,939

35,846

42,361

48,815

47,720

45,139

42,859

51,180

48,595

adjusted for 13.385% increase in CPI between 1999 and 2004:
46,418

40,643

48,031

55,348

54,107

BUT - per § 1325(b)(3), "in the case of a debtor in a household exceeding 4 individuals,
the highest median family income of the applicable State for a family of 4 or fewer
individuals, plus $525 per month for each individual in excess of 4":
46,418

40,643

48,031

55,348
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55,873

56,398

56,923

4) § 707(b)(2) allowable monthly expenses (expenses used in the "Means Test"):
a) "average monthly payments on account of secured debts", which is:
(i)

"the total of all amounts scheduled as contractually due to secured
creditors in each month of the 60 months following the petition" and

(ii)

"any additional payments to secured creditors necessary for the debtor
... to maintain possession of the debtor's primary residence, motor
vehicle, or other property necessary for the support of the debtor and the
debtor's dependents, that serves as collateral for secured debts"
[arrearages] .

(iii)

divided by 60 (months);

b) total priority debts divided by 60 (months);
c) an allowance for housing and utilities as determined by IRS Collection
Financial Standards (Local);
d) an allowance for transportation expenses as determined by IRS Collection
Financial Standards (Regional);
e) an allowance for food and household expenses as determined by IRS
Collection Financial Standards (National) (copy of relevant Financial
Standards included with outline);
f) "Other Necessary Expenses" as defined by the IRS, if debtor can substantiate
actual expenditures for expenses such as:

(i)

child care

(ii)

insurance - health, life, and disability

(iii)

health care

(iv)

payroll withholding taxes

(v)

other - see Internal Revenue Manual 5.15.1.10 (copy included with
outline);
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g) expenses to maintain safety from family violence;
h) expenses to care for elderly, chronically ill, or disabled household members;
i) school expenses up to $1,500 per year [$125 per month] for each child under
age 18, "if the debtor provides documentation of such expenses and a detailed
explanation of why such expenses are reasonable and necessary, and why such
expenses are not already accounted for" in the IRS Standards.
j) if the debtor demonstrates it is reasonable and necessary, an additional
allowance for food and clothing of up to 5% of the IRS food and clothing
allowance;
k) an additional amount based on actual expenses for home energy costs "if the
debtor provides documentation of such expenses and demonstrates that such
actual expenses are reasonable and necessary"; and
1) actual administrative expense of administering a chapter 13 plan, up to 10% of
projected plan payments.
5) Plan duration:
a) § 1325(b)(4)(A): "Applicable Commitment Period" (the period during which
all of the debtor's projected disposable income to be received will be applied
to make payments to unsecured creditors under the plan) is:
(i)
(ii)

3 years, or
not less than 5 years "if the current monthly income of the debtor and
the debtor's spouse combined, when multiplied by 12, is not less than ..."
the median family income.

b) Compare § 1322(d), the maximum duration of the plan:
(i)

"If the current monthly income of the debtor and the debtor's spouse
combined, when multiplied by 12, is not less than" the median family
income, "the plan may not provide for payments over a period that is
longer than 5 years."

(ii)

"If the current monthly income of the debtor and the debtor's spouse
combined, when multiplied by 12, is less than" the median family income,
"the plan may not provide for payments over a period that is longer than 3
years," unless the court approves a period that is not longer than 5 years.
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6) Verification of Income:
a) § 52I(a)(I)(B): Debtor must file:
(i)

copies of all "payment advices or evidence of payment received within
60 days before the date of the filing of the petition, by the debtor from any
employer of the debtor;"

(ii)

"a statement of the amount of monthly net income, itemized to show
how the amount is calculated"; and

(iii)

"a statement disclosing any reasonably anticipated increase in income
or expenditures over the I2-month period following the date of the filing
of the petition."

b) § 52I(e)(2)(A): Debtor must provide to the trustee and any requesting
creditor a copy of the debtor's most recent Federal tax return, or at the
debtor's option a transcript of the return.
(i)

The tax return/transcript must be provided to the trustee at least 7 days
before the date first set for the meeting of creditors.

(ii)

If the debtor fails to comply, "the court shall dismiss the case" unless
the debtor demonstrates that noncompliance was due to circumstances
beyond the control of the debtor.

c) § 521 (f)(I)-(f)(3): At the request of the court, the u.s. Trustee, or party in
interest, an individual debtor in chapter 7, 11, or 13 must file with the court:
(i)

tax returns/transcripts for "each tax year of the debtor ending while the
case is pending";

(ii)

tax returns/transcripts for the preceding 3 years if the returns had not
been filed with the IRS as of the date of the petition but were subsequently
filed;

(iii)

amendments to those tax returns.

d) § 521 (f)(4): At the request of the court, the u.s. trustee, or a party in interest,
in a chapter 13 case, the debtor must file annually a statement of income and
expenses for the preceding year, and a statement of monthly income, "that
shows how income, expenditures, and monthly income are calculated."
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(i)

deadlines for filing the 521(f)(4) statement:
(01) if the plan.has not been confirmed, 90 days after the end of the tax
year or one year after the petition date, whichever is later;
(02) after confirmation, annually, "not later than the date that is 45 days
before the anniversary of the confirmation of the plan."

(ii)

§ 521(g): The statement must disclose:
(01)

"the amount and sources of income of the debtor";

(02) "the identity of any person responsible with the debtor for the
support of any dependent of the debtor"; and
(03) "the identity of any person who contributed, and the amount
contributed, to the household in which the debtor resides."
.

e) § 1308: If the debtor has not filed tax returns for any of the 4 years preceding
the petition date, the debtor must file those returns no later than the day before
the date of the first meeting of creditors, with certain extensions as described
in the section.
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IRS Collection Financial Standards
\vw\v.irs.gov; search site for "collection financial standards"
General
Collection Financial Standards are used to help determine a taxpayer's ability to pay a
delinquent tax liability.
Allowances for food, clothing and other items, known as the National Standards, apply
nationwide except for Alaska and Hawaii, which have their own tables. Taxpayers are
allowed the total National Standards amount for their family size and income level, without
questioning amounts actually spent.
Maximum allowances for housing and utilities and transportation, known as the Local
Standards, vary by location. Unlike the National Standards, the taxpayer is allowed the
amount actually spent or the standard, whichever is less.

Food, Clothing and Other Items
:~r~lE:~.n.~l . Sl~.p.~l~Ir..g~. for reasonable amounts have been established for five necessary

expenses: food, housekeeping supplies, apparel and services, personal care products and
services, and miscellaneous.
All standards except miscellaneous are derived from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES). The miscellaneous standard has been established by
the IRS.

Alaska and Hawaii
Due to their unique geographic circumstances and higher cost of living, separate standards
for food, clothing and other items have been established for A.laska and ·H.a\vaii .

Housing and Utilities
The housing and utilities standards are derived from Census and BLS data, and are provided
by state down to the county level.

Transportation
The In!n~.p~:~I~~1iQn. .~l~.n~t~rg.~ consist of nationwide figures for monthly loan or lease
payments referred to as ownership costs, and additional amounts for monthly operating costs
broken down by Census Region and Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). Public
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transportation is included under operating costs. A conversion chart has been provided with
the standards which shows which IRS districts fall under each Census Region, as well as the
counties included in each MSA. The ownership cost portion of the transportation standard,
although it applies nationwide, is still considered part of the Local Standards.
The ownership costs provide maximum allowances for the lease or purchase of up to two
automobiles if allowed as a necessary expense. The operating costs are derived from BLS
data.
If a taxpayer has a car payment, the allowable ownership cost added to the allowable
operating cost equals the allowable transportation expense. If a taxpayer has no car payment,
or no car, only the operating costs portion of the transportation standard is used to come up
with the allowable transportation expense.

Recent Revisions
The Local Standards for housing and utilities and transportation were revised on 01/01/04 to:
•
•
•

add family size to the housing and utilities allowances (two or less, three, and four
or more);
base automobile ownership/leasing costs on the five-year average of new and used
car fmancing data compiled by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors; and,
reflect updated information from the Bureau of Labor Statistics."

The revised Local Standards for housing and utilities and transportation are effective for
financial analysis conducted on or after January 1, 2004.
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National Standards for Allowable Living Expenses
Collection Financial Standards for Food, Clothing and Other Items. Due to their unique
geographic circumstances and higher cost of living, separate standards have been established
for .!.\J.~.~.k.~ and Jl~w~U .

One Person National Standards
Based on Gross Monthly Income
Item

less
$1,250
$833 to
than
to
$1,249
$833
$1,666

TT

$1,667
to
$2,499

$2,500
to
$3,333

$3,334
to
$4,166

$4,167
to
$5,833

$5,834
and
over

197

215

231

258

300

19

369

543

19

20

25

26

29

36

37

51

60

61

70

75

100

124

134

17

19

24

26

27

40

42

43

44

108

108

108

108

108

108

108

108

;0

$494

$577

$691

~53

1

...-

~

......

-

~A..ppare! &

services
;"\;;II

~ulla~

care

PIU~U"'''~ &

services

, ..
Total

$403

Two Persons National Standards
Based on Gross Monthly Income
less
$1,250
$833Jo
than
to
$1,249
$833
$1,666

$1,667
to
$2,499

$2,500
to
$3,333

$3,334
to
$4,166

$4,167
to
$5,833

$5,834
and
over

336

337

338

424

439

:7

559

691

36

37

38

48

52

53

107

108

81

88

91

95

125

164

'6

33

34

35

43

44

51

56

71

134

134

134

134

134

134

134

14

$620

$630

r44

$794

i7

$1,020

,280

$3,334
to
$4,166

$4,167
to
$5,833

$5,834
and
over

TT

.c

-0

......
A_;;"ru.~l

&

services
"T'

r \;;II ~Ullal

r

care
&

services
-.6

Total

1

Three Persons National Standards
Based on Gross Monthly Income
• less $833 to $1,250
to
• than $1,249
$1,666
• $833

$1,667
to
$2,499

$2,500
to
$3,333

........
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467

468

469

470

490

546

622

778

41

42

43

49

53

55

108

19

132

144

157

158

159

188

204

.......

TT
.I.

......

~llpplies

•

&
services

303
....

~~ll:)u.l.lal care

:'"1.&
services
-.1.
JL

r

"6

11

34

36

37

44

45

;2

61

r9

161

161

161

161

161

161

161

161

$835

$851

$867

$882

$1,002

$1,156

" ~O

Four Persons National Standards
Based on Gross Monthly Income
less
$1,250
$833 to
than
to
$1,249
$833
$1,666

Item

TT

$1,667
to
$2,499

$2,500
to
$3,333

$3,334
to
$4,166

$4,167
to
$5,833

$5,834
and
over

468

525

526

527

528

640

722

868

42

43

44

50

54

61

109

10

146

169

170

171

174

:9

217

3 7

37

42

43

45

46

53

62

81

188

188

188

188

188

188

188

188

$881

$967

$971

$981

$990

$1,131

$1,298

$!,56,:{

1
.I.

....,

.1..1.

~AJLpp~el &

services
,.....

1

~. ~ll:)Ullal

care

PIV~U"''';:) &

services
~v"

I"

Total

More than Four Persons National Standards
Based on Gross Monthly Income
Item

each
additional
pel'SUl.l, add to
four person total
allowance:

less
$1,250
$833 to
than
to
$1,249
$833
$1,666

$134

$145

$155

$1,667
to
$2,499

$2,500
to
$3,333

$3,334
to
$4,166

$4,167
to
$5,833

$5,834
and
over

$166

$177

$188

$199

19

effective January 1, 2005
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Kentucky - Housing and Utilities Allowable Living Expenses
Collection Financial Standards
Financial Analysis - Local Standards: Housing and Utilities (effective 1/1/2005)

Maximum Monthly Allowance
County

Family of2
or less

Family of3

Family of 4
or more

Adair County

677

797

6

AI:

732

861

10

843

991

·0

785

902

'0

906

~2

County

701

825

949

County

637

;0

;2

1,106

1,301

17

853

1,003

54

745

876

1,008

17

950

1,092

County

732

861

190

County

693

815

8

;94

6

9

County

:94

1,051

19

County

692

814

6

:6

808

~9

:ounty

844

993

~2

Campbell County

962

1,131

1,301

County

661

778

895

Carroll County

822

967

1,12

.unty

638

751

863

Casey County

607

715

:22

rt

753

County

A

County

County

County
_1_

"'"'

~ln

County

Jl

County
~oyj

"'"'
-n

.11

~Il"" .~

~~I

County

Caldwell County

r_ .........'"
1

"'J

Carter

ISol

a

County

County
Clay County

9

852

1,002

576

678

1,153
'9
............

................................................. ............................................... .......' ........,..........................................................

.Clinton County

573

674

Crittenden County

618

727
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775

594

699

:04

782

920

1,058

724

851

'9

County

612

720

828

lunty

617

726

~4

967

1,138

673

792

911

717

844

'0

:"'.. m...k... . . . . . County

853

1,003

;4

·Ful

643

756

'0

810

953

196

0

929

1,068

Grant County

888

1,045

~02

Graves County

712

837

963

Grayson County

;99

823

·6

625

735

·6

17

t7

~7

772

908

,044

Hardln County

853

1,003

54

H;:Jrh:tn County

631

~2

853

:0

918

;6

:4

769

885

827

973

1,1 9

963

17

Cumberland County
County
T""

County

lyette County
County
County

County

Gallatin County
.unty

Garrard

1

County
Greenup County
TT

County

,II III ,ft.

,.

TT;i-

County

County

,.

TT

Hl

lty

County

TT

County

624

734

845

County

'00

824

948

Jackson County

539

634

~9

945

1,111

1,278

897

1,056

,4

715

841

968

980

1,153

:6

642

755

TT

T

.1

... IK

i"'r'

T

T

IS

,.

County
County

1.

County
County
.............

County

868
.....

County
County
. ..................................................

.....

ILaurel County
T

County

..........................................

",

698

821

944

703

827

951

744:1

875

17

636

749

861

.... ........ "" ....... ....
'

""
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553

650

748

647

761

875

605

711

818

605

711

818

698

821

944

644

757

871

753

886

9

731

860

989

857

109

1,160

702

826

;0

689

811

933

798

939

180

Martin County

751

883

1,015

M~~nn

792

932

172

835

983

,0

·9

646

743

:6

807

~7

,6

984

1,131

625

735

846

758

892

,026

~2

196

801

'4

793

2

765

901

, 6

635

747

860

668

786

904

775

911

1,048

698

821

944

675

794

914

1,189

1,399

19

782

920

1,058

525

617

County
I
~ Leslie County

.......................................................................

...
.............. .................

........

Letcher County

!i

....................................................................

ILewis County
......................................................................................... ......................................................... .......................................'........

.Lincoln County
,.1

v .l.l.15i:)LU.l.l

County

19an County
County

••

..............................................

~ Madison County
l"v"~

ror-

-

M~rlnn

..

_1.

County

County
11

County

lunty

M~rr~r1cpn

County

M~rrp:ary

lunty

McLean County

..

County
~-

County

Mercer County

.....
.....

ro

County

...

lty

y

~

Mnr~~n
. . . . .1

County

1

County
t;

County

County
.,.T
..L

County

Ohio County
Oldham County
County
Owsley County
;.

....................................'.............................................................................................................. .........................................................................

iPendleton County
County

°

953

1,096

:9

858

987

765

901

1,036

712

837

963

°

..........

County
County

800

County
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;6

633

744

698

821

lty

721

848

975

R II ~~e11 County

628

739

;0

955

1,124

,92

Shelby County

971

1,142

13

C"l

803

944

:6

Robertson CountY
"R

.

County

~ounty

Scott

County

c
r.

r

;7

1,011

:r-

.... 1 I t

Taylor County

745

'6

Todd County

655

'0

:6

867

~7

794

~4

1,075

719

:46

973

907

1,067

:7

County

:6

807

~7

lty

9

728

,7

'y'/~t.,,,,,,,.l County

688

810

931

Whitley County

712

838

164

Wolfe County

552

·9

'46

975

1,148

~20

~ounty

Trigg

~unty

Trimble

County
~unty

Warren
"w"w

T

vv

1

....,

Lynl

''IT

r-

1

County
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Allowable Living Expenses for Transportation
Collection Financial Standards
Financial Analysis - Local Standards: Transportation

r"

..............

-..T

~

.

.L

*

Costs

.

~

'p~I-CllUlg

Costs & Public T'

Regil

III

~

First Car

Second Car

$475

$338

.._..

UII.IUII

Costs

No Car

One Car

Two Cars

Northeast Reo-ion

$230

$298

$393

New York

Cl'

$302

$384

$479

11

$236

$298

$392

Boston

$259

$284

$380

Pittsburgh

$161

$286

$380

Midwest Region

$194

$251

$345

rhl(~~OO

$257

$329

$422

Detroit

$312

$376

$469

Milwaukee

$212

$247

$341

$276

$303

$397

Cleveland

$198

$293

$387

Cincinnati

$222 .

$272

$365

$203

$287

$383

$246

$291

$384

South Reo-ion

$197

$242

$336

Washington, D.C.

$289

$313

$407

Baltimore

$225

$240

$334

Atlanta

$283

$258

$351

Miami

$284

$344

$439

$255

$265

$359

Dallas-Ft. Worth

$309

$332

$425

Houston

$281

$367

$462

West Reo-ion

$246

$305

$399

$275

$353

$448

San Francisco

$317

$373

$466

San Diego

$311

$318

T'Ol.'

'11

...

.1.

'-'

,.

Paul

...

St. Louis
Kansas
Cl'

. .........

................

Tampa
......

Cl'

Los Angeles
........

. .....

•

...............
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$415

Portland

$189

$246

$339

Seattle

$258

$335

$427

Honolulu

$295

$314

$409

......

•

."

Anchorage

$312

$336

$431

Phoenix

$273

$326

$420

Denver

$302

$351

$442

.................

....

.

.........

* Does not include personal property taxes. (effective January 1, 2005)
For Use with Allowable Transportation Expenses Table
The Operating Costs and Public Transportation Costs sections of the Transportation
Standards are provided by Census Region and Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). The
following table lists the states that comprise each Census Region. Once the taxpayer's
Census Region has been ascertained, to determine if an MSA standard is applicable, use the
defmitions below to see if the taxpayer lives within an MSA (MSAs are defmed by county
and city, where applicable). If the taxpayer does not reside in an MSA, use the regional
standard.

Northeast Census Region
': . . . _._.. . . . . . _, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut,
J.JP"'lnc;:."lv~lnHI New York, New Jersey

:".A..I~L""'''''''''"

Dutchess, Kings, Nassau, New York, Orange, Putnam,
Richmond, Rockland, Suffolk, Westchester

'-'_'~¥.L".U ..
'::..L.I'~.L~¥.L.L"
",.L",.a._.L.LJLU,

....

~~L

... _

",.A..I ....._ ........... ,

Essex, Hudson, Hunterdon, Mercer, Middlesex, Monmouth,
Ocean, Passaic, Somerset, Sussex, Union, Warren

... ' _ '

Litchfield, Middlesex, New Haven

Chester, Delaware, Montgomery, Philadelphia

~".lC;.t.•• "."'"

Burlington, Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Gloucester,

.:, __................, . . , Essex, Hampden, Middlesex, Norfolk, Plymouth, Suffolk,
:~ Hll1sbolrOugh"

Merrimack, Rockingham, Strafford

G - 18

:~AlleJgh~~ny

Beaver, Butler, Fayette, Washington, Westmoreland

Midwest Census Region
NI
.. 1 1

Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio,
Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa

-

COUNTIES
Chicago

in
IL

otherwise ..

- ..

"

Cook, DeKalb, DuPage, Grundy, Kane, Kankakee, Kendall, Lake,
y Will

It.1.TT

in

Porter

IN~

in

1< pn{\(!h~

WI:
Detroit

in

~v"

in

Genesee, Lapeer, Lenawee, Livingston, Macomb, Monroe, Oakland,
St. Clair, Washtenaw,

.....

Ozaukee, Racine, Washington, Waukesha

WI:
"I

...

St. Paul

in
·MN~

Ano: Carver,Chisago, Dakota, Hennepin, Isanti, Ramsey, Scott,
rright
Sherburne, r/

-

in

St. Croix

WI:

Cleveland

A
in
OH: Summit

Cincinnati

Brown, Butler, Clermont, Hamilton, Warren
in
OH:

1

.I.-

Cuyahoga, Geauga, Lake, Lorain, Medina, Portage,
I

in
KY.'

Roone Campbell, Gallatin, Grant, Kenton, Pendleton

in

n

.1

Ohio

IN~

St. Louis

in

Crawford, Franklin, Jefferson, Lincoln, St. Charles, St. Louis,
Warren, St. Louis city

in

Clinton, Jersey, Madison, Monroe, St.Clair

·IL,·
Kan~a~

City

in

Cass, Clay, Clinton, Jackson, Lafayette, Platte, Ray

M~

in

Johnson, Leavenworth, Miami, Wyandotte

South Census Region
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Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, West
Virginia, Virginia, Maryland, District of Columbia, Delaware, North Carolina, South
Carolina,
Florida, Alabama
otherwise SP.~Clllle(l)

MSA
Washington,

__.., . _.-...... Charles, Frederick, Montgomery, Prince George's,
. . . . . . . . . ,..,.. ."'.. . ., Clarke, Culpepper, Fairfax, Fauquier, King George,
Prince William, Spotsylvania, Stafford, Warren,
Alt:~xa]tl(lrla city, Fairfax city, Falls Church city, Fredericksburg city,
lM.anciSSCiS city, Manassas Park city

·l..L.J•..,U'-<lVU.I..l..

in
Arundel, Baltimore, Carroll, Harford, Howard, Queen Anne's,
.i~ILL.l.I.JY"'.

Bartow,
Cherokee, Clayton, Cobb, Coweta, DeKalb,
Fayette, Forsyth, Fulton, Gwinnett, Henry, Newton,
~all1aln~, Pickens, Rockdale,
Walton

·;.L.'vu;-..u....

~ ..

. '• .£.JJL'"yl'''40... '.......

1-11301'"n-::anl'1n

Miami-Dade
Hillsborough, Pasco, Pinellas

Dallas, Denton, Ellis, Henderson, Hood, Hunt, Johnson,
Parker, Rockwall, Tarrant

.1~~Iu.u~.lJ.J.u.jlJ.,

in
.£.J,L~&..I"'
Chambers, Fort Bend, Galveston, Harris, Liberty,
TX' lM.onl:~O]me]':Y Waller
:,•

......'...,

West Census Region:
Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, Nevada, Utah, Washington,
Oregon, Idaho, California, Alaska, Hawaii
otherwise Sp.~Cllne(l)
Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernadino, Ventura
San Francisco

n.lClLlll~iua.. Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo,
Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Solano, Sonoma

San Diego
iClac:kaJmas, Columbia, Marion, Multnomah, Polk, Washington,

Seattle

• ,: .... u.a."4oA.......... ,

King, Kitsap, Pierce, Snohomish, Thurston
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TT

1.1.

A

in HI:

.... ).1
~

TT

1. . 1

in

.~

borough

.AK.
.,.,.1

rUU~lUA

in

'IVI

Jl

...

Pinal

A
n~nv~r

in

Arlam~

Arapahoe, Boulder, Denver, Douglas, Jefferson, Weld
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Internal Revenue Manual
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part5
5.15.1.7 (05-01-2004)
Allowable Expense
Overview
1.

2.

3.

Allowable expenses include those expenses that meet the necessary expense test. .The necessary
expense test is defined as expenses that are necessary to provide for a taxpayer's and his or her
family's health and welfare and/or production ofincome. The expenses must be reasonable. The
total necessary expenses establish the minimum a taxpayer and family needs to live.
There are three types of necessary expenses:
• National Standards
• Local Standards
• Other Expenses
National Standards: These establish standards for reasonable amounts for five necessary expenses.
Four of them come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Consumer Expenditure Survey:
food, housekeeping supplies,i apparel and services, and personal care products and services. The
fifth category, miscellaneous, is a discretionary amount established by the Service. It is $100 for
one person and $25 for each additional person in the taxpayer's household.

Note:
All five standards are included in one total national standard expense.
4.

5.
6.
7.

8.

Local Standards: These establish standards for two necessary expenses: housing and
transportation. Taxpayers will be allowed the local standard or the amount actually paid,
whichever is less.
A. Housing - Standards are established for each county within a state. When deciding if a
deviation is appropriate, consider the cost of moving to a new residence; the increased
cost of transportation to work and school that will result from moving to lower-cost
housing and the tax consequences. The tax consequence is the difference between the
benefit the taxpayer currently derives from the interest and property tax deductions on
Schedule A to the benefit the taxpayer would derive without the same or adjusted
expense.
B. Transportation - The transportation standards consist of nationwide figures for loan or
lease payments referred to as ownership cost, and additional amounts for operating costs
broken down by Census Region and Metropolitan Statistical Area. Operating costs were
derived from BLS data. If a taxpayer has a car payment, the allowable ownership cost
added to the allowable operating cost equals the allowable transportation expense. If a
taxpayer has no car payment only the operating cost portion of the transportation standard
is used to figure the allowable transportation expense. Under ownership costs, separate
caps are provided for the fITst car and second car. If the taxpayer does not own a car a
standard public transportation amount is allowed.
Other - Other expenses may be allowed if they meet the necessary expense test. The amount
allowed must be reasonable considering the taxpayer's individual facts and circumstances.
Conditional expenses. These expenses do not meet the necessary expenses test. However, they are
allowable if the tax liability, including projected accruals, can be fully paid within five years.
National local expense standards are guidelines. If it is determined a standard amount is
inadequate to provide for a specific taxpayer's basic living expenses, allow a deviation. Require
the taxpayer to provide reasonable substantiation and document the case file.
Generally, the total number of persons allowed for national standard expenses should be the same
as those allowed as dependents on the taxpayer's current year income tax return. Verify
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exemptions claimed on taxpayer's income tax return meet the dependency requirements of the
IRC. There may be reasonable exceptions. Fully document the reasons for any exceptions. For
example, foster children or children for whom adoption is pending.
9. A deviation from the local standard is not allowed merely because it is inconvenient for the
taxpayer to dispose of valued assets.
10. Revenue officers should consider the length of the payments. Although it may be appropriate to
allow for payments made on the secured debts that meet the necessary expense test, if the debt will
be fully repaid in one year only allow those payments for one year.
5.15.1.8 (05-01-2004)
National Standards
1.

2.

National standards include the following expenses:
A. Apparel and services. Includes shoes and clothing, laundry and dry cleaning, and shoe
repair.
B. Food. Includes all meals, home and away.
C. Housekeeping supplies. Includes laundry and cleaning supplies; other household products
such as cleaning and toilet tissue, paper towels and napkins; lawn and garden supplies;
postage and stationary; and other miscellaneous household supplies.
D. Personal care products and services. Includes hair care products, haircuts and beautician
services, oral hygiene products and articles, shaving needs, cosmetics, perfume, bath
preparations, deodorants, feminine hygiene products, electric personal care appliances,
personal care services, and repair of personal care appliances.
E. . Miscellaneous. A discretionary allowance of $100 for one person and $25 for each
additional person in a taxpayer's family.
Allow taxpayers the total national standard amount for their income level.

Example: The taxpayer's expenses are: housekeeping supplies - $150, clothing$150, food - $600, miscellaneous - $400 (Total Expenses - $1,300). The
taxpayer is allowed the national standard of$1,100.
3.

A taxpayer that claims more than the total allowed by the national standards must substantiate and
justify each separate expense of the total national standard amounts.

Example: A taxpayer may claim a higher food expense than allowed
Justification would be based on prescribed or required dietary needs.
5.15.1.9 (05-01-2004)
Local Standards
1.

Local standards include the following expenses:
A. Housing and Utilities. The utilities include gas, electricity, water, fuel, oil, bottled gas;
trash and garbage collection, wood and other fuels, septic cleaning, and telephone.
Housing expenses include: mortgage or rent, property taxes, interest, parking, necessary
maintenance and repair, homeowner's or renter's insurance, homeowner dues and
condominium fees. Usually, this is considered necessary only for the place of residence.
Any other housing expenses should be allowed only if, based on a taxpayer's individual
facts and circumstances, disallowance will cause the taxpayer economic hardship.
B. Transportation. Vehicle insurance, vehicle payment (lease or purchase), maintenance,
fuel, state and local registration, required inspection, parking fees, tolls, driver's license,
public transportation. Transportation costs not required to produce income or ensure the
health and welfare of the family are not considered necessary. Consider availability of
public transportation if car payments (purchase or lease) will prevent the tax liability
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from being paid in part or full. Public transportation costs could be an option if it does not
significantly increase commuting time and inconvenience the taxpayer.
Note:
If the taxpayer has no car payment, or no car, question how the taxpayer travels to and
from work, grocer, medical care, etc. The taxpayer is only allowed the operating cost or
the cost of transportation.

6.15.1.10 (05-01-2004)
Other Expenses
1.

2.
3.

Other expenses may be considered if they meet the necessary expense test - they must provide for
the health and welfare of the taxpayer and/or his or her family or they must be for the production
of income. This is determined based on the facts and circumstances of each case.
Ifother expenses are determined to be necessary and, therefore allowable, document the reasons
for the decision in your history.
The amount allowed for necessary or conditional expenses depends on the taxpayer's ability to full
pay the liability within five years and on the taxpayer's individual facts and circumstances. If the
liability can be paid within 5 years, it may be appropriate to allow the taxpayer the excessive
necessary and conditional expenses. If the taxpayer cannot pay within 5 years, it may be
appropriate to allow the taxpayer the excessive necessary and conditional expenses for up to one
year in order to modify or eliminate the expense. (See IRM 5.14, Installment Agreements)
Expense Item

Expense is Necessary if:
Representation before the
Service is needed or
Accounting and legal
meets the necessary
fees.
expense tests. Amount
must be reasonable.
If it is a condition of
employment or meets the
Charitable
necessary expense tests.
contributions
Example: A minister is
(Donations to tax
required to tithe
exempt organizations)
according to his
employment contract.

Child Care(Babysitting, day care,
nursery and
'Preschool)

It meets the necessary
expense test. Only
reasonable amounts are
allowed.

Notes/Tips
Disallow any other
accounting or legal
fees. Disallow costs
not related to solving
current liability.
Disallow any other
charitable
contributions that are
not considered
necessary. Example:
Review the
employment contract.
Cost of child care can
vary greatly. Do not
allow unusually large
child care expense if
more reasonable
alternatives are
available. Consider
the age of the child
and if both parents
work.

If court ordered and being
Court-Ordered
Payments (Alimony,
paid, they are allowable.
If payments are not being
child support,
Review the court
including orders made made, do not allow the
order.
by the state, and other expense. Child support
court ordered
payments for natural
payments)
children or.legally
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adopted dependents may
be allowed.
Dependent Care(For
If there is no alternative
the care ofthe elderly,
to the taxpayer paying the
invalid, or
expense.
handicapped)

Education

Health Care

Involuntary
Deductions

Life Insurance

Secured or legally
perfected debts

Unsecured Debts

Example: An attorney
must take so many
education credits each
It is required for a
year or they. will not
physically or mentally
be accredited and
challenged child and no
could eventually lose
public education
their license to
providing similar services
practice before the
is available. Also allowed
State Bar. A teacher
only for the taxpayer and
could lose their
only if required as
position or in some
condition of employment.
States their pay is
commensurate with
their education credits.
To determine monthly
expenses, the total out
of pocket expenses
Required for the health
would be divided by
and welfare of the family.
12. The Schedule A
Elective surgery would
may also be used to
not be allowed such as
determine the yearly
plastic surgery or elective
expense. Ensure that
dental work. The taxpayer
the amount used is out
must provide proof of
of pocket after
excessive out of pocket
insurance claims are
medical expenses.
paid. Substantiate that
payments are being
made.
To determine monthly
If it is a requirement of expenses, the total out
the job; i.e. union dues,
of pocket expenses
uniforms, work shoes.
would be divided by
12.
If there are whole life
policies, these should
be reviewed as an
If it is a term policy on
asset for borrowing
the life of the taxpayer
against or liquidating.
only.
Life insurance used as
an investment is not a
necessary expense.
Taxpayer must
If it meets the necessary substantiate that the
expense test.
payments are being
made.
If the taxpayer
Examples of
substantiates and justifies unsecured debts which
the expense, the minimum may be necessary
payment may be allowed. expenses 'include:
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The necessary expense
test of health and welfare
and/or production of
income must be met.
Except for payments
required for the
production of income,
payments on unsecured
debts will not be allowed
if the tax liability,
including projected
accruals, can be paid in
full within 90 days.

Taxes

It is for current federal,
FICA, Medicare, state
and local taxes.

Payments required for
the production of
income such as
payments to suppliers
and payments on lines
of credit needed for
business and payment
of debts incurred in
order to pay a federal
tax liability.

Current taxes are
allowed regardless of
whether the taxpayer
made them in the past
or not. Delinquent
state and local taxes
are allowable
depending on the
priority of the FTL
and/or Service
agreement with the
state and local taxing
agencies.

Optional Telephones
and Telephone
Services (Cell phone, It must meet the
/Jager, Call waiting, necessary expense test.
caller identification or
long distance)
If it is secured by the
Taxpayer must
federal government and substantiate that the
Student Loans
only for the taxpayer's
payments are being
education.
made.
If it meets the necessary
Internet Provider/Eexpense test - generally
mail
for production of income.
If the loan is secured by
the taxpayer's assets when
Repayment of loans those assets are of
made for payment of reasonable value and are
necessary to provide for
Federal Taxes
the health and welfare of
the· family.
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B) Treatment of Secured Claims
1) § 1325(a)(5) - The plan can be confirmed if, with respect to each allowed secured
claim provided for by the plan a) thecredito! has accepted the plan [no change]; or
b) if the debtor keeps the property, the plan provides that:
(i)

the creditor retains the lien until the earlier of:
(01) "the payment of the underlying debt determined under
nonbankruptcy law" or
(02)

the discharge under § 1328;

(03)

and

(ii)

"the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to
distributed under the plan 'on account of such claim is not less than the
allowed amount of such claim" [no change]; and

(iii)

if "property to be distributed pursuant to this subsection is in the form
of periodic payments, such payments shall be in equal monthly
installments"; and

(iv)

(v)

if "the holder of the claim is secured by personal property, the amount
of such payments shall not be less than an amount sufficient to provide to
the holder of such claim adequate protection during the period of the
plan";
or

c) the debtor surrenders the collateral.
2) Valuation of collateral:
a) § 1325(a) unnumbered paragraph following § 1325(a)(9): "For purposes of
paragraph (5), section 506 shall not apply to a claim described in that
paragraph" [i.e., no cramdown] if ..."
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(i)

the creditor has a purchase money security interest,

(ii)

in a motor vehicle (as defined in title 49 U.S.C.),

(iii)

purchased for personal use,

(iv)

within 910 days (2-1/2 years) before bankruptcy;

(v)

"or if collateral for that debt consists of any other thing of value, if the
debt was incurred during the I-year period preceding that filing."

b) In the event a cramdown is permitted, the method of valuation is now codified
as "replacement value."
(i)

§ 506(a), which provides for the bifurcation of a claim into a secured
claim to the extent of the value of the collateral and an unsecured claim as
to the balance, now consists of 2 paragraphs.

(ii)

§ 506(a)(2) provides: "If the debtor is an individual in a case under
chapter 7 or 13, such value with respect to personal property securing an
allowed claim shall be determined based on the replacement value of such
property as of the date of the filing of the petition without deduction for
costs of sale or marketing. With respect to property acquired for personal,
family, or household purposes, replacement value shall mean the price a
retail merchant would charge for property of that kind considering the age
and condition of the property at the time value is determined."

c) § 348(f)(I)(B): valuations in chapter 13 do not apply in a case converted to
chapter 7.
3) Payments on secured debts:
a) § 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii)(I): Payments must be in equal monthly installments (Le.,
the trustee can no longer distribute to the class of secured claims on a pro-rata
basis), and
b) § 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii)(II): If the claim is secured by personal property,
payments must be sufficient to provide "adequate protection" "during the
period of the plan."
(i)

What constitutes "adequate protection" is described in § 361.
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(ii)

§ 361 comes into play "when adequate protection is required under
section 362, 363, or 364." [no change].

(iii)

§ 1303 gives the debtor, exclusive of the trustee, the rights and powers
of a trustee under section 363 (e) (among other subsections) [no change].

(iv)

Per § 363(e), if collateral is to be used by the debtor, upon request of
the secured creditor the court "shall prohibit or condition the use ... as is
necessary to provide adequate protection" of the creditor's interest in the
collateral.

(v)

Therefore, it looks like the concept of adequate protection set forth in
§ 361 would apply under § 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii)(II).

(vi)

Per § 361 [no change], adequate protection may be provided by(01) making periodic payments to the extent that the use of the
collateral under § 363(e) results in a decrease in the value of the
creditor's interest in the collateral;
(02) providing an additional or replacement lien to the extent of the
decrease in the value of the creditor's interest in the collateral;
(03) granting other relief "as will result in the realization by such entity
of the indubitable equivalent of' the creditor's interest in the collateral.

c) What is the interrelationship. between the no-cram-down rule, adequate.
protection payments, and "average monthly payments on secured debts" under
the disposable income test? Does § 502(b)(2) ( which provides that a claim
for unmatured interest is disallowed) affect the analysis?
d)

§ 1326(a)(1): Unless the court orders otherwise, the debtor must commence
making payments 30 days after the filing of the petition.

e) § 1326(a)(1): Unless the court orders otherwise, the debtor pays:
(i)

the proposed plan amount to the trustee (less postpetition/preconfirmation adequate protection payments made directly to the creditor);

(ii)

postpetition/pre-confirmation adequate protection payments directly to
a creditor holding a purchase-money security interest in personal property,
reducing the plan payment by the amount of the adequate protection
payment and providing the trustee with evidence of the payment.
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f) § 1326(c):Unless otherwise provided in the plan or the order confirming the
plan, the trustee makes payments to creditors under the plan. [no change].

4) § 1326(a)(4): Within 60 days after filing the petition, the debtor must provide to
a creditor holding a purchase money security interest in personal property
evidence of insurance.
5) § 524(i) The willful failure of a creditor to credit payments made to the creditor
pursuant to the plan in accordance with the plan constitutes a violation of the
discharge injunction if the failure to properly credit the payments caused a
material injury to the debtor.
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C) Discharge
1) § 1328: There are additional conditions that must be satisfied before the
discharge can· be entered:
a) § 1328(a): If the debtor owed or owes a debt under a "domestic support
obligation" (child support, for example), the debtor must certify that all
amounts required to be paid have been paid.
b) § 1328(g): The debtor must complete a course in personal financial
management.
c) § 1328(h): The court must determine, after notice and hearing no more than
10 days before entering the discharge:
(i)

that there is no reasonable cause to believe that § 522(q)(1) applies to
the debtor; that is, that the debtor has claimed under state law certain
exemptions totaling more than $125,000, and
(01) per § 522(q)(1)(A) has been convicted of a felony which shows an
abuse of the bankruptcy laws; or
(02)

per § 522(q)(1)(B) the debtor owes a debt for securities fraud; or

(03) per § 522(q)(1)(B)(iv) the debtor owes a debt arising from "any
criminal act, intentional tort, or willful or reckless misconduct that
caused serious physical injury or death to another individual in the
preceding 5 years."
(ii)

and that there is no reasonable cause to believe that there is a pending
proceeding that might give rise to a § 522(q)(1) situation.

2) The "super-discharge" is greatly diminished. Debts that are nondischargeable in a
chapter 13 case have been expanded and now include:
a) § 1322(b)(5) long-term debts [no change];
b) § 507(a)(8)(C) priority tax debts;
c) the following obligations that are nondischargeable under § 523(a):
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(i)

§ 523(a)(1)(B) - debts arising from unfiled or late-filed tax returns;

(ii)

§ 523(a)(1)(C) debts arising from fraudulent tax returns;

(iii)

§ 523(a)(2) debts obtained by fraud, false financial statements; debts
for luxury goods or cash advances obtained shortly before bankruptcy;

(iv)

§' 523(a)(3) unscheduled debts;

(v)

§ 523(a)(4) debts for defalcation or embezzlement;

(vi)

§ 523(a)(5) debts for "domestic support obligations" (defined in §
lOl(14A));

(vii)

§ 523(a)(8) student loan debts;

(viii)

§ 523(a)(9) DUI debts;

d) § 1328(a)(3) restitution and criminal fines [no change];
e) § 1328(a)(4) restitution or damages awarded as a result ofa willful or
malicious injury.
3) § 1328(f): A debtor may not receive a discharge in a chapter 13 if the debtor
received a discharge:
a) per § 1328(f)(1), in a chapter 7, I10r 12.case filed within 4 years of the filing
of the chapter .13; or
b) per § 1328(f)(2), in a chapter 13 case filed within 2 years prior to the current
chapter 13 case.
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Beverly M. Burden
Chapter 13 Trustee, Eastern District of Kentucky
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I

Last updated April 15, 2005

BANKRUPTCY CODE AND SELECTED OTHER
PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES CODE
Marked Version Highlighting Amendments by the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, S. 256,
As Passed by the U.S. Senate on March 10,2005 and,
the U.S. House of Representatives on April 14, 2005

~

The following is the proposed Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention·and CoriSUmer"'Protection
Act of2005, S. 256, as passed by the u.s. Senate on March 10,2005 and the U.S. House of
Representatives on April 14, 2005, marked to show changes against the entire current
Bankruptcy Code and selected other statutes. It is intended to show how these statutes will read
ifand.when the legislation·is passed by the House and signed by the ·President. Insertions made
. by 8.256" are underlined. Text in current law that would be deleted by 8.256 is identified with
text struck through (e.g., these Ty,\lOfds 1la~le seeR deleted).

J

This comparison is not comprehensive.' It does not compare all of the statutes affected
by the proposed Act nor does it address certain other provisions of 8.256 such as those directing
that certain studies be performed and reports delivered. Davis Polk & Wardwell has compiled
these charts as part of our internal analysis of the proposed Act. We are making these materials
available in PDF format to visitors to our website (http://www.dpw.com/insolvency) with this
understanding and as a courtesy and public service. While we have used reasonable efforts to be
as accurate as reasonably possible in compiling this comparison, we do. not warrant that the
contents are accurate in every respect. Therefore, we urge all-readers to consult the applicable
provisi~ns ofthe proposed legislation and not to rely on this document fOJ; any specific purPose
or transaction.
. , "
.'.

.
Please also note that this comparison is a preli~ary draft and will·be
periodically revised. Please forward any corrections to kurt~hoffma~@dpw.com
or bri~n.resnick@dpw.com.
Effective Dates. Generally, the amendments shall take effect for cases commenced 180
days after the date of enactment, and will not apply with respect to cases commenced before the
effective date. However there are numerous exceptions. Selected exceptions are set forth in
the following table.
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TITLE 11
BANKRUPTCY
CHAPTER 1- GENERAL PROVISIONS

§ 101. Definitions
In I title- the fQIlQwini definitions shall 3p'ply:
(1)
"accountant" means accountant authorized under applicable law to practice public accounting, d
includes pro siona! accounting association, corporation, or partnership, if so authorizedt.&.
(2) The tenn
liate" means-(A) entity that . ectly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 percent ormore f the
outstanding voting s~e.tiesof the debtor, other than an entity that holds such securities-(i) in a fiduciary or ency capacity without sale discretionary power to vote such securities;
(ii) solely to secure a bt, if such entity has not in fact exercised such power to vote;
(B) corporation 20 percent ~~ore ofwhose outstanding voting secwities are directly or i · ectIyowned,
controlled, or held with power to vbte, by the debtor, or by an entity that directly or indirec owns,controls, or
holds with power to vote, 20 percent~re of the outstanding voting securities of the
tor, other than an entity
that holds such securities-,. '"
(i) in a fiduciary or agency capacity WitQ..out sole discretionary power to vote
h securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if such entity 11as not in fact exercised such powe to vote;
(C) person whose business is operated under'iiease or operating agreement y a debtor, or person substantially
all of whose property is operated under an operating'agreement with the debt ; or
(D) entity that operates the business or substantiallY'a~lI
of the property the debtor under a lease or operating
agreementt,
. (3) [Reaesigeatee]

s

" .

(8) Th eon "consumer debt" means debt incurred by an individual primarily for a personal, family, or household
purpose.:.).:.
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(9) The teon "corp
(A) includes-(i) association having a po
or privilege that a private corporation, but not an individu
possesses;...
(ii) partnership association' organized
debts of such association;
(iii) j oint-stock company;
(iv) unincorporated company or. association; or
(v) business trust; but
(B) does not include limited partnership:.).:.
(10) The teon "creditor" means-(A) entity that has a claim against the
order for relief concerning the
debtor;
(B) entity that has a claim a
S02(i) ofthis title; Of

st the estate of a kind specified in section 348(d), 502(£), 502(g), 502(h) or

debtor. files the schedule lof current income required by section 521(a)(1 )GB)(ii): Of
. (ii) the date on which current income determined by the court for purpOses of this' title if the debtof :does
'not file the schedule of current income required by section 521 (a)(l)CB)(ii): and
,
(3). includes any amount paid by any entity other than the debtor (or in a joint case the debtor and the debtor's
spouse),' on a reaular basis for the household exPenses of the debtor or the debtor t s dependents (and in a joint case
the debtor's spouse ifnot otherwise a dependent), but excludes benefits received under the Social Security Act,
payments to victims ofwar crimes or crimes against humanity on account of their status as victims of such crimes.
and payments to victims of international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of title 18) or domestic terrorism (js
defined in section 2331 of title 18)·on account oftbeir status as victims of such terrorism.

is

trus~e~~

proceedin~er

(A) recel . :r
any ofthe property ofthe debtor, appointed·in a case or
this'title;
'.' . (B) assignee
r a general assignment for the benefit of the debtor's creditors; or
./
(C) trustee, receive, r agent under applicable law, or under a contract, that is app~ted Of authorized t6 take

charge ofproperty of the de r for the purpose of enforcing a lien against such pro erty, or for the purpose of
general administration of such p erty for the benefit of the debtor's creditors;
(12) Ih~ term "de?,t" me~ liabi 1 :{~. a claim..

under section 110. but does not include-a
w i a
fi er irect
the bankrUptcy petition preparer;
a' non rofit r anization that is exem t fro
Code of 1986:
acre

..''"','"4''' +-1.+le 1

actin

(

".

-

" .
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(38)
,comargin payment" means) for purposes ofthe forward contract provisions ofthis tit ,payment or
as original
deposit of cas, ecurity or other property, that is commonly known in the forward contract
margin, initial margin, intenance margin, or variation margin, including mark-to-m
payments, or variation
payments~

(41)
. " erson" includes individuai, partnership, and 'corporation, but does not incl
except that a gove
ental unit that(A) acquires an as t from a person. (i) as a result of the eration afaIaan guarantee agreement; ar
. (ii) as receiver or liqui · g agent of-a person;
. (B) is a guarantor ofa pensio benefit payable by or on behalfof the d or or an affiliate of the debtor; or
(C) is the legal or beneficial 0
r of an asset of-(i) an employee pension benefit p that is a governmental pI ,as defined in section 414(d) ofthe Internal
Revenue Code of 1986; or
(ii) an eligible deferred compensation pI as defined· section 457(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986;
shall be considered, for purposes of section 11 of th· tIe, to be a person with respect to such asset or such
benefit.:,
4.A
. '. A if rovi ed
d btor rimaril fl r e

8
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...1),) A trustee rna r-ectuest a determination of any unpaid liability of the estate for any

. curred during the
administration ofthe cas by submitting a tax return for such tax and a request for su a determination to the
governmental unit charged · h responsibility for collection or determination of
tax at the address and in the
..
. Unless such return is fraudulent, or con · s a material misrepresentation, the
successor to
d~btor are dischar afrom any liability for such tax-tB-

the

(A)

ent f th t

h wrt n

t

_--.=0.). . .such governmental unit does not notify

~

)

· · 60 days after such request, that such return has
been selected for examination; or
<Bill such governmental unit does not campI such xamination and notify the trustee of any tax due,
within 180 days after such request or within s
additional time the court, for cause, permits;
(~B) upon payment of the tax determi
by the court, after notice d a hearing, after completion by such
governmental unit of such examinati , or
(~upon payment ofthe
etermined by such governmental unit to be du .

'tax

(c) Notwithstanding s .on 362 of this title, after determination by the court of a
un~r' '., section, the' ', ..,.
governmental un· arged with responsibility for collection of such tax may assess s~ch tax ag
e estate, the \
debtor, or a cessor to the debtor, as· the case may be, subject to any o~erwise applicable law.
I .

§ 50~. Determination of secured status
(a) !.l1An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest, or that is
subject to setoff under section 553.ofthis title, is a secured claim to the extent .ofthe value ofsuch creditor's interest
in the estate's interest in such property, or to the extent of the amount subject to seto~ as the case may be, and is an
unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest or the amount so subject to·set:-etis1Qffis less
than the amount of such·allowed claim. SuCh value shall be determined. in light of the purpose ofthe valuation and
of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with ~y hearing on such disposition or use
or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest.
'
(2) If the debtor is an individual in a case under chapter 7 or 13, such vallie with respect to personal property
securing an allowed claim shall be detennined based on the replacement value of such property as of the date ofthe
filing of the petition without deduction for costs of sale Of marketin~: With respect to prQperty acquired for
personal falDilv. or household PUtP0ses: replacement value shall mean the price a retail merphant would cbaIiO for
prgperty ofthat kind considerina the aie and condition ofthe prQperty at the time yalue is determined.
(b) To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the.value ofwhich, after any recovery under
subsection (c) of this section, is greater than the amount of such clainl, there shall be allowed to the holder ofstich
claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement or State
~der which such claim arose.

(c) The trustee may recover from property securing an aHowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and
expenses ofpreserving, or disposing of) such property to the extent of any benefit to the holder ofsuch claim~
inc1uclini the paYlnent of all ad valorem pro.perty taxes with respect to the pmperty.
(d) To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed' secured claim, such lien is void,
unless-'
(1) such claim was disallowed only under section S02(b)(5) or 502(e) of this title; or
(2) such claim is not an allowed secured claim due only to the failure of any entity to file a proof of such claim
under section 501 ofthis title.
-

§ SO,. Prierities -, 62
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(b) For
purpose of distribution under this title, a claim arising from rescission of a purchase or sale of ecurity
of the debto
ofan affiliate of the debtor, for damages arising from the purchase or sale of such a s
0ty, or for
reimbursement 0
ntribution allowed under section 502 on account of such a claim, shall be s
° ted to all
claims or interests tha
senior to or equal the claim or interest represented by such security xcept that ifsuch
s.ecurity is common stock, s
claim has the same priority as common stock.
(c) Notwithstanding subsections (a) d (b) of this section, after notice and a he · g, the coUrt may(1) under principles of equitable subo . ation, subordinate for purposes
Istribution all or part of an allowed
clajm to all or part of another allowed claim
1 or part of an allowe ° terest to all or part of another allowed
interest; or
(2) order that any lien securing such a subordinated c
sferred the estate.

to

§S11. Rate of interest on tax claims

SUBCHAPTER IT - DEBTOR'S DUTIES AND BENEFITS ..

§ 521. Debtor's duties
.oo..The debtor shall.' (1) fil~
--CAl a list of creditors~'and
---Cm unless the court orders otherwise-,.;..
~ a schedule of assets and liabilities;~
_ _(~it¥·) a schedule of current income and current expenditures,-aft(!,;..
_____(,uii-¥i) a statement of the debtor's fm~cial affairst and, if section 342(b) al=1plies, a certificate -(l) of an attorney whose name is indicated on the petition as the attorney for the debtor. or a bankruptcy

petition preparer siiDing the petition under section 110(1))(1), indicatini that such attorney or the bankruptcy
pet{tion prcparer delivered to the; debtor the notice required by section 342 OJ); oc,
.
jfno attorney is so indicated, and DO banknwtcy petition preparer si~ed the petition. of the debtor that
such notice was received and read by the debtQr;
(iy) cnpies of all payment adyices or other evickmce of payment received within 60 days before the date of the
tilini of the petition, by the debtor from any employer of the debtor;
. (v) a statement of the amount ofmonthly net income. itemized to show how the amount is calculated: and

. ax)

(vi) a statement disclosin~ any reasonably anticipated increase in· income or expenditures over the 12-moDth
period following the date of the filing of the petition:
(2) if an individual debtor's schedule of assets and liabilities includes 6OBSHf1leF debts which are secured by
property of the estate(A) within thirty days after the date of the filing of a petition under chapter 7 of this title or on or before the date
of the meeting of creditors, whichever is earlier, or within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such
period fixes, the debtor shall file with the clerk a statement of his intention with respect to the retention or surrender
of such property and, if applicable, specifying that such property is claimed as exempt, that the debtor intends to
redeem such property, or that the debtor intends to reaffinn debts secured by such property;
(B) within forty fiveJ.Q. days after the filing of a HoMe of iHteBt tifider thisfirst date set for the meetin& of
creditors under section; 341 Ca) or within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such fatly fiye3Q day
period fixes, the debtor shall perform his intention with respect to such property, as specified by subparagraph (A)

ofthis paragraph; and
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(C)nothing in $ubparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph shall alter the debtor's or the· trustee's rights with
regard to such property under ~s title, except'as provided in section 362(b);
(3) if a trustee is serving in the case; Of an auditor serving under section 586(t) Qf title 28, cooperate with the
trustee as necessary to enable the trustee to perform the trustee's duties under this title;
(4) if a trustee is serving in the case; or an auditor serving under section 586(1) Qftitle 28, surrender to the'trustee
all property of the estate and any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers, rela$g to
property of the estate, whether or not immunity is granted under section 344 of this title;-flflEl
(5) appear.at the hearing required under section 524(d) of this title.;
(6) in a case under chapter 7 of this title in which the debtor is an individual, not retain possessio.n Qf personal
pro.perty as to which a creditor has an allowed, claim for the purchase price secured in whole or in part by an interest
in such persQnal pmpertY unless the debtor, not later than 45 dAys after the fIrSt meeting of creditors under section
341 (a), either-(A) enters into an il&reement with the creditor pursuant to section 524(c) with resPect to the claim secured by
such pro.perty: or
.
(B) redeems such property from the securitY interest pursuant to section 722.
, If the debtor fails to so act within the 45-day period referred to in paramph (.6), the stay under section 362(1) is
tenninate<1 with respect to the personal property of the estate or of the debtor wbjeb is affected. such prgpcqty shall
no longer be prQPeJ1Y oftbe estate. and the creditor may take whatever action as 'to Si1ch'ptOperty as is 'pePniited bY"
anplicable nonbankryptey law. unless the court determines on the motion Qf the trustee filed before the ,exPimtiQD' of
such 45-day period; and after notice ahd a hearing, that such property is' Qf coriseqYeotial value Of benefit to the:
eState, orders almropriate adequate protection of the creditor's interest'and orders the debtor to deliver any
collateral in the debtor's' possessiOn to the trustee; and
'.
.
, (7) Unless a'trustee is Serving in the case, continue to perform the obligations required of the administrator (as
defined in Section 3 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act Of 1974) of an emplQyee benefit plan jf at the
time of the commencement of the case the debtor (or any entity designated by the debtor) served as such
administrator, ,
'
(b) In addition to the requirements under sUbsection (al. a debtor who is an ip·djvidual shall file with the court(1) a certificate from the aDproved nonprofit budget and credit COunseling aseDcy that provided the debtOr

services under section 1Q9@ describing the services provided to the debtor: and
(2) a cQ;gy of the debt repayment plan if any: developed under section 10901) thrQUih the a~u)rQved nonprofit
bud2et and credit counseling agency referred to in para~h (1).

(.c) In addition to meetini the requirements under subsection CAl, a debtor shall file with the court a record of any
interest that a debtor has in an education indjyidual retirement account (as defined in section 53Q(b)(1) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986) or under a Qualified State tuition program W defined in section 529(2)(1 )ofsuch
~

Cd) If the' debtor faUs timely to take the action apecified in subsection (a)(6) of this section, Qr in paragmphs (1) and
(2) of section 362QJ), with respect tg property whicb a lessQr or bailor owns and has leased, rented, or hailed to the
debtor or as to which a creditor holds a security interest not otherwise voidable ynder section 522(i) 544, 545 547,
548, or 549, nothing in this title shall prevent or limit the operation of a prQvision in the underlying lease or
agreement that has the effect of placing the debtor in default under such lease or aifeement by reason of the
occurrence, pendency, Of existence ora proceeding under this title Of the insolvency of the debtor. Nothine in this
subsectiQn shall be deemed to justify limiting such a provision in any other circumstance.
(JV(1) lithe debtor in a case under chapter 7 OT 13 is an individual and ira creditor files with the court at any time a
reqpest to receive a CQPy of the petition, schedules, and statement of financial affairs filed by the debtor, then the
court shall make such petition such schedules: and such statement available to sucb creditor.
O)eA) The debtor shan provide-(i) not later than 7 days before the date first set for the first meeting of creditors. to the trustee a co~y of the
Federal income tax return reQJlired under allplicabJe law (or at the election of the debtor a transcript of such return)
for the most recent tax year endjui immediately before the commencement oftbe case and for whicb a Federal
income tax return Was filed: and
67
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aj)

at the same time the debtor complies with clause 0). a CQt)y of such return (Qr if elected under clauSe (D.
such transcript) to any creditor that timely requests such cQPY.
.
(5) If the debtor fails to compLY with clause G) or (ii) of subparaw.ph (Al, the court shall dismiss the case
unless the debtor delDonstrates that the failure to so comply is due to circumstances beyond the control of the
~
(C) If a creditor reqyests a co.gy of such tax return or such transcript and if the debtor fails to provide a co,py of
such tax return or such transcript to such creditof at the time the debtor provides such tax return Of such transcript to
the trustee, then the court shaH dismiss the case unless the debtor demonstrates that the failure to provide a CQPY of
such tax return or such transcript is due to circumstances beyond the control of the debtor.
(3) If a creditor in a case under chapter 13 files with the court at any time a request to receive a CQP.Y of the plan
filed by the debtor. then the court shalI make available to such creditor a c0ID' of the plan-CA) at a reasQnable cost: and
(B) not later than 5 days after such reqpest is filed.
"

(t) At the reQJ1est of the court the United States trustee Qr any party in interest in a case under chapter 7 11 or 13,
a debtor whQ is an individual shall file with the court-(1) at the same time tiled with the taxini authority, a copy of each FedemI income tax return reQuired under
mwlicable law (or at the election Qf the debtor. a transcript Qf such tax return) with respect to each tax year of the
.~, '
. ". . : , . '
,. . :
f
debtor eodini while the case is pendin~ under such chapter:
(2) at the Same time filed with. the taxin~ authority, each Federal income tax return required under agp Ii cable law
(Of at the election of the debtor, a transcript Qfsrich tax return) that had not been filed with such 'authority as of the
date Qf the commencement Qf the case alid that was subsequently filed for any tax year of the debtor ending in the 3year'period ending on the date ofthe' commencement Qfthe case:
",
.(3) a CQPY'pfeach amendment to any Federal income tax return or transcript filed with the court under paragraph
(1) or (2); and
(4) in a case under chapter 13-(A) on the date that is either 90 days after the end of such tax year Of 1 year after the date of the Commencement
Qf the Case, whichever is later, if a plan is not continued before such later date: and .
"
. (B) annually· after the plan is continued and until the case is clOsed, not later than the date that is 45 days before
the anniversary of the confirmation of the plan·
"
a statement, under penalty ofpetiuO', of the income and expen~itures of the debtor during the tax year of the debtQr
most recently concluded before such statement is filed under this para~ph, and Qftbe monthly income oftbe
debtof, tha~ shows hQW income, ex.penditures and monthly income are calculated.
I.

"

" •.

(&leI) A statement referred to in 'subsection 00(4) shall discIQse-(A) the amount and SQurces ofthe income Qfthe debtor:
(B) the identity of any person responsible with the debtor for the sm1port of any dePendent Of the debtor: and
(el the jdentin' of any person whQ contributed, and the amount CQntributed, to the household in which the
debtor resides. ,
(2) The tax returns; amendments, and statement of incolne and expen.ditures described in subsections (Ei)(2)(A)
and
shall be available to the United States trustee (or the bankruptcy administrator, if any), the trustpe, and any
party in interest for inspection and'cQpying, subject to the reguirelnents ofsectiQn 315(c) of the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of2QQ5.
.

en

(jl)' If requested by the United States trustee or by the trustee. the debtor shall provide-(1) a document that eStablishes the identity Qfthe d.ebtot. includini a driver's license passport. OT other document
that contains a photograph of the debtor: or
(2) such other personal identifyjn2 infQnnatiQn reIatini tQ the debtof that establisbes the identity Qftbe debtor
(i)(l) Subject tQ para~raphs (2) and (4) and notwithstanding section 707(a). iran individual debtor in a voluntaty
case under chapter 7 QT 13 fails to file an of the informatiQn reQuired. under subsection (a)(l) within 45 dAys after
the date of the filing of the petition, the case shall be automatically dismissed effective on the 46th day after the date
of the filing of the petitiQn.
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(2) Subject to ParaWph (4) and with respect to a case described in pam~ph (1), any party in interest may
request the court to enter an order dismissing' the case If requested, the court shall enter an order of dismissal not
later than 5 days after such reQ.uest
(3) Subject to paramPh (4) and upon request oftbe debtor made within 45 days after the date oftbe tiline- of the
petition described in paragraph (1), the court may allow the debtor an additional period of not to exceed 45 days to
tile the infonnatioD reQyired under subsection (a)(l) if the court finds justification for extendini the period for the

!ilin£

(4) Notwithstanding any other proyisionof this subsection, on the motion of the trustee tiled before the expjmtion
of the agplicable period of time s.pecified in paragraph (1), (2), Of (3), and after notice and a hearing. the court may
decline to dismiss the case if the court finds that the debtor attempted in gOQd faith to file all the infonnatioQ
required by subsection (AlC! l(J3l(iv) and that the best interests ofcreditors would be served by administration of the

case.
(0(1) Notwithstandins any other provision of this title, if the debtor fails to file a tax return that becomes due after
the cgmmencement of the case or to properly obtain an exten§ioD of the due date for fiIini such return, the weina
authority may reQ.JlCst that the court enter an order cQnyertin~ Qr dismissini the case.
(2) If the debtor does not tile the required return or obtain the extension referred to in pamimph (1) within 90
days aftef'a reQuest is tiled by the taxjni aythority under that para~ the cqurt shall convert or dismiss the ca~e.
whichever is in the best interests of creditors and the estate
.
' ,' . . . ..
I"

•

'

.•

I,'.

§ 52 • Exemptions
(a) In this ction.
(1) "depen
t" includes spouse, whether or not actually dependent; arid
, (2) "value"'me fair market value as of the date of the filing of the peti.tion or, with respect to pro

becomes property 0

e estate after such date, as ofthe date such property ,becomes property of

'

that
tate.

(b)!ll Notwithstanding sectl 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt from pro
' of the estate the
propertY listed in either paragra (+2) or, in'the alternative, 'paragraph (~.3) of this sub . tion. In joirit cases filed '
under section 302 of this title and in ·vid~al c'ases filed under section 301 or 303 of
'title by or against debtors
who are husband and wife, ·and whose e tes' are ordered to be jointly administ aunder Rule l015(b) 'ofthe
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, on ebtor may not elect to exempt operty listed in paragraph (*'2) and
the other debtor elect to exempt property listed· aragraph (~.3.) of this
section, If the parties cannot agree on
the alternative to be elected, they shall be deemed to lect paragraph , where such election is permitted under the
law ofthe jurisdiction where the case is filed,
.
.
(-1-12) PropertY listed in this parafUaph is pr<;>perty that is s
. led under subsection (d) efthis seetioB, unless the
State law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph )
ef this sueseeties specifically dO.es not so
authorize; ef) iB the a.ltemaa'ie,.a.
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sectio~,~y not be converted to a case under mother chapter

(d) Notwithstanding any other provision o.f this
a
of this title unless the debtor may be a debtor under sue

ter.

-

"

§ 707. Dismissal of a case or conversion to a case under chapter 11 or 13
(a) The court may dismiss a case under this chapter only after notice and a hearing and only for cause, including-(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
(2) nonpayment of any fees or charges required under chapter 123 of title 28; and
(3) failure of the debtor in a voluntary case to file, within fifteen days or such additional time as the court may
allow after the filing of the petition commencing such case, the information required by paragraph (1) of section
521, but only on a motion by the United States trustee.
(b) .(.U..After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion by the United States trustee, ~
at £Be feCiliest ef s1:1ggesaea eftmstee (gr bankruptcy administrator, ifany): Qr any party in interest, may dismiss a
case filed by an individual debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts, or with the debtor's
consent. convert such a case to a case UDder chapter 11 or 13 ofthis title if it finds that the granting of reliefwould
be a S1:18StaBtialm abuse of the provisions of this chapter-. Thereshad:l 'Be a flfeSt:llllptioB is faYJOf of gmetiftg t1=le FeUef
reqaesteti By the seator. In making a determination whether to dismiss a case ~d~~ ~is sec~C?n, tlte CO~I ~y ~ot
take into consideration whether a debtor has made, or continues to make, charitable contributions (that meet the ..'
definition of "charitable contribution" under section 548(d)(3)) to any qualified religioUs or charitable entity or
organization (as that term is defined in section 548(d)(4»).
; :(2) (A) (i) In cQnsiderin~ under paragraph (1) whether the granting of relief would be an abuse of the provisions
of this chapter, the court shall presume abuse exists if the debtor's current nl0nthly income reduced by the amounts
determined under clauses (iD. (iii). and (00. and multiplied by 60 is not less than the lesser of25 percent Qf the debtor's nonpriority unsecured claims in the case, or $6,000, whichever is greater: Of
(ill $IQ.OQQ.
'
"'
(ii) 0> The debtor's monthly expenses shall be the debtor's applicable mQnthly exPense amougt, specified
under the National Standards and Local Standards, and the debtors actual monthly expenses for the catei0rjes
specified a, Other NecesSity Expenses issued by the Internal Revenue Service for the area in which the debtor
resides, as in effect on the date of the order for relief for the debtQr, the dependents of the debtQr.. aDd the spouse Qf
the debtor in a joint case, if the apouse is not otherwise a dependent. Such expenses shall include reasonably
necessary health insurance disability insurance, and health saviniS account expenses for the debtor. the spouse of
the debtor, or the dependents of the debtor. NQtwithstandini any other provision of this clause, the monthly
expenses of the debtor shaH not include any payments for debts. In addition, the debtor's monthly expenses shall
j"nclude 'the debtor's reasonably necessary exPenses incurred to maintain the' safety of the debtor and the family of
the debtor frQm family violence as identified under section 309 of the Family violence Prevention "and Servjces Act.
or Qther Iwlicable federal law The expenses included in the debtor's monthly expenses described in the precedini
sentence shall be kept confidential by the court: In additiQn, jf it is demonstrated that it is reasonable and necessary ,
the debtor's monthly expenses may alSQ iQclude an additional allowance fQr fQQdand clothjnS- Qf up to 5 percent of
the food and clothins categories as sPecified by the National Standards issued by" the Internal Revenue Service.
In addition, the debtors monthly expenses may include. ifanplicable, the continuation Qfactual
exPenses paid by the debtor that are reasonable and necessary for care and SUlm0rt of an elderly. chronically ill, or
disabled household member or member of the debtor's immediate family (including parents, grandparents, siblings,
children, and wndchildren of the debtor, the dependents of the debtor. and the spouse Qfthe debtor in a joint case
who is not a dej)endent) and who is unable to pay for such reasonable and necessary expenses.
all) In addition, for a debtor eligible for chapter 13, the debtor's monthly expenses may include the actual
administrative expenses of administerina a chapter 13 plan for the district in which the debtor resides up tQ an
amount of 10 percent of the prQjected plan payments, as detennined under schedules issued by the Executive Office
fQr United States Trustees
OY) In additiQn, the debtors monthly expenses may include the actual exPenses for 'each dependent child
less than 18 years of aaet not to exceed $1,500 per year per child, to attend a private or public elementary or
secondary schQol if the debtor provides documentation of such expenses and a detailed explanation of why such
expenses are reasonable and necessary. and why such exPenses are not already aCCounted fQr in the National
Standards. Local Standards, Of Other Necessary Expenses referred to in subclause a)e
110
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(V) In addition. the debtor's monthly expenses may include an allowance fQr hOUSini and utilities, in excess
Qf the aHowance specjfied by the Local Standards fQr hQusing and utilities issued by the Internal Revenue Servi'Ce,
based QD the a'Ctual expenses fQr home enemY costs if the debtor provides documentatiQn of such actual expenSes
and demonstrates that such actual expenses are reasQnable and necessary.
(iii) The debtor's avemse monthly payments on account Qf secured debts shall be calculated as the sum Qf(I) the total of all amounts scheduled as contractually due to secured creditors in each month of the 60
months followinB the date· of the petition: and
.
aI) any additional payments to secured creditors necessary for the debtor. in filina- a plan under chapter 13
of this title, to maintain possession of the debtor's primaty residence. motor vehicle. or other property necessaty for
the SllRJ2011: of the debtor and the debtQr's dependents, that serves as collateral for secured debts:
divided by 60.
(iv) The debtQr's expenses for payment of all priority claims (including: priQrifJ' child Syp.pQrt and alimony
claims) shall be calculated as the total atnount Qf d.ebts entitled to priority divided by 60.
(B) CD In any proceedjn~brQu&ht under this subsection, the presumption of abuse may only be rebutted by
demoDstmtiui special circumstances. such.as a serious medical condition Qr a can Qr order to active duty jn the
Anned Forces. tQ the extent such special circumstances that justity additiQnal expenses Qr a<ijUStrneuts Qfcurrent
monthly income for which there is no reasQnable alternative
(ii) In order to establish special circumstauc§s. the debtor shaIl be reqyired to itemize each additiQDa;l e2)penst(

necessary and reasonable.·
' .
:- .
-. .
(iii) The debtOr shalt attest under oath to the accuracy of any ·infonnation provided to- demonstrate that
additional expenses Qr adjustments to income are required.
Ciy) The presumption of abuse may only be rebutted if the additional expenses or adjustments to income
referred to in clause CD cause the product ofilie debtor's current mQnthly incQme reduced by the .amounts
deteonined ynder clauses eii) OU) and Gy) of subparamPb (A) when multiplied by 60 to be lesS than the lesser Qf-25 perCent Qf the debtor's ilonpriority unsecured claims, or $6~QQO, whichever is ~ate[: or
00 $10,000.
(C) As part of the schedule of current incQme and expenditUres required under section 521 the debtor shall
include a statement Qf the debtor's current mQnthly income. and the calculations that determine whether a
presumption arises under suhparaw.ph (A)(i), that·shQw how each such amount is calculated.
(D) Subparagraphs (Al through (C) shall not awl~ and the court may Dot dismiss or convert a case based on
any form °Qfrriearts testing, °ifthe debtor is a disabled veteran (as defined in section 3741(1) of title 38), and the
jndebtedness occurred primarily durini a period durini which he Qr she WM-(D on actiye duty (as defined in section 101(.<1)(1) Qftitle 1Q); or
. ail perfQnnini a homeland defense activity (as d.efined in section 901 (1) Qf title 32).
(3) In consjderjn~under paraimPb (1) whether the srantiDa- QfreliefwQUld be an abuse Qfthe provisiQns of this
chapter in a 'Case in which the presumption in subparaifaph (Al(i) of such palJ~mph does not arise or is rebutted,
the CQurt shall·consider-CAl whether the debtor filed the petitiQn in bad faith: Of
the totality of the circumstances (including whether the debtor seeks to reject a personal services contmct
and the financial need for such rejection as sought by the debtor) of the debtor's financial situation demonstrates

a)

cal

~

(4) (A) The court, on its own initiative or on the motion of a party in interest in accordance with the procedures
described in rule 9011 Qfthe Federal Rules QfBankruptcy Procedure, Inay Qrder the attorney for the debtor to
reimburse the trustee for all reasonable costs in prosecutini a U10tiOD filed under section 7Q7(b), includina
reasonable attorneys' fees, if-0) a tnlstee files a motion for dismissal or conversion under this subsectiQn: and
. (ii) the court-(I) grants such motion; and
01) finds that the action of the attorney for the debtor in tiling a case under this chapter violated rule 9011 of
the FedemI Rules QfBankmptcy Procedure.
°
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(13) If the court finds that the attorney fQr the debtor violated rule 9011 of the Federal Rilles of Bankmptey
PrQcedum, the CQurt, Qn its own initiative Qf on the motion ora party in interest. in aCcordance With such
procedures, may order·(0 the assessment of an ap.propriate civil penalty agajnst the attorney for the debtor; and
(in the payment of such civil penalty to the trustee, the United States trustee (pr the ban_toy administrator,

if.IIW:.

(C) The sianature Qf an attom~Y
attorney has--

OD

a petition, pleadipf: or written motiQn Shall constitute a" certification that the

0) perfQnned a reasQnable investigatiQn into the circumstances that gave rise to the petition, pleadini. Of
written motion· and
(ii) detennined that the petition, pleading, Of written motion0) is well grounded in fact: and
existing Jaw'and does not constitute an abuse UDder paragmph (It
The sianature Qf an attorney on the petition shan constitute a certification that the attorney has DO
knQw1ed&C after an inqyiry that the infQnnation in the schedules tiled with such petition is incorrect
(5) (A) ExceJ)t as provided jn subpamwph (3) and subject to parampb (6), the court. on its own initiative or on
the motion ofa Pam' in interest. in accordance with the procedures described in rnle 9011 of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure. may award a debtor all reasonable costs (inclndioi reaSonable attorneys' feeS) in" contestina'" '
a motion .filed by a partY in interest (other than a trustee or United States trustee (or bankmptey administrator, if
any) under this subsection if.."
\
(0 the 'court does ·not grant the motion: and .
eii) the CQurt finds tbatID the position of the party that filed the motion violated nUv 901'1 oftbe Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure: or
.
01) the attorney (if any) whQ filed the motion did not comply with the requirements of clauses (D and oil of
paraifA1)h (4j~) and the motiQD Was made solely for the puQ)ose. of coercjna a debtor into waivipa a riiht
iJWilllteed to the debtor under this title.
(13) A small business that has a claim oran aggregate amount less
$l,QQQ shall not be'subject to
sub.parasraph (A)(jOO)·
(C) For purposes Qf this paragmph0) the term "small business" means an unincorpQrated business, partnership cQrporation. association or
organization that-- .
(D 'has fewer than 25 full-time emplQyees as detennined on the date on which the motion is tiled: and
is cDia_ in commercial or business activity: and
the number of employees Qfawholly owned subsidiaxy Qia corporation includes the employees of(1) a parent· corporation· and
OI) any other subsidiaxy co[poration of the parent corporation
,',
(6) Only the judse or United States trustee (or bankruptcy administrator, if any) may file a motion under sectiQn
107(b), if the current monthly income Qfthe debtor, or in a joint case, the debtOr and the debtor's sPOuse, as of the
date oithe Qrder for .relief, when multiplied by 12. is eg.ual to or less thaD"'(A) in' the case of a debtof in a household of 1 person, the median family income of the applicable State for 1
earner;
in the case ora debtor in a household of2. 3, Qr 4 individuals, the highest median family income oftbe
Ap.plicable State for a family of the same number or fewer individuals: Of
(.Cl in the case of a debtQr in a household exceedina 4 individuals, the hi&hest median family income of the
8RPJicable State for a family Qf 4 or fewer individuals, plus $525 per Dlontb for each itidiyiduaI in excess of 4.
. (7) (N No judie United States trustee (or bankruptcy administrator, jf any),. tmste~, or other partY in interest may
file a motion under paraiUaph (2) iftbe current monthly income of the debtor, includini a veteran (as that tenn is
defined in section 101 of title 38), and the debtor's &pause combined, as oftbe date of the order fQr reliefwben
multiplied by 12. is equal to or less than....
0) in the case of a debtor in a household of 1 person, the median family income of the aDplicable State fQr 1

em

than

aD
.' aD

an
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Cii) in the case of a debtor in a household of2: 3: or 4 individuals tbe highest median family income Qftbe

cmplicable State for a family oitbe same number or fewer individuals: or
(iii) in the case ofa debtor in a hQusehold exceeding 4 individuals. the his-best median family income ofthe
11lpIicable State for a family Qf 4 Qr fewer individuals, plUS $525 per month fQr each individual in excess Qf4.
In a case that is not a joint case, current monthly income of the debtor's sPouse shan not be conSidered for
pU[poses Qfsub.parampb (A) if--

ca)

(i) (I) the debtor and the debtor's spouse are se.parated under a~pljcable Donbankruptey Jaw; OT
ail the debtor and the debtor's spouse are livini separate and apart. other than fQr the purpose of evadin2
subparagraph CAl; and
(ii) the debtor tiles a statement under penalty of perjwy-specifyin& that the debtor meets the requirement of subclause 0) or
of clause (i)' and
aD disclosins' the aggregate, or best estimate of the agBI"egate, amount of any cash or money payments

a)

aD

received from the debtor's spouse attributed to the debtor's current monthly income.
(c) (1) In this subsectjon-(A) the tenD "crime ofyioJence" has the meanini iiyen such tenn in section 16 oftjtle 18: and
(8) the tenn "dOlK traffickini crime" has the meaning a-iven such tenD in section 924(9)(2) oftitJe 18.
(2) Except as provided in parailllph 0). after notice and a bearini. the court, 011 a mQtion by the victim Qf a crime
'QfyioJence or a drys traffickin~ crime: may when it is in the best interest oithe victim dismiss a vOluntarj
filed
under this chapter by a debtor who is an individual if such individual was convicted of such crime.
0) The Court IDLY not dismiss a case under pamWlph (2) if the debtor establishes by a preponderance Qf the
eVidence that the filing of a case under this chapter is necess8.1:Y to satisfy a claim for a ~Qmestic suPport obligation.

'case

CHAPTER ~I - COLLECTION, LIQUIDATION, AND DISTRIBUTION OF· THE ESTATE

§ 721.

~

horization to operate business

The court may au
' e the trustee to operate the business of the debtor for a limited period · such operation is in
the best interest of the
te and consistent with the orderly liquidation of the estate.

§ 722. Redemption

th:i!ri

An individual debtor may, whether or n the debtor has waived
0 redeem under this section, redeem
tangible personal property'intended p .
for personal, family, or ollsehQld use, from a lien securing a
dischargeable consumer debt, if such property· exemPted~der ction 522 of this title or has been abandoned
under section 554 ofthis title, by paying the holde of such lie
e amount ofthe allowed secured claim of such

holder that is secured by such lien '

t

' e

d

§ 723. Rights of partnership trustee against gen al pa

ti.

.

rs

(a) If there is a deficiency ofproperty of the e tate to pay in full all aims which are allowed in a case under this
er of the partnership is personally liable,
chapter concerning a partnership and wi espect to which a general p
the trustee shall have a claim against ch general partner to the extent tha
der applicable nonbankruptcy law
such general partner is personally; ·able for such deficiencyt.&.
(b) To the extent practicab ,the trustee shall first seek recovery of such deficiency fio· any general partner in such
ciency, the court may
partnership that is not a~btor in a case under this title. Pending detennination of such
order any such partneito provide the estate with indemnity for, Qr assurance ofpayment 0 , y deficiency
recoverable fro
ch partner, or not to dispose ofproperty.
(c) Notwi tanding section 728(c) of this title, the trustee has a claim against the estate of each genera: artner in
such p
ership that is a debtor in a case under this title for the full amount of all claims of creditors allo d in the
case onceming such partnership, Notwithstanding section 502 of thi.s title, there.shall not be allowed in suc
~ er's case a claim against such partner on which both such partner and such partnership are liable, except to any
113
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(b) (1) S tions 1222(a), 1222(b), and 1223(c) of this title and the requirements of section 122S(a) of this ti apply
to any mo cation under subsection (a) of this section.
(2) The plan modified becomes the plan unless, after notice and a hearing, such modification is di proved.
(c) A plan modifi under this section may not provide for payments over a period that expires aft three years
after the time that th lI'st payment under the original confinned plan was due, unless the court, r cause, approves
e.
a longer period, but the ourt may not approve a period that expires aft~r five years after such

§ 1230. Revocation of an order of confirmatio Caution: For prove Ion that 11 USCS § § 1201 et seq. are
reenacted for a period ending on July 1,2005, see § 490fDivisio
of Act Oct. 21, 1998, P.L.. I0S-277, w~~4
appears as 11 uses § 1201 note.]
'. "
I · . "

!

.

'.

",

(a) On request of a party in interest at any time within 180
s after the date of the entry of an order of
. confirmation under section 1225 of this title, 'and after no · e d a hearing, the court may revoke such order if such
order was procured by fraud.
.
~) If the court revokes an order of confirmation un r subsectio~ (a) fthis section, the court shall dispose' ofthe
case under section 1207 of this title. unless, wi · the time fixed by the ourt. the debtor proposes and the court
.
confinns a modification of the plan under secti 1229 of this title.

§ 1231. Special tax provisions [Caution: r provision that 11 uses § § 140 et seq. are reenacted for a period
ending on July 1, 2005, see § 149of.Di · ion C ofAct Oct. 21, 1998, P.L. 105-~ ,which 'appears as 11 uses §
1201 note.]

(e) The issuance,
fer, or exchange of a security, or the making or delivery of an instrument of tran er under a
., plan confinned un er section 1225 of this title, may not be taxed under any law imposing a stamp tax or s' ·lar tax.

may authorize the proponent of a plan to request a determination, limited to questions of law, b a-'
charged with responsibility for collection or determination of a tax on or
measure y income, of the tax effects, under section 346 ofthis title and under the law imposing such tax, ofthe
he event of an actual controversy, the court may declare such effects after ~e earlier ofplan.
( the date on which such governmental unit responds to the request under this subsection; or
) 270 days after such request.

~~~tBBm1Xgovernmental unit

CHAPTER 13 - ADJUSTMENT OF DEBTS OF AN INDIVIDUAL WITH REGULAR INCOME
SUBCHAPTER I - OFFICERS, ADMINISTRATION, AND THE ESTATE

§ 1301. Stay of action against codebtor
165
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(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, after the order for relief under this chapter, a
creditor may not act, or commence or continue any civil action, to collect all or any part of a consumer debt of the
debtor from any individual that is liable on such debt with the debtor, or that secured such debt, unless-(1) such.individual became liable on or secured such debt in the ordinary course ofsuch individual's business; or
.(2) the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7 or 11 of this title.
(b) A creditor may present a negotiable instrument, and may give notice of dishonor of such an instrument

(c) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay provided
by subsection (a) of this section.with respect to a creditor, to the extent that(1) as between the debtor and the individual protected under subsection (a) of this section, such individual
received the consideration for the claim held by such creditor;
(2) the plan filed by the debtor proposes not to pay such claim; or
(3) such creditor's interest would be irreparably hanned by continuation of such stay.
(d) Twenty days after the filing of a request tinder subsection (c)(2) of this section for relief from the stay provided
by subsection (a) of this section, such stay is terminated with respect to the party in interest making such request,
unless the debtor or any individual that is liable on such debt with the debtor file~ and s~rves upon suc~ party in .

interest a written objection to the taking of the proposed action.

..' ,

.r,.

,'.

.'

.

.

•

.:'

'§·1~.?~. 'T~stee'

(a) ]ftheUni~ed States trustee appoints ail individual under 'section 586(b) oftitle 2~' to serve'as standing trustee in
C8:s'es tinder this chapter 'and if such individual qualifies under seCtion 322 of this title, then such individual shall'
serve as trustee in the case. Otherwise, the United States trustee shall appoint one disinterested person to serve as
trus~ in the case or the United States trustee may serve as a trustee in the case.
(b) The trustee s~all--

(1) perfonn the duties specified in sections 704(2), 704(3), 704(4); 704(5), 704(6), 704(7), and 704(9) of this title;
..... (2) appear and' be heard at any ~earing that concerns--'
'
(A) the value of property subject to a lien;'
. . (B) confirmation of a plan; or
(C) modification of the plan after confirmation;
(3) dispose ot: under regulations issued by the Director ofthe Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
moneys received or to be received in a case under chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act;
(4) advise, other than on legal matters, and assist the debtor in performance under the p1an;-ae.4 .
. (5) ensure that the debtor commences makfug timely paynients under section 1326 ofthis title~
(6) jf with respect to the debtor there is a claim for a domestic su:gport obligation. provide the ap,plicable notice ,
specified in subSection (d).
.
(c) If the debtor is ~ngaged in business, then in addition to the duties specified in subsection (b) ofthis section, the
tr:ustee s~all perform the duties specified in sections 1106(a)(3) and 1106(a)(4) .ofthis title.

Cd) (1) In a case described in subsection (b)(6) to which subsection (h)(6) applies the trustee sba11-

CAl CD provide written notice to the holder ofthe claim described in subsection 0»(6) of such claim and of the

riaht of such holder to use the services of the State child SURPort enforcement 8:iengy established under sections 464
and 466 ofthe Social Securib' Act for the State in which such holder resides. for assistance in collectini child
SUlm0rt during and after the case under this title: and
(ii) include in the notice provided under clause (i) the address and telephone number of such State child
SyP.port enforcement agency:
CB) provide wr,itten notice to such State child support enforcement agency of such claim: and
(ii) include in the notice provided under clause (0 the name, address. and telephone number of such holder

en

166
DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL

G - 51

Preliminary Draft - Subject to Revision

(CJ "at such time as the debtor is 2filDted a discb~e under section 1328: provide written notice to such holder
and to sYch State child su;gport enforcement a~ency of-(0 the granting of the discharge:
(in the last recent known address of the debtor:
(jii) the last recent known nalne and address of the debtor's employer: and
(iv) the name each creditor that holds a claim that-·
is not discbaraed under paramPb (2) Of (4) ·of section 523(1); OT
01) was reaffion ed by the debtor under section 524(c).
(2) fA) The holder of a claim described in subsection (b)(6) or the State child sUP'PQrt enforcement agency of the
State in which such holder resides may request from a creditor described in paraiflph (l)(C)(iv) the last known
address ofthe debtor.
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision Qf law, a creditor that makes a disclosure ora last known address of a
debtor in connection with a reQ.uest made under subpara&mph CA) shall not be liable by reason of makini that
disclosure.

a)

or

§ 1303. Rights and powers of debtor
Subject to any limitations on a trustee under this chapter, the ~ebtor shall have, exclusive ~f tI;1,e trustee, the ri~ts ,
and powers ofa trustee under sections 363(b), 363(d), 363(e), 363(£), and 363(1), of this title.' .
I'

0"

I

".,.

§ 1304. Debtor engaged in business
(a) A debtOr that"is self-employed and incurs trade credit in the production of income from such employment is
engaged in business.
.
(b) Unless the court orders otherwise, a debtor· engaged in business may operate the business of the debtor and,
subject to any limitations on a trustee under sections 363(c) and 364 of this title and to such limitations or
conditions as the ~ow1 prescribes, shall have, exclusive ofthe trustee, the rights and powers ofthe trustee under

such sections..
(c) A debtor engaged in business shall perform the duties of the trustee specified in section 704(8) of this title.
§ 1305. Filing' and allowance of postpetition claims

(a) A proof of claim may be filed by any entity that holds a claim against the debtor-(1) for taxes that become payable to a governmental unit while the case is pending; or
(2) that is a consumer debt, that arises after the date of the order for relief under this chapter, and that is for
property or services necessary for the debtor's performance under the plan.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) ofthis section, a claim filed under subsection (a) of this section shall be
allowed or disallowed under section 502 ofthis title, but shall be determined as of the date such claim arises, and
shall"be allowed under section 502(a), S02(b), or S02(c) of this title, or disallowed'under section 502(d) or S02(e) of
this title, the same as if such claim had arisen before the date ofthe filing ofthe petition.

(c) A claim filed under subsection (a)(2) ofthis section shall be disallowed if the holder of such claim knew or
should have known that prior approval by the trustee ofthe debtor's incurring the obligation was practicable and
was not obtained.

§ 1306. Property of the estate
(a) Property of the estate includes, in addition to the property specified in section 541 of this title-(1) all property of the kind specified in such section that the debtor acquires after the commencement of the case
but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, er-Il, or 12 ofthis title, whichever
occurs first; and
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(2) earnings from services performed by the debtor after the commencement ofthe case but before the case is
closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title, whichever occurs fIrSt.

(b) Except as provided in a conflIlIled plan or order conflIlIling a plan, the debtor shall remain in possession of all
property of the estate.

§ 1307.' Conversion or dismissal

(a) The debtor may convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 7 of this title at any time. Any waiver
of the right to convert under this subsection is unenforceable.
(b) On request of the debtor at any time, if the case has not been converted under section 706, 1112, or 1208 of this
title, the court shall dismiss a case under this chapter. Any waiver ofthe right to dismiss under this subsection is
unenforceable.

the

(c) Except as provided in subsection (e) ofthis section, on request ofa party in interest or
United States trustee
and after notice and a hearing, the court may convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 7 ofthis title,
or may dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever is in the best interests of creditors and the es~ate, for cause,
including-.
. .... ;
,.,.
(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
(2) nonpayment of any fees and charges required under chapter 123 of title 28;
(3) failure to file 'a plan timely Wlder section 1321 ofthis title;
(4) failure to commence making timely payments under section 1326 of this title;
(5) denial ofconfirmation of a plan under section 1325 .ofthis title and denial a request made for additional
time for filing another p~ or a modification of a plan;
(6) material default by the debtor with respect to a term of a conflI1Iled plan;
(7) revocation of the order of confinuation under section 1330 ofthis title, and denial of confirmation ota
modified plan under section 1329 of this title;
(8) tennination of a confmned plan by reason of the occurrence of a condition specified in the plan other than
completion ofpayments under the plan;
(9) only on request of the United States trustee, failure of the debtor to file, within fifteen days, or such additional
time as the court may allow, after the filing of the petition 'commencing such case, the infomiation required by' .
paragraph (1) ofsection 521;-ef
(10) only on request of the United States trustee, failure to timely file the information required by paragraph (2) of
section £i-:.s2..l.;.g[
(11) failure of the debtor to pay any domestic support obli~atjQn that first becomes payable after the date ciftbe
filini of the petition.
'
.

of

(d) Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, at any time before the confirmation ofa plan under section
1325 ofthis title, on request of a party in interest or the·United States trustee and after notice and a hearing, the
court may convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 11 or 12 of this title.

(e) Upon the failure of the debtor to file a tax return under section 1308, on request ofa party in interest or the'
United States 1.nlstee and after notice and a hearing, the court shan dismiss a case or convert a case under this
chAPter to a case under chapter 7 of this title, whichever is in th~ best interest of the creditors and the estate.

!fl.:the court may not convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 7, 11, or 12 ofthis title if the debtor
i~ afanner, unless the debtor requests such·conversion.
.
(i&) Notwithstanding any other provisi.on ofthis section, a case may not be converted to a case under another
chapter ofthis title unless the debtor may be a debtor under such chapter.
§ 1308.

Filing of prepetition tax returns
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(I) Not later than the dlrY before the date aD which the meetins" of the creditors is first scheduled to be beld under
section 341 (a), if the debtor Was reQuired to file a tax return under ap.plicaqle nonbankrqptcy law, the debtor shall
tile with 'mprQpriate tax authorities all tax returns for all taxable periods endini durini the 4-year period eodina on
the date of the fjljna of the petition.
(h) 'I) Subject to para~aph (2) if the tax returns required by subsection (I) have not beeD filed by the date on

which the meeting of creditors is first scheduled to be held under section 341(1), the trustee may hold QPen that

meetini for a reasonable period oftime to allow the debtor an additional period of time to file any UUfi1ed returns,

but such additional period of time shall not extend beYQnd-

(A) for any return that is past due as oftbe date of the filing of the petition. the date that is 120 days after the
date of that meetin2' or
"
cal for any return thatis not Past due as of the date of the filing oftbe petition the later of-G) the date that is 120 days after the date of that meetin&; Of
(ij) the date Qn which the return is due under the last automatic extension of time for filiuS that return to wbich
the debtor is entitled, and for which request is timely made in accordance with 11lpljcable DQnbanlqgptcy law.
(2) After nQtice and I hanOi. and Qrder· entered before the tQUini Qf any agplicable filini period deteanined
under this subsection if the debtor demonstrates by a prepond.erance of the evidence that the failure to file a return
as required under this subsection is attributable to circumstances beyond the control of the 'debtor. the cOUrt
extend the filing period established by the trustee under this subsection for-(A) a period Qrnot more than 30 days for returns descnDed in paragraph (1); and
(B) a" period not to extend after the applicable extended due date for a return described in paragraph (2).

may "

.

.

(~ For pUrposes of this section; 'the teon "return" includes a "return prepared pursuant to subsection (I) or (b) of
section 6020 ofthe Internal Revenue Code Qf 1986. Qr a similar State or local law, or a written stipulatiQn to a
judament or a final order entered by a Donbaokmptcy tribunal.

SUBCHAPTER n - THE PLAN"

§ 1321. Filing of plan

The debtor shall file a plan.
§ 1322. Contents of plan

(a) The plan shall- '

(1) provide for the submission of all or such portion offuture earnings or other future income of the debtor to the
supervision and control of the trustee as is necessary for the execution of the plan;
(2) provide for the full payment,in deferred cash payments, of all claims entitled to priority under section 507 of
this. title, unless the holder of a particular claim agrees to a different treatment of such claim;-eBfi
(3) if the plan classifies claims, provide the same treatment for each claim within a particular clas~aw1

(4) notwithstanding any other provision'of this section, a plan may provide for less than fuU payment of all
amounts owed for a claim entitled to priQrityunder section 507(a)(l)03) only if the plan prQyjdes that all of the
debtors prQjected disposable income fQr a 5-year period beginning Qn the date that the first payment is due under
the plan will be SUWlied to make payments under the plan.

(b) Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this sectiQn, the plan may-(1) designate a class or classes of unsecured claims, as provided in section 1122 of this title, but may not
discriminate unfairly against any class so designated; however, such plan may treat claims for a consumer debt of
the debtor if an individual is liable on such consumer debt with the debtor differently than other unsecured claims;
(2) modify the rights ofholders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real
property that is the debtor's principal residence, or of holders ofunsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of
holders of any class of claims;
(3) provide for the curing or waiving of any default;
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(4) provide for payments on any unsecured claim to be made concurrently with payments on ~y secured claim or
any other unsecured claim;
(5) notwithstanding paragraph (2) ofthis subsection, provide for the curing of any default within a reasonable
time and maintenance ofpayments while the case is pending on any unsecured claim or secured claim on which the
last payment is due after the clate on which the final payment under the plan' is due;
.
(6) provide for the payment of all or any part afany claim allowed under section 1305 of this title;
(7) subject to section 365 of this title, provide for the assumption, rejection, or assignment of any executory

contract or unexpired lease ofthe debtor not previously rejected under such section;
(8) provide for the payment of all or part ofa claim against the debtor from property of the estate or property of
the debtor;
(9) provide for the vesting ofproperty ofthe estate, on confrrmation of the plan or at a later time, in the debtor or
in any other entity;-aftEi
.
(10) provide for the payment of interest accruin~ after the date of the filin~ Qf the petition on ynsecured claims
that are nondiscbargeable under section 1328(a), except that such interest may be paid only to the extent that the
debtor has disposable income ayajlable to pay such interest after makin~ provisjon for full payment of all allowed
claims: and
--!l.UJnclude any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with this title.
(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b)(2) and applicable nonbanlauptcy law..(1) a default with respect to, or that gave rise to, a lien on the debtor's principal residence may be cured under
paragraph'(3) or (5) ofsubsection (b) until such residence is sold at a forecloSlire sale that is conducted in'
accordance with applicable nonbanlauptcy law; and
.
(2) in a case in which the last payment on the original payment schedule for a claim'secured orily by a security
date on which the"final payment
interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is due before
under the plan is due, the plan may provide for the payment the claim as modified pursuant to section 1325(a)(5)
of ~is title.
'

of

the

(d) +kef1) If the Current monthly inCOme of the debtor and the debtor's spouse combined, when multipUed hy 12, is
not less than--'
(A) in the case of a debtor in a household of 1 person: the median family income of the ap.p1icable State for 1
earner:
(B) in the case ofa debtor in a household of2 3, or4 individuals: the hi&hest median family income of the
applicable State for a family of the same number Of fewer individuals; or
(0 in the case ofa debtor in a household exceeding 4 individuals, the highest median family inQQme of the
a~1jcable State for a family of4 or fewer individuals: plus $525 per month for each indiyjdual in excess of 4,
~ plan may not provide for payments over a period that is leBger thELfl three is lODier than 5 years·
(2) If the CUrrent monthly income of the debtor and the debtor's spouse combined, when multiplied by 12 is less
~

(A) in tbe case of a debtor in a household of 1 person, the median family income of the ill1plicable State for 1
amm:;.
(B) in the case ora debtor in a household of2: 3, or 4 individuals, the highest niedian family income Qftbe
ap,plicable State for a family of the same number or fewer individuals: or
eel in the case ofa debtor in a household exceeding 4 individuals, the highest median family income of the
applicable State for a family of4 or fewer individuals. plus $525 per month for each individual in exCesS of4:
the plan may not provide for payments oyer a period that is longer than 3 years, unless the court, for cause, approves

a longer period, but the court may not approve a period that is longer than fi¥e~ years.
(e) Notwithstanding subsection (b)(2) of this section and sections 506(b) and 1325(a)(5) of this title, ifit is proposed
in a plan to cure a default, the amount necessary to cure the default, shall be determined in accordance with the
underlying agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy law.

CD A plan may not materially alter the tenus of a loan described in section 362(b)(19) and anY amounts required to
nway such loan shall not constitute "disposable income" under section 1325.
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§ 1323. Modification of plan before confirmation
(a) The'debtor may modify the plan at any time before confirmation, but may not modify the plan so that the plan as
modified fails to meet the requirements of section 1322 of this title.
(b) After the debtor files a modification under this section, the plan as modified becomes the plan.

(c) Any holder of a secured claim that has accepted or rejected the plan is deemed to have accepted or rejected, as
the case may be, the plan as modified, unless the modification provides for a change in the rights of such holder
from what such rights were under the plan before modification, and such holder changes such holder's previous
acceptance. or rejection.

§ 1324. Confirmation bearing
Aitef(a) Except as prOvided in subsection (12) and after notice, the court shall hold a hearing on confumation of the
plan. A party in interest may object to confirmation of the plan.
(b) The bearin& on confbmation of the· plan may be held not earlier than 20 days and not later thau'4s days after' the .
date of the meeting ofcreditors under section 341 (I). unless the court determines that it would be in the best
interests Of the creditors and the estate to hold sucb hearin& at an earlier date and there is DO objection to such earlier

~'

§ 1325. Confirmation of plan
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm a plan if-(1) the plan complies with the provisions of this chapter and with the other applicable provisions of this title;
(2) any fee, charge, or amount required under chapter 123 of title 28, or by the plan, to be paid bef<?re
confirmation, has been paid;
(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means' forbidden by law;'
(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, ofproperty to be distributed under the plan on account of each
allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor
were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date;
. (5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan-(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B) (i) the plan provides that:
- -....
<0=.,,10 the holder of such claim retain the lien securing such claim yntil the earlier of(al) the payment oithe underlyjn& debt deteanined under DonbAnkmptcy law' or
Q?b) discharge linder section 1328: and
(II) if the case under this chapter is dismissed or converted WithQut cQmpletion Qfthe plan, such lien shall
also be retained by such holder to the extent recQiDized by iWplicable nonbankrqptey law; and
(ii) the value, as of the effective date ofthe plan, ofproperty to be distributed under the plan on account Qf
such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such claim; md
(iii) if-pmperty to be distributed pursuant to this subsection is in the fonn ofperiQdic payments, such payments
shall be in egual monthly amounts: and
(10 the holder of the claim is secured by personal PrQpertY, the amount ofsuch payments shall not be less
than an amount sufficient to provide to the holder of such claim adequate protection during the periQd of the plan: or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such holder;-aB8:
(6) the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to comply with the plan~
(7) the action of the debtor in filing the petition was in good faith:
(8) the debtor bas paid all amounts that are required to be paid under a domestic SUDport oblifmtion and that first
become payable after the date oftbe filini of the petition if the debtor is reQyired by a judicial Qr administrative

a)

order or by statute to pay such domestic support obli~ation; and
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(9) the debtor has filed all a:gpUcable Federal State and local tax returns as reQllired bY section 1308.
FQr purposes Qfpam~ph (5), section 506 shall Dot a;gply to I clajm described in that para~ jfthe creditor bas a
purchase money security interest securina the debt that is the subjeet Qfthe claim, the debt Was incurred within the
91 Q-day precedini the date of the flUnK of the petition, and the collateral for that debt cQnsists Qf a motor vehicle (as
defined in section 30102 oftjtIe 49) acquired for the persQnal use Qfthe debtQt Of if collateral for that debt consists
aeMY Qther thina ofya1ue. if the debt was incurred during the I-year periQd precedina that filing.
(b) (1) If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the cQnfrrmation of the plan, then the
court may not approve the plan uDless, as of the effective date of the plan-(A) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the
amount of such claim; or
(B) the plan provides that all of the debtor's projected disposable income to be received in the tffi:eeyeafapplicable commitment period beginning on the date that the fIrst payment is due under the plan will be applied
to make'payments to unsecured creditors under the plan.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, the tenD "disposable income" means current monthly income v.taiell is
reeeh,ceEl By tlie seater ettEl '.'/meh is ftetreceiyed by the debtor (.other than child SJUlport pl,VtDents. foster care
Pl)'ll'lMts. Of disability payments for a demendent child made in accordance with applicable nonbankn;lptey law to
the extent reasonably necessItY to be expended for such child) lesS amounts r~asona"ly n~cessary t~ b~ expe~ded- ,.
(A)(U for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor, iftellolsiagor for a dOmestic " .'
slij1port obligatiQn, that first becomes PCWb1e after the date the petitiQn is filed; and
Gi) for charitable contributions (that meet the definition of "charitable contribution" unde~ section 548 (d)(3)1
to a qualified religious Qr charitable entity or organization (as that tenT1 is defmed in section 548(d)(4)) in'an amourit
not to exceed 15 percent of-the gross income of the debtor for the year in'which the contributions are made; and
(B) if the debtor is engaged in business, for the payment ofexpenditures necessary for the continuation,"
preservation, and operation of such ~usiness. '
'
. (3) Amounts reasonably necessaxy to be expended under parasmph (2) shall be detQunined in accordance wjth
Subpammphs CA) and (a) ofsectiQn 7Q7(b)(2), iftbe debtor has current mQnthly income. when multiplied by 12,
pterthan-CAl in the case' of a debtQr in a household 1 person, the median family income of the awlicable.State for 1

Qf

earner:
(B) in tbe case of a dftbtor in a household of 2 3 or 4 individuals, the highest median family incOlU¥ of the
applicable State for a family Of the Same number or fewer individuals: Of
.
'
,
(C) in the case Qfa debtor in ahousebold exceeding 4 individuals. the highest median family income of the
ap.plicable State for a family of4 Of fewer indjyic1uaJs~ plus $525 per month for each individual in excess Qf4
(4) For purposes of this subsectioD, the "ap,pJicable commitment periodu Cal sybject to subparamwh (B), shall be-(0 3 years: or
.
.
GD not less than 5 years. if the cummt monthly incQme of the debtor and the debtots spouse cQmbined. when

Inultjplied by 12. is nQt less than-in the case of I debtor in a household Qf 1 person, the median family income Qf the a~licable State for 1

a)

a;gplicable State for a family of the same number or fewer individuals: or
all) in the case of a debtor in a household exceeding 4 individuals, the highest Inedian family income of the
applicable State for a family Qf 4 Of fewer individuals, plus $525 per month for each individual in excess of 4: and
(]3) roM' be less than 3 or 5 years,wbicbever is aRplicable under subparaiTaph (A), butonlv if the plan provides
for payment in full Qf all allowed unsecured claims over a ShQrtef period.

(c) After confinnatiQn Qf a plan, the court may order any entity from whom the debtor receives income to pay all or
any part of such income to the trustee.
§ 1326. Payments
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a:,.

(a) (1) Unless the court orders otherwise, the debtor shall connnence makingthe-payments proposed af)lan
'.vithia 30 says after ihe fJlaa is fUeQnot later than 30 days after the date of the filing of the plan or the Qrder for
relief whichever is earlier in the amount-(A) pro.posed by the plan to the trustee:
(8) scheduled in a lease ofpersQnal pmpettv directly to the lessor for that portion of the Qbligation that becomes
due after the order for reliet: reducini the payments under subpara&mph (Al by the amount so paid and provjdina
the tnJstee with evidence ofsygb payment. jncludin2 the amount and date ofpayment; and
(cl that provides adeQJll1:e protection directly to a creditor hQldiD2 an allowed claim secured· by Personal
propem to the extent the claim is attributable to the purchase of such prQperty by the debtor for tbatportion Qfthe
obJj~ation that becQmes due after the order fQr relief: reducing the payments under sub.para~ph CAl by the amount
SQ paid and providing the trustee with evidence Qf such payment. includin2 the amount and date Qfpayment.
(2) A payment made under tBis sDBseetioeparnWlph (I)(A) shall be retained by the trustee until confirmation or
denial of confumation-eHrplaa. If a plan is confirmed, the trustee shall distribute any such payment in accordance
with the plan as soon as .i1.practicable. If a plan is not confumed) the trustee shall return any such paymestpayments
not previously paid and not yet due and owina to creditors pursuant to parAwwh (3) to the debtor, after deducting
any unpaid claim allowed under section S03(b) oftfiis title.
(3) SuQject to section 363 the court may. upon notice and a hearins. modify. increase or reduce the payments
required under this subsection pending cooftmlation of a plan.
.
(4) NQt later than 60 days after the date Qf filini Qf a case under this chapter' a 'debtor retaining poSseSsion of
personal property subject to a lease or securing a claim attributable in whole or in part to the purchase price Qf such
pro.perty shall prQvide the lessQr or secured creditor teas'Qoable evidence of the maintenance of any reqyjred
insurance coverage with respect to the use or ownership of such property and continue to dQ SQ for So toni as the
debtor retaitis pQssessiofl ofsuch propm,y.
(b) Before or at the time of ~ch payment to creditors under the plan, there shall be paid·(1) any unpaid claim of the kind specified in section 507(a)(f.') of this title;'(2) if a standing trustee appointed under section S86(b) of title 28 is serving in the case, the percentage fee fixed

for such standing trustee' under section 586(e)(1)(B) of title ~~
(3) if a Chapter 7 trustee has been allowed compensation due tQ the conversion or dismissal of the debtor's prior

case 'pursuant to section 707(9), and some portion Qf that compensation remains unpaid in a case converted to this
chapter Of in the case dismissed under section 7Q7(b) and refiled under this chapter the amotmt of any such unpaid
compensation, which shall be paid monthly-. .
. (A) by prorating sucb amount Over the remaining duration of the plan: and
(B) by mQnthly payments Dot to exceed the &reater of-U)$25;or
.
liD the alDQUDt payable to unsecured nonpriority creditors as provided by the plan. multiplied by 5 percent,
and the result divided by the mlmber of months in the plan.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in the plan or in the order confIrming the plan, the trustee shall make payments to
creditors under the plan.
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title-(1) COl'npensatiQD referred to in subsection (2)(3) is payable and may be collected by the trustee under that

Paragraph. even if such amount has been discbar&ed in a prior case under this title: and
(2) such compensation is PAYable in a case under this chapter only to the extent permitted by subsection (12)(3).

§ 1327. Effect of confirmation
(a) The provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor and each creditor, whether or not the claim of such creditor is
provided for by the plan, and whether or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in the plan or the order confirming the plan, the confimation of a plan vests all of
the property ofthe estate in the debtor.
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(c) Except as otherwise provided in the plan or in the order confirming the plan, the property vesting in the debtor
under subsection (b) of this section is free and clear of any claim or interest of any creditor provided for by the plan.

§ 1328. Discharge
(a) AsSubject to subsection (d). as soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments under the plan,..
and in the case of a debtor who is reQ.Jiired by a judicial or administrative order, or by statute, to pay a domestic
sypport obligation. after such debtor certifies that all amounts payable under such order or such statute that are due
on or before the date of the certification (includin2 amounts due before the petition was filed, but only to the extent
provided for by the plan) have been paid unless the court approves a written waiver of discharge executed by the
debtor after the order for reliefunder this chapter, the court shall grant the debtor a discharge ofall debts provided
for by the plan or disallowed under section 502 of this title, except any debt-(1) provided for under section 1322(b)(5) oftl:lis title;
(2) of the kind specified in section SQ7(a)(8)(C) or in paragraph (l)(B). (1)(.C), (2), (3). (4), (5), (8), or (9) of
section 523(&) Eer a'2J(a:)(9)] efthis ti~e; SF';'
(3) for restitution, or a criminal fme, included in a sentence on the debtor.!.~s conviction of a crime~
(4) for restitution, or damaaes, awarded in a civil action. aaainst the debtor as a result of wjllful or malicious injury
by the debtor that caused personal injUO' to an indjvidilal or the death of an indiyidual.··
.,
(b) MSubject to .subsection (;1). at any time after the confirmation of the plan and after notice and a hearing, the .

Court may grant a discharge to a debtor that has not completed payments under the plan only if-

(1) the debtor's failure to complete such payments is due to circumstances for which the debtor shoUld not justly
be held accountable;
(2) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, ofproperty actually distributed under the plan on account of each
allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would have been paid on such claim if the estate of the
de~tor had been liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date;
(3) modification oftl;1e plan under section. 1329 of this title is not practicable.

and

.

(c) A discharge granted under subsection (b) of this section discharges the de~tor from all unsecured debts provided
for by the plan or disallowed under section' 502 of this title,'except any debt-(1) provided for under section 1322(b)(5) of this title; or
(2) ofa kind specified in section 523(a) of this title.
(d). Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a discharge granted under this section does riot discharge
the debtor from any debt based on an allowed claim filed under section 1305(a)(2) of this title ifprior approval by
the trustee of the debtor's incurring such debt was practicable and was not obtained.

(e) On request of a PartY in interest before one year after a discharge under this section is granted, and after notice
and a hearing, the court may revoke such discharge only if-(1) such discharge was obtained by the debtor through fraud; and
(2) the requesting party did not know of such fraud until after such discharge was granted.
(f) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (12), the court shall not grant a discharge of all debts provided for in the pIan
under section 502. if the debtor has received a discharge.
(1) in a case filed UDder chapter 7. II or 12 oftbjs title durina the +year period precedipi the date oithe order
for relief under this chapter. or
(2) in a gase tiled under chapter 13 of this title duUne the 2-year period precediua the date of such order
Of disallowed

(g) (1) The court shall not mnt a discharge under this section to a debtor unless after filing a petition the debtor bas
cOllm1eted an instructional course concernin& personal financial manaiement described in section 111.
.
(2) Parampb (1) shall not ap.ply with respect to a debtor who is a person described in section lQ9(h)(4) or whQ
resides in a district for which the United States trustee (or the bankruptcy acbninistrator, if any) deteonines that the
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aWfoyed ipstructional courses are not adequate to service the additional individuals who would otherwise be./
reqyired to complete sUCh instnlctional course by reaSOD of the requirements ofparafWWh (I).
(3) The United States trustee (Qr the bankruptcy ad11?-inistratof, if any) who makes a determination described in
paraiGPb (2) shall review such detenninatioQ not later than 1 year after the date of such cietenninatiOD. and not lesS
fteQ.llent!y than annualLY thereafter.
(b) The court may not 2Jllnt a discbari<f under this chapter unless the court after notice and a heariDi held not more
than 1Q days before the date of the ento' of the order grantinfl the discharGe finds that there is no reasonable cause to
believe that-(1) section 522(.q)(1) may be 3Dplicable to the debtor: and
(2) there is pendin~ any proceeding in which the debtor may be found guilty of a felony oithe kjnd descnbed in
section 522(g)(1)(A) Qf liable for a debt ofthe kind described in section 522(g)(I)(B).

§ 1329. Modification of plan after confirmation
(a) At any time after confirmation ofthe plan but before the completion ofpayments under such plan, the plan may
be modified, upon request of the debtor, the trustee, or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim, to(1) increase or reduce the amount'ofpayments on claims of a particular class provide~ for by the plan; :
(2) extend or reduce the time for such payments;-er
.
"
(3) alter the amount of the distribution to a creditor whose claim is provided for by the plan to the extent necessary
to take account of any payment of such claim otherthan under the plan;..m:
,(4) reduce amounts to be paid under the plan by the actual amount expended by the debtor to purchase health
insurance for the debtor (and for any dependent of the debtor if such dependent does not othelwise have health
insurance coverage.) if the debtor dOcuments the cost of such insurance and demonstrates that--

CAl such eXPMses are reasonlble and necessary;
(B) (i) jftbe debtor previously paid for health insurance, the amount is not materially laraer than the cost the
debtor previously pajd or the cost necessary to maintain the lapsed policy' or
(in if the debtor did not have health insurance the amount is not'materially laraer than the reasonable cost that
would be incuued by a debtor who purchases health insurance, who bas similar income, expenses, lic, and health
status, and who liyes in the same geo~icallocationwith the same number of dependents whQ do not otherwise
have health insurance coverage: and
(Q the amount is not otherwise allowed forpu[poses ofdetepninin~dispoSable income under section 1325(b)
of this title:
and upon request of any party in interest files proof that a health i9surance policy was purchased.
(b) (1) Sections 1322(a), 1322(b), and 1323(c) of this title and the requirements of section 1325(a) of this title apply
to any modification under subsection (a) of this section.
(2) The plan as modified becomes the plan unless, after notice and a hearing, such modification is disapproved.

(c) A plan modified under this section may not provide for payments over a period that expires after three }'eafs!bst.
a;gplicable commiUllent period under section 1325(h)(1)(B) after the time that the fll'St payment under the original
confumed plan was due, unless the court, for cause, approves a longer period, but the court may not approve a
period that expires afterfive years after such time.

§ 1330. Revocation of an order of confirmation
(a) On request ofa party in interest at any time within 180 days after the date of the entry of an order of
confirmation under section 1325 of this title, and after notice and a hearing, the court may revoke such order if such

order was procured by fraud.
(b) If the court revokes an order of confirmation under subsection (a) of this section, the court shall dispose of the
case under section 1307 of this title, unless, within the time fixed by the court, the debtor proposes and the court
confirms a modification of~e plan under section 1329 of this title.
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GUC's?

>--------------No-------------t~

Yes

Is the collateral a
"motor vehicle" per 49
USC 30102(a)(6)?

No

>------No-----..

Yes

No
Yes

Yes

>-----No-----...

Yes

Yes -----~- ..
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NEW DEFINITION OF WHO MAY BE A DEBTOR:
New § 109 (attached)
•

§109(a) - no changes

•

§109(b) - minor changes - foreign banks and certain foreign insurance
companies can be debtors

•

§109(c) - (e) - no changes

•

§ 109(f) - family fishermen can now file chapter 12 bankruptcy

• § 109{g) - no changes
•

§109(h) - entirely new section

•

§ 109(h)(1) - individual cannot be a debtor unless they have received a

briefing from an approved nonprofit credit counseling agency within 180
days prior to filing bankruptcy_ This counseling:
~

must outline available credit counseling

~

must assist the individual in analyzing their budget

~

can be in a group setting

~

can be by telephone

»

can be over the internet

•

§109(h)(2)(A) - there is an exception if the US Trustee or SA declare that
no agency in the district is able to provide adequate counseling

•

§109(h)(2){B) -- The US Trustee or SA approves the agencies and must
review their approvals annually, but may disapprove an agency at any
time.

•

§109(h){3){A) - Short term exception if debtor files a certification:
~

showing exigent circumstances exist that merit waiver, or

»

showing that debtor requested but was not able to obtain
counseling for 5 days after the request was made, and

~

that is satisfactory to the court

1
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•

§109(h)(3)(B) -If debtor uses the above short term exception, they still
must comply and get the counseling within 30 days (or 45 with a court
ordered extension) after filing for bankruptcy

•

§109(h)(4) - the only real exception is if, after notice and a hearing, the
court determines that the debtor is:

»

so incapacitated that they cannot make rational decisions regarding
finances, or

»

so disabled they are unable to receive the counseling in person, by
phone or over the internet, or

»

in active duty in a military combat zone

NEW NOTICING PROVISIONS:
New §342 (attached)
•

§342(a) - no change -- notice of entry of order for relief

•

§342(b) - before case is filed, clerk has to give notice of chaptersincluding:

»

the purpose, benefits and costs of proceeding under each chapter

»

the types of services that are available from credit counseling
agencies

~

warning that false statements or concealing assets is grounds for a
fine or imprisonment or both

»

warning that all information "supplied by a debtor" in a case may
be examined by the Attorney General

•

§342(c)(1) - if notice is required to be given "by the debtor" to a creditor,
the notice must contain the debtor name, address and last 4 digits of the
SSN

•

§342(c)(2) - if creditor sends 2 notices during 90 days prior to bankruptcy
with account number and with address which creditor requests to receive
correspondence, then any notice required to be sent "by the debtor"
must be sent to this address and must include the account number
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•

§342(c)(2) - if creditor can't send 2 notices during 90 days prior to
bankruptcy due to nonbankruptcy law, then last 2 notices before the 90
days must be reviewed to see if they have an account number and an
address which creditor requests to receive correspondence at, then any
notice required to be sent "by the debtor" must be sent to this address
and must include the account number

•

§342(c)(2) - if the notice is due to an amendment adding a creditor, "the
debtor" must include the full SSN in the notice sent to the creditor, but
must include only the last 4 digits of the SSN in the copy filed with the
court.

•

§342(d) - If the debtor "flunks" the "means test , then, not later than 10
days after the Ch. 7 petition is filed, the clerk's office must send notice to
all creditors that it is presumed that the debtor is abusing the bk laws by
filing chapter 7.

•

§342(e) -In a 7 or 13, a creditor may at any time file a notice with the
court and debtor of an address to be used for the creditor in that case.

n

)- Six days later, the court and debtor/debtor's attorney must be

using the new address for mailings.
•

§342(f) - Creditor can give any court a preferred address(es) to use for
noticing including a specific subdivision and/or a specific person's
attention
)- Address can be national for all notices and all bk courts

»

Address can be regional for notices in that area

)- Address can be by district/court for cases filed in that area
•

31 days later, notices must go to correct address(es)

•

Specific case addresses trump a national/regional/etc.
address

•

Version 2.7 is changing CM/ECF so that when a party pulls
up a creditor list, the system will check with the BNC to see if
there is a preferred address on file and a pdf document will
be returned momentarily with address labels with the correct
addresses substituted (except for case specific ones). The
BNe's computer will do a comparison, and, If in doubt, the
notice goes to both the address provided by the debtor and
the preferred address.

3
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~

When a preferred address request is made to our court, we will
either direct the creditor to the BNC website or phone number or we
will forward the request to the BNC.

)- The creditor will be able to sign up directly on-line at the BNC
website.
)- Once the BNC is aware of the request, they will contact the creditor
regarding electronic noticing alternatives (EBN)
~

Available EBN alternatives include EDt (the BNC computer talks to
the creditor computer). Also, a-mail or fax noticing are available.

•

§342(f) - The creditor can withdraw the preferred address

•

§342(g) - If debtor or the court sends a notice and it doesn't comply with
creditor request, then it is ineffective until brought to creditor's attention.
~

Until the specific person or subdivision designated receives the
notice, it will not have been brought to the creditor's attention.

»

What are the consequences if the notice is ineffective?
•

If it is a notice that an order for relief has been entered, the
creditor can violate the automatic stay without fear of any
monetary penalties.

•

For other notices, §342 is silent as to the consequences.

New FRBP 2002(g) is effective 12/1/05 (attached)
•

FRBP 2002(9)(1):

»

2002 notices must be addressed as last requested in the case by
the entity

»»

A proof of claim is a request unless it is filed in a no-asset case

~

•

A proof of interest filed by an equity security holder is a request
Other than those two listed items, it is unclear in both the code and
the amended FRBP what exactly constitutes a request

FRBP 2002(g)(2) - If no request is made, then notice will be sent to
creditor as listed on the creditor matrix or debtor's schedules (whichever
is filed later) or as listed on the list of equity security holders.

4
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•

FRBP 2002(g)(3) - notice will be sent to both the legal representative of
an infant or incompetent as listed in schedules and to the requested
address unless the legal representative is the one who made the address
change request.

•

§342(g)(4) - The entity and an AD approved notice provider (BNC) can
agree as to where and how notice will be supplied and that will be the
proper means to provide notice.
~

Even if the BNC then doesn't use the agreed upon procedure
(such as a form of EBN), the notice is not invalidated.

NOTE: The Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules has determined that the
Act and the rule changes are different and can co-exist (5/10-11/05 Bankruptcy

Noticing Working Group minutes)

NEW DEBTOR (DEBTOR ATTORNEY) DUTIES:
New §521 (attached)
•

§521(a)(1) - Debtor must file the following:

»
»

a list of creditors,

a schedule of assets and liabilities,

)- a schedule of current income and expenses,
~

a statement of financial affairs, and

»

if debtor is an individual with primarily consumer debts, a certificate
showing:
•

that the attorney/petition preparer delivered the §342(b)
Clerk's Notice (ra: available chapters, etc.) to the debtor,

or
•

if pro se, that the debtor received the §342(b) Clerk's Notice
and read it

~

copies of all payment "advices" or other evidence of payment by all
employers of debtor for 60 days prior to filing date

~

an itemized statement showing calculations of monthly net income

G- 67

5

~

a statement disclosing any expected increase in income or increase
in expenses during 12 months after bankruptcy is filed

•

§521 (a)(2)(A) - if an individual's schedules show debts of any kind (used
to be just consumer), which are secured by property of the estate, the
debtor must file a statement of his intention with regard to the property by
the 341 meeting or within 30 days after filing (whichever is earlier)

•

§521 (a)(2)(8) - by 30 days after the "date first set" for the meeting of
creditors (or longer if request is made and granted prior to 30 days
expiring), debtor must perform his stated intentions

•

§521 (a)(2)(C) - Debtors and trustees still retain their rights with regard to
the property, but automatic stay is terminated if debtor fails to perform the
above 2 steps unless:
~

»

the trustee proves the property has consequential value to the
estate and adequate protection is provided to the creditor, or
the debtor tries to reaffirm and the creditor refuses

•

§521 (a)(3) - debtor must cooperate with trustee or auditor (if appointed) to
enable them to perform their duties

•

§521 (a)(4) - debtor must turnover all records, documents and papers
relating to the estate to a trustee or auditor (if appointed) regardless of
whether immunity has been granted

•

§521 (a)(5) - debtor must appear at a discharge hearing (if held) and at a
hearing regarding entering into a Reaffirmation Agreement (if debtor is pro
se)

•

§521 (a)(6) - debtor must turnover any personal property secured by a
PMSI within 45 days after the meeting of creditors (code doesn't indicate
if it is the date first set or the conclusion) unless they have entered into
a reaffirmation agreement or redeemed the property. If debtor fails to act
within the 45 days, then the stay is terminated unless the trustee proves
the property has consequential value to the estate and adequate
protection is provided to the creditor.

•

§521 (a)(7) - unless a trustee has been appointed, the debtor must
continue to perform the obligations required of an ERISA administrator for
any employee benefit plan if they or their designee were serving as the
administrator at the time the case was filed.

•

§521 (b) - an individual debtor must file with the court:

6
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•

~

a certificate from the approved credit counseling agency that
describes the services provided to the debtor, and

~

a copy of any debt repayment plan developed during the
counseling

§521 (c) - debtor must file a record of any interest the debtor has in:
)- an education IRA, or

»

a qualified state tuition program

•

§521 (d) -if the debtor fails to timely take any of the actions previously
mentioned, or to assume the lease as referred to in §362(h), then, if the
original lease or agreement entered into by the debtor contains a clause
that states that filing bankruptcy is a default under the lease/agreement,
then nothing in this subsection limits the enforcement of such a provision.

•

§521(e)(1) - states that creditor can get copies of petition, schedules, etc.

•

§521 (e)(2)(A) - at least 7 days prior to the "date first set" for the meeting
of creditors, a debtor must give:
)-

the trustee a copy of the most recent income tax return that the
debtor filed prior to filing bankruptcy or a transcript of the return,
and

»

at the same time, must give a copy of the return/transcript to any
creditor who has requested one

•

§521 (e)(2)(B) - case will be dismissed if debtor doesn't provide tax
return/transcript to trustee unless it is due to circumstances beyond the
debtor's control

•

§521 (e)(2)(C) - case will be dismissed if debtor doesn't prOVide tax
return/transcript to requesting creditor at same time it is provided to
trustee unless it is due to circumstances beyond the debtors control

•

§521 (e)(3) - within 5 days of a request by a creditor, court must provide a
copy of the Ch. 13 plan for a reasonable cost

•

§521 (f)(1) - (3) - in all cases (except Ch. 12), at the request (not

automatically) of the court, the US Trustee, or any party in interest, the
debtor must file with the court:

»

each federal income tax return/transcript required by applicable
law and filed with the taxing authority for each tax year that ends
while a case is pending.
G- 69
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•

~

each federal income tax return/transcript required by applicable
law for each tax year that ended 3 years prior to bankruptcy which
had not been filed before the bankruptcy but is filed with the taxing
authority during the bankruptcy.

~

any amendments to the above tax returns

§521 (f)(4) - a Ch. 13 debtor must file a statement under penalty of perjury
of the income and expenses from the tax year just ended, and a statement
of monthly income showing how month income and expenses were
calculated within:
~

90 days after the first tax year ends (or up to 1 year after the case
is filed if there has been no plan confirmed yet), and

»

annually, after the plan is confirmed, until the case is closed
•

•

The annual statements must be filed 45 days before the
anniversary of the confirmation date.

§521(g)(1) - the statements referred to above must disclose:
)- the amount and sources of income
~

the identity of persons who are also responsible for the support of
any dependent of the debtor

»

the identity of any person who contributed to the household in
which the debtor resides and the amount they contributed

•

§521 (g)(2) - the tax returns/transcripts, amended returns/transcripts, and
statements referred to above can be inspected and copied by the US
Trustee or SA, the trustee, and any party in interest subject to privacy
limitations

•

§521 (h) - if requested by US Trustee or trustee, a debtor must provide
documentation establishing their identity

•

§521(i)(1) - if the debtor does not file the documentation required by
§521(a)(1) within 45 days, on the 46th day, the case will be automatically
dismissed without following the normal §707(a) procedure of having notice
and a hearing first

•

§521 (i)(2) - even though the case was automatically dismissed, any party
in interest may request that an Order of Dismissal be entered and the
court must do so within 5 days of the request
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•

§521 (i)(3) - if the debtor requests an extension before the 45 days have
expired, the court may grant the debtor up to an additional 45 days to file
the required documents if it is justified

•

§521 (i)(4) - if a trustee files a motion requesting that the case not be
dismissed before the 45 days have expired, the court, after notice and a
hearing, may decline to dismiss the case if:
;.. the court finds the debtor made a good faith attempt to provide the
documents. and

»

it is in the best interest of the creditors to administer the case

•

§521 0)( 1) - if the debtor doesn't stay current on filing tax
returns/extensions that become due after the bankruptcy is filed, the
taxing authority can request that the case be converted or dismissed

•

§521 (j)(2) - if the debtor still isn't current on filing tax returns/extensions
within 90 days after the taxing authority requests dismissal or conversion,
the court will determine what is in the best interest of the creditors and
then convert or dismiss the case

NEW US TRUSTEE AND CASE TRUSTEE DUTIES:
New §704 (attached)
•

§704(a)(1) - (9) - Unchanged

•

§704(a)(10) - if someone has a claim against the debtor for domestic
support obligations, the trustee must provide a detailed notice. (the
requirements for this notice are described further down in the
materials under §704(c»

•

§704(a)(11) -- the trustee must perform the obligations required of an
ERISA administrator for any employee benefit plan if the debtor or a
designee of the debtor was serving as the administrator at the time the
case was filed.

•

§704(a)(12) - if the debtor is a health care business that is closing, the
trustee must use their best efforts to transfer patients to an alternate

health care facility that:

»
»

is in the vicinity of the one closing, and
provides substantially similar services, and

9
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SUPPLEMENTAL HANDOUTS

SECTIONG

BEVERLY M. BURDEN

DISPOSABLE INCOME - COMPARISON OF SOME "REASONABLY NECESSARY" EXPENSES UNDER BAPCPA
© Beverly M. Burden
TENTATIVE DRAFT - SUBJECT TO CHANGE

5/17/05
ifthe debtor's "Current Monthly Income"
is less than Median Family Income?

ifthe debtor's "Current Monthly Income"
is more than Median Family Income?

(applying present case law ofthe 6th
Circuit and local bankruptcy court rulings,
which presumably will continue to be
controlling the absence ofstatutory
amendments)

(applying § 707(b)(2) "means test"
expenses as required under amended §
1325(b)(3))

charitable contributions

yes (with limits)

unclear, but arguably no

401K loan repayment

no

yes

payment on debt secured by "luxury"
collateral (ATV, boat, Mercedes, etc.)

no

unclear, but arguably yes

college tuition for a child over 18

possibly (depending on circumstances)

no

private school for child under 18

possibly (depending on circumstances)

no more than $1,500 per year

Can these expenditures be deducted in
determining the debtor's disposable income

...

Is the debt a PMSI?

" > - - - - - - - - - - - - N o - - - - - - - - - - -...

Yes

Is the collateral a
"motor vehicle" per 49
USC 30102(a)(6)?

No

Is the collateral "any
other thing of value"?

>-----No---....

Yes

as the motor vehi
acquired for the
personal use of the
debtor?

Yes

No

Yes

as the debt incurre
within 910 days
receding the petition
date?

Was the debt incurred
within 1 year preceding
the petition date?

..

>-----No--~

Yes

Y e s - - - - - -.......

ection 506 does no
apply to determine
amount of secured
daim.

"Cram-down" (as to
valuation of collateral)
under section 506 is
allowed.

,IU.S .c. j I 0 (

.

Prelimin~ Draft -- Subject to Revision

(13A) The term "debtor's principal residence"-(A) means a residential structure includine- incidental property. without reiard to whether that structure is
attached to real property: and
- .
(13) includes an indiyjdual condominium or cOQperative unit a mQbile or manufactured home, or trailer.

interest materially adverse to the interest of the esta~e or of any class 0 r~ditors or equity
ason of any direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or ' rest in, the debtor-ef=QB•
•
, .
• Of for any Qtber

collectiD~

the debt'
(IS) The tean "entity" include person, estate, trust, governmental unit, an

(16) The teon "equity sec · " means(A) share in a corporati , whether or not transferable or denominated "stock or similar security; .
(B) interest of a limi
partner· in a limited partnership; or
.
.'(e) 'warrant oi-righ . other than a right to convert, to purchase, sell, or subscribe to share, security, or interest
of a kind specified in ubparagraph (A) or (B) of this paragraph;.:.
(17) The term "e ity security holder" means holder of an equity securitY of'the debtort.
(18) The term" amily farmer" means-.
(A) individ I Of individual and spouse engaged in a farming operation whose aggregate de s do not exceed
$1,500,000
7 00 and not less than 8050 percent ofwhose aggregate noncontingent, liquidate ebts (excluding
a debt for t e principal residence of such individual or such individual and spouse unless such debt .ses out of a
farming eration), on the date the case is filed, arise out of a farming operation owned or operated b uch
indivi al or such individual and spouse, and such individual or such individual and spouse receive fro such .
farm' g operation more than 50 percent ofsuch individual's or such individual and spouse's gross incom for=
i . the taxable year precedin~
,,£,_U1,l~~QIJ~~:..iDla..Jla.JMiltWUJ~lPJ~:.Ql]· ag;,' the taxable year in which the case concerning such
3
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Page 1 .
49 V.S.C.A. § 30102

c
Effective: [See Text Amendments]
United States Code Annotated Currentness
Title 49. Transportation (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle VI. Motor Vehicle and Driver Programs
Part A. General
'9i Chapter 301. Motor Vehicle Safety (Refs & Annos)
"lI Subchapter I. General
...§ 30102. Definitions
(a~ Ge~eraI definitions.--In this

chapter-

n caler" means.-a-peB&n.-setlilrg and dlStributlrig new motor ve·.
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SECTIONH

I.

Introduction

There is no nobler profession than that of the law. 1
Law ... I admire as a science; it becomes tedious and embarrassing only
when it degenerates into a trade. 2
In addition to having to attract and service clients and thereafter generate and collect sufficient fees in
order to simultaneously pay law office overhead expenses and establish an acceptable personal level of
income, attorneys also have extraordinary and oftentimes very far-reaching ethical and professional duties and
responsibilities.

Failure to adequately and appropriately perform these ethical and professional duties and

responsibilities may result in serious adverse consequences. Attorneys have specific professional duties and
responsibilities to provide competent and zealous legal representation and counseling to their clients.
Concomitantly they serve as respectful and vigilant officers of the court. Without proper balance and good
habits in their professional and personal lives, unwary, oblivious, or uncaring attorneys face serious potential
pitfalls and traps (including possible disciplinary action).3
Attorneys who practice in the United States bankruptcy courts ("Bankruptcy Attorneys") are required to
abide by all generally applicable non-bankruptcy model rules and standards of professionalism and ethical
behavior.

Bankruptcy attorneys also must adhere to the requirements and limitations existing under and

imposed by the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code"), the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and applicable
local rules and procedures. Although bad manners, alone, ordinarily will not·trigger professional disciplinary
action, it is axiomatic that certain acts indeed rise to the level of unacceptable professional conduct. For
example, a bankruptcy attorney who exhibits unduly contentious, bellicose, and in your face" advocacy in the .
practice of bankruptcy law, including bad faith or unprofessional conduct during the course of litigation,
discovery, arbitration, and mediation, crosses the boundary line of acceptable standards of conduct.
Bankruptcy courts will not condone or tolerate unprofessional or bad faith conduct or unethical behavior of
attorneys arising out of a case or proceeding under the Code - whether inside or outside of the bankruptcy

1See Alexis De Tocqueville's Democracy in America.
2Gerald T. Dunne, Justice Joseph Story and the Rise of the Supreme Coult p.34 (1970) (citing Letter to Thomas Welch, Oct. 19, 1799, in W.W. Story,
1,83).
3David S. Kennedy and Vanessa A. Lantin, Litigation: Professionalism: Maintaining the Professionalism and Competence of a Lawyer in Bankruptcy
Litigation When Compensation Becomes a Problem and Related Matters, 13 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. NO.5 at 21 (2004).
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courtroom. Bankruptcy courts must vigorously discourage and successfully deter such inappropriate conduct
and behavior.
All attorneys should engage in acceptable ethical and professional behavior at all times and places and
also should demonstrate appropriate competence, stability, and demeanor. 4 Failure to meet these high ethical
and professional standards may result not only in attorney disciplinary proceedings, but also may result in
irreversible damage to an attorney's professional and personal reputation.

Attorney disciplinary actions

include possible disbarment, suspension, censure, reprimand, removal as attorney of record from a particular
case or proceeding, and disgorgement or reduction of fees and/or expenses.
It has been the experience of this writer that the hearts and minds of the vast majority of bankruptcy
attorneys (99+%) are in the right place. These attorneys earnestly seek to properly serve the legal profession,
their clients, the court, and the public. Despite clear ethical rules and standards, there seemingly are always
a few attorneys who, for whatever reason(s), do not sufficiently adhere to these professional rules and
standards. This article will address different types of unprofessional or unethical conduct and also will suggest
and discuss various responsive approaches to such conduct in bankruptcy cases or proceedings.

More

specifically, this article addresses the following selected topics:
•

overview of professionalism in bankruptcy practi.ce and the attorney
disciplinary process;

•

personal attacks and inappropriate statements made by counsel during oral
arguments or negotiations;

40verly abusive, aggressive, and combative attorneys who engage in unprofessional or unethical conduct should be distinguished from impaired
attorneys who have addiction problems that also may result in professionalism and competency problems. The appropriate response or reaction to
unprofessional conduct should be dictated by the circumstances and the people involved. Although the practice of law is a high stress activity and
"bum-out" and addictions of various kinds can be serious concerns, nonetheless adherence to the model rules and standards of professional conduct is
required of everyone, including the judges. The public must be protected from both the unprofessional and the impaired attorney (or judge). A referral
to a local bar association that has a "lawyers-helping-lawyers" program may be a way of saving an impaired attorney-colleague's law license before it is
too late.
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II.

•

'attorney conduct arising out of discovery disputes and how and when to
bring such disputes to the attention of the bankruptcy court;

•

unsupported "lawyer testimony" during oral arguments;

•

cloaking improper conduct or communications from view of the bankruptcy
court under the guise of "settlement negotiation;" and

•

utilization by counsel of self-serving written correspondence and e-mails as
exhibits to pleadings.

Professionalism in the Practice of Bankruptcy Law and the Attorney Disciplinary Process:
Addressing Unacceptably Aggressive or Abusive Behavior by Attorneys in Bankruptcy Cases and
Proceedings

Attorneys should guardedly and zealously protect their professional and personal reputations and
at the same time foster, promote, and protect the integrity of the justice system as a whole, while also
looking out for the best interests of their clients. An inappropriate moral lapse or professional. misstep can
result in devastatingly adverse consequences to an attorney (or judge) that could be difficult or near
impossible to unravel or overcome.

In some instances, such an inappropriate lapse or misstep may

become the defining moment of an attorney's future personal and professional reputation and legal career.
One split-second misjudgment of a particular kind may produce a lasting personal and/or career tragedy.
It is said that "the law is a jealous mistress." The rigorous demands of a law practice can be difficult
and quite exacting at times. Incivility and unprofessional attorney conduct are nonetheless not acceptable
responses or reactions to such demands.

Attorneys, as public citizens, also have a responsibility to

promote the public good while appropriately representing the legal profession.

Additionally, "[a]s an

advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system."s
An attorney must be careful not to cross the boundary line from permissible zealousness and enter
into the dark underside world of unprofessional or unethical conduct. An attorney who crosses that line
may be subject to not only professional disciplinary action from specialized and independent state boards,
but also subject to sanctions from the court itself, including possible suspension from practice or
disbarment. As will be subsequently discussed,6 most lower courts hold that the bankruptcy courts have
the authority and duty to impose sanctions or suspend an attorney under appropriate circumstances.

5MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Preamble
6 See

11 2 (2003).

infra n. 39 and accompanying text.
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These courts find disciplinary authority, for example, in 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1927, Rule 9011
of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and the inherent powers doctrine. 7 As will be seen,
sanctions imposed by the courts must be chosen to employ the least possible power necessary to deter
the inappropriate behavior.
A.

Professional Rules and Standards of Conduct

The Preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Preamble') states:
A lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in
professional service to clients and in the lawyer's business and personal affairs. A
lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to
harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal
system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public
officials. 8
The underlying principle of the model rules "include[s] the lawyer's obligation zealously to protect and
pursue a client's legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law, while maintaining a professional,
courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal system."g
For example, the following model rules are illustrative. Rule 3.5(d) provides: "A lawyer shall not
engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.,,1o The accompanying comments to Rule 3.5 give further
guidance: "Refraining from abusive or obstreperous conduct is a corollary of the advocate's right to speak
on behalf of litigants ... An advocate can present the cause, protect the record for subsequent review and
preserve professional integrity by patient firmness no less effectively than by belligerence or theatrics ...
The duty to refrain from disruptive conduct applies to any proceeding of a tribunal, including a
deposition.,,11
Rule 1.3 provides: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a
client.,,12 Comment 1 to Rule 1.3 states: "The lawyer's duty to act with reasonable diligence does not

e.g, In re Rimsat, Ltd., 212 F.3d 1039, 1043 (7th Cir. 2000); Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (holding that a federal court has
inherent power to sanction for bad faith conduct during the course of litigation, and that the purpose of these sanctions is to deter such conduct); In
re Computer Dynamics, Inc., 253 B.R. 693 (E.D. Va. 2000) (holding that bankruptcy courts, pursuant to their civil contempt power, can suspend an
attorney from practice pending compliance with a court order).
7 See,

8MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Preamble
91d.

1f 5.

at 1f 9.

10MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.5.
11 1d.

R. 3.5 Cmt. 4,5.

121d.

R. 1.3.
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require the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal process with
courtesy and respect.,,13
Not surprisingly, many judicial districts have adopted their own supplemental rules and standards
of professional conduct. The supplemental rules and standards of professional conduct of the following
judicial districts will be reviewed or cited here: the Northern District of Alabama, Southern District of
Georgia, Northern District of Georgia, Western District of North Carolina, Northern District of Florida, and
the Eastern District of Kentucky.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama provides for attorney
discipline in the form of "disbarment, suspension, censure, reprimand, removal from a particular case,
ineligibility for appointment as court appointed counsel, ineligibility to appear under subsection (b) and (c),
monetary sanctions, or any other sanction the court may deem appropriate.,,14 The Northern District of
Alabama also has established a grievance committee to "conduct, upon referral by the court or a judge

thereof, inquiries and investigations with respect to alleged misconduct or commission of a serious crime
by an attorney or with respect to reinstatement of an attorney; to conduct and preside over disciplinary
hearings; to consider, upon referral by the court or a judge thereof, matters relating to possible
incompetency, incapacity, or impairment of an attorney; and to submit written findings and
recommendations to the court or referring judge for appropriate action.,,15 Pursuant to its Local Rule 20902 (h)(1), the "court or a judge thereof may refer to the Grievance Committee any accusation or evidence of
misconduct by a member of the bar of this court for such investigation, hearing and report as may be
appropriate.,,16

13/d. R. 1.3 Cmt. 1.
14Bankr. N.D. Ala. R. 2090-2 (t). These disciplinary measures may be taken after an attorney violates the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct
as adopted by the Alabama Supreme Court or the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (except ABA Rule 3.8(t». In
addition, "[alcts and omissions by any such attorney which violates such standards, individually or in concert with any other person, shall constitute
misconduct, whether or not occurring in the course of an attorney-client relationship, and shall be grounds for discipline, as shall the commission
by an attorney of any serious crime." Attorneys must also notify the clerk of the court if they are "(i) disbarred, suspended or publicly disciplined by
another court or disciplinary authority, (ii) resigning from another bar while an investigation into allegations of misconduct is pending, or (iii) being
convicted by any court of any serious crime." See also Bankr. N.D. Ala. R. 2090-2(h)(2) B (4). The Middle District of Alabama incorporated Local
Rule 83.1 of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, which contains similar grievance provisions and authorizes the court to act
sua sponte to address disciplinary issues to the extent of the court's statutory authority.
15Bankr. N.D. Ala. R. 2090-2 (g)(1). (The grievance committee also has the power to "compel the attendance of witnesses, to take or cause to be
taken the deposition of any witnesses, and to order the production of books, records, or other documentary evidence.")
16Bank r. N.D. Ala. R. 2090-2 (h)(1).

H -5

The Southern District of Georgia addresses attorney discipline in its Local Rule 83.5,17 which
states that: "Any attorney who appears in a case or proceeding, or who represents a party in interest in a
case or proceeding, may for good cause shown, and after notice and hearing, be disbarred, suspended
from practice for a definite time, reprimanded, or subjected to such other discipline as the Court may deem
proper.,,18 Local Rule 83.5 further provides that an attorney who has "been disbarred or suspended from
the practice of law" in Georgia or any other state, or "has been convicted of a felony or any crime involving
moral turpitude ... may be provisionally suspended forthwith from practice before this Court; and, unless
good cause to the contrary is shown within thirty (30) days from the date of such suspension or conviction,
an order of disbarment shall be entered.,,19
The Northern District of Georgia also adopted the Local Rules of Professional Conduct in Rule
2091-1 to "govern all actions and proceedings in the Bankruptcy Court.,,20 The Middle District of Georgia
addresses attorney conduct in its Local Rules 9011-1, which states that an attorney will not be granted a
leave of absence by the court, but reasonable accommodations will be attempted for those times when the
attorney will be absent, provided proper notice is given by the attorneY,21 that the attorney's bar number
should be indicated on "all documents filed with the court,"22 that motions filed with the clerk shall include a
proposed order, that "[a]1I motions should indicate applicable code sections or FRBP which affect the
granting or denial of the relief which is sought," and that motions filed should also include a notice that
complies with LBR 9004-1 (b).23
In the Southern District of Georgia the applicable rules further provide that a violation of the
American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct or the Georgia Rules of Professional
Conduct "may subject the attorney to appropriate disciplinary action.,,24 However, disciplinary proceedings

17S.D. Ga. R. 83.5 (expressly incorporated into the Local Rules of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Georgia).

18/d. R. 83.5(a).
19/d. R. 83.5 (b).
2°Sankr. N.D. Ga. R. 2091-1 (expressly incorporating the Local Rule 83.1 of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia).
21Sankr. M.D. Ga. R. 9011-1 (a).

22/d. R. 9011-1 (b).
23/d. R. 9013-1 (a)-(c). Rule 9013-3 states that all motions filed shall include a certificate of service.
24

5.0. Ga. R. 83.5 (d).
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will be closed unless the court finds that justice or the subject of the action requires the proceeding to be
open. 25 The Southern District of Georgia has specific rules for matters that come before a non-Article III
judge. 26 The United States Attorney for this District will prosecute "any disbarment or disciplinary action
brought against any member of the bar of this Court.,,27
Further, the Local Rules of the Southern District of Georgia also provide specific instructions to
attorneys as to the examination of witnesses and argument, objections to questions, decorum, the
witness, court hours and promptness, exhibits, advance notice of difficult questions, the filing and use of
depositions at trial, the use of answers to interrogatories and requests for admissions, and even opening
statements. 28 These Local Rules are very specific, even including instructions on where the attorney is to
stand during the proceeding; violation of anyone of these rules could theoretically be considered a
violation of the rules leading to disciplinary action. 29

25/d .

R. 83.5 (f).

26/d. R. 83.5 (g).

d . R. 83.10.

27/

28/d .

R. 83.13 - 22.

2~he relevant rules of the Southern District of Georgia are as follows:

LR 83.12 Examination of Witnesses and Argument:
(a) Counsel should conduct examination of witnesses from the lectern or the counsel table.
(b) Do not approach a witness without asking permission of the Court. VVhen permission is granted for the purpose of working
with an exhibit, resume the examination from the table or lectern when finished with the exhibit.
(c) Rise when addressing the Court or jury and when making objections.
(d) During opening statement and argument, counsel should stand at the lectern or table unless the Court grants permission
to approach another area for a proper purpose.

LR 83.13 Objections to Questions:
(a) VVhen objecting, state only that you are objecting and specify the ground or grounds of objection. Do not use objections
for the purpose of making a speech, recapitulating testimony, or attempting to guide the witness.
(b) Argument upon the objection will not be heard until permission is given or argument is requested by the Court.

LR 83.14 Decorum:
(a) Colloquy or argument between attorneys is not permitted. Address all remarks to the Court.
(b) In a jury case, if there is an offer of stipulation, first confer with opposing counsel about it.
(c) Do not ask the reporter to mark testimony. All requests for re-reading of questions or answers shall be addressed to the
Court.
(d) Counsel during trial shall not exhibit familiarity with witnesses, jurors, or opposing counsel. The use of first names is to be
avoided. During arguments, no juror should be addressed individually or by name.
(e) During the argument of opposing counsel, remain seated at the counsel table and be respectful. Never divert the attention
of the Court or the jury.

LR 83.15 The Witness:
(a) Witnesses shall be treated with fairness and consideration; they shall not be shouted at, ridiculed, or otherwise abused.
(b) No person shall ever by facial expression or other conduct exhibit any opinion concerning any testimony which is being
given by a witness. Counsel should admonish their clients and witnesses about this common occurrence.

LR 83.16 Court Hours and Promptness:
(a) The Court makes every effort to commence proceedings at the time set. Promptness is expected from counsel and
witnesses.
(b) If a witness was on the stand at a recess or adjournment, have the witness on the stand ready to proceed when Court is
resumed.
(c) Arrange the schedule of your case so that you will not run out of witnesses and cause unnecessary delay.

***
LR 83.19 Difficult Questions B Advance Notice:
If you have reason to anticipate that any question of law or evidence is difficult or will provoke an argument, give the Court
advance notice.
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The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of North Carolina imposes a specific duty upon
attorneys who represent debtors. 3o Local Rule 2091-1(a) states that "[a]ny attorney who files a bankruptcy
petition for or on behalf of a debtor shall remain the responsible attorney of record for all purposes,
including the representation of the debtor in all matters that arise in the case and conversion to another
Chapter.,,31 Further, "[a]n attorney is automatically deemed relieved of the duty to represent the debtor
when the debtor's case is closed. Alternatively, an attorney may be relieved of the duty to represent the
debtor only upon motion, and after notice and a hearing, and on the order of this Court.,,32
The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Florida adopted very specific Rilles of Conduct
and Decorum applicable in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida and attached

them as an addendum to the Local Bankruptcy Rules. 33

30Bankr. W.D. N.C. L.R. 2091-1 (a).

31/d.
32/d. R. 2091-1(b).
33Bankr. N.D. FI. Addendum A to Local Bankruptcy Rules. This addendum provides as follows:

Customary and Traditional Conduct and Decorum in the United States District Court:
A. The purpose of the addendum is to state for the guidance of those heretofore unfamiliar with the traditions of this United
States District Court certain basic principles concerning courtroom conduct and decorum. These standards are minimal and
not all-inclusive. They are intended to emphasize and supplement, not supplant or limit, the ethical obligations of counsel
under the Code of Professional Responsibility or the time honored customs of experienced trial counsel.

B. When appearing in the United States District Court, all counsel and all persons at counsel table should conduct themselves
in the following customary and traditional manner:
(1) Stand as court is opened, recessed or adjourned.
(2) Stand when the jury enters or retires from the courtroom.
(3) Stand when addressing, or being addressed by, the Court.
(4) Address all remarks to the Court, not to opposing counsel.
(5) Avoid disparaging personal remarks or acrimony toward opposing counsel and remain wholly detached from any ill feeling
between the litigants or witnesses.
(6) Refer to all persons, including witnesses, other counsel and the parties, by their surnames and not by their first or given
names.
(7) Counsel should request permission before approaching the bench; and any document counsel wishes to have the Court
examine should be handed to the clerk.
(8) Unless opposing counsel has previously been shown exhibits, any exhibit offered in evidence should, at the time of such
offer, be handed to opposing counsel.
(9) In making objections, counsel should state only the legal grounds for the objection and should withhold all further comment
or argument unless elaboration is requested by the Court.
(10) In examining a witness, counsel shall not repeat or echo the answer given by the witness.
(11) Offers of, or requests for, a stipulation should be made privately, not within the hearing of the jury.
(12) In opening statements and in arguments to the jury, counsel shall not express personal knowledge or opinion concerning
any matter in issue, shall not read or purport to read from deposition or trial manuscripts, and shall not suggest to the jUry
directly or indirectly that it mayor should request transcripts or the reading of any testimony by the reporter.
(13) Counsel shall admonish and discourage all persons at counsel table from making gestures, facial expressions, audible
comments, or the like, as manifestations of approval or disapproval during the testimony of witnesses, or at any other time.
(14) Smoking, eating, food and drink are prohibited in the courtroom at any time.
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Finally, the Eastern District of Kentucky has not promulgated a special local rule regarding attorney
discipline in the bankruptcy court; however, included here are the rules from the United States District
Court regarding attorney discipline to be used as a guide when considering such matters.

Local rule of the District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky
LR 83.3 Attorney Discipline
(a) Discipline Generally. Any attorney practicing before the Court is subject to discipline by the Court upon
a showing that:
(1) The attorney has been subjected to public discipline in any other court of record; or
(2) The attorney is guilty of unprofessional conduct.

(b) Discipline in Another Court; Procedure.
(1) Attorney's Duty to Notify. An attorney practicing before the Court who is subjected to public discipline in
any other court of record must promptly inform the Clerk of that action.
(2) Notice to the Attorney. Upon filing a certified copy of a judgment or order demonstrating that another
court has disciplined an attorney, the Court will immediately issue a notice to the attorney containing the
following:
(A) a copy of the judgment or order from the other court; and
(8) an order to show cause -- within thirty (30) days after service of that order -- why the Court's imposition of
the identical discipline would be unwarranted. The challenge to the Court's imposition of the identical
sanction must be based on one of the grounds contained in (3). The attorney may respond to the show
cause order personally or by mail.

(3) Discipline Imposed; Grounds for Challenge. Thirty (30) days after service of the notice provided in
(b)(2), the Court will impose the identical discipline as that imposed by the other court unless the Court
concludes that the entry of some other order is appropriate. To conclude that the entry of some other order is
appropriate, the Court must find that the record underlying the other court's discipline clearly indicates that:
(A) the procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due
process;
(8) the proof establishing the misconduct was so infirm that the Court could not -- consistent with its duty -accept the other court's conclusion as final;
(C) the Court's imposition of the same discipline would result in grave injustice; or
(0) the Court concludes that the misconduct warrants substantially different discipline.

(4) Finality of the Other Court's Action. Unless the Court determines that one of the grounds contained in
(3) exists, another court's final adjudication of attorney misconduct conclusively establishes the misconduct
for purposes of this Court's discipline. If the discipline in the other court is stayed or is not a final decision,
this Court's reciprocal discipline is deferred until the stay expires or the decision becomes final.
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(c) Discipline for Unprofessional and Improper Conduct. If it appears to the Court that an attorney
practicing before the Court has violated the rules of the Kentucky Supreme Court governing professional
conduct or is guilty of other conduct unbecoming an officer of the Court, any judge may order an attorney to
show cause -- within a specified time -- why the Court should not discipline the attorney. Upon the expiration
of the period specified or upon the attorney's response to the show cause order, the Court will enter an
appropriate order. If requested by the responding attorney, the Court will conduct a hearing prior to
determining the appropriate order.
(d) Discipline for Contempt. Disbarment from the Court may be utilized as a sanction for contempt of court
under the procedures contained in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42. Nothing in this rule shall limit the
Court's power to punish contempt.

It is abundantly clear that there are no uniform rules and procedures in the federal system
governing attorney discipline matters in the nation's bankruptcy (or district) courts. Accordingly, individual
judicial districts are free to establish rules and procedures to be followed and grounds for punishment.
(Know your district.) Legitimate confusion may exist regarding whether the bankruptcy court even has the
threshold authority to address and ultimately redress violations of ethical standards or unprofessional
conduct arising within a particular bankruptcy case or proceeding. It is certain, however, that the attorney
disciplinary process allows for the administration of justice and the protection of the public from
unprofessional, unqualified, unfit, or unethical attorneys. Attorneys and judges collectively must maintain
the integrity of the legal profession, efficiently manage the entire bankruptcy process, and zealously guard
the propriety and impartiality of the bankruptcy process.
The attorney disciplinary process should, inter alia, balance the regulation of the practice of law
with the attorney's need for maintaining a livelihood and professional reputation. If a court proposes to
sanction or discipline an attorney, it should, ipso facto, give that attorney specific and full notice of the
conduct and charges alleged to be sanctionable, and also the standards by which that conduct will be
assessed. 34 The court thereafter should allow the attorney a full opportunity to be heard on the matter and
to meaningfully defend against specific disciplinary charges. 35 Additionally, the accused attorney must be
fully warned of the authority and actual charges under which the court is considering sanctions. 36
Courts have consistently asserted and maintained that the attorney disciplinary process must
balance numerous issues.
34
35

For example, the disciplinary process must afford attorneys accused of

E.g., 60 East 80th Street Equities, Inc. v. Jeffrey Sapir (In re 60 East 80th Street Equities, Inc.), 218 F.3d 109, 117 (2d Cir. 2000).

1d.

36 ld.
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unethical conduct with both procedural and substantive due process in all disciplinary proceedings. Of
course, disciplinary procedures must be fair and thorough; and they also must be perceived as such by
attorneys and the public. It is said that justice should not only be done, but also should be seen to be
done. Unquestionably, attorneys should have appropriate notice of applicable professional standards and
also proper advance notice of the charges brought against them with a fair and reasonable opportunity to
defend themselves.
B.

What Authority Do Bankruptcy Courts Have to Discipline Attorneys?

Important threshold questions exist. For example, do the Bankruptcy Code, the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, the various local rules, and other statutory or common law support the bankruptcy
courts' exercise of original attorney disciplinary power? Should a bankruptcy judge who has, sua sponte,
initiated the charge of ethical misconduct and thereby threatened discipline against an attorney recuse him
or herself from the disciplinary proceedings because the judge's impartiality might be reasonably
questioned due to an asserted personal bias or prejudice concerning the attorney or party?37 Although the
bankruptcy court may have both the express and the inherent authority to discipline attorneys (e.g.,
suspension) appearing before it, are such disciplinary proceedings ordinarily best reserved to independent
bodies that have been specifically created to investigate charges of unprofessional conduct and to
prosecute disciplinary proceedings?
There are a number of related substantive and procedural issues that also may be considered by
the courts. For example, what is the relationship between a judicially generated disciplinary proceeding in
the bankruptcy court (or district court) and one conducted by the state or federal court licensing
authorities? As noted earlier, should the bankruptcy court initially defer such disciplinary matters to the
district court or specialized and independent state licensing authorities or state boards of professional
responsibility? Or, is it preferable under certain facts and circumstances for bankruptcy courts to initially
conduct disciplinary proceedings? If disciplinary proceedings are conducted in the bankruptcy court, is
there a danger of the appearance of prejudice against the attorney? Should the bankruptcy judge be the
accuser, investigator, prosecutor, impartial judge, and "executioner" in the same action?

Is a full

37See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a); compare In re Johnson, 921 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1991) and In re Derryberry, 72 B.R. 874 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
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evidentiary hearing required in every disciplinary proceeding involving an attorney before a bankruptcy
judge?38

In resolving these and related disciplinary issues, courts have relied upon many different

sources of law and procedure to ultimately reach their decisions, including consideration of applicable
federal statutes, common law, local district court and bankruptcy court rules and procedures, state ethical
and disciplinary rules, and ABA standards. A bankruptcy court that exercises original attorney disciplinary
authority should take great care to act within predictable and consistent parameters, within the scope and
limitations of bankruptcy jurisdiction, and in full accordance with substantive and procedural due process.
C.

Core/Non-Core Proceeding Dichotomy Involving Attorney Disciplinary Actions

It is asserted here that an attorney disciplinary action brought in the bankruptcy court ordinarily is a
core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1 )-(2). As such, the presiding bankruptcy judge has jurisdiction
both to hear the matter and also to enter a final order, subject, of course, to traditional appellate review
under 28 U.S.C. § 158 utilizing the abuse of discretion standard. By virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 151, each
United States judicial district has a bankruptcy court that exists as a statutory unit of the district court.
Bankruptcy judges, who are appointed to 14-year terms by the court of appeals for the respective circuit,
serve as judicial officers of the district court. 39 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9002(4),
"district judge" means "bankruptcy judge" if the proceeding is pending before a bankruptcy judge.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), a district court may refer all bankruptcy cases and
proceedings to the bankruptcy court within its judicial district. Each of the 94 judicial districts has entered
broad orders of reference.

When a bankruptcy proceeding is referred by the district court to the

bankruptcy court, the role and authority of the bankruptcy judge depend on whether the particular matter is
a "core proceeding" or a "non-core proceeding."

If the particular matter is a core proceeding, the

bankruptcy judge may hear and determine all issues and enter a final order, subject to traditional appellate
review. 40 The statutory provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A)-(O) set forth a non-exclusive laundry list of

3aln re Sheridan, 362 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 2004); see In fa Johnson, 921 F.2d 585, 587 (5th Cir. 1991); see also 28 U.S.C. § 455(a),(b)(1); Code of
Judicial Conduct Canon 3(C)(1); cf. In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 827 (4th Cir. 1987).
3928

U.S.C. §§ 151 and 152(a); Rules 9001(4) and 9002(4) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.

4°28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 158.
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core matters that may arise in bankruptcy cases. 41 If the matter is a non-core proceeding, absent consent
of all the parties to the proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2), the bankruptcy court by virtue of 28
U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) nonetheless may hear the proceeding and thereafter submit proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law to the district court, and any final order or judgment shall be entered by the district
judge after considering the bankruptcy judge's proposed findings and conclusions and after reviewing de
novo those matters to which any party has filed and specifically objected pursuant to FED. R. BANKR. P.
9033. If it is unclear whether a particular proceeding is core or non-core, the bankruptcy judge determines
the appropriate classification. 42
Generally speaking, a particular proceeding that "arises under" the Code as contemplated under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b) and 157(b)(1) is considered core. Whether an attorney disciplinary proceeding that
arises within, for example, a single bankruptcy case is a "core proceeding" under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) or
a "non-core proceeding" under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) is a matter of statutory construction. The term "core
proceeding" is not self-defining.

Although no explicit statutory reference is made under 28 U.S.C. §

157(b)(2)(A)-(O) to attorney discipline matters (e.g, sanctions, contempt, suspension from practice or
disbarment), it is emphasized here that 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) contains only a non-exhaustive laundry list
of illustrated core proceedings. The discipline of attorneys who practice in the bankruptcy court is a vital
and essential function to the proper administration of the case or proceeding; it also is an essential
function "concerning the administration of the [§ 541 (a)] estate" as contemplated under 28 U.S.C. §
157(b)(2)(A). Indeed, an attorney disciplinary action is central or core to the administration of the case. 43
A legitimate functional need exists for bankruptcy courts to have "core" jurisdiction over attorney
misconduct arising within core proceedings. Congress in the 1984 jurisdictional amendments intended
that "core proceedings" would be broadly interpreted in light of the open-ended statutory text contained in
41Cf.
42

Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Une Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).

28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3).

43 See, e.g., In re Dragoo, 219 B.R. 460, 465-68 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998), aff'd, 86 F.3d 614 (5th Cir. 1999) (Fifth Circuit affirmed a four-year
suspension imposed by a bankruptcy court in a proceeding that involved evidence of attorney misconduct in three separate bankruptcy cases and
did not take issue with the bankruptcy court's express entry of a final order under FED. R. BANKR. P. 7052); see also In re Melendez, 235 B.R. 173,
181-82 and 201-04 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999) (imposing sanctions in an omnibus disciplinary hearing initiated sua sponte by the bankruptcy court
against several debtors' attorneys for inadequate representation of their respective clients, and expressly entering its findings under FED. R.
BANKR. P. 7052); In re Nesom, 76 B.R. 101, 102, n.1 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987) (suspending an attorney for misconduct in two bankruptcy cases
after a sua sponte disciplinary hearing by the court, and expressly finding the proceeding was core); In re Ludwick, 185 B.R. 238, 242-47 (Bankr.
W.O. Mich. 1995) (en bane) (suspending a bankruptcy attorney from practice for two years and determining that the hearing was a core
proceeding). Cf. In re Sheridan, 362 F.3d 96 (1 st Cir. 2004).
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28 U.S.C. § 157(b). The absence of relevant constitutional and statutory constraints is obvious. It is said
that "core comes from core."
Prior to Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line CO. 44 and the enactment of the
1984 bankruptcy jurisdictional amendments, the Supreme Court recognized that a court's power to
regulate the conduct of the bar, including the power to suspend and disbar attorneys, is absolutely
essential to the administration of justice and the protection of the pUbli~.45 In In re Sheridan, Circuit Judge
Lynch in a dissenting opinion stated: 46
In fact, there is every reason to believe that Congress wanted and
expected bankruptcy judges to enforce the professional responsibilities of
bankruptcy attorneys through final and binding orders where the misconduct in
question occurred in a core bankruptcy proceeding or proceedings. In 1984,
when Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to create the core/non-core
distinction, the case law available to Congress provided no reason to think that
bankruptcy courts' status as Article I tribunals would bar them from entering final
disciplinary orders. In 1926, the Supreme Court itself held in Goldsmith v. U.S.
Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117,46 S.Ct. 215, 70 L.Ed. 494 (1926), that the
U.S. Board of Tax Appeals, an Article I tribunal, possessed the authority not only
to promulgate ethical rules of admitting attorneys to practice, but also to disbar
attorneys who failed to meet those standards. See ida at 121-22, 46 S.Ct. 215
(emphasizing, in holding that the Board possessed this power, "the character of
the work to be done by the board, the quasi judicial nature of its duties, [and] the
magnitude of the interests to be affected by its decisions"). The Court explicitly
rejected the contention that such a tribunal cannot disbar or discipline lawyers
absent express statutory authority, observing that the power of the Board to do
so is "so necessary ... and so usual" that the statute creating it would be
interpreted to include that power. Id. at 122, 46 S.Ct. 215.
Furthermore, Congress knew that federal courts before 1984 had upheld
the power of other Article I tribunals to issue binding disciplinary orders against
counsel appearing before them. See, e.g., Kivitz V. SEC, 475 F.2d 956, 962
(D.C. Cir.1973)(power of SEC to disbar attorney for ethical misconduct); Herman
V. Dulles, 205 F.2d 715, 715-16 (D.C. Cir. 1953)(similar, International Claims
Commission); Francis V. Virgin Islands, 11 F.2d 860, 864 (3d Cir.
1926)(upholding the contempt powers of the U.S. District Court for the Virgin
Islands); Fleming V. United States, 279 F. 613, 616 (9th Cir. 1992) (similar,
United States Court for China). Consistent with this line of cases, some courts
had by 1984 already upheld the authority of bankruptcy courts to discipline
attorneys for unethical conduct in bankruptcy cases. As early as 1979, for
example, the Second Circuit described as "nothing novel" the proposition that a
debtor's counsel could be sanctioned for breaching his ethical responsibilities to

444 58

u.s. 50 (1982).

45Se8, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-67 (1980); In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 743-45 (1985) ("Courts have long
recognized an inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers.").
46

362 F.3d 96, 122-23 (1st Cir. 2004).

H· 14

the bankruptcy court. See In re Arlan's Dept. Stores, Inc., 615 F.2d 925, 943-44
(2d Cir. 1979).
Congress enacted the 1984 bankruptcy amendments against this
background. Nothing in the 1984 Act or its legislative history suggests that
Congress intended to deny bankruptcy judges the authority to regulate the
bankruptcy bar. On the contrary, this court has held that Congress's purpose in
the 1984 amendments was to press the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts "to
its constitutional bounds" in the wake of Northern Pipeline. See In re Arnold Print
Works, Inc., 815 F.2d 165, 168 (1st Cir. 1987) (Breyer, J.). The congressional
sponsors of the 1984 amendments described non-core proceedings as
"Marathon-type" cases, referring to the Northern Pipeline decision, and they
understood that category to be "very limited." Id. Accordingly, this court
concluded that "Congress intended that 'core proceedings' would be interpreted
broadly, close to or congruent with constitutional limits." Id.
Congress had no reason to think that Article III is offended when a
bankruptcy court enters a binding order against a bankruptcy attorney for
professional misconduct in a core bankruptcy proceeding. Even the principal
opinion does not so contend. Indeed, less than a year after its decision in
Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court emphasized the limits of its holding: "The
Court's holding in that case establishes only that Congress may not vest in a
non-Article III court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue
binding orders in a traditional contract action raising under state law, without
consent of the litigants, and subject only to ordinary appellate review." Thomas
v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87
L.Ed.2d 409 (1985) (emphasis added). (footnotes omitted).
Circuit Judge Lynch's reasoning is persuasive regarding the core/non-core distinction addressed
here.
In summary, it is fundamental that federal courts have the inherent power to discipline attorneys
who appear before it. 47 This inherent power is necessary for federal courts to manage their affairs and to
achieve orderly and expeditious disposition of cases and proceedings. 48 Pursuant to its inherent power to
manage its affairs, a federal court is vested with the power to require those who appear before it to submit
to and follow its rules and mandates. 49 The bankruptcy court, as a unit of the United States district court
and as a federal court, has the responsibility, subject to ordinary and traditional review on appeal, to take
appropriate action in order to uphold and protect the integrity of the court, its bar, and the public from
unprofessional misconduct or unethical behavior. 50

47Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,44 (1991), citing Ex Parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 529 (1824).

491d.

50ln re Derryberry, 72 B.R. 874 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
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D.

Addressing Unacceptably Aggressive and Abusive Attorneys

As noted earlier, there are no clear uniform standards, rules, or procedures governing attorney
discipline in the 94 federal district courts and the 90 bankruptcy courts. As also discussed supra, most
courts have held that a bankruptcy court has, in appropriate situations, the statutory and inherent authority .
to discipline attorneys.51 Attorneys who appear in the bankruptcy courts may not be fully aware of the
applicable procedures available to redress asserted violations of ethical and professional standards
arising in a bankruptcy case or proceeding. Of course, local rules of the bankruptcy court, local rules of
the corresponding district court, and local practice should be taken into consideration.
According to most courts, a bankruptcy court not only has the authority, but also has the duty to
unequivocally uphold the integrity of the court and its bar, and to actually protect the public from attorney
professional misconduct. Many courts opine that they should regulate and "police" attorneys appearing
before them by, for example, sanctioning those who imper'!1issibly violate professional and ethical rules. 52
The bankruptcy court, as described by the Fifth Circuit in In re Johnson,53 suspended an attorney/trustee
from practicing before the court for one year. The bankruptcy court in the Johnson case ordered the
obstreperous attorney to take and successfully pass the multi-state professional ethics examination as a
precondition of his reinstatement to the practice of law. 54 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit ruled that § 105(a) of
the Code was "a basis for holding that bankruptcy courts have both statutory and inherent authority to
deny attorneys and others the privilege of practicing before the court.,,55

However, the Fifth Circuit

reversed the bankruptcy court's order, holding that the bankruptcy judge under the circumstances should
have recused himself from the disciplinary action against the attorney.56
In an effort to additionally address particular abuses, courts and parties in interest, such as the
United States trustee or the bankruptcy administrator, also may refer certain questionable and egregious

51See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
52E.g., In re Sheridan, 282 B.R. 79 (B.A.P. 1st Gir. 2003), rev'd onjurisdictional grounds, 362 F.3d 96 (1st Gir. 2004).
53 921

F.2d 585 (5th Gir. 1991).

54

Id. at 586.

55

/d.

56

1d. at 587.
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matters to the United States Attorneys Office for possible criminal investigation. 57

This can result in

criminal indictment, prosecution, and conviction in the United States district court under title 18 of the
United States Code.
One example of an appellate court upholding a bankruptcy court's authority to discipline attorneys
is illustrated in In ra Crayton. 58 Crayton involved an attorney who was directed by the bankruptcy jUdge to
appear and show cause why he should not be (1) barred from practicing in the bankruptcy court, (2)
reported to the State bar, and (3) ordered to disgorge fees.

In Crayton, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy

Appellate Panel ("BAP") went into great detail regarding the authority of bankruptcy courts to discipline
attorneys, and outlined relevant law and procedure as follows:
•

Terms of an attorney disciplinary order are reviewed on appeal for an abuse of
discretion.

•

"Abuse of discretion" is found if the reviewing court has a definite and firm
conviction that the court below committed clear error of judgment in the
conclusion it reached upon weighing of relevant factors.

•

On review of disciplinary orders, findings of fact are not overturned unless they
are clearly erroneous.

Ii

Court may disbar or suspend an attorney only upon presentation of clear and
convincing evidence.

•

Trial court's interpretation and application of local rules is reviewed for abuse of
discretion.

•

Bankruptcy court has both express and inherent authority to regulate attorneys
who practice before it - even to disbar attorneys appearing before it. 11 U.S.C. §
105(a).

•

Bankruptcy court had the express authority to discipline an attorney who
appeared before it in connection with chapter 11 case by barring him from
chapter 11 practice in court's district and from all debtor representation under
local rules, which provided that attorneys who appear for any purpose before
bankruptcy court are subject to its discipline and granted bankruptcy court
discretion to determine appropriate penalties, and under the bankruptcy court's
power to approve attorney's employment in bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 327(a);
U.S. Bankr. Ct. Rules C.D. Cal., Rules 102(5), 106(1).

57See 18 U.S.C. § 3057.
58

192 B.R. 970 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1996).
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•

Under its inherent disciplinary powers, the bankruptcy court had the authority to
discipline attorney it found incompetent, and who accepted fees from pro sa
chapter 11 debtor, refused to return fees upon debtor's demand, and failed to
seek employment by bankruptcy court as required, even though it did not
expressly find that attorney acted in bad faith; bad faith finding was not required,
inasmuch as bankruptcy court was exercising disciplinary powers to protect the
public against unqualified practitioners, and, even if it were, finding was implicit
in bankruptcy court's determination that the attorney accepted fees from the
debtor without obtaining employment from the bankruptcy court and refused to
return fees despite the debtor's demand, and in the attorney's admission that he
represented chapter 11 debtor although incompetent to do so. 11 U.S.C.A. §§
105(a), 327(a).

•

As a unit of the district court, the bankruptcy court is a federal court. 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 151. And a federal court has power to control admission to its bar and to
discipline attorneys who appear before it.

•

There is no uniform procedure for attorney disciplinary proceedings in the federal
system; instead, individual judicial districts are free to define rules to be followed
and grounds for punishment. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1654.

•

Although the bankruptcy court has both express and inherent authority to
suspend attorneys appearing before it, disciplinary proceedings are best
reserved to independent bodies that have been specifically created to investigate
charges of unprofessional conduct and to prosecute disciplinary proceedings,
and thus it is recommended that matters involving attorney discipline be referred
to standing committee.

•

In attorney disciplinary proceedings, the question before the court is whether an
attorney may continue to practice a profession imbued with public interest and
trust.

•

Court in attorney disciplinary proceeding must consider both fitness of one of its
officers and need to protect public from an unqualified practitioner.

•

Criteria for reviewing attorney disciplinary proceedings are whether the
disciplinary proceeding was fair, whether evidence supports findings below, and
whether the penalty ·imposed was reasonable.

•

Attorney who is subject to discipline is entitled to notice and opportunity to be
heard. U.S. Const. Amend. 5.

•

Attorney subject to disciplinary proceeding must receive prior notice as to reach
of grievance procedure and precise nature of charges leveled against him. U.S.
Const. Amend. 5.

•

Evidentiary hearing in attorney disciplinary proceedings is not required by due
process. U.S. Const. Amend. 5.

•

Attorney's admission that he was incompetent to practice chapter 11 bankruptcy
law rendered harmless any due process error stemming from bankruptcy court's
failure to give attorney notice, in order to show cause issued to attorney, that his
competency in such area was at issue. U.S. Const. Amend. 5. The admission
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was also clear and convincing evidence that supported the finding of
incompetence.
•

Bankruptcy court violated attorney's due process rights when it made additional
charges against the attorney regarding his competence to represent chapter 7
and 13 debtors, without giving the attorney notice or opportunity to defend
himself, following hearing on order to show cause detailing charges against the
attorney. U.S. Const. Amend. 5; 11 U.S.C.A. § 327(a).

•

Attorney's due process right to notice of charges against him in disciplinary
proceeding was satisfied with regard to charges specifically stated in order to
show cause that attorney failed to seek employment by bankruptcy court,
accepted fees from the Chapter 11 debtor, and failed to refund money upon
debtor's demand. U.S. Canst. Amend. 5; 11 U.S.C.A. § 327(a).

•

Finding in attorney disciplinary order that the attorney admitted he was not
qualified to practice bankruptcy law was not supported by the evidence,
inasmuch as attorney admitted only that he was incompetent to practice chapter
11 bankruptcy law, no evidence was taken at the hearing with regard to the
attorney's competency to practice chapters 7 and 13, and the bankruptcy court,
following hearing, relied on past chapter 13 case to assess attorney's current
fitness to represent debtors in chapters 7 and 13.

•

Remand was necessary when the bankruptcy court did not consider American
Bar Association Standards in determining reasonableness of its sanctions in
permanently barring the attorney on district-wide basis from practicing chapter
11 bankruptcy law and from representing debtors in Chapters 7 and 13, and
when its grounds for order barring the attorney from chapter 11 practice were
unclear. This also constituted abuse of discretion.

•

Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel would adopt American Bar Association
Standards, using State Bar Standards and relevant case law as supplemental
points of reference, as appropriate factors to be used in determining reasonable
attorney disciplinary sanction.

Ordinarily, a client's right to choose counsel is considered of the highest importance. However, the
duty of the judicial tribunal to protect the public from unqualified, unethical, and unprofessional attorneys
may at times require an exception to that special rule. Amazingly, at least one court, in an unpublished
opinion, has entered an order that appears to trump the client's ordinarily highly respected right to counsel
of choice. 59 In Klein-Becker v. Stanley, the United States district court ordered the attorneys in the civil
action to immediately change their "manner of practice and start conducting themselves as competent to
practice in the federal court," and if they do not change "the Court will contemplate and may enter an order
requiring the parties to obtain new counsel."so Pursuant to Klein-Becker, if counsel crosses the line too far

59 See

60 ld.

Klein-Becker, LLC, and Basic Research v. Stanley and Bodyworx.com, A-03-CA-871-SS (W.O. Tx. 2004) (unpublished opinion).

at 930.
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and too many times, thereby making a mockery of the court system, the court can trump the client's right
to counsel of choice and bar the offending attorney from practicing in that court.
In another recent case which demonstrates the developing law of attorney disciplinary actions, in
the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland filed an
adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy case of a disbarred attorney, seeking to have a judgment of
$6,903.76 against him declared nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7), claiming that the judgment
rendered against him in connection with attorney disciplinary proceedings for voluntarily misappropriating
funds and violating the Maryland Rules, the Maryland Code, and the Maryland Rules of Professional
Conduct related to trust accounts was excepted from the Chapter 7 discharge sought by the attorney.61
The court outlined the three-pronged test under § 523(a)(7), stating that the following three elements must
be in place for a debt to be nondischargeable under that provision: "(1) the debt must be payable to and
for the benefit of a governmental unit: (2) it must be in the nature of a fine, penalty, or forfeiture; and (3) it
must not be compensation for actual pecuniary loss.,,62 The attorney argued that the third element was
not present in his case, suggesting that the judgment was compensation for actual pecuniary loss. The
court found for the Attorney Grievance Commission ("Commission"), finding all three elements clearly in
place. As for the attorneys argument, the court dismissed it finding that the purpose of imposing the costs
was penal, the Commission was duty-bound to pursue the claim against the attorney regardless of the
cost, and the court cited public policy reasons for holding that an award for costs in an attorney
disciplinary proceeding is nondischargeable, finding that it is in the public's best interest to "prevent
attorneys who violate professional rules of conduct from eluding punishment for professional improprieties
by filing for bankruptcy.,,63 The judgment was excepted from discharge.
Attorneys should keep in mind that the client may ultimately be punished for the actions of the
unqualified, unprofessional or unethical attorney.

It is emphasized that retaliation in kind against

61

Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Scott G. Smith (In fe Smith), 317 B.R. 302 (Bankr. D. Md. 2004).

62

1d. at 306 (citations omitted).

631d. at 313.
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obstreperous opposing counsel is not acceptable conduct as this behavior does nothing but perpetuate
and intensify unprofessionalism in the practice of law, and it likewise will not be tolerated.
III.

Police Powers, Reference to the United States Attorney's Office, and Possible Bankruptcy Crimes

The unpleasant topic of bankruptcy crimes resulting from certain unprofessional acts and conduct
of attorneys is sufficiently important for an independent article. Since excellent articles already exist on
the subject, this serious topic will be briefly discussed here, particularly as it relates to the court's duty and
power to address egregious abuses of standards of professional and ethical conduct through resorting to
referral for prosecution on the grounds of such conduct. One of the underlying purposes of the laws of
Congress relating to bankruptcy is to provide the honest, but unfortunate debtor with a fresh financial start
unhampered by the pressures and discouragement of pre-existing debts. 64 To achieve this congressional
goal, attorneys must play a vital role in the bankruptcy process.

The justice system process

understandably relies heavily on the honesty and good faith of all of the participants, including the
attorneys. When attorney conduct goes beyond the level of professional or ethical indiscretion and enters
the realm of criminal action, the court and its officers may be morally or statutorily obligated to refer the
matter for further investigation to the appropriate body, usually the United States Attorney's Office. 65
Thus, the conduct and activities of an attorney during the course of litigation, discovery, arbitration, and
mediation may be criminal under 18 U.S.C. §§ 152 and 1503.66

64Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
65 See,
66

e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3057.

Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 152 states:
A person who(1) knowingly and fraudulently conceals from a custodian, trustee, marshal, or other officer of the court
charged with the control or custody of property, or, in connection with a case under title 11, from creditors
or the United States Trustee, any property belonging to the estate of a debtor;
(2) knowingly and fraudulently makes a false oath or account in or in relation to any case under title 11;
(3) knowingly and fraudulently makes a false declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty
of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, in or in relation to any case under title 11;
(4) knowingly and fraudulently presents any false claim for proof against the estate of a debtor, or uses any
such claim in any case under title 11, in a personal capacity or as or through an agent, proxy, or attorney;
(5) knowingly and fraudulently receives any material amount of property from a debtor after the filing of a
case under title 11, with intent to defeat the provisions of title 11;
(6) knowingly and fraudulently gives, offers, receives, or attempts to obtain any money or property,
remuneration, compensation, reward, advantage, or promise thereof for acting or forbearing to act in any
case under title 11;
(7) in a personal capacity or as an agent or officer of any person or corporation, in contemplation of a case
under title 11 by or against the person or any other person or corporation, or with intent to defeat the
provisions of title 11, knowingly and fraudulently transfers or conceals any of his property or the property
of such other Person or corporation;
(8) after the filing of a case under title 11 or in contemplation thereof, knowingly and fraudulently conceals,
destroys, mutilates, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any recorded information (including books,
documents, records, and papers) relating to the property or financial affairs of a debtor; or

H - 21

The foregoing criminal statutes do not make a clear distinction between an attorney, the debtor,
and other parties in a bankruptcy case or proceeding. Therefore, an attorney's unprofessional conduct or
unethical activities may in fact be sanctionable under the applicable criminal statute. In a case involving
court-imposed criminal discipline, the United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Georgia
has reported that an attorney who pled guilty to a mortgage fraud scheme was incarcerated, ordered to
pay $593,337 in restitution, ordered to file tax returns for the past four years, and lost his law license,
which was suspended by the court. 67
In United States v. Connery,68 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the case of an inhouse counsel who aided a creditor, his employer, in filing a false proof of claim in a bankruptcy case.
The attorney/defendant was thereafter convicted of numerous counts of criminally aiding and abetting his
client by filing false proofs of claim. 69 It is worth noting here that the attorney was found guilty under the
aiding and abetting statute under 18 U.S.C. § 2. 70
Under the statutory provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2, it is not necessary that the attorney actually be the
one who committed the crime, but rather that a crime (1) be committed by someone, (2) that the attorney
knowingly associated

wi~h

the entity who committed the crime, (3) that the attorney knowingly participated

in some aspect of the crime's commission, and (4) that the attorney possessed the requisite mental state

(9)

after the filing of a case under title 11, knowingly and fraudulently withholds from a custodian, trustee,
marshal, or other officer of the court or a United States Trustee entitled to its possession, any recorded
information (induding books, documents, records, and papers) relating to the property or financial affairs
of a debtor, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.

67Bankruptcy Court Decisions, Weekly News & Comment, FRAUD WATCH, p. A7, Vol. 43, Issue 20 (Nov. 9, 2004). S~e also Bankruptcy Court
Decisions, Weekly News & Comment, FRAUD WATCH, p. A7, Vol. 43, Issue 26 (Jan. 11, 2005) (A Mississippi attorney was disbarred for
continuing to serve clients after a he was convicted of bankruptcy fraud. His bankruptcy fraud conviction came after he plead guilty to concealing
$10,000 in client's assets in a bankruptcy petition, for which he was originally put on probation for five years with a $10,000 fine and restitution of
$8,681); Bankruptcy Court Decisions, Weekly News & Comment, FRAUD WATCH, p. A7, Vol. 43, Issue 9 (August 17, 2004) (Oakland, California,
attorney indicted for fraud along with his client for using the bankruptcy process to prevent creditors from obtaining a jUdgment lien against his
client's property); Bankruptcy Court Decisions, Weekly News & Comment, p. A9, Vol. 43, Issue 17 (Oct. 12,2004) (Disbarred Virginia attorney was
indicted on 18 counts of fraud in association with filing false proof of claims against the Archdiocese of Portland for alleged sexual abuse by a
priest); In re Knoll, 505 U.S. 1242 (1992) (attorney disbarred after being convicted of aiding and abetting a client's financial fraud); In re Pfingst, 53
A.D.2d 268 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (attorney disbarred after conviction under 18 U.S.C. §152); In re Metheany, 449 P.2d 609 (Ariz. 1969).
68 United
691d.

States v. Connery, 867 F.2d 929 (6th Cir. 1989).

at 936.

7°18 U.S.C. § 2 provides as follows:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or
procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense
against the United States, is punishable as a principal.
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for the crime (usually "knowingly" or "fraudulently,,).71 Illustrative examples that might fall into this category
include an attorney, knowing that a claim is fraudulent, assists the creditor client with pursuing the
fraudulent claim. 72 Also, though not specific to courtroom decorum, completing and filing or causing to be
filed incorrect schedules or reports also may qualify as criminal conduct under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and
152(3).73
Needless to say, it is strongly believed that these cases are the rare exception rather than the rule.
However, it is important to note that criminal sanctions are available in appropriate cases and proceedings
as a means to address egregious unprofessional or bad faith conduct of attorneys and to maintain the
integrity of the judicial process in bankruptcy.
IV.

Attorney Conduct During Discovery Depositions, Rule 2004 Examinations, and Examinations at
Section 341 first Meetings of Creditors - Harassing, Rude Inappropriate, or Embarrassing Questions,
and Obstructionist, Delaying, or Coaching Objections.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and the
American College of Trial Lawyers Code of Pretrial Conduct (the "ACTL Code") set forth numerous rules
relating to professional conduct of attorneys during the discovery process.

These rules apply to

depositions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, examinations under Rule 2004 of the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and § 341 (a) meetings of creditors under the Code. 74 An attorney should
refrain from using any form of discovery, or the scheduling of discovery, as a means of harassing or
intimidating opposing counsel and/or counsel's client. 75 According to the ACTL Code:

"[a] lawyer should

conduct discovery to elicit relevant facts and evidence, and not for an improper purpose, such as to
harass, intimidate, or unduly burden another party or a witness.,,76
Attorneys conducting discovery depositions, Rule 2004 examinations, and examinations of the
debtor at the § 341 (a) meeting of creditors should be civil and exercise proper professional and ethical
71Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949); United States v. Connery, 867 F.2d 929, 933 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Weinstein, 834 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Tashjian, 660 F.2d 829 (1st Cir.), cert. den., 454 U.S. 1102 (1981).
72 Connery, 867 F.2d at 933.
73 Weinstein, 834 F.2d at 1462.
74 FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (applicable to cases under the Code by virtue of FED. R. BANKR. P. 7037 and 9014(c»; 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (counsel's liability
for excessive costs); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011; American College of Trial Lawyers, Code of Pretrial Conduct (2002) (the ACTL Code is available at
www.actl.com).
75 ACTL

76

Code at 4.

1d. at 4.
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demeanor.

Concerns for professional civility and proper demeanor also extend to arbitration 77 and

mediation 78 matters arising out of bankruptcy cases and proceedings. Harassing, rude, inappropriate, or
embarrassing questions and improper coaching are unprofessional; and the parties and courts should not
tolerate such behavior.

The discovery focus is on the deponent - not the attorney.

deponent is the source of testimony.

The discovery

Obstructionist and delaying tactics of attorneys also are

unprofessional and should not be condoned. These matters are discussed in more detail infra.
How and when should unprofessional conduct and other disputes under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or under 11 U.S.C. § 341(a) and Rule 2004(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
be brought to the attention of the bankruptcy court? Who has the burden of proof arising out of such
disputes? What is the proper standard of proof at a proceeding before the bankruptcy judge arising out of
such dispute? Procedurally speaking, unresolved discovery disputes should be expeditiously brought to
the attention of the bankruptcy court via motion practice. The aggrieved party in the discovery process, as
the movant, has the ultimate burden of proof at the hearing before the court to consider the motion. The
standard of proof in each proceeding is a preponderance of the evidence considering a totality of the
particular facts and circumstances on a case-by-case basis.
A.

Depositions

When properly utilized, discovery depositions serve a meaningful purpose

Unfortunately,

discovery depositions sometimes become "theaters for posturing and maneuvering rather than the
intended and efficient vehicles for the discovery of relevant facts or the perpetuation of testimony.,,79 As a
result, some depositions are less cost-effective for obtaining discovery.8o Many courts impose sanctions
upon unduly manipulative attorneys who turn discovery depositions into a "three ring circus.,,81 Motions to

77 See

FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(c).

78 Most courts have now adopted formal or informal mediation programs.
79 A

80

Report on the Conduct of Depositions, 131 F.R.D. 613 (1990).

ld.

81ACTL Code at, supra n.64, at 7-8. The ACTL Code addresses depositions as follows:
(1) Lawyers should limit depositions to those that are necessary to develop the claims or defenses in the pending case or to
perpetuate relevant testimony.
(4) During a deposition, lawyers should conduct themselves with decorum and should never verbally abuse or harass the
witness or unnecessarily prolong the deposition.
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compel and motions for sanctions can be used a effective tools to promote meaningful discovery. The
bankruptcy court is not a "legal playground" where attorneys are permitted to indulge in elaborate and
unprofessional games of "catch-me-if-you-can.,,82
In In re First City Bancorporation of Texas, Inc.,83 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals imposed
monetary sanctions of $25,000 on a vituperative attorney who engaged in professional misconduct during
discovery depositions. In that case, the attorney's "egregious, obnoxious, and insulting behavior" included
characterizing the Assistant United States Attorney and other attorneys with offensive names including
"stooge," "puppet," "weak pussyfooting deadhead," "inept," "a bunch of starving slobs," and "an underling
who graduated from a 29th-tier law school.,,84 The recalcitrant and rude attorney also referred to various
other attorneys, law firms, and their clients by using other incredibly degrading names. 85 The bankruptcy
court found under the circumstances that the attorney's "egregious, obnoxious, and insulting behavior ...
constituted an unwarranted imposition upon and an affront to the bankruptcy court and the parties and
practitioners who have appeared in this bankruptcy that should not have to be endured in the future."s6
The bankruptcy court then barred the attorney from practicing in the bankruptcy court for the Northern
District of Texas "unless he first obtained written permission from the court."S? The court also imposed a
$22,500 monetary sanction against the abusive and insulting attorney.ss The attorney appealed the order,
which was remanded on appeal to the bankruptcy court to reconsider the sanctions. 89 On remand, the
bankruptcy court removed the bar from practicing in its bankruptcy courts, but increased the monetary

(5) During the deposition, lawyers should strictly limit objections to those allowed by the applicable rules. In general, lawyers
should object only to preserve the record, to assert a valid privilege, or to protect the witness from unfair, ambiguous, or
abusive questioning. Objections should not be used to obstruct questioning, to improperly communicate with the witness, or
to disrupt the search for facts or evidence germane to the case.

82Cf. In re Bystrek, 17 B.R. 894,895 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
83

282 F.3d 864 (5th Cir. 2002).

84

Id. at 866.

d.

8S/

86

ld.

871d.
88/d.
89 In

re First City, 282 F.3d at 866.
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sanction to $25,000. 90 The attorney again appealed the order of the bankruptcy court to the district court
which affirmed the bankruptcy court. The attorney then appealed the district court's decision to the Fifth
Circuit. 91

The Fifth Circuit found that "the sanctioning court must use the least restrictive sanction

necessary to deter the inappropriate behavior."92 The Fifth Circuit also upheld the $25,000 monetary
sanction as not abusive of the bankruptcy court's discretionary sanctioning power.93
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals imposed monetary sanctions on an aggressively
defiant attorney who conducted discovery depositions in an unproductive, obstructionist, and harassing
manner, as well as the attorney in the same law firm who merely signed the notice of discovery
deposition. 94

In In re Rimsat, Ltd., the sanctioned attorney, among other things, argued and asked

harassing questions of the witness. 95 When the attorney asked the witness about a conversation between
the witness and another party, the rude attorney said: "I want to know everything she said to you ... every
single word she uttered ....,,96 The attorney then began to argue with the witness and counsel for the
witness, and implied that the witness intended to be dishonest and improperly invoke the attorney-client
privilege. 97 The attorney shortly thereafter ended the discovery deposition without questioning the witness
at all about the actual issue in the case. 98 After a motion for sanctions and notice and a hearing, the
bankruptcy court sanctioned the attorney for his unprofessional conduct by charging to him the costs of
the deposition, a total of $10,890.81,99 and by revoking the pro hac vice status of the questioning attorney
and his associates. 10o The attorneys appealed to the district court, which affirmed the sanctions. 101 The
attorneys then appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which also affirmed the sanctions. 102

Id. at 866-67.

90

911d.
92

1d.

93

1d.

94

In fe Rimsat, Ltd., 212 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 2000).

951d. at 1042.
96

ld.

971d.
98

Id. at 1043.

99

Id.at 1039.

100

Id.
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The bankruptcy court for the District of Puerto Rico similarly has held that an attorney may be
sanctioned for obstructive and unprofessional conduct during discovery depositions. 103 In Amezaga, the
attorney "engaged in extensive and unnecessary colloquy, asserted groundless objections, improperly
objected and took every opportunity to interrupt and argue with opposing counsel.,,104 The court noted that
"[w]hile this style may project zealousness[,] 'Rambo litigation ... does not promote the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action,' as is required by FED. R. CIV. P. 1 and is not tolerated by this
court.,,105 The court went on to hold that the attorney's unprofessional conduct "served to effectively
obstruct the success of the discovery deposition and violated numerous mandates contained in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.,,106 The court imposed monetary sanctions against the attorney for the
cost and attorney fees incurred by the opposing party as a result of the unsuccessful deposition. 107 The
court also imposed a $500 sanction for "unnecessary delays and waste of judicial resources caused by
conduct which is contrary to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.,,108
Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made applicable to bankruptcy adversary
proceedings and contested matters pursuant to Rules 7037 and 9014(c) of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, provides generally for sanctions against parties or persons, including attorneys,
unjustifiably resisting discovery. Rule 37(a), inter alia, addresses the subjects of expenses and sanctions
for various acts. Subdivision (b) of Rule 37 deals with sanctions for failure to comply with a court order;
orders of contempt may be entered in appropriate cases. Rule 9011 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure also allows for the imposition of sanctions upon attorneys and law firms responsible for certain
conduct combined with a procedure to bring such egregious matters before the court. Additionally, 28
U.S.C. § 1927 provides that any attorney admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or
101

/d.

102

Id. at 1049.

103

In re Amezaga, 195 B.R. 221 (D. P.R. 1996).

104

Id. at 228.

105

ld. (quoting Van Pi/sum v. Iowa State Univ. of Science and Technology, 152 F.R.D. 179, 181 (S.D. Iowa 1993».

106ld. at 228.
107

1d. at 229.

108

ld.
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any Territory thereof who impermissibly multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be liable for excessive costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because
of such conduct. Rule 9011 109 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure provides for further sanctions
under appropriate circumstances. Also, as a sanction, the court held in In re Rimsat, Ltd., supra, that an
attorney's pro hac vice status in appropriate cases could be revoked.
As discussed supra in Section II, matters involving egregious, unprofessional conduct are subject
to judicial disciplinary action and/or referral to independent, specialized bodies that have been created to
investigate charges of unprofessional conduct.
B.

Rule 2004 Examinations Under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure

Rule 2004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure is a basic discovery tool or device utilized
by parties in interest in bankruptcy cases and proceedings, especially by bankruptcy trustees and
examiners.

Rule 2004(a) specifies the procedural .manner of moving for an examination; it allows an

examination of any entity110 on motion filed with the court. No adversary proceeding pursuant to Rule
7001(1) - (10) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure or contested matter pursuant to Rule 9014 of
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure need be instituted as a prerequisite to obtaining an order for
an examination pursuant to the discovery devices of Rule 2004. 111
The scope of an examination pursuant to Rule 2004 is extremely broad and has been compared to
"a fishing expedition.,,112 A Rule 2004 examination also has been referred to as "unfettered and broad" in
scope.

Interestingly, Rule 2004 is unique to bankruptcy law and procedure.

It affords few of the

procedural safeguards that an examination under, for example, Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure does. 113

109lt is noted that FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011(d) provides that subdivisions (a) (Signature); (b) (Representations to the Court); and (c) (Sanctions) do
not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, etc. that are subject to the provisions of FED. R. BANKR. P. 7026 through 7037.
11CThe term "entity" is broadly defined in § 101(15) of the Code.
111 Interestingly, if an adversary proceeding or contested matter is pending; Rule 2004 ordinarily should not be used. The scheme of discovery
provided for in Rules 7026-7037 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure should be utilized instead.
112See, e.g., In re Szadkowski, 198 B.R. 140 (Bankr. D. Md. 1996) (holding that discovery under Rule 2004(a) allows broad fishing expedition into
entity's affairs for the purpose of obtaining information relevant to administration of bankruptcy estate). See a/so In re M4 Enterprises, Inc., 190
B.R.471 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995) (holding that the policy behind Rule 2004(a) is to promote open-aired examination even for those on a "fishing
expedition").
113/n

re GHR Energy Corp., 33 B.R. 451,454 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983).
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Examinations under Rule 2004 are broadly allowed for the intended "purpose of discovering assets
and unearthing frauds."114 However, there are limits to the scope of examination pursuant to Rule 2004.
For example, it may not be used for "purposes of abuse and harassment," and it cannot stray into matters,
that are not relevant to the basic inquiry.115 The bankruptcy judge resolves objections to questions that
arise during the Rule 2004 examination at a later time, after the filing by the aggrieved party of a motion,
and after notice and a hearing. A general purpose of the examination pursuant to Rule 2004 is to locate
assets, to make those assets available for creditors under the statutory 'scheme of distribution, and to
assist in upholding the integrity of the bankruptcy system.
burdensome are not permitted under Rule 2004. 116

Examinations that are oppressive and

The doctrine of privileged communications, if

-applicable, applies to an examination pursuant to Rule 2004. 117
To prevent abuse, the parties and the courts have numerous and varied "police tools" to utilize, as
in the discovery deposition process, in order to fashion a proper result after considering appropriate
sanctions in light of a totality of the particular facts and circumstances. 118 Independent bodies that
investigate attorney conduct may assist in enforcement, as may the criminal justice system, as discussed
supra.
C.

Examinations at § 341 Meetings of Creditors Under the Bankruptcy Code

Subsection (a) of § 341 of the Code mandates that there be a meeting of creditors conducted
within a reasonable time after the order for relief in a case under the Code. Section 343 of the Code
requires the debtor to appear at the § 341 (a) meeting of creditors and submit to an examination under
oath that is administered by the United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator.

In contrast to

procedures under the former Bankruptcy Act and Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure, section 341(c) of the
Code expressly prohibits the bankruptcy judge from presiding at, or even attending, a meeting of creditors
or meeting of equity holders.
114Id.; see also in re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 156 B.R. 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd 17 F. 3d 600 (2d Cir. 1994).
115E.g., In re Miffco, Inc., 44 B.R. 35, 36 (Bankr. E.D.Wis. 1984).
116E.g., Vantage Petroleum Corp., 34 B.R. 650, 652 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983).
117The doctrine of privilege is governed by Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and is made applicable to bankruptcy cases by virtue of
Rule 9017 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.

118See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011; 28 U.S.C. § 1927; 11 U.S.C. § 105(a); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 37.
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A meeting of creditors held in accordance with § 341(a) is not an adjudicative proceeding; it is a
non-judicial meeting. 1 Nonetheless, unprofessional conduct of attorneys and trus~ees at such meetings is
sanctionable by the court. This statutorily required meeting of creditors is held in "all bankruptcy cases so
that creditors and other parties in interest including a bankruptcy trustee may broadly examine and
question the debtor."2 Civility and proper demeanor should prevail at the § 341(a) meeting of creditors.
The United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator, or his or her designee, presides over the § 341 (a)
meeting of creditors. 3 Disputed objections to questions or other unresolved problems that arise during the
non-judicial meeting of creditors, however, are decided by a bankruptcy judge at a later time, after notice
and a hearing. 4
The § 341 (a) meeting of creditors operates under the Code as the functional equivalent of a quasidiscovery deposition.

Unlike a discovery deposition, the sworn testimony of the debtor at a § 341(a)

meeting of creditors ordinarily is not admissible as direct evidence in a later Rule 7001(1)-(10) adversary
proceeding or Rule 9014 contested matter. 123 However, the debtor's sworn testimony at the § 341(a)
meeting of creditors ordinarily may be used in a subsequent proceeding including an adversary
proceeding, a contested matter, or a criminal action as, for example, an admission against interest or for
impeachment purposes.
Because the § 341(a) meeting of creditors under the Code is not a Part VII adversary proceeding
or a contested matter governed by Rule 9014 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, neither the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Federal Rules of Evidence are expressly applicable at the
meeting. 124 Further, non-attorney creditors who attend such meetings may participate and ask questions
of the debtor, and not be found guilty of engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. 125 To prevent abuse
11n re Kincaid, 146 B.R. 387, 388 (W.O. Tenn. 1992).
2 1d.

at 388.

1241d. at 389, quoting Handbook for Chapter 7 Trustees at pp. 66-68 (1988).
1251d. at 388. See also State Unauthorized Practice of Law Cmte. v. Paul Mason & Assoc., Inc., 46 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 1995); In re Filene's, 144
B.R. 617 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992); In re Clemmons, No. 392-09717, 1993 VVL 65450 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1992); In re Gravitt, No. 91-00017, slip op.
(Bankr. E.D. Ky. July 12, 1991); Wittman v. ITT Fin. Services, No. R-88-3244, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5189 (D. Md. 1989) (bench opinion); In re
Markley, No. B87-01429, slip op. (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Oct. 21,1987).
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at the § 341 (a) meeting of creditors, the parties and the courts should use the same "police tools"
discussed supra. For example, orders to compel and for sanctions may be entered where appropriate,
after notice and hearing.

v.

Inappropriate Personal Attacks and Derogatory or Offensive Statements Made During Oral
Arguments or Negotiations

In the heat of legal combat, an attorney may get caught up in the issue and become too zealous
and overly aggressive as an advocate for his/her client.

Such excitement may cause the attorney to

engage in inappropriate, vicious attacks or other unacceptable conduct or offensive statements during oral
arguments, negotiations, or other proceedings.

Attorneys must exercise emotional control or face

reprimand or sanctions by the court or a state board of professional responsibility for such inappropriate
and unprofessional conduct.

Simply put, attorneys are accountable for their unprofessional actions or

inactions.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a situation of an offending attorney who made
personal attacks and obnoxious statements in his brief and oral arguments. 126 In In re 60 East

8dh Street

Equities, Inc., the debtor's attorney, in his appellate brief addressing the order of the bankruptcy court,

made "disparag[ing] and unsubstantiated allegations that the bankruptcy court and the trustee were
engaged in civil and criminal misconduct.,,127
The attorney in In re 60 East

8dh Street Equities, Inc. continued with a disparaging laundry list of

offensive name-calling and accusational statements that were in reality completely unfounded.

The

attorney also accused the bankruptcy trustee of "fraud, deceit and misrepresentation," and of being an
"idiot who pocketed the purchase price of the judgments.,,128 The district court affirmed the bankruptcy
court's order and awarded sanctions sua sponte against the recalcitrant attorney.129 The court imposed
monetary sanctions against the attorney in the amount of $5,000, which was half of what the bankruptcy

126

ln fe 60 East 80th Street Equitie~1 Inc., 218 F.3d109 (2d Cir. 2000).

127 1d. at 113.
1281d.
129ld. (The sanctions were awarded pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for "maintain[ing] this appeal in bad faith for the purpose of multiplying the
proceedings in the case unreasonably and vexatiously," and for making "spurious allegations of criminality in his brief against the Bankruptcy
Judge and the Trustee.")
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trustee estimated as the cost of responding to the appeal from the bankruptcy court's decision. 130 The
attorney appealed the imposition of sanctions to the Second Circuit. 131 In the appellate brief, the attorney
continued calling the court offensive names and dispensing unfounded accusational statements. 132 The
Second Circuit upheld the sanctions imposed by the lower court. 133 The court further ordered double
costs and attorneys' fees of $5000, and stated that the court "shall not accept any more papers from [the
debtor's attorney] except upon proof of payment of the sanctions imposed by this Court and the District
Court.,,134
In another attorney discipline matter, the United States district court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee in

Lockheed Martin Energy Systems,

Inc.

v.

Siavin 135 found that the offending

defendant/attorney violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in six specific ways, which
included:
(5) pursuing a campaign of personal attacks on Lockheed and asserting irrelevant
matters to portray Lockheed as an entity of ill repute, undeserving of legal rights and
protections, without any legal or rational basis to believe such materials were germane in
any way to the Court's determination: and
(6) pursuing a campaign of personal attacks on Mr. Horde and asserting irrelevant
matters to malign Mr. Horde's character in an attempt to persuade the Court to discredit
anything filed by Mr. Horde on behalf of his client, without any legal or rational basis to
believe such materials were material in any way to the Court's determination. 136
The Slavin court imposed numerous sanctions against the offending attorney, including a
reprimand, requirement of a written apology, payment of costs and expenses, and an additional

$10,000.00 sanction that would be suspended provided the attorney complied with the other sanctions
and not engage in "conduct violative of Rule 11 before any Court, whether federal or state, judicial or
administrative."137

130/n re 60 East 80th Street Equities, 218 F.3d.at 115.
131/d.

133/d. at 118.
134/d.

135

at 121.

190 F.R.D. 449, 458 (E.D. Tenn. 1999).

136/d.

at 458.

137/d . at 461-2.
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VI.

Unsupported "Lawyer Testimony" During Oral Arguments

Understandably, "lawyer talk" during oral arguments ordinarily is not proof in a lawsuit. It should be
emphasized that an attorney's oral statements during arguments are not made under oath and, of course,
are not subject to cross-examination. The Code of Trial Conduct promulgated by the American College of
Trial Lawyers states that:
(a) In appearing in a professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer should not: ... (5) in
trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will
not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue
except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a
cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of
an accused ....138
"Lawyer talk or testimony" made during oral arguments may be objected to as being violative of the
Code of Trial Conduct and also as being abusive and offensive. Hearsay grounds additionally may exist,
especially if the lawyer is asserting hearsay as truth of the matter asserted. 139

In some instances, the

conduct and statements of the lawyer may serve as testimony of that lawyer during oral arguments in a
later proceeding. 140 By way of illustration, this conduct may include how the attorney acts, the introduction
or non-introduction of inadmissible evidence, inappropriate opening statements, the pleadings, witness
questioning, and "the invocation of rules excluding incompetent evidence and of privileges.,,141

In some

instances, these actions may even be seen and dealt with as party admissions. 142
Further, "[ilf litigation behavior is allowed to be used as evidence, this may lead to the introduction
of rebutting evidence that otherwise would not be offered.,,143

If, however, "the rebutting evidence has

slight probative value and would take a great deal of time or be very burdensome to present, it may be
excluded under the general principle set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 403.,,144

138American College of Trial Lawyers, Code of Trial Conduct, Standard 18(a)(5), 156 F.R.D. 275,289 (1994).
139John H. Mansfield, Evidential Use of Litigation Activity of the Parties, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 695, 696 (1992).

d. at 695-96.

140/

d. at 701.

141/

d . at 702.

143/

144/d.; see FED. R. BANKR. P. 9017.
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"Under certain

circumstances this principle might justify admitting evidence of relevant litigation behavior while excluding
other evidence designed to rebut it.,,145
If attorneys do present unsupported statements during oral arguments, this also may lead to issues
involving trial management. 146 For example, "[i]f in closing argument defense counsel asks the trier of fact
to draw an inference from plaintiffs counsel's behavior - for instance from a question put to a witness plaintiff may ask that the trier be prohibited from drawing the inference or that plaintiff be allowed to
reopen the case to introduce rebutting evidence. If the plaintiff had the burden to obtain clarification of the
law and failed to do so, there is not [sic] reason to disrupt the usual order of trial by allowing him to
introduce rebutting evidence after the defendant's closing argument.,,147
This scenario may also present the issue of the ethical prohibition of an attorney acting as a
witness in a case in which he/she is the attorney.148

Some may argue that "simply by using the lawyer's

conduct as an item of evidence, this prohibition will be violated."149 Others may argue that "the prohibition
will be violated because if the lawyer's conduct is used as an item of evidence, this may lead to rebuttal
testimony by the lawyer to explain his conduct. 150

There are, however, exceptions to this rule, and

"perhaps an exception should be recognized when it is the lawyer's trial conduct itself that is offered by the
opponent as evidence against the client and the lawyer takes the stand to rebut the adverse implications
of this conduct.,,151
During opening statements, counsel does have "an obligation not to refer to evidence he/she
knows he/she does not have or is not going to introduce, or that he/she knows would be barred by an
exclusionary rule.,,152

145 Mansfie/d,

supra

n. 139, at 702-3.

146/d. at 703.
147/d.

at 703-04.

148/d .

at 704.

d.

149/

150/d.
151/d.

at 706.

152/d.

at 717.
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VII.

Cloaking Improper Conduct or Communications From View of Bankruptcy Court Under the Guise of
"Settlement Negotiation"

The ACTL Code provides that:

"A lawyer should never make settlement proposals that are

designed to antagonize or further polarize the parties ... [a] lawyer should never engage in settlement
negotiations for the purpose of delaying discovery or gaining an unfair advantage ...[i]n participating in
settlement negotiations and alternative methods of resolving disputes, lawyers should practice the same
courtesy, candor, and cooperation expected of them during other pretrial proceedings.,,153
Additionally, Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, entitled Compromise and Offers of
Compromise, applies in cases under the Code by virtue of Rule 9017 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure. Pursuant to Rule 408, neither an offer to compromise, neither acceptance of such offer, nor
an actual completed compromise of a disputed claim is admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the
claim or its amount. Likewise, evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is not
admissible. 154
It is said that the reasons recognized for exclusion under Rule 408 are:
•

irrelevance, since the offer or compromise may, depending upon the circumstances, involve
a purchase or attempt to purchase peace rather than an admission of liability; and

•

policy, in that compromises, favored by public policy would be discouraged by admitting the
evidence.

Attorneys who intentionally and inappropriately cloak improper conduct or communications from
view of the bankruptcy court under the guise of "settlement negotiation" engage in unprofessional conduct.
Attorneys are required to be zealous officers of the court, and have a duty of candor and honesty to the
court. Such unprofessional conduct impugns the integrity of the profession and the judicial system itself.
VIII.

Utilization of Self-Serving Written Correspondence and E-Mail as Exhibits to Pleadings

Self-serving declarations of attorneys made during the course of a title 11 case or proceeding "are
not admissible in evidence as proof of the facts asserted."155 A self-serving declaration "is a declaration
made at some time and place out of court, and does not include testimony which one gives as a witness at
153ACTL

Code, at 10.

154 Rule 408 does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise
negotiations. This Rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a
witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
155

29A AM. JUR. 20 Evidence § 794 (2004).
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the trial. The objection to the admission of this kind of evidence is its hearsay character; the phrase 'selfserving' does not describe an independent ground of objection.,,156
An attorney's statement, however, may be "self-serving in one respect, but contrary to another
interest. In such a case, the court must balance the competing interests to determine their predominant
nature and ultimately the level of trustworthiness of the statement."157 The Supreme Court of Alabama
addressed this issue in Crawford v. Holmes & Waddell, Inc. 158 In Crawford, the court held that letters and
exhibits admitted in that case were admissible as tending to show the plaintiffs conception of the
contract. 159 The court stated:
The general rule of evidence ... "that a party cannot make evidence for himself
by his written communications address to the other party, as to the character of
dealings with them, or the liability of the party to whom they are addressed, in the
absence of any reply assenting to the same," is in accord with the rule of our
decisions.
There are, however, some exceptions to this general rule, and one of these is
that unanswered letters are admitted in favor of the writer when they are of the res
gestae of the transaction under investigation.
Another statement of this exception to the rule is that such letters are
admissible, though they contain self-serving declarations and are not a part of the
mutual correspondence, when they relate to existing contracts between the
parties. 160
IX.

Discovery Disputes and How and When to Bring Such Disputes to the Attention of the Bankruptcy
Court

Like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the
Code of Pretrial Conduct also addresses discovery disputes. More specifically, Standard 5(5) of the Code
of Pretrial Conduct states that: "When a discovery dispute arises, opposing lawyers should attempt to
resolve the dispute by working cooperatively together.

Lawyers should refrain from filing motions to

156ld.

158

280 Ala. 89 (1966).

1591d. at 91.
160 Id. In contrast, the Colorado Court of Appeals declined to admit self-serving correspondence as an exhibit because it lacked any foundation as
to its authenticity. Thrifty Rent-A-Car System of Colorado v. Chuck Ruwart Chevrolet, Inc., 500 P.2d 172, 175 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972) (not selected
for official publication).
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compel or for sanctions unless they have genuinely tried, but failed, to resolve the dispute through all
reasonable avenues of compromise and resolution."161
Discovery problems that cannot be consensually resolved by the parties should be promptly
submitted to the bankruptcy court for resolution via motion practice. The moving party ordinarily has the
burden of proof in such matters. The standard of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence considering
a totality of the particular facts and circumstances and applicable law.

Local rules and procedures

addressing such matters should be carefully considered.

x.

Conclusions

As zealous professional advocates and concerned officers of the justice system, bankruptcy
attorneys, as do all other attorneys, have ethical and statutory obligations to promote justice, to provide
equitable and efficient processes of dispute resolution, and to respect core values of honesty, fairness,
and good faith on which that process depends. 162 Many local judicial guidelines of professional courtesy
exist. 163 Efficient practice and professional conduct serve to minimize conflicts while discouraging unduly

161

ACTL Code at 4.

162

Deborah L. Rhode, Opening Remarks: Professionalism, 52 S.C. L. REV. 458, 467 (2001).

163

For example, the Memphis Bar Association has published the following Guidelines for Professional Courtesy and Conduct:

I.

COURTESY. CIVILITY AND PROFESSIONALISM

1. A lawyer should treat the opponent, the opposing party, the court and the members of the court staff with courtesy and civility,
conducting business in a professional manner at all times.
2. A lawyer has no right, even when called upon by a client to do so, to abuse or to indulge in offensive conduct toward the opposite
party. A lawyer should always treat adverse witnesses and parties with fairness and due consideration.
3. VVhile in adversary proceedings, clients are litigants, and while ill feelings may exist between them, such ill feeling(s) should not
influence a lawyer's conduct, attitude, or demeanor towards opposing lawyers.
4. A lawyer should do all that is necessary to ensure that clients, the public, and other lawyers respect the judicial system. To this
end, a lawyer should:
(a) Never knowingly misstate fact or law, regardless of any pressure to do so.
(b) Not engage in tactics that complicate or delay matters unnecessarily.
(c) Avoid creating unrealistic expectations of a client or the public.
(d) Avoid denigrating the legal profession, the court system or adversary counsel.
5. A lawyer should encourage methods and practices which simplify and make less expensive the rendering of legal services.
6. A lawyer should never institute or pursue a legal procedure solely for the lawyer's own profit where there is no reasonable
expectation that it will advance or contribute to the best interest of the client.
7. A lawyer should preserve and respect the law by observing all duties to the community and to the Profession. To this end, a
lawyer should:
(a) Contribute time and expertise to those unable to otherwise afford representation of their interests.
(b) Participate in public service and public education activities through personal involvement and financial contributions,
and encourage fellow lawyers to do the same.
(c) Work to develop among lawyers a strong commitment to the ideals of integrity, honesty, competence, fairness,
independence, courage, and dedication to the public interest.
8. A lawyer should recognize the importance of communication with both clients and adversaries. A lawyer should return all
telephone calls and respond to all correspondence promptly.
9. A lawyer should never deceive the court or another lawyer.
10. A lawyer should honor promises or commitments made to another lawyer.
11. A lawyer should make every reasonable effort to cooperate with opposing counsel.
12. A lawyer should maintain a cordial and respectful relationship with opposing counsel.
13. A lawyer should seek sanctions against opposing counsel only where required for the protection of the client or of the legal
system and not for mere tactical advantage.
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aggressive and abusive attorney conduct during the course of litigation, discovery, arbitration, or
mediation.
Attorneys have an obligation to be courteous, tolerant, patient, civil, and polite to the court and staff
of the court; this duty further extends to bankruptcy trustees and administrators, clients, opposing parties
and their counsel, and witnesses of the parties. It is not inconsistent for an attorney to zealously represent
a client while maintaining civility with his/her opposing counsel.

Despite common misconceptions,

effective advocacy does not require antagonistic, obnoxious and unprofessional "Rambo" tactics.

An

attorney should be ever mindful of his/her broader professional duty to the judicial system and should
demonstrate concern for public perceptions of the legal profession and its members. More to the point,
attorneys should not be overly contentious, combative, or bellicose. Courtesy, cooperation, and respect
for the court, trustees, bankruptcy administrators, clients, opposing counsel, and witnesses are, in reality,
professional strengths and virtues - not weaknesses. Personal dignity and professional integrity are vital
to the legal profession and the judicial process and public confidence. Attorneys who do not live up to
ethical and professional standards and the accompanying rules of conduct, for whatever reason(s),
essentially proceed at their own peril.
Bankruptcy courts, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), ordinarily may enter final orders in
response to unprofessional conduct as are just under the totality of the facts and circumstances of a
particular case or proceeding to prevent undue manipulation and abuse of the judicial process and to
protect the integrity of the bankruptcy court, its bar, the justice system as a whole, and the public. The
terms of attorney disciplinary orders are reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion; findings of fact are
not overturned unless they are clearly erroneous.
Understandably, the bankruptcy courts cannot afford to condone or tolerate unprofessional
attorney conduct, and no one should seriously quarrel with this obvious statement. Of course, in a perfect
bankruptcy world, the issue of unprofessional attorney conduct would never arise.

Nevertheless, as

earthly professionals and human beings, attorneys are expected to act with courtesy, civility, and
14. A lawyer should not make unfounded accusations of unethical conduct about opposing counsel.
15. A lawyer should never intentionally embarrass another lawyer and should avoid personal criticism of another lawyer.
16. A lawyer should always be punctual.
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professionalism. They should never retaliate in kind in response to unprofessional or unethical conduct of
other attorneys. Failure to act in a professional manner may result in dire consequences for attorneys
(and judges). However, the court imposing the sanctions must use the least restrictive sanction necessary
to deter inappropriate behavior. In other words, a court should exercise restraint when considering use of
its inherent power to impose sanctions.
In conclusion, it is expressly observed that the vast majority of today's attorneys sufficiently comply with the
governing and applicable rules and standards of ethical conduct and also act responsibly with all due deference to
professional courtesy and civility; and they are to be highly commended and respected for doing so. Unfortunately, it
seems that far too much time, effort, and costs are devoted to the dark underside of the legal profession. The harsh
reality is that a few unprofessional attorneys conduct their "trade/business" at the great expense and time of other
attorneys, their clients, the court, the justice system as a whole, and the public. Yet, there is no nobler profession
than that of the law!
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SECTION I

Ethical Issues And Fee Al!Plications
I.

The Changing Landscape: An Overview of Changes from "The
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005"
Affecting Compensation, Responsibilities, and Ethical Issues for
Practitioners

(A)

Sanctions for a Consumer Debtor's Attorney Under Section 707(b)
S. 256, Section 102 amends Section 707(b) of the Code. As a result, the attorney for a
Chapter 7 debtor is exposed to increased liability and is expected to shoulder new
responsibilities:
· Under Subparagraph (4)(A), upon a motion by any party in interest or upon'the
court's own initiative, an attorney may be forced to compensate a trustee who
successfully pursues a Section 707(b) motion if the court determines that the
Chapter 7 filing violated Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011;
· Subparagraph (4)(B) permits the court, whether upon its own initiative or the
motion of a party interest, to award a civil penalty against the attorney to be paid
to the trustee or United States trustee;
· Subparagraph (4)(C) signifies that an attorney's signature certifies that the
attorney has "performed a reasonable investigation into the circumstances that
gave rise to the petition, pleading or written motion" and found that it was "well
grounded in fact" and was not reliant upon an impermissible interpretation of law;
and
· Subparagraph (4)(D) establishes that an attorney's signature constitutes that the
attorney·has no information leading him or her to believe the petition is incorrect.

(B)

New Requirement to be an Individual Debtor Under Section l09(h) and Its Potential
Effect on Involuntary Consumer Bankruptcies
Pursuant to S. 256, Section 106, Section 109(h) now requires individual debtors to
receive credit counseling from a nonprofit credit or budget-counseling agency as
approved by new Section 111 of the Code. Individuals excepted from this requirement
include debtors who:
· Filed in a district that does not have adequate counseling services as determined
by the United States trustee;
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· Filed a motion explaining exigent circumstances and informing the court they
unsuccessfully sought briefing five days before their filing; and
· Are incapacitated, disabled, or are on active military duty in a combat zone.
Since individuals are required to receive debt counseling before they may be considered
debtors unless an exception applies, involuntary consumer bankruptcy filings may be
extremely restricted.

(C)

Minimum Requirements for Nonprofit Budget and Credit Counseling Agencies
Information about nonprofit budget and credit counseling agencies is found in Section
111, an addition to the Code. The United States Trustee must keep a list of approved
agencies. An agency is required to "provide qualified counselors, maintain adequate
provision for safekeeping and payment of client funds, provide adequate counseling with
respect to client credit problems, and deal responsibly and effectively with other matters
relating to the quality, effectiveness, and financial security of the services it provides."
Before approval, each agency must meet the following minimum criteria:
· Maintain a board of directors that has a majority of members that are outside
directors and "will not directly or indirectly benefit financially from the outcome
of the counseling services;"
· Charge a reasonable fee, if a fee is charged at all, and provide services whether
or not the client is able to pay;
· Uphold the integrity of client trust funds by conducting annual audits and
maintaining suitable bonding for employees;
· Provide complete disclosures including costs of the program and "how such
costs will be paid";
Analyze each client's financial situation focusing on the client's current
financial condition, reasons the client has financial difficulty, and creati<?n of a
responsive plan;
· Employ counselors who have "adequate" experience and training;
· Prohibit "commissions or bonuses based on the outcome of the counseling
services provided" paid to the counselors;
"[D]emonstrate adequate experience and background In providing credit
counseling", and
· Sustain "financial resources" to ensure agency support servIces so that all
repayment plans may be completed.
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(D)

Exclusive Jurisdiction of Section 327 Matters in District Where Bankruptcy is
Commenced or Pending
Section 1334(e)(2) of the Code, as added by Section 324 of S. 256, grants the district in
which the bankruptcy petition was filed or is pending. exclusive jurisdiction "over all
claims or causes of action that involve construction of [S]ection327."

(E)

Section 330(a)'s Methodology to Calculate Trustee Compensation
Under Subparagraph (a)(3) and pursuant to S. 256, Section 407, the phrase "trustee under
[C]hapter II" has been included as a person whose compensation, lik~ an examiner or
professional person, is based upon the following:
· The time spent on tasks;
· Rates charged for such services;
· Whether the tasks were "necessary" and "beneficial";
. The reasonableness of the time spent on the tasks;
The certification or experience with bankruptcy with respect to a professional
person only (an addition made pursuant to S. 256, Section 415); and
· The reasonableness based on rates charged by similarly skilled practitioners in
other bankruptcy matters.
Since Chapter 11 trustees are specifically mentioned in Subparagraph (a)(3) while
Chapter 7 trustees are not, it may be assumed that compensation for Chapter 7 trustees,
but not for Chapter 11 trustees, is detennined by new Subparagraph (a)(7) which states:
"In detennining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded a trustee, the court
shall treat compensation as a commission, based on [S]ection 326."

(F)

Clarification of Fee Arrangements for Professional Persons Under Section 328
Section 328, as amended by S. 256, Section 1206; now expressly approves fixed·fees or
percentage fees for professional persons.

(G)

Payment of a Chapter 7 Trustee When a Case Has Been Converted to Chapter 13 or
Refiled Under Chapter 13
If a case has been converted or dismissed under Section 707(b), a trustee may receive
some funds based on an amount previously awarded. Under new Section 1326(b)(3), as
enacted by S. 256, Section 1224; the trustee is paid based on a fonnula. In essence, the
trustee may receive, per month for the life of the plan, the greater of $25 or 5% of the
average monthly payment made to general unsecured creditors. Generally, most plans
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will not exceed an average of $500 per month for unsecured creditors. Therefore, over a
five-year plan, a trustee is likely to receive a maximum of$1500.

(H)

Appointment. of a Trustee in Chapter 11 if Management Has Engaged in "Fraud,
Dishonesty or Criminal Conduct"
Section 1405 of S. 256 adds Subparagraph (e) to Section 1104 of the Code. Now, the
United States trustee "shall move for the appointment of a trustee" if there are
"reasonable grounds to suspect" that the debtor's current management "participated in
actual fraud, dishonesty or criminal conduct in the debtor or the debtor's public financial
reporting."

(I)

Additional Duties of a Trustee or Debtor in Possession in a· "Small Business"
Chapter 11
Section 1116, a new addition to the Code, sets forth· additional responsibilities when the
debtor is considered·a "small business." In such a case the trustee or debtor in possession
must also:
· Append a balance sheet, statement of operations, cash-flow statement, and
federal income tax return or swear under penalty of perjury that these documents
have not been prepared;
· Attend meetings scheduled by. the court or United States trustee unless, after
. notice and a hearing, the court excuses such;
· Meet all deadlines for the filing of schedules and statement of financial affairs
unless the court, after notice and a hearing, grants an extension;
· File all required post-petition reports;
· In light of Section 363(c)(2), maintain "customary and appropriate" insurance
for the debtor's industry;
· Subject to Section 362(c)(2), pay all taxes that are deemed an administrative
expense except those that are being appropriately contested;
File all government filings (including tax returns) ina timely fashion; and
Permit the United States trustee to review the debtor's business records and
inspect the debtor's premises upon adequate written notice or a waiver of notice
by the debtor.
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II.

Compensation Issues in Chapter 7 Bankruptcies

(A)

Chapter 7 Debtor's Attorneys Cannot Receive Payment from the Estate for PostConversion Work (Laime v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004»
In Laime, the petitioner had been retained to serve as counsel for the Chapter 11 debtor.

The case was eventually converted to Chapter 7, but Laime continued to perform services
on the debtor's behalf. Eventually, Laime filed a fee application that included a request
for payment for post-conversion work. The United States trustee objected to payment out
of the pool o'funencumbered estate funds.
The United States Supreme Court turned to a text of Section 330 in light of its
amendment by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994. While agreeing that the language of
the current Section 330(a)(I) was clumsy, the Court refused to find an ambiguity based
on improper grammar in a statute. Since the amendment deleted any reference to "the
debtor's attorney," the petitioner was precluded from receiving payment under Section
330(a)(I).
The petitioner argued that a plain reading of Section 330(a)(I) would prohibit debtors
from obtaining' necessary counsel. The Court addressed this assertion by emphasizing
that a debtor's attorney in a Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy is still entitled to
reasonable compensation. Further, with reference to Section 327(a) and (e), the Court
stated it was possible for a Chapter 7 debtor's attorney to receive payment if the trustee
approves. Finally, the Court concluded that the "common practice" for Chapter 7
debtors' attorneys to ensure their compensation is via a retainer, and the Court's
interpretation of Section 330(a)(I) does not disturb this method.
(B)

Dischargeability of Fees for Pre-Petition Work (Rittenhouse v. Eisen, -- F.3d --, 2005
WL 774306 (6th eire April 7, 2005»
In Rittenhouse, a debtor failed to pay a previously agreed-upon sum to her attorney for

services rendered prior to her Chapter 7 filing. The United States Trustee successfully
moved the court to prevent collection of the fees. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed.
In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals focused on a plain reading of Sections

727(b) and 523(a). Section 727(b) permits a discharge of all debts except those listed in
Section 523(a). None of the nineteen exceptions in Section 523(a) applied to pre-petition
attorney's fees; therefore, the debt was dischargeable.
The appellant presented two arguments: (1) the Section 329 requirement of disclosure by
the debtor's attorney for all payments or agreements to pay within one year of the filing
would be made meaningless and (2) the benefits of bankruptcy would be unavailable to
debtors who could not pay for an attorney upfront.
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First, the court determined that Section 329 still serves a substantial purpose as authority
for the bankruptcy court to detennine if pre-paid attorney's fees are reasonable and· to
recover any excessive amount, to investigate any affirmed debts for attorney's fees to
ensure they are reasonable, and to decide if non-dischargeable, post-petition debts to
attorneys are ul1!easonable.
In turning to the second argument, the court deferred to the legislature. The court
conceded that prior to filing for bankruptcy, a debtor could be forced to forego payments
to suppliers of necessities resulting .in a negative impact on the general public. However,
the court held this was a policy issue requiring Congressional attention.

(C)

Decisions from Other Circuit Courts of Appeals Regarding Dischargeability of Fees
Under Chapter 7 for Pre-Petition Services
Rittenhouse noted that three other circuits have determined .whether pre-petition
attorney's fees are dischargeable: In re Fickling, 361 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding
that attorney's fe~s incurred after the filing of a Chapter 11 petition but before the
conversion of the case to Chapter 7 are dischargeable under Section 727); Bethea v.
Adams & Assocs., 352 F.3d 1125 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding debts arising out of a
prepetition agreement are dischargeable); and In re Biggar, 110 F.3d 685 (9th cir. 1997)
(discharging fees sought post-petition for pre-petition work).

(D)

Use of a Chapter 7 Retainer for Payment of Post-Conversion Fees (In re CK
Liquidation Corp., 321 B.R. 10 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005)
In CK Liquidation, Ropes and Grays, LLP ("R&G") was retained to represent the debtor
in its Chapter 11 reorganization. As part of the agreement, R&G received a retainer.
. After the court approved a sale of virtually all of the debtor's assets, the case was
converted to a Chapter 7 upon the debtor's motion. Subsequent to conversion, R&G filed
the post-petition list of creditors, attended the Section 341 meeting, and "generally
assisted the trustee with such transition as the trustee required to familiarize himself with
the case." R&G's final fee application included a request for $7,820 in post-conversion
fees. The United States Trustee objected based on his contention that Laime precluded a
debtor's attorney from receiving payment for post-conversion work unless the Chapter 7
trustee employs the attorney.

First, the court concluded that Laime did not address whether an attorney who performed
services for a converted Chapter 11 debtor could obtain payment for post-conversion
work from a pre-petition security retainer. Thus, Laime was not dispositive. Next, the
court viewed the pre-petition retainer as encumbered property, irrespective of its alleged
status as property of the estate. Relying on the applicable state law, the court determined
that R&G had a lien against the retainer funds. So long as there are undisbursed funds
and a valid claim, subject to review by the court, the debtor's attorney may utilize a prepetition retainer as compensation for services.
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(E)

Attorneys Can Draw Down a Pre-Petition Retainer for Pre-Petition Work But
Cannot Draw Down a Pre-Petition Retainer for Post-Petition Work for a Debtor
(Fiegen Law Firm, P.C. v. Fokkena (In re On-Line Services Ltd.), -- B.R. --, 2005 WL
600361 (8th Cir. BAP March 16, 2005»
In On-Line Services, the Fiegen Law Firm ("Fiegen") obtained a $9,000 retainer to
represent On-Line in its Chapter 7 bankruptcy. A trustee was appointed, but the trustee
did not hire Fiegen as special counsel. Fiegen continued to do work for the debtor.
Eventually, Fiegen filed a $6,977.77 bill for legal services: $3,693.27 for pre-petition
work and $2,284.50 for post-petition services.

The court determined that the retainer was property of the estate; however, it was subject
to a retaining lien to the extent the lien was for a reasonable amount based upon prepetition services rendered. The reasonableness of pre-petition services is determined
under Section 329.
The court, relying on Laime and Eighth Circuit cases, stated that Fiegen could not be
awarded estate funds for post-petition work. Any lien for unperformed services did not
survive the filing of the petition. Specifically, "[a] security retainer, to the extent it is
valid, is extinguished on the petition date with respect to any future advances."
(F)

Disgorgement of Retainer Held as Interim Compensation (Specker Motor Sales, Co.
v. Eisen, Case No. 03-1893 (6th Cir. Dec. 17,2004»
Specker Motor Sales filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy on March 18, 1997, and Donald Bays
("Bays") was authori,zed to serve as counsel to the debtor. As part of the agreement,
Bays received a $10,000 retainer. On September 24, 1997, the case was converted to
Chapter 7. On February 4,2002, Bays's final application for $17,343.10 was approved.
The bankruptcy court let him keep the $10,000 retainer as interim compensation. After
final liquidation, the court determined that each of the administrative claimants, including
Bays, was entitled to a pro rata share of only $973.41. Thus, the bankruptcy court
ordered Bays to disgorge $9,026.59. Bays objected on the grounds that the $10,000 had
already been paid out of the e~tate.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that interim compensation could be adjusted and
is subject to disgorgement. Based on the plain meaning· of Section 726(b), all likesituated creditors get a pro-rata share. To permit a professional who received a retainer to
keep that retainer would upset the Code's carefully considered balance of payments. The
court notes that "interim compensation is never anything but an administrative expense."
As such, disgorgement of interim compensation is always a viable option to ensure pro
rata distribution.
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III.

Chapter 7 Trustee's Compensation When Case is Converted

(A)

Chapter 7 Trustee May Receive Quantum Merit Award When Case is Converted in
Spite of Section 326(a) (In re Moore, 235 B.R.414 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1999»
The debtor initially filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. At the Section 341 meeting, the
Chapter 7 trustee uncovered'several sums of money that had not been included in the
petition. The debtor converted his case to Chapter 13.
After conversion, the Chapter 7 trustee filed a fee application requesting compensation.
The bankruptcy court decided, en banc, that the Chapter 7 trustee had discovered assets
that led to a much greater payout under Chapter 13 than the creditors would have
received under Chapter 7. As such, the trustee was entitled to a quantum meruit award
payable as a Chapter 13 administrative expense.
Before figuring the amount, the court must first determine if the trustee's "substantial"
efforts resulted in a benefit to the creditors. After considering the advantage enjoyed by
the creditors due to the trustee's work, the court will look to "the amount of services
performed by the [t]rustee." The court expressly states that this method would not apply
if the trustee applies for compensation as the attorney for the Chapter 7 estate.

(B)

Other Cases Allowing a Chapter 7 Trustee to Receive a Quantum Meruit Award for
Service Provided Pre-Conversion
A majority of courts favor a quantum meruit award for a Chapter 7 trustee who has
conducted work that benefits the creditors in lieu of a literal application of Section
326(a). In re Main Realty & Management, LLC, 277 B.R. 1,8 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2002).
As listed in Main Realty, some of these include: In re Rodriguez, 240 B.R. 912 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 1999) (granting quantum meruit compensation when the Chapter 7 trustee's
investigation and adversary proceeding led to a conversion); In re Washington, 232 B.R.
814 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999) (allowing quantum meruit award because trustee found
several undisclosed assets before conversion to Chapter 13); and In re Colburn, 231 B.R.
778 (Bankr. D. Or. 1999) (permitting fees on a quantum meruit basis since trustee's work
led to Chapter 13 conversion for a Chapter 7· "no asset" case). See also In re Horton,
2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1408 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2004).

(C)

Cases Applying a Strict Application of Section 326(a) to Prevent an Award of
Compensation for Chapter 7 Trustee Upon Conversion
Under Chapter 7, a trustee's payment is limited to a percentage of funds disbursed to
creditors. Some courts have refused to compensate a Chapter 7 trustee for services'
conducted in a subsequently converted case. Those that have utilized this rationale
include In re Murphy, 272 B.R. 483 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2002) (rejecting a Chapter 7
trustee's application for fees in a converted case based on Section 326(a)).
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IV.

Maximum Compensation for Trustees

(A)

Procedure for Determining Chapter 7 Trustee's Compensation (In re Moss, 320 B.R.
143 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2005»
In re Moss reviews procedures and Code provisions relating to a Chapter 7 trustee's
application for the maximum amount of fees allowable under Section 326(a). Upon the
debtor's objection, ,the court concluded that the trustee did not meet ~is burden for
maximum compensation.
In determining a trustee's fees, the Moss Court applied Section 330 ("Compensation of

Officers") before Section 326 ("Limitation on Compensation of Trustee"). Stated
differently, a court must first calculate the "reasonable" compensation of the trustee
under Section 330 and then apply Section 326 to limit the amount ifnecessary.
Section 330 contains factors used to determine th'e "reasonableness" of a request for
compensation, and the trustee must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
requested fees are "reasonable" and necessary. The court noted that a fee application
must comply with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2016(a) (requiring the trustee to keep accurate
records including time expended) and any local bankruptcy rules.
Once a court has the trustee's fee application, the court makes a reasonableness decision
using the lodestar method. First, the court multipl~s the proven number of hours
expended by a reasonable hourly rate to determine the lodestar figure. Second, the
lodestar figure is adjusted up or down to reach a reasonable result. Courts look to the
factors enumerated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.
1974), for both steps: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the
question; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service; (4) the preclusion of other
employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6)
whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the
circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience,
reputation, and ability of the attorney; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the
nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in
similar cases.
In Moss, the court recognized that the trustee ably performed his duties and limited the

costs of administration, but more was needed to permit an upward' adjustment of the
lodestar figure. Also, the court acknowledged that trustees often received a meager
compensation for the many "no asset" cases; however, awarding a trustee an upward
adjustment for this reason alone would amount to a tax on particular debtors and their
creditors.
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(B)

Common Fund Approach Not Allowed to Calculate Trustee's Fees (In re MiniScribe
Corp., 309 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2002»
In MiniScribe, a trustee was awarded the maximum percentage under Section 326 for
recovery of a pool of money by the bankruptcy court with a lodestar multiplier of 3.5.
The district court rejected the sum as excessive, denied the 'use of the common fund
method of calculation in this case, and remanded .to the bankruptcy court. On remand,
the bankruptcy court reapplied the common fund method. Eventually, the case reached
the court of appeals.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals faced a choice between application of the lodestar
test to gauge trustee's fees and the common fund approach. The common fund approach
awards a percentage of a pool of funds recovered for the benefit of third parties (e.g. an
attorney that recovers money for her clients). Noting very little case law on the
differences between the lodestar test and the common fund approach in ascertaining a
trustee's compensation, the MiniScribe Court's review lead to a decision endorsing the
lodestar test as the method to calculate a Chapter 7 trustee's fees.
The MiniScribe Court first held that reasonableness must be determined under Section
330 before the maximum amounts can be set under Section 326. Then, the court
investigated use of the. common fund approach. It resolved that the common fund
approach was inappropriate for the following reasons:
(1) Section 326 serves only as a cap and does not establish the trustee's
entitlement to a commission or percentage of amounts disbursed from the
estate; (2) there is no principled relationship between the amounts disbursed
by a debtor corpo~ation and reasonable compensation based on the trustee's
actual efforts; (3) there is no support in case law for a common fund
approach; (4) setting reasonable compensation based on a percentage of the
debtor's disbursements would create a substantial risk of abuse in the
selection and appointment of trustees by the United' States trustee; and (5) a
percentage compensation approach could discourage courts from appointing
a trustee when it might otherwise be appropriate.

In re Miniscribe, 309 F.3d at 1242, citing In re Marvel Entertainment Group, 234 B.R.
21 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999).
The court also referenced a key difference between a trustee and a litigator: the trustee
receives periodic compensation in the role of a fiduciary while a litigator has a
completely different skill set, fronts the costs of litigation in some cases, and receives a
contingency based on his/her recovery. Additionally, Section 330 specifically requires
consideration of the time· spent on services. If a common fund method were permissible,
this factor would not be given proper weight. .Finally, there is no Code provision
expressly allowing a trustee to work on a .contingency basis' the way there is for the
attorney of a trustee.
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v.

Reevaluation of Payment Terms

(A)

Test to Determine if Fee Arrangement has been Pre-Approved (Nischwitz v.
Miskovic (In re Airspect Air, Inc.), 385 F.3d 915 (6th eire 2004»
Nischwitz, an attorney, was approved by the bankruptcy court to serve as special counsel
for a debtor in possession to prosecute a breach of contract claim. The attorney's
application to the court specified a $7,000 retainer fee and a contingency fee arrangement
providing for between 33%-50% of any settlement or award. The bankruptcy court
issued an ordering stating that "Airspect [the debtor in possession] is authorized to pay
the sum of $7,000 of corporate funds as partial retainer for expenses." Furthermore,
Nischwitz was required to "submit application for fees to this Court for approval."
Once the lawsuit was resolved, Nischwitz sought over $189,000 in compensation. The
bankruptcy court denied his request and determined that $37,050, as calculated using an
hourly rate, was reasonable. Nischwitz appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel. The Panel reversed because the judge had approved the
contingency fee pursuant to Section 328. The court was obligated to pay the contingency
fee unless it proved improvident. The bankruptcy court decided it had improvidently
approved the agreement. Turning to Section 330, the bankruptcy court concluded that
$37,050 was reasonable. Also, the bankruptcy court concluded that its order did not
approve Nischwitz's contingency fee pursuant to Section 328. Once again, the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed, and the matter was brought before the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that an order that only
indirectly approved a contingency fee agreement did not satisfy the Section 328. If
Section 328 does not apply, compensation is judged for reasonableness under Section
330.
The Sixth Circuit adopted a "totality of the circumstances" test under which the court
looks to factual circumstances of the professional's motion for pre-approval of
compensation and the court's subsequent order. For a court to pre-approve a contingency
fee arrangement pursuant to Section 328, the court should check for the following factors:
(1) whether the. debtor's motion for appointment specifically requested fee
pre-approval; (2) whether the court's order assessed the reasonableness of
the fee; and (3) whether either the order or the motion expressly invoked
Section 328.
In re Airspect Air, Inc., 385 F.3d at 922. Neither Nischwitz's motion for pre-approval
nor the court's order mentioned the terms of the contingency agreement or the
reasonableness of the fee. The court concluded that the arrangement was not preapproved and remanded the case to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel to determine if
$37,050 was reasonable under Section 330.
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(B)

Decisions from Other Circuit Courts of Appeals
Airspect referenced decisions from the United States Courts of Appeals for the Third and
Ninth Circuits. The. Third Circuit requires the order approving a compensation
agreement to "unambiguously state specific terms and conditions" that are approved, or
otherwise, the lodestar analysis is conducted to determine reasonableness. Zolfo, Cooper
& Co. v. Sunbeam-Oster Co., Inc., 50 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit is even
stricter in its requirements. For valid pre-approval of a payment arrangement, the
professional's application must specifically invoke Section 328. In re Circle K Corp.,
279 F.3d 669 (9th Cir. 2002). Deeming those two tests too strict, the Sixth Circuit
adopted the more flexible "totality of the circumstances" test for determining preapproval of contingency fee arrangements.

VI.

Fees Limited to Work that Benefits the Estate

(A)

In General: The Bankruptcy Code's rules regarding disinterestedness also govern the
lawyers' behavior during the case. Section 327 prohibits the attorney from holding or
representing an interest adverse to the estate and requires the attorney to be
"disinterested." Section 328(c) makes clear that the attorney must remain disinterested
throughout the case as a precondition to an award of fees. That section provides:
(c) Except as provided in section 327(c), 327(e), or 1107(b) of this title, the
court may deny allowance of compensation for services and reimbursement
of expenses of a professional person employed under section 327 or 1103 of
this title if, at any time during such professional person's employment under
section 327 or 1103 of this title, such professional person is not a
disinterested person, or represents or holds an interest adverse to the interest
of the estate with respect to the matter on which such professional person is
employed.
Section 330(a) provides another way to approach the problem. Short of a finding of
disinterestedness, the court could deny the attorney's application for fees upon a finding
that the legal work was not necessary or was not reasonably likely to provide a benefit to
the estate. Section 330 provides in part:
(a)(I) After notice to the parties in interest and the United States
Trustee and a hearing, and subject to sections 326, 328, and 329, the
court may award to a trustee, an examiner, a professional person
employed under section 327 or 1103-(A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services
rendered by the trustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney
and by any paraprofessional person employed by any such person;
and
(B) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses ...

1- 12

(4)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the court shall not allow
compensation for-(i) unnecessary duplication of services; or
(ii) services that were not(I) reasonably likely to benefit the debtor's estate; or
(II) necessary to the administration ,of the case.
Cases addressing contested fee applications have used both approaches to limit attorneys'
fees when courts have concluded that the attorney has taken actions that were designed to
benefit one group of interested parties at the expense of others.

(B)

In re Kendavis Ind. Int'l Ltd., 91 B.R. 742 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) remains the best
example of a case finding that the debtor in possession's lawyer's actions during a case
provided evidence that the attorney was not disinterested. In Kendavis, the court also
found evidence of a lack of disinterestedness in correspondence between the attorney and
the shareholders of the debtor. The court made clear that the ethical obligation of the
attorney for the debtor in possession is to' exercise independent professional judgment on
behalf of its client. Actions that benefited only shareholders evidenced an unwillingness
to exercise that judgment and resulted in the denial of $2 million of fees.

(C)

In re Office Products ofAmerica, 136 B.R. 983 (Bankr. W.D. Tex 1992), provides a
different take on the analysis. In that case, the court was confronted with claims that the
attorney for the debtor in possession had failed to remain disinterested. The court
rejected the approach stating:
The trustee would have this court hold that, in essence, proposing such a
plan necessarily created a conflict of interest, and debtor's counsel, by
advancing that plan in the face of creditor opposition, developed a conflict
of interest, justifying their disqualification under § 327(a) and a concomitant
disallowance of their fees under § 328(c).
There are serious policy ramifications to such a holding, however, which
auger against deciding the case on that basis. The cramdown provisions of
the Code are an expression of congressional intent regarding the importance
of reorganization values even in the face of considerable creditor opposition,
provided those creditors' interests are appropriately protected. H.Rep. No.
595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220-21, 416-18 (1977). Were we to hold here
that pursuing those goals over the objections of creditors in and of itself
created a conflict of interest, lawyers would be discouraged from even
representing debtors in the face of creditor opposition (even ifthe plan could
pass muster under § 1129(b», for fear of not being paid.
Such a result is so antithetical to the structure of the reorganization chapters
that we must retreat from such a harsh ruling. If there is a basis for the
trustee's objections to the fees requested, this is not it (at least not under the
facts of this case). We tum to the other arguments raised by the trustee.
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Id. at 986-87. Thus, rather than use a blanket approach to the question, the court chose to
examine the attorney's fee application on an issue by issue basis.
In conducting this examination, the court focused on the requirement of Section 330 that
compensation be awarded only if the services 'rendered were necessary to the estate. The
court concluded:
The fee detail does indeed suggest that there was a point in time when the
debtor knew or should have known that pursuit of this plan flew in the face
of § 1129(a), yet the debtor pushed on anyway. At that point, the services
of counsel were no longer "necessary," as the debtor was no longer at that
point discharging its duties as fiduciary of the estate, was no longer pursuing
legitimate reorganization.
Instead, the fight against conversion and the
insistence on pursuing the plan served interests other than those of the
estate, namely maintaining then-current management's control over the
enterprise.
Counsel could no longer expect to be compensated for its
services at this point under the standards set by § 330(a), for its services
were no longer "actual, necessary" services associated with representing the
debtor-in- possession in the discharge of its fiduciary duties to the estate and
its beneficiaries, the creditors.
Id. at 990-91. ,Thus, the court recognized a responsibility on the part of the attorney to
exercise his or her own judgment as to whether continued efforts at reorganization are
futile. At that point, counsel proceeds only at the risk that fees for those continued efforts
will be denied.
(D)

In re Wilde Horse Enterprises, Inc., 136 B.R. 830 (Bankr. C.D.Calif. 1991), the court
denied the attorney for the debtor in possession all of her fees because the attorney failed
to investigate the circumstances surrounding the sale of assets of the estate to a party
related to the debtor's principals. In the opinion, the court provided an extensive review
of the obligations of the attorney for the debtor in possession:
An attorney's "client" is the person or entity on whose behalf the lawyer
acts. In certain proceedings an attorney may have more than one client,
and where this is so, they owe duties of loyalty to all the interests
represented. The duty of loyalty includes a duty of candor--candor to all
the interests represented. "A lawyer like a trustee is bound to higher
standards than the morals of the marketplace." MGIC Indemnity
Corporation v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500,504 (9th Cir.1986). "Professional
ethics requires of a lawyer a decent sense 'of responsibility to all those he
[or she] serves." Id, at 504.

Because the attorney for debtor in possession is a fiduciary of the estate
and an officer of the Court, the duty to advise the client goes beyond
responding the client's requests for advice. It requires an active concern
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for the interests of the estate, and its beneficiaries, the unsecured creditors.
Consequently, the attorney may not simply close his or her eyes to matters
having a legal and practical consequence for the estate-- especially where
the consequences may have an adverse effect. The attorney has the duty
to remind the debtor in possession, and its principals, of its duties under
the Code, and to assist the debtor in fulfilling those duties.
186 B.R. at 840. The court went on to analyze the red flags that should have resulted in
further investigation and concluded that the attorney had utterly failed to uphold her duty
to the court and the estate.

(E)

In ICM Notes, Ltd., v. Andrews and Kurth, L.L.P., 278 B.R. 117 (S.D. Tex. 2002), a
secured creditor, extending the analysis of cases holding that the attorney owes a duty to
the estate, brought a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the attorneys for the debtor in
possession. The court rejected the claim, holding that an attorney for a DIP does not owe
a duty to specific creditors, stating:
[I]n a bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor, secured creditors, unsecured
creditors, and other related parties have different and competing interests...
. The Bankruptcy Code requires that a debtor's attorney be disinterested and
not represent the interest of any party to the bankruptcy case other than the
debtor. The Code contains prohibitions against conflicts of interest and
requires that compensation be paid from an estate only if the services
provided by counsel benefit the estate. 11 U.S. C. §§ 327, 328. A finding
that debtor's counsel owes a particular duty to an individual creditor in a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding would prevent counsel from representing
his client in accordance with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
Further, ICM Notes [the secured creditor] was an adverse party to ICM,
Inc., the debtor, and was fully represented by its own counsel during the
course of the bankruptcy proceedings. A ruling that counsel of adebtor-inpossession owes a fiduciary duty to a particular creditor is contrary to the
tenet of the Bankruptcy Code mandating that debtor's counsel be
disinterested. Therefore, the Court finds that counsel for a debtor-inpossession does·not owe any fiduciary duties to a particular creditor.
228 B.R. at 126 (citations omitted).

(F)

In re Phoenix Group Corporation, 305 B.R. 447 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003) the court
brought the connection between the attorney's duty to the estate and the attorney's
compensation full circle when it overruled the debtor's objection to a fee application filed
by the counsel for the DIP. The basis of the objection was that the law firm failed to seek
a trustee in a related case and failed·to object to ttle plan filed in that related case. The
court noted several cases that· discuss the duty of the attorney to the estate and noted that
the attorney was under an obligation to rely on its professional judgment in determining
whether the requested actions would'be contrary to its ethical and fiduciary obligations.
305 B.R. at 452.
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VII. Disgorgement and Denial of Fees for Unethical Conduct
(A)

Disgorgement is Appropriate if Examiner is Disinterested (In re Big Rivers Elec.
Corp., 355F.3d 415 (6th Cir. 2003»
The Chapter 11 debtor, Big Rivers.Electric Corporation, was a publicly-regulated utility.
J. Baxter Schilling was appointed as examiner to facilitate a global agreement with
creditors and to negotiate a· plan of reorganization. Shortly after his appointment,
Schilling sought, and in at least one case obtained, the agreement of some large
unsecured creditors to pay him a "success fee" of three percent of their enhanced
recovery from the estate. During the course of his employment as examiner, Schilling
filed interim fee applications that contained Disclosure Statements asserting that he had
no improper interests that were adverse to the estate. Although the court noted that
Schilling was, in large part, responsible for the development of a reorganization plan that
included several million dollars new value for creditors, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the disgorgementof all fees paid to Schilling and
his law firm, a sum of nearly one million dollars.
Pursuant to Section 11 04(b), an examiner must be a "disinterested person." In Section
101(14)(E), the Code defines a disinterested person as an individual that does not have a
materially adverse interest to the estate, any creditors, or any security holders because· of
a relationship with the debtor "or for any other reason." The court concluded that
Congress intended examiners to uphold the same fiduciary duties as trustees.
The court examined the duties of an examiner in a bankruptcy case. Based upon Section
101(14), an examiner cannot have an interest that is adverse to any party in the
bankruptcy at any time. F~rther,examiners are required to disclose any· perceived
agreements relating to compensation. Also, examiners owe a duty of loyalty to the debtor
and creditors.
The court found that Schilling did not properly discharge his duties. He was not
disinterested because of his agreement with a creditor for a "success fee." Schilling did
not properly disclose his understanding that some of the creditors would augment his
compensation. The court also agreed that Schilling violated his duty of loyalty by
entering into, or attempting to enter into, .side agreements with some creditors and by
misrepresenting his actions to the bankruptcy court. By going outside of Section 330(a),
Schilling attempted to impermissibly increase his compensation in a self-interested
manner. Finally, the court of appeals approved disgorgement· of all fees whenever an
examiner becomes disinterested.

(B)

Denial of Compensation Permitted if Professional is not ·Disinterested (Schilling v.
Smith, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16865 (W.D. Ky. 2003»
In Smith, the bankruptcy court again disallowed all of the trustee's fees for his failure to

remain disinterested while serving as a trustee and attorney for the trustee in a Chapter 7
case. Schilling, as trustee, filed a complaint against Smith, the debtor, objecting to his

1- 16

discharge. Schilling alleged the debtor's brother had received a fraudulent conveyance.
The trustee and the debtor entered into an agreement settling the matter. Schilling
included a provision in the settlement agreement that specified the debtor would not
object to the allowance of claims. Additionally, the debtor agreed to support Schilling's
request for previously disallowed attorney's fees.
In an effort to justify his trustee fees, Schilling then filed seven claims after the bar date
and after the period in which the trustee may file claims under Federal Bankruptcy Rules
3002 and 3004. The bankruptcy court found that both the settlement agreement and the
tardily filed claims violated·Schilling's requirement to remain disinterested and his duty
to the debtor and the estate. The district court upheld' the denial of the trustee's
compensation and disgorgement ofpreviously awarded fees.

(C)

Conflict Arising· from Attorney's Representation of Debtor That Filed a Proof of
Claim in Another Bankruptcy and the Attorney's Representation of a Creditor
Contesting Payment to the Other Debtor's Estate (In re Grieb Printing, Co., 297 B.R.
82 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2003»
Schilling once again faced sanction for a conflict of interest in Grieb Printing. Schilling
was appointed trustee in the Grieb Printing bankruptcy. The court approved Schilling's
application to serve as attorney for the trustee. In· his dual capacity, he filed a proof of
claim in the LMC bankruptcy case, an unrelated proceeding. Subsequently, Schilling
was contacted by Michael Heideman. Heideman sought Schilling's representation in the
LMC bankruptcy regarding a dispute over insurance funds. Schilling did not recall the
proof of claim he filed on behalf of Grieb Printing in the LMC bankruptcy. Schilling did
not conduct a conflicts check using ~ computerized database of his current and former
clients. Schilling agreed to represent Heideman in the LMC bankruptcy.
The court found Schilling's representation of Heideman and Grieb Printing to be a
conflict of interest. When Schilling agreed to serve as Heideman's attorney, he argued
for Heideman's ownership of certain proceeds that would otherwise belong to the estate.
If the funds were part of the estate, there would have been more funds for the proof of
claim Schilling filed on behalf of Grieb Printing. A conflict of interest is measured by
whether an attorney could have made unbiased decisions for both of his or her clients.
Therefore, while serving as attorney on behalf of Heideman, Schilling advanced an
interest that was adverse to the estate and was subject to sanction under Section 328(c).
For much the same reason, Schilling as the trustee became liable for sanctions under
Section 326(d) when he allowed Schilling the attorney to undertake representation of
Heideman.
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VIII. Other Cases of Interest
(A)

Conflict of Interest Created where Debtor's Attorney's Fee for Redemption is
Funded through Redemption Loan·Agreement; Excessive Fee for Redemption. (In
re Miller, 312 B.R. 626 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2004»
In Miller, the debtor's attorney prepared and filed an uncontested motion to redeem the
debtor's automobile. Upon the entry of the motion, the United States Trustee filed a
motion to examine the fees the debtor's attorney received for preparing the motion. The
attorney's Disclosure of Compensation form listed a fee of$750 but was silent regarding
whether this fee would cover legal work for redemptions. The motion to redeem was
also silent regarding additional attorney's fees for the work relating to the motion.
Notwithstanding this lack of disclosure to the court, the debtor's attorney received a fee
of $400 from the lender, 722 Redemption Funding, Inc. The amount was included in the
loan made by the lender to the debtor to finance the redemption.
The court held that $400 was an excessive fee for filing a pro~forma redemption motion
and also held that the method of funding the fees created a conflict·ofinterest and that the
structure of the transaction was designed to keep the debtors unaware that they were
paying anything for the redemption work. The court ordered the firm to refund the $400
plus interest to the debtor.

(B)

Willful Violation of Fee Disclosure Obligations Requires Complete Disgorgement of
all Fees. (In re McCrary & Dunlap Construction Co., LLC, 263 B.R. 574 (M.D. Tenn.
2001).
In McCrary, special counsel for the debtor failed to file fee applications or receive prior
court approval for payments of fees from the estate. Counsel also failed to disclose the
source of retainers received by the largest unsecured creditor of the debtor. The
bankruptcy court required disgorgement of 10% of the payments received plus $500 for
one of the retainers, reasoning that the violations were not willful. In its decision, the
bankruptcy court took note of the fact that counsel sincerely apologized and that the firm
was relatively new to bankruptcy.
On appeal, the district court held that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in failing
to require full disgorgement of the fees. In its opinion, the district court noted that the
firm had touted its bankruptcy experience in its application for employment and in its
belated fee application. The court went on to note:
Even if the lawyers had been entirely new to bankruptcy practice, this would not
have served to excuse their violation of the Rules and Code. As the Second
Circuit noted in In re Arlan's Dept. Stores, Inc., "if [the firm] was incompetent in
bankruptcy matters, as it now urges, that fact either should have been brought to
the attention of the bankruptcy court when [the lawyer] sought the employment or
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[the lawyer] should have immediately and assiduously undertaken a study of
bankruptcy rules and procedures." 615 F.2d 925, 939 (2d Cir. 1979). 263 B.R. at
583.
(C)

Conflict of Interest Found where Creditors Committee Sought to Retain Wholly
Owned Subsidiary of Creditors' Committee Counsel (In re Greystone Holdings,
L.L.C., 305 B.R. 456 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003)
In Greystone, the United States Trustee objected to the Creditors' Committee

employment of financial advising firm that was a wholly owned subsidiary of the firm
that was serving as counsel to·the committee. The court held that the firm's ownership of
the financial advisor created a significant potential for conflict, since the ownership
structure and shared financial goals would prevent the law firm from objectively
reviewing the financial advisor's fee applications. The court stopped short, however of
adopting a per se rule against such arrangements.
(D)

Fee Application Issues (In re Condor Systems, Inc., Case Nos. 01-55472-JRG and 0155473-JRG (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2004»
Counsel for the Chapter 11 debtor filed its final fee application. On March 23, 2004, an
audit was ordered. The Court recognized that a professional person may be compensated
a reasonable amount for "actual, necessary services rendered" and reimbursement of
"actual, necessary expenses." Clearly, double-billing entries are disallowed. Further,
entries for correspondence with "vague characterizations of services performed with no
detail concerning the general subject matter" are not permitted. The court notes that,
generally, only one professional may charge for intra-office conferences and meetings.
The court took issue with paralegal activity that was, in essence, clerical services.
Clerical services are considered overhead and are not within the purview of Section
330(a) as an activity worthy of compensation.

(E)

A Specialized Store Selling Bankruptcy Forms and Advisin2 Debtors About
Exemption is the Unauthorized Practice of Law (Brooks v. United States Trustee,
Civil Action No. 5:04-352-JMH (E.D. Ky. Dec. 21, 2004»
Brooks owned a store that sold kits containing forms for filing bankruptcy. The United
States Trustee for Region 8 filed a motion with the bankruptcy court to compel
compliance with Section 110. The bankruptcy court held that Brooks "engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law" as a "bankruptcy petition preparer."
Brooks appealed to the district court. She asserted that she was not engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law. The court noted a "bankruptcy petition preparer" was a
person who prepared a bankruptcy filing for a fee. The bankruptcy court found the
Brooks had aided debtors by offering advice and actually filling in some forms. She was
compensated because she sold the forms for $88.90 even though the forms could be
downloaded for free or could be purchased at retail stores for $24.99. Furthermore, she
admitted she had assisted debtors with their exemption forms. The district court held that
the bankruptcy court's orders were not clearly erroneous.
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